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THE PROCEEDINGS

of

**The South Carolina
Historical Association**

2007

Robert Figueira and Stephen Lowe
Co-Editors

The South Carolina Historical Association
South Carolina Department of Archives and History
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The co-editors are especially indebted to those colleagues who reviewed papers for publication. Their comments and suggestions have greatly improved the quality of the papers presented here. Reviewers for the 2007 volume were:

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A Beleaguered but Proud Man: Alexander Salley and the Beginnings of the South Carolina Department of Archives and History*

Charles H. Lesser

IN 1905 ALEXANDER SAMUEL SALLEY, JR., became the first employee of the Historical Commission of South Carolina. In his application he wrote that he was “the only person in South Carolina who has adopted scientific historical research as a profession.” Referring to the state’s spectacular accumulation of government records, he added, “I want to work up those records. I expect to make practical studies among them the remainder of my life, and I would like to build my monument out of them.” For the next forty-four years Salley built his “monument” until he was forced to retire against his will at age seventy-eight in 1949.

In the 101 years since its modest beginnings in 1905 the South Carolina Department of Archives and History has had only five directors. Charles E. Lee, who was director during the department’s great expansion in the late 1960s, served for twenty-six years until he was seventy. I myself have been with the department in various capacities for more than thirty years, but I have no intention of staying on into old age. I will retire in a little more than two years, and I think of the history of the department that I am writing as a retirement gift to the archives. That draft history has now reached the end of the Salley era in seventy-five pages, but it is very much a work-in-progress, a project that can only be turned to when the press of day-to-day archival work allows. Aleck Salley stares down on you in our lobby and his bust is in our exhibit hall. This afternoon I want to try to give you a sense of the man and an overview of the almost soap-opera-like story of his retirement.

When I came here the forced retirement of the man we in the building still call “Mr. Salley” was something that was somehow talked about almost in a whisper. But it is an interesting tale of the changed nature of the historical profession, the personality of a very proud man, and South Carolina politics. It is also the story of two men of different generations who were both deeply committed to this state’s history. The other man, Robert L. Meriwether, chair of the University of South Carolina History Department and director of the South Caroliniana Library, led

*The work-in-progress from which this conference luncheon address was extracted contains full annotation. I would like to thank the many colleagues and friends who have been more than generous in helping me with this project.

a two-decade-long battle with Alexander Salley that ended in confrontations in the governor's office, Salley's retirement, and a revitalized department under the direction of a Ph.D. historian, J. Harold Easterby.

To understand the battle, we need to go back to the beginning. Karen Cox in her book, *Dixie's Daughters*, has recently argued that the United Daughters of the Confederacy were a significant factor in the development of Southern state archives. As in so many other aspects of its history, however, South Carolina's archival story is different. The creation of a separate state agency responsible for its government records had more to do with patrician gentlemen scholars than with ladies concerned with preserving a Southern viewpoint on what Mr. Salley himself called "the war of northern aggression and the reconstruction nightmare."

Salley came from that patrician historical world. A member of a prominent Orangeburg family, he had stayed in Charleston after graduating from the Citadel. He passed the bar (though he never really practiced law), was admitted to the elite St. Cecilia Society, and for six years ran the South Carolina Historical Society as secretary, treasurer, and first editor of the *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*. Salley and other members of the historical society, especially Mayor William Ashmead Courtenay and that great antiquarian scholar of South Carolina's lowcountry, Judge Henry Augustus Middleton Smith, led a campaign that resulted in the 1905 hiring of Salley to take charge of the state's archival records. Much of the motivation was jealousy of neighboring North Carolina's great set of printed colonial records. Salley was already known nationally in the emerging historical profession, then just beginning the transition to academics with doctorates. He was the key figure in bringing the 1913 annual meeting of the American Historical Association to South Carolina. For Salley "scientific history" centered on publishing accurate historical texts and demolishing myth. And he had a very high opinion of himself. As he put it in 1906, "I have, through my work, made my name a household word in the great libraries and historical organizations of the country."

Salley was widely known for his campaigns against myths and errors. He argued against the alleged Mecklenburg declaration of independence of 1775 in the *American Historical Review*. In a typical comment, he told a Winthrop College professor, "If you see anything in an encyclopaedia it is pretty apt to be wrong." In 1909 a satiric poem in the *Charleston News and Courier* entitled "The Doom of Art" made fun of his propensity. The artist who wasn't there when Sargent Jasper raised the flag at Fort Moultrie or did not with his own eyes see Rebecca Motte fire her own house was "doomed by Mr. Salley." The poem went on, "Mere fancy scenes. Suppress them, please; They've heard from Mr. Salley."

Salley thought the noted Charleston author John Bennett had written the poem and sent him an insulting postcard. Bennett then asked his friend Yates Snowden to intervene. Snowden, who had earlier briefly run a bookstore in Charleston in partnership with Salley and was now a history professor at the University of South Carolina, thought Salley “could fill a very useful role, but for his . . . stupendous self-conceit.” Playful references like “Alexander the Great Salley Jr,” “you—like the Pope and Aleck Salley—are infallible,” “sheer terror of Alex Salley’s white-hot scornful pen,” “almost as proud as Aleck Salley,” and “Salley-like, I can find a wrong date” spattered the correspondence between Bennett and Snowden over the years.

Alexander Salley’s personality sparked reactions like these, but they also grew out of the fact that for many years he was the authority on any number of questions about the history of his native state. Even when the campaign of academic historians and others to force his retirement reached its height in the late 1940s, he had his fervent advocates, including the author of the state’s multi-volume history, David Duncan Wallace, and Mary Simms Oliphant, granddaughter of William Gilmore Simms and then the grand dame of South Carolina history. Chapman J. Milling, who wrote a laudatory retirement spread for the Columbia Sunday newspaper magazine, told of his timidity when as a young physician he initially approached the man whose “favorite diet consisted of professional historians with an occasional amateur for an appetizer.” At least once Salley admitted that his own disposition suffered from “the D.A.R. and the pesky ancestor hunter asking stupid questions.” They were enough, he thought, “to sour” men “on mankind.”

The size of the task Salley faced was overwhelming and assistance almost nil. In 1939 he summed up, “I have been practically this department since its inception, 1 April 1905. For nineteen years I had no assistants, for fifteen more a stenographer and for the last three years one other assistant.” Located for three decades in the State House, Salley made solid legislative contacts that would serve him well. But those contacts did not result in an adequate, professionally educated staff. There was more than a little truth in his friend Judge Henry A. M. Smith’s frank critical comment to him early on that he feared Salley believed that all the work “can best be done by yourself.”

A strong opponent of Governor Coley Blease (1911–15), whom he called in a private letter “our freak governor,” Salley successfully defeated Blease’s efforts first to remove him and then, failing that, to abolish the Historical Commission. In 1915, as a result of the battle with Blease, the membership on the Historical Commission was changed so that a majority of its members were history department chairmen at state-supported colleges and universities rather than gubernatorial appointees. Almost

single-handedly, Salley obtained use of the ground floor of a proposed World War I memorial building as enlarged quarters for the Historical Commission and then saw to it that the building was constructed in the midst of the Great Depression.

Strong criticism of Salley's progress, especially in terms of publication, began in December 1930 when Robert L. Meriwether became chairman of the Historical Commission in place of an aged Confederate veteran and banker, Washington Augustus Clark. The University's South Caroliniana collection grew dramatically in the ensuing years under Meriwether's leadership, and Meriwether's campaign to reinvigorate the Historical Commission became in part a personal fight between the two men. Although it was not true, Salley came to believe that Meriwether wanted to cart the state's records off to the South Caroliniana Library and destroy his life's work.

In the early 1930s an executive committee of the commission consisting of Meriwether and two other academic historians seemed to be gaining control. Salley's publication of the state's colonial records had mostly consisted of a myriad of tiny volumes, the smallest of which had but sixteen pages. The full commission supported the executive committee in reforms, including the requirement that documentary editions have at least five hundred pages. The commission also thwarted Salley's efforts in the legislature to pack the commission with additional members. Salley's 1935 attempt to abolish the commission entirely and make his position appointive failed in the South Carolina Senate on the motion of J. Strom Thurmond, then a state senator. With only one dissenting vote that same year the commission forbade Salley from making any legislative initiative with regard to the commission without their approval. But the commission was not united behind Meriwether, and his campaign subsided for a decade.

Forbidden from changing the commission, Salley instead began to use his legislative contacts to render it powerless. A proviso to the appropriations act for fiscal year 1940/1941 removed the commission's power to annually elect its secretary and instead fixed his term of office "at six (6) years from the date of his last election, June 24, 1939." Three years later another proviso removed the commission's approval on hiring staff. These provisos assured that Salley could not be forced to retire until 1945 when he would be seventy-four, but as that year approached he again made use of the legislature. The appropriations act for fiscal year 1944/1945 lengthened his term to ten years from the 1939 election. This last extension eventually held in 1949 when Salley was seventy-eight, but not without dramatic further battles.

Salley had more room in the World War Memorial Building but no staff to process records. Early in 1940 Senator Edgar Brown, one of the most powerful state senators in South Carolina's long history as a legislative state, happened to go to

the stockroom of the Joint Committee of Printing and “by chance discovered” the original South Carolina Constitution of 1776. This discovery of important records still stashed in the State House resulted in Senator Brown obtaining additional staff for his friend Salley. Brown’s opponents, including Strom Thurmond, saw Brown as a leader of what they called the “Barnwell Ring.” Salley cultivated his ties to associates of that group, including hiring the sister of Richard Manning Jefferies, president pro tempore of the senate. The additional staff Brown obtained allowed Salley to make substantial progress in the 1940s in filing the mass of papers rescued from storerooms and the basement in the State House.

Meriwether and others were still unhappy over the slow rate of publication of the state’s records and the general lethargy in the commission’s programs as Salley aged. The 1945 act establishing a state retirement system provided that all persons who had “obtained the age of seventy shall be retired forthwith,” and even year-to-year exceptions were restricted to age seventy-two in 1949 when Salley would be seventy-eight. Oscar H. Doyle, an Anderson lawyer who had represented the American Legion on the Historical Commission since 1932, joined Meriwether in leading the fight to obtain new leadership for the commission. In December 1947 the commission unanimously declared that they intended to hire College of Charleston history professor J. Harold Easterby at the end of Salley’s legislatively-imposed term on 24 June 1949.

But Salley still was not ready to retire. In February 1948 the commission’s plans were almost derailed when Senator Brown’s Finance Committee added a proviso to the appropriations bill extending Salley’s term for two more years to 1951 when he would have been eighty. Days later a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to abolish the commission and devolve its powers on the state historian, the title that Salley now held. Most of the state’s historical community, including this association, sprang into action in a public campaign. Lillian Kibler, president of the association, joined the presidents of the South Carolina Historical Society and the Social Studies Department of the South Carolina Educational Association in issuing a statement deploring South Carolina’s slowness in publishing its colonial records and noting “the other types of work which are equally in need of attention.” While the House bill abolishing the commission was easily defeated in committee on 24 March 1948, the appropriations bill passed with its proviso extending Salley’s term intact and landed on Governor J. Strom Thurmond’s desk that same day. The state commander of the American Legion joined delegations from the Historical Commission, the Historical Society, the Historical Association, the American Association of University Women, and the South Carolina Educational Association in marching into the governor’s office to urge him to veto the proviso.

Thurmond, who had run for governor on an anti-“Barnwell-ring” platform, did veto the proviso. Citing the organizations supporting that action and stating that it was “unfair to compel retirement generally and then use the Appropriation Act to make exceptions,” Thurmond also diplomatically acknowledged Salley’s “signal service . . . to his state.” But the legislature almost overturned Thurmond’s veto, and skirmishes continued for the next year until the very day slated for Salley’s retirement. But even Senator Brown was tiring of the fight. After it was over he wrote that he had “been trying for years to get my dear friend, Alex Salley, to put on a better staff. . . . Alex does things in his own good way and during his tenure, never did get around to doing the job as it ought to have been done.” On the afternoon of 24 June 1949, J. Harold Easterby and his son sat in a drugstore across the street from the World War Memorial Building until they saw Salley leave. Easterby then went in, and Salley’s assistant Francis Marion Hutson handed him the keys. What Meriwether called “the Alexandrian epic” had come to an end.

The Friendship Nine and National Organizations: A Case Study in Mutual Aid

Mark Thomas Evans

ON 31 JANUARY 1961, the entire Rock Hill police department was on duty. Someone had tipped off the police force that more sit-ins were coming. The city, irritated with months of near ceaseless protest, responded decisively, immediately arresting the protestors—students of a local black junior college—as they entered the local McCro-ry’s five and dime store. Subsequent events brought the small South Carolina town into the national spotlight and initiated a new phase in the struggle for black equality.

Events in Rock Hill were set into motion one year earlier, on 1 February 1960, when sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina, initiated a chain reaction across the South. Sit-ins reached Rock Hill twelve days later and continued for the next year, culminating with the sit-in of 31 January. What distinguished this sit-in from the rest was the decision of nine of the ten protestors to choose a jail term over paying a fine. The Rock Hill demonstration—the case of the Friendship Nine—was the beginning of the nation-wide “jail, no bail” campaign. The saga of the Friendship Nine is nearly perfect corroborating evidence for a leading interpretation of the study of the civil rights movement. Success in the civil rights movement, according to this interpretation, cannot be attributed to a single catalyst, such as grassroots activism, a particular civil rights organization, or the federal government. Instead, eventual success reflected a synthesis of efforts among several players.¹

In 1960 and early 1961, national civil rights organizations lacked a significant presence in Rock Hill. On the organizational level, CORE and SCLC were minor players in the town, with no established offices and only individual representatives organizing protests. SNCC, still in its infancy in 1960, was a non-factor, and the NAACP had existed in Rock Hill for some time but played a limited roll in the fight against segregation outside of the courthouse.²

Not only were the civil rights organizations minor players prior to 1960, but black Rock Hillians also offered little resistance to the city’s system of segregation. The only significant pre-1960 action taken against Rock Hill’s social code occurred in the wake of a spontaneous demonstration by Addelene Austin White, who disembarked a public bus and walked home after being ordered to surrender her seat to a white person on 13 July 1957. Word of White’s protest quickly spread through Rock Hill’s black community and inspired a boycott of public transportation that drove the city’s bus line out of business within a year. However, the sense of purpose inspired by White

quickly died after the boycott proved successful, and the black citizens of Rock Hill again turned complacent until the Greensboro protest on 12 February 1960.

From initial protests in the days following the Greensboro sit-ins until the eve of the Friendship Nine's sit-in, Rock Hill's battle for equality was almost entirely a grassroots operation, with Friendship Junior College as the epicenter. In the wake of the Greensboro movement, the student body of this small black college mobilized to renew the seemingly stagnant fight in Rock Hill. While only 224 strong, the Friendship students, under the leadership of Arthur Hamm, Martin Johnson, Abe Plummer, and John Moore, launched a campaign of sit-ins, boycotts, and picket lines.³

The students received only guidance in conducting their early demonstrations. The Reverend Cecil A. Ivory, president of the local NAACP chapter, was the first to offer assistance. Ivory cannot truly be viewed as an NAACP representative, however. According to Lynn Willoughby, "Ivory chose not to work within the NAACP because that organization was not yet comfortable using direct action to achieve integration."⁴ Instead of accepting the organization's policy of integration through litigation, Ivory assumed a more active role, advising the Friendship students in civil disobedience techniques and engaging in several demonstrations himself. After a surge of sit-ins in February and March of 1960, Ivory organized a boycott of eight stores that practiced racial discrimination.⁵ During this boycott, Ivory intentionally provoked his arrest on "several occasions" by refusing to obey police officers' orders.⁶ Images of an incarcerated respected community member, who was permanently confined to a wheelchair after an accident, briefly caught the media's attention.

The Greensboro sit-ins succeeded through peaceful resistance, but the form the Rock Hill sit-ins would assume was not yet determined. The Friendship students met secretly on campus and organized the Friendly Student Civic Committee. Most of the Friendship students were members of CORE or the NAACP and were proponents of peaceful protest.⁷ Despite their affiliations with national organizations and their mentor's position with the NAACP, the students were adamant that their work was independent of these organizations' influences. During the February 12 sit-ins, one of the student leaders told a reporter for the *Evening Herald* that the group was not connected with CORE.⁸ After some discussion, the students collectively decided to follow the model of the Greensboro Four by dressing nicely, being polite, saying little, refraining from all forms of violence, and refusing to retaliate if and when attacked.⁹ Once the decisions were made as to when and how to protest, CORE dispatched James T. McCain, a field secretary, to train the students in nonviolent practices. While McCain played an important role in training and educating the Friendship students, the planning and execution of the sit-ins were entirely the students' doing.¹⁰

The *Evening Herald's* handling of the issue notes the frequency of the sit-ins under the Friendly Student Civic Committee. The initial February sit-ins received front page treatment, often with detailed descriptions of the events. However, as the months passed and the sit-ins grew in frequency and intensity, they lost their novelty and became increasingly marginalized, moved to the interior pages of the newspaper and usually mentioned only as part of a topical summary of events.

As the Rock Hill protests wore on and the Friendship students proved their dedication, additional national civil rights organizations began to commit resources to the Rock Hill cause. One such resource was Tom Gaither, a CORE field secretary. Gaither first became involved with CORE as a student at Claflin College in Orangeburg, South Carolina, where he led a string of protests in the spring of 1960. After graduating from Claflin, he became a CORE field secretary and was promptly sent to Rock Hill. His decision to join CORE full-time stemmed from a disapproval of what he called the "poor leadership" and "apathetic attitude" displayed by the students of black colleges in South Carolina.¹¹ From his new position, Gaither hoped to harness the momentum in Rock Hill and turn the local struggle into one of greater import. The vehicle by which the Rock Hill fight would become a national issue was a jail-in. Gaither hoped a jail-in in Rock Hill would set off a chain reaction similar to the one that followed the Greensboro sit-ins.

CORE latched on to Gaither's plan. As a young organization, CORE did not have the resources to pay one-hundred dollar fines every time a student was arrested. Under Gaither's plan, CORE would save large sums of money if students committed to serving their jail terms. More importantly, CORE realized that the stories, images, and controversy surrounding students doing jail time for minor offenses such as sitting at a segregated lunch counter would inevitably attract national media attention; the CORE leadership hoped the coverage would invoke reaction from apathetic Northerners.¹²

Gaither's first action upon assuming the CORE leadership at Friendship was to organize a CORE-sponsored action workshop to further the students' training. In order to conceal the plans and protect the participants, CORE held the meeting at distant Claflin College from 9 to 11 December 1960.¹³ It was in Orangeburg that the Friendship student leadership first learned of jail-ins. Previously, all students arrested during sit-ins had their fines paid by the NAACP or the black community, who took up collections for the cause.¹⁴ Newly inspired, the students returned to Rock Hill and continued their demonstrations. In one account of his activities in Rock Hill, Gaither writes, "Immediately after the workshop a really intensified program of sit-ins and picketing got under way in Rock Hill."¹⁵

Soon after their return, Gaither began recruiting students to involve themselves in the jail-in. One of his early recruits was John Gaines, who in turn began to

recruit his friends. Gaines was responsible for recruiting most of the eight additional students who participated in the sit-in that led to the jail-in.¹⁶ In the end, Willie McCleod, Charles Taylor, James Wells, Clarence Graham, David Williamson, Robert McCullough, Mack Cartier Workman, Willie Massey, Gaines, and Gaither were arrested. All but Taylor and Gaither were students from Rock Hill. Their experiences in the civil rights movement ranged from veteran, in the case of Gaines and Gaither, to the novice, Williamson, whose involvement was limited to picket lines before this demonstration.¹⁷

On 31 January 1961, the students entered the McCrory's five and dime on Main Street shortly before 11:30 in the morning to find police officers waiting for them. They were immediately told to leave by the manager; when they sat down anyway, they were arrested.¹⁸ The next day, the ten sit-in participants stood before Judge Billy Hayes with Ernest A. Finney, Jr. as counsel. When Judge Hayes asked the defendants which option they chose—a one-hundred dollar fine per person or thirty days in jail—Finney, an influential African American lawyer, spoke for the group: “They say they’ll go to jail before they give you a dime.”¹⁹ In Gaither’s own words:

Surprise and shock filled the courtroom when it became known that we had chosen to be jailed-in. The only thing they had to beat us over the head with was a threat of sending us to jail. So we disarmed them by using the only weapon we had left—jail without bail. It was the only practical thing we could do. It upset them considerably.²⁰

The following day, the Friendship Nine were sent to the York County Prison Farm to begin their sentence. Tom Gaither placed his one phone call to the SNCC office in Atlanta, announcing what had happened. SNCC had supported the jail-in idea for a long time, but had never sponsored one.²¹ Gaither knew this, and expected SNCC to go public with the news.

SNCC surpassed Gaither’s expectations. At a steering committee meeting, SNCC decided to send four of its sit-in veterans to Rock Hill to join the Friendship Nine in prison. Charles Sherrod, Charles Jones, Diane Nash, and Ruby Doris Smith were arrested on 7 February. SNCC purposely sent high profile individuals to Rock Hill in order to attract national attention, but once they were in the spotlight, the SNCC workers made the local activists the focus. Speaking to a reporter after the trial, one of the SNCC members credited the Friendship Nine with inspiring their actions.²² They also used their prestige to elevate the situation in Rock Hill, telling reporters, “[We] hope this will bring large numbers of demonstrators to Rock Hill to fill the jails and thus increase the pressure for desegregation of luncheon counters in the South.”²³

SNCC's pleas found sympathetic ears; demonstrators from places like Nashville, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C. descended on Rock Hill, where they orchestrated marches to visit the Friendship Nine, performed "kneel-ins" in segregated churches, held rallies, and joined the ongoing sit-ins. The dramatic increase in activity caught media attention outside of Rock Hill. First, reporters from Charlotte recorded footage of demonstrators performing a kneel-in at the First Presbyterian Church.²⁴ Then, national media syndicates recorded the massive caravan of some three- or four-hundred people who exploited the prison farm's visitation hours. Soon, the story of the Friendship Nine was reproduced in black national publications such as *The Afro-American* and mainstream publications such as *Harper's* and *The Nation*. During her internment, Diane Nash wrote a letter to the editor of Rock Hill's *Evening Herald* explaining the cause; the letter was reprinted in newspapers across the nation, including the *New York Times*.

SNCC's actions in Rock Hill had the desired effect beginning in February when eighty students from various black colleges in Atlanta opted for jail after being arrested for demonstrating.²⁵ In all, some one-hundred jail-ins were reported across the nation in the month of February, 1961.²⁶

Writing in 1973, August Meier and Elliot Rudwick reflected on the success of the Rock Hill sit-ins and, more importantly, the "jail-no bail" campaign launched by the Friendship Nine:

The Rock Hill jail-in did not desegregate the lunch counters, but in the history of the Southern movement and CORE, it was an event of considerable significance. . . . Once Gaither and the others were released CORE exploited their celebrity status. . . . [T]he Rock Hill campaign also provided a sense of momentum to a movement that was slowing down. It furnished the inspiration for student jail-ins in Lynchburg and Atlanta. . . . Most important, Rock Hill was the model for the jail-in strategy of the Freedom Rides of 1961, and several subsequent major campaigns which CORE conducted in the South.²⁷

Indeed, the Friendship Nine were responsible for energizing a weak local protest and for rejuvenating the nationwide student movement, but their success only came as a result of the cooperation between the Friendship Nine, the NAACP, SNCC, and CORE. This synergy of grassroots activism and national organization clout resulted in a complete force, one with energy and manpower from below and experience, logistical know-how, and resources from above.

The complex narrative of the Friendship Nine can be drastically simplified to show this collaboration. An outside influence, the Greensboro Four, inspired the students at Friendship Junior College. An experienced mentor and role model, Reverend Ivory, gave the Friendship students the tools to fight injustices in Rock Hill. Tom Gaither and CORE turned small-scale demonstrations into those capable of attracting attention, and the participation of SNCC made the events in Rock Hill national news.

Today, Rock Hillians simplify the complex story of the Friendship Nine to only the nine men involved. This past 31 January marked the forty-fifth anniversary of the arrests that led to the nation's first jail-ins. An article in the Rock Hill *Herald* commemorating the anniversary mentioned SNCC only once—an erroneous sentence implying that SNCC sent members to Rock Hill only after the Friendship Nine's story received national coverage.²⁸ A true appreciation for the significance of the Friendship Nine, however, requires an understanding of their part in a much larger apparatus.

NOTES

1. This interpretation is supported in part by various works, including: Charles M. Payne, *I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), and Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988).
2. The NAACP's Rock Hill branch was established in 1927 and reorganized in 1933.
3. Letter from Martin L. Johnson to Dorothy Amick, authoress of "The Direct Action by Rock Hill Negroes in Protest Against Segregation, 1957–1962," 14 July 1969. Arthur Hamm is not mentioned in the letter, but is mentioned in several other sources, including Lynn Willoughby's *The "Good Town" Does Well: Rock Hill, S.C., 1852–2002*.
4. Lynn Willoughby, *The "Good Town" Does Well: Rock Hill, S.C., 1852–2002* (Orangeburg: Written in Stone, 2002), 214.
5. *Evening Herald*, 18 March 1960. Rock Hill, SC.
6. Willoughby, 216.
7. Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 31–32.
8. *Evening Herald*, 12 February 1960.
9. Willoughby, 216.
10. Tom Gaither, *Jailed-In* (New York: CORE, 1961), 3.
11. August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, *CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942–1968* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 117.

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12. Meier and Rudwick, 117.
 13. Gaither, 4.
 14. David Williamson, Jr., interview with author, 3 February 2006.
 15. Gaither, 4.
 16. Willoughby, 219. Charles Taylor did not serve jail time because he elected to pay the fine after being arrested.
 17. Williamson Interview.
 18. *Evening Herald*, 31 January 1961.
 19. Williamson interview.
 20. James Peck, *Freedom Ride* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962), 103.
 21. Meier and Rudwick, 119. There is no record of the origination of the jail-in concept, but several historians and Gaither note that SNCC had been attracted to it for an undefined period of time.
 22. *Evening Herald*, 7 February 1961.
 23. *Charlotte Observer*, 8 February 1961.
 24. *Evening Herald*, 13 February 1961.
 25. Howard Zinn, *SNCC: The New Abolitionists* (Boston; Beacon Press, 1964), 39.
 26. Peck, 94.
 27. Meier and Rudwick, 119.
 28. *The Herald*, 31 January 2006. Rock Hill, SC.

Reinterpreting South Carolina History: The South Carolina Negro Writers' Project, 1936–1937

Jody H. Graichen

It would only be fair to the reader to say frankly in advance that the attitude of any person toward this story will be distinctly influenced by his theories of the Negro race. – W.E.B. Du Bois, 1935'

FROM 1936–1937 THE SOUTH CAROLINA NEGRO WRITERS' PROJECT provided employment opportunities for blacks under the auspices of the Works Progress Administration's Federal Writers' Project. The project employed ten writers and gave them license to document the history of blacks in the state in their own words. The goal was to produce a Negro Guide to South Carolina, and though it was never published because the project folded after sixteen months, the work fits into larger national trends in black history pioneered by the writings of black historians W.E.B. Du Bois and Carter G. Woodson who, along with their academic protégés, attempted to make the study of black history more mainstream for black students and liberal whites. This essay will discuss two themes evident in the project: how the South Carolina Negro Writers' Project was representative of ways in which black Americans attempted to revise their history and how that reinterpretation was relevant to contemporary issues. In doing so, it will address specific topics in the draft of the Negro Guide and how those topics appeared in the published state guide. To place the Negro Writers' Project in context, this essay will first discuss contemporary black historians, the rise of academic black history programs, and the New Deal.

In 1941, the Federal Writers' Project published *South Carolina – A Guide to the Palmetto State* which incorporated little of the text prepared by the Negro Writers' Project. Because white editors ultimately decided what black history to include in the book, the guide was unrepresentative of the state as a whole and disregarded legitimate attempts to reinterpret black history. The South Carolina Negro Writers' Project has not been examined since the Federal Writers' Project folded and drafts were deposited at the University of South Carolina. This New Deal initiative was part of a larger movement toward identifying with black culture and history, but because it has not been thoroughly studied to date, an important segment of the state's history has been overlooked for nearly seventy years. Discussing the Negro Writers' Project

in the context of larger advances for blacks in the early twentieth century offers a glimpse of how black South Carolinians viewed their place in the state's history. A discussion of the twin themes of revision and relevance and how they are reflected in the writings of black historians W.E.B. Du Bois and Carter G. Woodson will serve as a contextual basis for the motives of black writers in South Carolina.

The early decades of the twentieth century witnessed a discovery in scholarly appreciation for black history and culture and at the helm of this movement was W.E.B. Du Bois. Interest in black Americans rose among blacks and some whites and stemmed from various sources: racism at home and abroad during World War I, the establishment of black history programs in colleges, conflicting interpretations of the role of blacks in Reconstruction, and the discovery of black folklore by white historians and sociologists. A select but vocal group of leading white historians taught and wrote of a one-dimensional Reconstruction Era that sympathized with southern whites and portrayed submissive blacks.² In response, Du Bois refuted these claims and urged blacks to interpret their own history. As the editor of *The Crisis*, the periodical produced by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Du Bois reached a growing audience of middle-class blacks. His reinterpretation of black history was strongest in his *Black Reconstruction in America*, developed between 1909 and 1935, where he argued that the only histories of Reconstruction written at the time were produced by "passionate believers in the inferiority of the Negro."³

Like Du Bois, Carter G. Woodson worked to promote black pride and a more even-handed account of black history. In 1915, Woodson established the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History to educate the black public of their historical contributions to society. In 1935, Woodson wrote *The Story of the Negro Retold* to teach high school students the true history of blacks in the United States. Claiming history texts ignored blacks to that point, Woodson's goal in this work was to teach black youths about their history in the hopes that they would ultimately think for themselves rather than let others think and act for them.⁴ This particular work complemented Du Bois' more extreme revisionist slant by teaching blacks of the contemporary lessons to be learned from history. In their writings, Du Bois and Woodson introduced blacks to many aspects of their own culture, reaffirmed beliefs that blacks held about their rich and worthwhile past, and instilled a sense of hope for the future.

These nationally-known historians helped spark a trend in new interpretations of black history that trickled to non-academic arenas and their publications and notoriety lent credence to their larger goals of advancing black culture, education, and appreciation. Academic efforts at Southern and Fisk Universities focused

on documenting the history of black Americans in the form of ex-slave narratives. These schools instituted programs to interview former slaves in an effort to record the experience of slavery while those who experienced it were still living. These particular projects also cultivated interest in black culture among liberal white writers and revisionist historians and introduced scholars of both races to the unique and varied experiences of blacks living in the South before 1865. In South Carolina, several white writers conducted similar interviews and published works written in dialect that fed the growing interest among whites in black culture. However, as similar as these efforts appeared to those of black writers, there existed a noticeable difference in the accounts of black history written by whites. The academic accuracy of local histories, the tone, and the attention to a lower economic class as opposed to the black middle-class that black writers concentrated on, all combined to create an entirely different approach to black history in the South and specifically South Carolina.⁵

While black historians stressed a need for more representative accounts of black history, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Works Progress Administration (WPA) provided an outlet for unemployed writers to document their state's history for a series of guidebooks under the Federal Writers' Project.⁶ Federal Writers' Project workers also collected ex-slave narratives, blending earlier academic pursuits of blacks with the interest in black folklore expressed by whites. National Director of the Federal Writers' Project Henry Alsberg was determined to include black Americans in both drafting the guidebooks and in the written text, and in 1936 he established the Office of Negro Affairs headed by poet and Howard University professor Sterling Brown. Brown hoped to make the guides "readable and appealing to intelligent, liberal Americans of whatever race," and in his capacity as Editor of Negro Affairs, he worked to ensure that blacks were hired to work on guides and that black history was given fair attention within them, a problem more common in the southern states. At the urging of Alsberg, the South Carolina Writers' Project, directed by Mabel Montgomery, established a separate Negro Writers' Project in January of 1936 to employ black writers.⁷

South Carolina's black writers incorporated growing academic trends by attempting to correct misconceptions about black history and instill pride for black contributions. From January 1936 to July 1937, ten black writers drafted essays and biographical sketches for the proposed Negro Guide to South Carolina. The guide was never published, but a limited amount of the work was incorporated into one chapter entitled "The Negro" in the 1941 South Carolina guide.⁸ The essays the black writers prepared followed contemporary thought among black historians to reinterpret the history of blacks in America. With support from Alsberg and Brown, black

WPA writers exercised creative license in their interpretations of black history and culture. For South Carolina's black writers, this license resulted in interpretive essays on blacks in the state under slavery, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow.

Led by Elise Ford Jenkins, a black Columbia woman, nine men and women collected information through personal interviews and sources at segregated black libraries in an attempt to tell the history of blacks in the state on their own terms. Negro Writers' Project writers were Samuel Addison, Jr., Lillian Buchanan, Eva Fitchett, Mildred Hare, Augustus Ladson, Laura Middleton, Hattie Mobley, Robert Nelson, and Simmie Smith.⁹ Jenkins, educated at Benedict College, Fisk University, the Hampton Institute, and South Carolina State College, taught in Columbia schools and maintained an office for the Negro Writers' Project at Benedict College in Columbia. Her husband and brother-in-law were prominent physicians in Columbia and established the city's first hospital for blacks. As supervisor of the Negro Writers' Project, Jenkins edited material prepared by the black writers, worked with her staff to prepare an outline and index for the guide, and reported directly to State Director Mabel Montgomery. In choosing what topics to include in the guide, Jenkins concentrated most heavily on state history, with 1865 acting as a focal point, and also on guide material for travelers, information critical for blacks traveling through the Jim Crow South. At the urging of Brown and the Office of Negro Affairs, Jenkins shifted her focus to more contemporary accounts of black life in the state, although because the project was short-lived most material documented the original focus on historical events. Throughout her tenure as supervisor for the Negro Writers' Project, Jenkins adhered to the project's goal of "affording a very valuable contribution to the life and history of the Negro race in South Carolina."¹⁰

Representative of the academic direction Du Bois and Woodson initiated, the South Carolina's Negro Writers' Project chose revision and relevance as prevailing themes within the proposed Negro Guide. One essay written by Mildred Hare entitled "Slavery of the Negro in South Carolina" stressed the lengths to which slaves went to be educated. While the published 1941 guide hardly mentioned education for slaves, Hare's essay accentuated its importance in gaining freedom from white slaveholders. "Realizing the value of learning as a means of escape, and having a longing for it too because it was forbidden, many slaves continued their education under adverse circumstances. Things went on with the slaves snatching a little knowledge here and there until the Reconstruction period."¹¹ This essay not only stressed education as desirable for blacks, it emphasized the fact that blacks were not merely contented slaves as earlier historians taught and white writers implied in the published guide. While offering this reinterpretation of black education, Hare also addressed the

importance of blacks gaining an education, a critical and controversial belief in the 1930s South.

In addition to reinterpreting black history in the state, the Negro Writers' Project writers made a concerted effort to stress the importance of utilizing this history in everyday life by discussing contemporary issues and urging blacks and whites to work cooperatively during the hardships of the Depression. One essay entitled "Negro Education in South Carolina" took whites to task for their indifference to inadequate educational standards for blacks in the state, though it also mentioned a willingness from some white leaders to help improve education for blacks. Quoting Eleanor Roosevelt and including startling statistics, the author stated, "considerable progress in the education of the Negro in South Carolina has been made in recent years, but today we find conditions rather deplorable." The author went on to say that conditions were so bad because whites did not know the real situation in black schools.¹²

Another essay, written by outside consultant O.D. Reid and entitled "The Economic Future of the Negro in South Carolina," revealed the grim conditions blacks faced in the 1930s. Reid claimed that black farmers failed to adjust to changing economic conditions during the Depression, thus resulting in their majority status as poor tenant farmers and sharecroppers. However, he also considered the attitudes of white landlords in his essay, and blamed both blacks and whites for the state's stagnant economy.¹³ While earlier essays positively discussed black history in the state, the goal of these two in particular again reflected the need for blacks and whites to organize and work cooperatively. Additional contemporary themes included a survey of black literature and authors, significant black educators, and travel information including accommodations, theaters, and restaurants that welcomed a black clientele.¹⁴

The Negro Writers' Project also made efforts to impart the proud heritage and noteworthy accomplishments of South Carolina blacks by including biographical sketches on prominent black leaders. These biographies focused predominantly on contemporary figures but they included many Reconstruction politicians as well. The black writers collected the majority of their biographical information from the subjects themselves, and all nine workers contributed to the biographical sketches. Educators, artisans and politicians received the most attention from the black writers, with religious leaders and heroic slaves complimenting the more contemporary information. The Negro Writers' Project writers touted national leader Mary McLeod Bethune as the greatest educator of her day; teacher Celia Dial Saxon as "the most beloved and outstanding Negro woman in all of South Carolina;" and college president Dr. John J. Starks as a man who, "in spite of handicaps due to racial identity,"

accomplished “enviable achievements.”¹⁵ Reconstruction politicians Francis L. Cardoza, Thomas Ezekial Miller, and Beverly Nash received praise for their legislative accomplishments. Several of the Reconstruction politicians the black writers included were also mentioned in Du Bois’ *Black Reconstruction in America*, thus supporting their merit as national, rather than simply local, figures. These biographies celebrated the accomplishments of South Carolina blacks, many of whom left the state to achieve their goals. Instilling pride and documenting success, the Negro Writers’ Project writers intended to inspire their audience with these biographies.

Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Negro Writers’ Project was the collection and organization of material for the Negro Guide. Evidence of this work was shown in the “Index for the Negro Guide Book” which outlined ten separate sections of material: “The Economic Future of the Negro in South Carolina,” biographies, institutions, organizations, churches and religious organizations, music, folklore, folkways, miscellaneous, and “Negro Material by Whites.”¹⁶ The Negro Writers’ Project staff noted biographies for sixteen notable blacks in South Carolina, though they eventually added many more, and miscellaneous topics included “Education of the Negro in Charleston Prior to the Civil War,” “Memorable Scenes of the Coast,” and “Inscription on Monument to Slaves in Fort Mill.” “Negro Material by Whites” included essays that white writers prepared on topics such as superstition, folk customs, and religious institutions, and each of these essays required Jenkins’s approval.¹⁷ Though Jenkins and the black writers devised an index and outline for their guide, they only completed selected works before the Negro Writers’ Project folded in 1937. The essays the Negro Writers’ Project completed discussed slavery, politics, rural life, emancipation, and slave insurrections, in addition to business ventures, educational pursuits, and ministerial work by South Carolina blacks. These essays presented a strikingly different portrayal of black life than the official 1941 guide’s brief essay entitled “The Negro.”

The essays prepared by the black writers addressed both historic and contemporary issues faced by blacks in the state, although their intended audience remained questionable, no doubt influenced by state office staff. Although the Negro Writers’ Project aimed for a black audience, it contended with white supervisors, the possibility of white readership, and funding recommendations from a white-run state office. Perhaps due to these factors, several Negro Writers’ Project essays addressed a white audience rather than a black one. One essay by Robert Nelson entitled “Early Negro Life in the South Carolina Low Country” referred to black butlers as being loyal and taking great pride in copying the sayings of their masters. The same essay discussed friendly relations between blacks and whites in Charleston and stated that “nearly all

of the slaves had proved their love for their masters by staying at home during the four years of the war.”¹⁸ An essay by Mildred Hare entitled “The Old Slave Market” stated that “unfortunately the word ‘slave’ was given to the African . . . but the condition of the southern slave was the best of any peasantry in the world.”¹⁹ Even if these ideas were in any way true, they spoke more to a nostalgic white audience than to a black audience only seventy years removed from slavery.

When the Negro Writers’ Project folded in 1937 because of employment reductions, the white staff for the South Carolina Writers’ Project was left with the work prepared by the ten black writers. Rather than publish the work as the intended separate guide or weave the essays and biographical sketches into the state guide, Mabel Montgomery chose to have white writers speak for blacks and draft new material. This eventually became the chapter entitled “The Negro.” This decision eliminated any legitimate black representation in the state guide and skewed the image of life in the state. Montgomery’s white writers simply did not appreciate or represent the perspective of South Carolina blacks, and therefore they did not successfully interpret black history.

In their efforts to represent blacks, white South Carolina writers left much to be desired. Memos from Washington, D.C. claimed the material sent by South Carolina, though enormous in volume, was virtually worthless. The Office of Negro Affairs commented that “after devoting so much space to the ‘War Between the States,’ Reconstruction, Wade Hampton and his Red Shirts, and their connection with Negroes, naturally there was not wordage enough to present a realistic picture of the Negroes in South Carolina.”²⁰ Additional editorial comments from the Office of Negro Affairs suggested that some of the redundant passages about Reconstruction be replaced with information concerning black South Carolinians, as they represented a large portion of the population. In their narrow focus on Reconstruction, white writers did not follow the trends set by Du Bois and Woodson, but rather expressed a detached perspective of blacks in the state. Furthermore, Alsberg requested that Montgomery “bring the Negro population into the contemporary scene whenever possible,” and noted that any outstanding contributions to the community should be mentioned.²¹ Montgomery and her staff ignored this request.

White writers perverted and misinterpreted the documented black voice within the published guide and in doing so exposed social viewpoints that South Carolina blacks and whites held in direct opposition. The issue of slave riots in particular reflected how both races accepted historical events differently. In a discussion of a slave uprising at Stono in 1739, the published guide reported from the viewpoint of Lieutenant Governor Bull, referring to murderous rebel slaves executed for their

mischievous deeds. Alternatively, if the guide included the Negro Writers' Project passage on the same event, black and white audiences would have encountered the following observation: "There must have been some substantial cause for this feeling of hatred evinced by so many Negroes toward their masters. The Negro slaves were human, and only a spark was needed to set such headed tinder to flames."²² Other omissions further proved to discredit black material written by whites. The 1941 guide reduced entire essays the black writers produced to mere sentences. Editors transformed two essays on the 1822 Denmark Vesey insurrection to six sentences in the guide, abridged an essay that highlighted the oldest continuous black-owned lumber manufacturing operation in the South to two sentences on the J.J. Sulton Lumber Company in Orangeburg, and shortened an essay entitled "The Origin of the Color Line in Charleston" to two paragraphs. These changes resulted in fitting the black experience in South Carolina neatly within just ten pages. Though state officials commended the Writers' Project for their treatment of blacks in the state guide, the abbreviated text left holes in the long and distinguished history of black South Carolinians, and clearly privileged the information white writers and editors thought most important.

Black history seen through white eyes could not and did not accurately convey the personal investment black writers expressed in their own words. Evident in the comments from the Office of Negro Affairs, the content of the South Carolina guide lacked depth without the work of the black writers. The information on South Carolina's black residents published in the guide described blacks negatively through their past. The severe editing of material prepared for the Negro Writers' Project prevented blacks' efforts to revise their history and discuss its relevance in the present day. However, it is clear from the Negro Writers' Project drafts that South Carolina blacks were not only familiar with larger trends in writing black history, they were directly in tune with the goals of Du Bois and Woodson, and therefore participants in the revisionist movement at large.

Efforts to reinterpret state history from the perspective of blacks were intended to educate readers and encourage future achievements. The larger trends of revision and relevance acted as a starting point for blacks to move toward a more equal footing with their white counterparts. Reinterpretations of slavery and Reconstruction, though bold at the time, could have strengthened the organizational structure of blacks in America and led to increased interest and research among black students. However, the trends orchestrated by historians like Du Bois and Woodson were not only ignored in state guides, but suppressed. Because this manuscript was never published, the writers' progressive approach to history was overlooked and forgotten.

Additionally, the fact that the South Carolina Negro Writers' Project failed might speak louder than any other Negro Guide could have at the time in that it testifies to the racial dynamics of 1930s South Carolina.

NOTES

1. W.E.B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America* (West Hanover, MA: Halliday Lithograph Corporation, 1935) authors' introduction to the reader. This work originated in essay form in the *American Historical Review*, 1909.
2. Norman Yetman, "The Background of the Slave Narrative Collection," *American Quarterly* 19 (Autumn 1967): 534–53. Yetman argues that this interest provided the basis for the collection of ex-slave narratives prior to a similar narrative collection undertaken by the Works Progress Administration and the Federal Writers' Project. In Du Bois' *Black Reconstruction in America*, the author discusses white academic treatment of black history in a chapter entitled "The Propaganda of History." On pages 713–19, Du Bois refers to the teachings of John W. Burgess and William A. Dunning at Columbia University, and a similarly oriented program at Johns Hopkins University. Du Bois states that the Columbia school of historians issued sixteen studies of Reconstruction in the Southern states between 1895 and 1935 that were based upon sympathy with the South, ridicule and contempt for blacks, and a prejudiced attitude toward the North. Today these views on Reconstruction are recognized as highly inaccurate in the majority of the scholarly community. August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, *Black History and the Historical Profession, 1915–1980* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 3–7, 73–98. In their introduction Meier and Rudwick state their goal to produce a historiographical text examining the process by which black history transitioned from a "Jim Crow specialty ignored by the nearly the entire profession" to a legitimate and popular segment of the history profession. Later the authors state that while the extreme opinions of Columbia's faculty did not dominate the views of white historians, black participation in the field was miniscule.
3. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 381.
4. Carter G. Woodson, *The Story of the Negro Retold* (Washington D.C.: Associate Publishers Inc., 1935), 257–92.
5. Yetman, "The Background of the Slave Narrative Collection," 541–43. South Carolina writers such as E.C.L. Adams and Julia Peterkin wrote of black folk life in the state emphasizing the daily routines, conversations, and concerns of blacks. In works like *Congaree Sketches*, Adams wrote short stories in black dialect about blacks living in the Columbia area. A review of the work stated that Adams did not use sociology, but rather included "just the record of what this certain type of Negro thinks about, talks about, and how he does both." (E.C.L. Adams Papers, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, *The State*, 5 June 1927.) In *Roll, Jordan, Roll*, Peterkin used ex-slave narratives to link white customs to those of South Carolina blacks. Peterkin stated that with generations of contact with Negroes behind them, white southerners showed the influence of black ways and ideas. "They are infected with the Negro wish to please, the wish to live with a minimum of labor, and the willingness to discard ambition for contentment and enjoyment." Julia Peterkin, *Roll, Jordan, Roll* (Thirty Bedford Square, London: Jonathan Cape, 1934), 19.

6. For detailed background information on the New Deal and the WPA, see William F. McDonald, *Federal Relief Administration and the Arts* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1969). In his introduction, McDonald writes that “Federal One” which included the Federal Arts, Theater, Writers’ and Music Projects, grew from two ideas: “that in time of need the artist, no less than the manual worker, is entitled to employment as an artist at the public expense, and that the arts, no less than business, agriculture, and labor, are and should be the immediate concern of the ideal commonwealth.” Information regarding the New Deal that is specific to South Carolina can be found in Jack Irby Hayes, Jr., *South Carolina and the New Deal* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2001). For general information on South Carolina blacks in the 1930s see I.A. Newby, *Black Carolinians* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1973) and Edwin D. Hoffman, “The Genesis of the Modern Movement for Equal Rights in South Carolina, 1930–1939,” *The Journal of Negro History* 44(4): 346–69.

7. Jerrold Hirsch, *Portrait of America: A Cultural History of the Federal Writers’ Project* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 23–26; Jerre Mangione, *The Dream and the Deal* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), 53–59; Monty Penkower, *The Federal Writers’ Project: A Study in Government Patronage of the Arts* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 18–19; Harvard Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks: the Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978); Records of the NAACP, Roll 8 Part 10, letter of 22 December 1937 from Sterling Brown to Walter White. WPA Records, Record Group 69, Administrative Correspondence, Box 42, “Employment.” Mabel Montgomery was an upper-class white woman from Marion County, South Carolina and she directed the state writers’ project from 1935–1941. Montgomery held a degree from Winthrop College, and her professional background included teaching, writing for several newspapers, working in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and preparing material for the state’s adult education program. Under her tutelage, seventy-six writers prepared essays and driving tours for *South Carolina – A Guide to the Palmetto State* (Mabel Montgomery Papers, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina).

8. Federal Writers’ Project, *South Carolina – A Guide to the Palmetto State* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1941), 45–54.

9. The “List of Negro Workers on Federal Writers’ Projects” can be found in the WPA Index, Cabinet K, Drawer 1, Folder 21 (hereafter noted K-1-21), Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina. 1939 *Columbia City Directory*, (Richmond, VA: Hill Directory Co., Inc.); 1936 *Charleston City Directory*, (Charleston, SC: Baldwin Directory Co., Inc.) Though it remains unclear whether or not the NWP writers knew each other prior to working on the Negro Guide, according to South Carolina State University’s *Catalog and Announcements*, Mildred Hare and Augustus Ladson attended the Adult Teachers Summer School at SCSU in 1935. Eva Fitchett attended Summer School at SCSU in 1934 and Elise Jenkins attended in 1929 and again in 1938; Jenkins could have sought employees for the Negro Writers’ Project at SCSU based upon her experience there in 1929.

10. Personal interview with Dr. Noble and Carol Cooper, son-in-law and daughter of Elise Ford Jenkins, 12 November 2004; “D.K. Jenkins Named to Replace Brother as Superintendent of Waverly Hospital,” *The Palmetto Leader*, Columbia, SC 18 January 1936; WPA Records, Record Group 69, Administrative Correspondence, Box 42, “Instructions to Negro Field Workers,” 10 March 1936.

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11. WPA Index, "Slavery of the Southern Negro in South Carolina," K-1-2, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
 12. WPA Index, "Negro Education in South Carolina," K-1-2, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, no author listed.
 13. WPA Index, "The Economic Future of the Negro in South Carolina," K-1-4, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
 14. WPA Index, "Outline for Negro Material" and "Materials for Guide Proper," C-1-7, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
 15. WPA Index, Biographical Folder, K-1-1, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
 16. WPA Index, C-1-7, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina. An April 1937 criticism of Negro material specifically asked about the economic future of blacks in South Carolina. Unfortunately the essay by that title was never published, thus leaving the question unanswered.
 17. WPA Index, K-1-8, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
 18. WPA Index, "Early Negro Life in South Carolina Low-Country," K-1-2, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
 19. WPA Index, "The Old Slave Market," K-1-2, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
 20. WPA Records, RG 69, Reports and Miscellaneous Records Pertaining to Negro Studies, Box 1, memo of 19 October 1938 from the Office of Negro Affairs to W.T. Couch, Federal Writers' Project editor.
 21. WPA Records, RG 69, Editorial Correspondence, Box 46, letter of 26 October 1938 referring to black population in Aiken, Anderson, Florence, Greenville, Greenwood, Rock Hill, Spartanburg, Beaufort, and Camden.
 22. WPA Index, "The Stono Insurrection," K-1-2, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina; Federal Writers' Project, *South Carolina*, 46-47.

Wade Hampton: Conflicted Leader of the Conservative Democracy?*

Fritz Hamer

IN APRIL 1877 WADE HAMPTON, III, Confederate military hero, and now political “savior,” declared to a Columbia crowd on his return from Washington that they should “forget we are Democrats or Republicans, white or colored, and remember only that we are South Carolinians.”¹ Although Hampton may have used some political hyperbole to soothe a fractious electorate, as the now undisputed governor of the Palmetto State he seemingly wanted to convince white Democrats that blacks, most of them former slaves, should be allowed to participate in the political process. Of course the litmus test for this to happen had to be that African Americans repudiate the Republican party. That party, which in the minds of many South Carolina whites had corrupted and nearly ruined the state since 1866, had championed the rights of the former slaves. While white Democrats appeared united in their hatred of the Radical Republican regimes of Reconstruction, the latter’s rule in South Carolina had ended in 1877. Hampton now offered an olive branch, of sorts, to those black Republicans whom he had reviled for over a decade. And most of Hampton’s Democratic allies supported the former general’s overtures, for they expected that African Americans would have few alternatives.

But some of Hampton’s allies in the 1876 election disagreed. Several former Confederate officers, among them Matthew C. Butler and Martin Gary, had no patience for reconciliation with blacks. In their minds, the battle for the state government, for the very integrity of a white-dominated South Carolina, was to eliminate all political opponents, white or black. In other words, neither the reviled Republicans of both races, nor, for that matter, any other African Americans, should be allowed to participate henceforth in the political process. Did Hampton believe that his prestige and personal qualities were strong enough to overcome such powerful hatreds, or was his Columbia rhetoric just that, something to offer the opposition until he and his lieutenants could eliminate them completely from the political arena? This paper will review his motives and relations with people up to the election of 1876, and will argue that both tendencies were at play. In the final analysis, however, Hampton

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represented white Democrat resurgence and retrenchment, and while he may have believed that former slaves could be a part of the political process, it would only be on his and his white lieutenants' terms. In their minds only whites had the ability, indeed the very right, to govern the state. But to find out what led Hampton to his "redeemer" leadership role in the crucial election of 1876, one must first review his background.

Until South Carolina's secession in 1860, Hampton's life had little to suggest that he would be embroiled in contentious politics. Although his grandfather had held prestigious military posts, first in the Revolution and later in the War of 1812, and his father also had attained distinction in the latter war, the family focus was to attain land, slaves, and wealth. When the third Wade was born in 1818, he became part of one of the most privileged families in the American South. The Hampton family already controlled vast acreage in the South Carolina Midlands, owned hundreds of slaves, and made millions of dollars from growing cotton. They had few social or economic peers. Wade Hampton, III, was not just a wealthy scion of a prominent family, but was also well educated and traveled, having attained a degree from South Carolina College and having toured extensively in Europe and the Northeast during his young adult life. Nonetheless, his most important purpose in life was to become a successful plantation manager who would direct vast estates of cotton lands from which the family would continue to derive great wealth. In 1843 he began to manage the family plantation in Mississippi, which included 12,000 acres and nearly one thousand slaves. Hampton traveled regularly between these holdings and those in the Midlands of South Carolina in order to manage both. His favorite activities, hunting and fishing, could also be assuaged in such endeavors. Like his father and grandfather, Wade viewed politics as a secondary role in society that he reluctantly assumed. In 1852 Richland District constituents elected him for the first time to the South Carolina House of Representatives, and six years later the same voters elevated him to the State Senate. Although he served on legislative committees regarding federal relations, agriculture, and redistricting, he rarely spoke publicly and did not initially distinguish himself in either chamber. And not until his last years in the antebellum legislature did he even speak out on major issues before the legislature. In short, it seems that he served in the State House because his social position required it.²

Such modest political ambitions began to change as the rift between North and South grew more intense at the end of the 1850s. In fall 1859 Hampton spoke out against John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry and warned that if the North did not condemn this radical abolitionist, the Union could not survive. Although he did not lead the charge when Lincoln became the standard bearer as the Republican presidential nominee, the South Carolina planter supported plans for a secession

convention if the Illinois lawyer were elected. Hampton not only voiced his support for the Minutemen, those groups of men in many communities around the state that prior to the national election supported secession, but he formally joined them. Throughout the fall 1860 electoral campaign season, groups of Minutemen held public demonstrations in their own regalia and published a manifesto supporting secession. In the wake of Lincoln's election victory, Hampton continued to support the calling of a secession convention, although he was not subsequently elected to that body. But when South Carolina seceded, Hampton immediately offered his services to defend the newly independent "nation." In the midst of the crisis, however, as South Carolina faced off against the Federal government over the status of Fort Sumter at the mouth of Charleston harbor, Hampton saw fit to leave the state in March 1861 to check his holdings in Mississippi. It was only after his return to the Palmetto State two weeks after Sumter surrendered that Hampton began to organize his now famous Legion. The planter-turned-soldier became not only the Legion's founder, but also its financier, using his vast wealth to pay for its soldiers' uniforms, equipment, and firearms. By late spring the Confederate high command ordered Hampton's Legion north to defend the newly anointed capitol in Richmond, Virginia.³

Hampton's many exploits as a military leader, first of his legendary Hampton Legion and then as cavalry commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, are well known. After the Confederate armies reorganized in spring 1862, the Legion was split up, and its commander became a subordinate under the renowned cavalry general, Jeb Stuart. Upon this legendary figure's death in May 1864, Hampton's distinguished service and abilities led to his promotion as Stuart's successor in command of all Confederate cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia. From Manassas to Gettysburg to Petersburg, the South Carolinian received many wounds in daring attacks against Federal cavalry and infantry. In the last months of the war Hampton went home in a doomed attempt to stop William T. Sherman's march through the Carolinas. Loyal and determined to war's end, Hampton's resilience seemed more tragic because of his own personal losses. First, his brother Frank fell mortally wounded at Brandy Station in June 1863. More than a year later, one of his sons, Preston, was killed in an engagement near Petersburg. To compound these tragic deaths, at the war's end Hampton's family home at Millwood, just outside Columbia, was burned to the ground by Sherman's troops. His holdings in Mississippi, including three steam cotton gins and 4,700 bales of cotton, were likewise lost. Perhaps Hampton's greatest capital loss, however, was the liberation of more than one thousand slaves. In spite of all his dedication to the Southern cause, the state's most distinguished surviving Confederate military commander found himself virtually destitute financially and

emotionally.⁴ Despite his best efforts, Hampton could only recover a small portion of his holdings following his declared bankruptcy in 1868.

In the midst of such personal and capital losses Hampton was slow to accept the new social and political order dawning on post-war South Carolina. Although he rejected emigration to South America or Europe, a course that some of his former Confederate comrades had taken, he was slow to reconcile himself to the Confederacy's demise. In summer 1866 he wrote to his former commander-in-chief, Robert Lee, that "I am not reconstructed yet. . . ." Furthermore, he told Lee that "[T]ime will prove that you have not fought in vain." It is clear that Hampton would not easily concede that four years of bloodshed and personal loss had been a national and personal waste.⁵

As the defeated Confederate tried to cope with his own personal loss, the political and economic changes occurring within his state became more alarming. For a brief period it had appeared that former Confederates would be able resume the reins of power with the blessings of President Andrew Johnson. But the Republican-controlled Congress soon refused to accept Johnson's lenient terms for the former Confederacy and reversed the president's Reconstruction policy with a series of laws in 1866 that imposed severe restrictions on most of the old leadership and required the Southern states for the first time to accept former slaves as political and social equals. This was an affront, if not worse, to most whites such as Hampton. And they soon showed their opposition.

Hampton expressed this bitterness in greater detail in an 1866 letter to President Andrew Johnson. He denounced what he perceived as a vindictive Congress that was led by Radical Republicans who had usurped their authority and ignored the Constitution by forcing the Southern states to adopt the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments without due deliberation by their respected white leaders. In short, to Hampton the amendments were forced upon the South illegally. He could also not accept that Congress had responded in such a manner in order to thwart the South Carolina legislature, which in December 1865 had passed a series of "Black Codes" that severely restricted the movement of freedmen and, essentially, returned them almost to the life of servitude that they had recently left. Nor could Hampton see the purpose of what he called the "corrupt" Freedmen's Bureau and "a horde of barbarians – your brutal negro troops" that imposed law and order in the South. Such organizations, he maintained, were an effrontery to whites, but especially to former slaveholders who had had virtual life-and-death mastery over blacks barely a year before. Such a response was natural for men like Hampton who had grown up and been taught that only they had the ability and right to govern the affairs of their state. Now that former slaves were free men to whom Congress had given political

rights, Hampton could not fathom such a monolithic shift in social position, even if his beloved South had been defeated militarily.⁶

His bitterness slowly waned in the following months, but Hampton remained true to his upbringing as a planter and former slaveholder. Even though he advocated limited political rights for freedmen, he advised his white friends that they could still control the state legislature by controlling the black vote. Like planters of the antebellum era, Hampton and most of his class could not conceive that former slaves actually had the ability to behave rationally in the political arena. Many former slaveholders believed that freedmen were still inherently imbued with the secondary status they had possessed in slavery. African Americans needed people like Hampton to instruct them and “prevent” them from harming themselves. Such a conclusion came from the paternalist racist assumption that blacks were unable to think for themselves or realize their own best interests. In 1868 he told James Connor, a fellow Confederate veteran from South Carolina, that it was the duty of “every Southern man” to secure the “good will and confidence of the negro.” It was even acceptable to send blacks to Congress, since Hampton considered that they could be trusted more than “renegade [whites] or Yankees.” In conclusion he advised Connor that “respectable negroes” should be recruited. Presumably Hampton meant freedmen whom whites knew could be relied upon, whether by bribery or intimidation, to accept and serve Southern whites in a loyal, that is, subordinate manner.⁷

The assumptions of Hampton and his associates were sorely tested during the following decade as the battle against Republican party rule in the state ebbed and flowed. At first, most white voters tried to forestall the election of delegates to a new state constitutional convention mandated by Congress. Since the latter had required that a majority of the state’s registered electorate ratify the convocation of such a convention, a large number of registered white voters never cast their ballots on election day in November 1867. Despite this unity, the vast majority of registered black voters (85 percent) who voted for such a body was sufficient to validate the elections for the constitutional convention that met two months later. Not surprisingly, the convention’s majority of black delegates drafted a new constitution that ushered in tax and land reform, and the establishment of the first formal public education system in the state. Nonetheless, the former cavalry leader continued to believe that whites could influence enough freedmen so that Democratic conservatives could control the legislature when the next round of elections occurred in fall 1868. But Hampton’s assumptions, as we will see, proved false.

The Radical Republicans’ bold program threatened white conservatives, who feared losing control of black labor and of political affairs to a Republican party

with majority black support. It was the intention of most white Democratic leaders to prevent this and take back the reins of power in order to forestall what they imagined would be political and social chaos. Although some whites, even Hampton for a time, advocated some peaceful accommodation with Republicans, many believed that only intimidation and violence against their opponents could resurrect white control. Former Confederates such as Martin Gary and Matthew C. Butler decried this perilous new order as an attempt to place the “negro over the white man” whereby Republicans were “at war with the noblest instincts of our [white] race.” To those whites who tried to reach an accommodation by political means with former slaves, intransigent conservatives like Butler believed they were badly misled, if not traitors to their race. Butler and his supporters, known as “straight outs,” began a campaign of intimidation and violence to attain future electoral victory for conservative Democrats. Such violence ranged from beatings to murder, one of the more extreme cases being the assassination of a black leader, Benjamin Randolph, in October 1868 while the latter was campaigning in Abbeville for a seat in the legislature. Several shots rang out at the local train station and killed him instantly. Yet even in this violent atmosphere blacks and their white Republican allies went to the polls in November and won a significant majority.⁸ The Radical Republicans now began to implement their reform agenda – they raised taxes, implemented land redistribution, and installed a locally-administered public education system.

Hampton could not legally run for political office because Congress had barred high ranking Confederate officers from public service, yet his work behind the scenes was not impeded by the Republican victory of November 1868. Since his prediction that whites could control the black vote had proved illusory, he seemed to discard his hopes in that direction. Hampton now tacitly supported the Klan violence that accelerated in the wake of the 1868 elections. Active primarily in the upstate, bands of vigilantes, often clad in frightening regalia, intimidated and attacked white and black Republican supporters with impunity. Unable to end the violence, the Republican governor, Robert K. Scott, appealed to President Grant and Congress for Federal troops to help stem the carnage. In April 1871, after the President invoked the Third Enforcement Act (commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act), Federal troops soon arrested several hundred suspected Klansmen. Even though Hampton publicly spoke out against the violence, he nonetheless led a subscription effort on behalf of the accused for their legal defense. Although one historian has called the Act timid and has suggested that it should have been imposed earlier and more forcefully, this action by the national government ended most of the violence. Hundreds were incarcerated and trials were held. Unfortunately for the authorities, so many suspects turned

themselves in that the courts and jails could not process the huge backlog that these arrests and surrenders had created in the justice system. This circumstance, coupled with the expert trial representation that the accused received through the moral support and the financial backing of people such as Hampton and Butler, assured that only a token number of accused Klansmen were convicted, and they generally received light prison sentences. Even though the violence came to an end, the pause proved only temporary. As the campaigning for the fall 1876 elections began in earnest, white conservative elements re-ignited their campaign of intimidation and violence. And this time Hampton led the effort by running for governor.⁹

Although former Confederates at all levels had eventually been given political amnesty by Congress in 1872, Hampton had remained too preoccupied with personal family issues and his poor finances to take a leadership role in the fight against the Radical Republicans at that time. His efforts to improve his finances collapsed when the insurance company he joined went into bankruptcy less than a year after his appointment to its board. Nevertheless, he still had a keen interest in the political future of his home state. Thus when old Confederate leaders approached him in June 1876 to be the Democratic Party's nomination for governor, he readily accepted.¹⁰

Hampton's social position and heroic role as a Confederate leader during the war made him the ideal standard bearer for the conservative Democrats. Unanimously nominated in the August party convention, the soldier-turned-politician started a campaign across the state from the Upcountry to the Lowcountry, defending the virtues of his party and castigating the allegedly corrupt and spendthrift ways of the Radical Republicans. But Hampton's speeches and his obvious public appeal as a hero of the defeated Confederacy became more effective largely because of the private militia – the mounted Red Shirts – that bolstered his appeal and protected him in every community where he took his campaign. On the fall campaign swing through Anderson, Sumter, Winnsboro, and Yorkville Hampton was met by an impressive entourage of local dignitaries, admiring young women, and scores, sometimes hundreds, of mounted Red Shirts. For one campaign rally in Winnsboro on 16 October 1876 an elaborate itinerary was created and fliers were posted throughout the community.¹¹ The arrangements outlined where the local Democratic dignitaries were to stand, the location of "colored clubs," and how the "mounted men" were to position themselves so that "colored people of both parties" could be admitted in front of them. In Yorkville a grand parade met Hampton at the train station and turned out for the Democratic nominee's stump speech where he appealed not only to whites, but also to blacks. As usual, he castigated the corrupt Republicans in Columbia and their governor, Daniel Chamberlain; then Hampton appealed for black support. Ironically,

he told blacks that they had become “slaves to your political masters” and that to be “freemen they must leave the Loyal League” and join with him to bring “free speech, free ballot, a free press.”¹² And yet just a decade before most of the blacks in the audience had been slaves for life to Hampton and to others of his class, chattels devoid of any rights whatsoever. Now fear prevented many black voters at these meetings from disagreeing openly while the Red Shirts stood ready to pounce on any dissenters in the crowd. Except in the Lowcountry where blacks outnumbered whites, few of these grand political rallies allowed the opposition to refute Hampton’s claims.

In spite of Hampton’s appeals on the stump and his professed opposition to campaign violence, his Red Shirt supporters ruthlessly used intimidation and violence throughout the Upcountry to suppress Republican opposition. One Laurens County Republican group appealed to Governor Chamberlain for protection because no one “dares to speak nor act with respect of his franchise privileges without being in extreme danger.”¹³ Individual acts of violence sometimes expanded into major battles that led to injury and death on a large scale. Just as the campaign began in earnest, the Ellenton riots of September 1876 saw black militia carry on a running battle with Red Shirt companies for almost two days before Federal troops intervened to end the carnage. At least 50 blacks and one white Red Shirt lay dead at its conclusion. At Cainhoy in the Lowcountry blacks and whites faced off again in similar fashion. Here the black militia got the better of the action, but still white Democrats inflicted nearly as many casualties on the Republicans before they fled. Despite such brutal violence occurring all around him, Hampton seemed to remain above the fray, outlining before black audiences why they should support his election. Through an alliance with the whites, he argued, “who owned the land . . . [and] pay the taxes,” blacks could redeem the state “together.” But, he warned, if they continued with their “carpet-bag friends [the Republicans],” they would lose any aid or support, presumably from whites, when needed.¹⁴

As Edmund Drago shows in his recent study, some former slaves seemed to take Hampton’s words to heart, for the white Red Shirt clubs did possess black allies. There were at least eighteen black Democratic Clubs organized during the 1876 political campaign. It is difficult to determine how many of these clubs actually were formed by political coercion from whites or from genuine disillusionment by blacks with the Republican leadership. Evidence gathered by Drago suggests that these black organizations had members that joined for a variety of reasons, some from conviction, others out of necessity. Some African Americans felt that even if the Democrats were not their best political allies, they did not think that the Republican party could protect them. In order to continue living and working in their communities, some former

slaves consequently believed that they needed to gain favors from white Democrats who would protect and sustain them during and after the elections.¹⁵

Even though black allies for the Red Shirts did exist, it is clear that most African Americans remained loyal to the Republican party despite the growing divisions within its ranks during the election campaign. And most of those black voters who switched their allegiance faced severe rebuke from fellow blacks, including their wives. Within most black communities such betrayal often led to expulsion from the household, and sometimes even physical assaults. But white intimidation by the Red Shirts and their allies was far greater. Even so, the results at the polls were very close when the November ballots were tallied. Although the conservative Democrats had a lead of just over one thousand votes across the state, this was initially nullified by the vote count in Laurens and Edgefield Counties. County commissioners in these two districts reported voter fraud where Democrats received more votes than actual registered voters. This began the long stalemate over who had won the election. For the next several months both Republicans and Democrats claimed victory.¹⁶

In spite of this uncertainty Hampton declared himself the winner. He demanded that his Republican opponent step down. Backed by Federal troops, Chamberlain refused. A potentially bloody riot almost ensued during the last days of November 1876 as both Republican and Democratic legislators claimed victory for themselves and proceeded to occupy the same chamber in the still-unfinished South Carolina State House, each group led by rival would-be speakers, E.W.M. Mackey for the Republicans and William H. Wallace for the Democrats. The tense situation continued for four days with both sides refusing to leave the chamber. Surrounded by Federal troops, on the morning of the fourth day the Democrats reluctantly voted to leave voluntarily when the soldiers outside seemed poised to remove them by force. Meanwhile, disgruntled whites had begun to arrive in Columbia from many areas of the state to gather around the State House, seemingly bent on throwing out the Republican members regardless of the Federal troops. Before violence could break out, Hampton displayed commanding leadership when he went before the mob and requested that it disperse. As it did so, his authority was manifest, while the legitimacy of the Republican governor and his party was irrevocably weakened.¹⁷

While Chamberlain tried to hang on with the aid of Federal troops and Congressional backing, Hampton had enough public support to have himself inaugurated governor in December 1876 even though he lacked legal authority. He declared in his acceptance speech that he owed much of his success to black voters who “rose above prejudice of race and honest enough to throw off the shackles of party.” Yet even though Hampton publicly claimed this black support, others in his own party realized

that the Red Shirt bands with their intimidation tactics and recourse to violence had really “won” the election for him, not any putative black cross-over voters. A case in point: on election day in one Lexington precinct a Democratic observer admitted that only ten blacks voted the Democratic ticket. While it is difficult to assess how many blacks actually voted Democratic across the entire state, one historian estimates that probably no more than 100 blacks in each county voted for Hampton and his party.¹⁸

Nonetheless, even without substantial black support Hampton would eventually force his Republican rival to resign his office. As he and Chamberlain disputed each other’s legitimacy into the spring of 1877, Republicans’ hopes that somehow their ticket could still win grew ever dimmer. Hampton and his Red Shirts advised their supporters to pay taxes to the Democracy – that is, his own Democratic party’s regime – not to Columbia, so that the Republican regime increasingly could not operate the daily duties of government. In fact, the power of the conservative Democrats had grown to such a degree that just before Chamberlain resigned in April 1877 Hampton reputedly claimed that he would have every tax collector in the state hanged if Chamberlain refused to yield his office. But the final chapter in Republican rule only ended after Hampton visited the newly inaugurated President Rutherford B. Hayes in Washington. There he assured Hayes that he would guarantee political rights and protection to blacks as well as whites, regardless of party, and the President in turn agreed to pull out all remaining Federal troops from the state. With Federal military protection now gone, Chamberlain had no other recourse but to step down and leave the state.¹⁹

With Hampton and the Democrats finally undisputed victors, the former cavalry hero continued to claim that he regarded both races as equals before the law and that African Americans should enjoy the same political rights and protections as whites. Perhaps the “redeemer” governor truly believed this, but some, if not most, of his lieutenants did not. Men such as Butler and Gary viewed the election of 1876 in the same stark racial terms as George Tillman had previously characterized the 1868 electoral campaign: “Southern Society . . . will not have these people [i.e., blacks] rule over us.” Or as another Red shirt leader and future governor of the state, Ben Tillman, put it when looking back at that pivotal year – it was a battle between white “civilization” and black “barbarism.”²⁰

Whether Hampton considered racial dominance to be the essence of this political struggle or not, it is obvious that he viewed blacks as second-class citizens who could only participate in politics under white supervision. Old Confederates such as Butler were determined to eradicate black political participation, regardless of who might supervise black voters. Although Butler’s extreme goal, namely to remove

African Americans both from the State House and from local offices, failed in the early post-Reconstruction era, black political participation was steadily eroded over time. And the process started within months of Hampton assuming undisputed office in spring 1877. In Richland County Senator Beverly Nash and State Supreme Court Justice Jonathan Wright were forced to resign their offices by the fall of 1877 after trumped-up charges of corruption and drunkenness were brought against them. Even if they were not directly threatened, by the early 1880s most black politicians resigned once they realized how tenuous their own position in the white-dominated government had become. A few African Americans held onto their offices through the 1880s only because they came from predominately black counties. Yet even these few who clung to political office had little but symbolic impact on policy. By the 1890s white supremacy would be complete and remained so for most of the next century.²¹

Hampton's political leadership continued to have an impact through the 1878 election. He worked to improve funding for the budding public education system created by the Republicans, and expenditures per pupil continued to rise for both blacks and whites through the 1880s under subsequent governors. But while Hampton's legacy for equal education appeared genuine, his alleged desire for equality in the political process never did. During the Hampton years constitutional office-holders, that is, the elected heads of state agencies, became all white. The former general's party lieutenants found ways to stuff ballot boxes and restricted minority voters through literacy tests and grandfather clauses, two means that steadily excluded more African American voters from exercising their right to vote. And while Hampton oversaw these new restrictions of voting rights, he also did little to support the few remaining African Americans in local offices, even if they were Democrats. Likewise, the few black legislators did not remain long in office after Hampton left the governorship to become U.S. senator in 1879.²²

In 1878 Hampton was elected to a second term as governor, but plans were already afoot to send him to Washington where his influence on state politics would be minimized. Although the war hero's prestige as a "redeemer" leader would survive as a symbol of white supremacy over the hated Radical Republican regime, his power on the state political stage was no longer essential to white political dominance. Now over sixty, Hampton's age probably affected his situation, as there were younger leaders poised to take over the reins of real political control. In late 1878, following a serious hunting accident, Hampton's very survival even seemed precarious. Even though the hero and victor of the 1876 election survived his accident and continued his political career in Washington for another decade, Hampton became largely a symbol of the old guard whose influence on state politics was steadily eroded. While

respected by most of his colleagues in Congress, Hampton's tenure there had little significance for the state or the nation. He rarely spoke to the Senate and often missed sessions because of illness or infirmity. Although the conservative regime that Hampton had returned to power in 1877 continued to maintain political control in South Carolina through most of the 1880s, its days were clearly numbered as Ben Tillman's star began to rise. By the end of the 1880s even Hampton's symbolic value to the state's Young Turks, led by Tillman, was gone. The State Senate voted him out of office on 11 December 1890.²³

Hampton lived for another decade and struggled to support his family while attending Confederate reunions inside and outside the state when his health permitted. When he died in April 1902 he was praised for his determination and bravery as a soldier who did all in his power to defend his state and the Confederacy during four years of war. There is no denying that he was one of the last of the old cavaliers who fought ferociously for the Cause, but his political leadership during and after Reconstruction is more problematic. After the war Hampton tried, as a member of the old guard, to return the state essentially to some semblance of its pre-war days when blacks and most whites had accepted the planter oligarchy without question. Born into this established white planter class, he envisioned a world ordered as he perceived it to have been before secession. Although he verbally opposed violence after Appomattox, he still acquiesced in the Red Shirt campaign of 1876. Even though he continued to claim that he had garnered a significant number of black votes – allegedly 16,000 – to win back the governorship in 1876, most of his white supporters in that election subsequently admitted that Hampton was in error. As one of them, Ben Tillman, observed years later, “every active worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully mistaken.”²⁴

A noble soldier, Wade Hampton was at best a resolute but reactionary politician, grudgingly willing to concede to blacks a place in the political arena only on white Democrats' terms. Despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Hampton accepted the tactics of intimidation and violence in order to “save” the state from what he and other white Democratic leaders considered chaos under a black-dominated Republican Party. Like most whites, he believed that the best option for all, blacks and whites, was a paternalistic society that controlled the economic and political course of the state. To Hampton, equitable distribution of political power and economic freedom for recently freed slaves was a recipe for disaster. His philosophy and upbringing made his political career one of reaction and retrenchment.²⁵

NOTES

1. Walter Brian Cisco, *Wade Hampton, Confederate Warrior, Conservative Statesman* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004), 266.
2. *Ibid.*, 10–12, 17, 23, 29, 31, 46; Hampton to E. Ham, 1 January 1877, Hampton Family Papers, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia (hereafter HFP); N. Louise Bailey, Mary L. Morgan, Carolyn R. Taylor, *Biographical Directory of the South Carolina Senate, 1776–1985* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986), 1:656–59.
3. Cisco, 51–52.
4. *Ibid.*, 55–163; Charles E. Cauthen, ed., *Family Letters of the Three Wade Hamptons, 1782–1901* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1953), 113–14; Hampton to E. Ham, 1 January 1877, HFP.
5. Hampton to R.E. Lee, 21 July 1866, HFP.
6. Cauthen, 126–141. For quotations from this letter see especially pp. 129–31.
7. Hampton to John Connor, 9 April 1868, HFP. For one of the best overviews of the general attitude towards blacks by most whites in the state after 1865, see Stephen Kantrowitz, *Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction of White Supremacy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 41, 44.
8. For the failed effort to forestall the election of delegates to the state constitutional convention in November 1867, see Walter Edgar, *South Carolina: A History* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 385–86. For the division among whites in 1868 and the violent actions led by people like Gary, see Richard Zuczek, *State of Rebellion: Reconstruction in South Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 51–52.
9. For the support Hampton gave the indicted Klansmen, see Zuczek, 100; for the violence perpetrated by the organization, see *ibid.*, 94–100 and Cisco, 204–6. Also see Lou Falkner Williams, *The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871–1872* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 53.
10. On the Congressional amnesty for former Confederates see Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 504. For Hampton's tragic personal and financial problems in this period, see Cisco, 198–201, 210–11. And for his acceptance of the Democratic nomination for governor, see the typescript of narration dated 25 July 1876, HFP, and Walter Allen, *Chamberlain's Administration in South Carolina* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1888), 400.
11. For details about the Hampton political rallies see the handbill entitled "Celebration in Honor of General Wade Hampton at Winnsboro," 16 October 1876, HFP, and *Yorkville Enquirer*, 19 October 1876; the author wishes to thank Debra Franklin, South Carolina State Museum researcher, for taking extensive notes of the latter for this study.
12. The Loyal League had originally been organized in the North during the war to rally support for the Union. After 1865 many new local chapters sprang up in the South and consisted largely of freedmen.

13. For this and the following see Zuczek, 174, 176–78.
14. Dewitt Grant Jones, “Wade Hampton and the Rhetoric of Race: A Study of the Speaking of Wade Hampton on the Race Issue in South Carolina, 1865–1878” (Louisiana State University Ph.D. dissertation, 1988), 144–45.
15. See Edmund L. Drago, *Hurrah for Hampton: Black Red Shirts in South Carolina during Reconstruction* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1998), particularly 16, 22–34.
16. For review of the vote tallies and the stalemate that ensued, see Zuczek, 193. For black attempts to switch to the Democratic side and how insignificant such occurrences actually were, see Joel Williamson, *After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction, 1861–1877* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 408–12. Nevertheless, Cisco (232–34) tries to claim that many blacks did switch to the Democrats. Also see Richard M. Gergel, “Wade Hampton and the Rise of One Party Racial Orthodoxy in South Carolina,” *Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (1977), 6–9.
17. For an account of the stalemate in the State House after the election, see Cisco, 250–252.
18. For an account Hampton’s inaugural address and its contents, see *Charleston News and Courier*, “extra edition,” 14 December 1876, HFP, and Cisco, 256–58. For estimates on the number of black voters that supported Hampton, see Williamson, 411.
19. On the threat by Hampton see Cisco, 267. For the end of Chamberlain’s tenure see *ibid.*, 266–69.
20. For George Tillman’s remark, see Kantrowitz, 53; for Ben Tillman’s characterization, see Zuczek, 160. Also see William Cooper, *The Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 1877–1890* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).
21. On Wright’s removal from office see James Lowell Underwood and W. Lewis Burke, Jr., eds., *At Freedom’s Door: African American Founding Fathers and Lawyers in Reconstruction South Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), 64–67. On Beverly Nash’s removal see John H. Moore, *Columbia and Richland County: A South Carolina Community, 1740–1990* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), 265–66. For the general campaign used by Hampton and his allies to remove most blacks from office, see *ibid.*, 267. For a comprehensive examination of the removal of blacks from politics in the 1880s, see Cooper, 90–107.
22. On Hampton’s short tenure as governor and his modest success in carrying out his election promises to blacks, see Kantrowitz, 78–79; Williamson, 412–17, and Williams, 90, 96, 111–12. Also see Gergel, 9–14.
23. On Hampton’s health and waning influence, see Cisco, 270–324, and Kantrowitz, 92–94, 185.
24. Kantrowicz, 78.
25. Kantrowitz (78–79) argues persuasively that Hampton’s paternalistic view of race was really little different from the violence which Ben Tillman and Matthew Butler advocated in 1876. In the end, both sides believed that the only proper and conceivable order of society was for whites to dominate blacks.

**Free-Soilers and Forty-Eighters:
The Anglo- and German-American Campaign
for a Free Western Texas, 1854–1856**

Mischa Honeck

TRAVELING THROUGH TEXAS IN EARLY 1854, Frederick Law Olmsted, the famous landscape architect and explorer of the Old South, wrote home: “The country has a great deal of natural beauty, and we have fallen among a German population very agreeable to meet: free-thinking, cultivated, brave men.”¹ Frederick and his brother John were fascinated by the Germans who had settled alongside the Colorado and Guadalupe Rivers. While slave labor was a common sight on the Anglo-Texan estates, the German farmers, Olmsted noted, tilled, sowed, and brought in the harvest with their own hands, and they did so with greater efficiency than the slaves.² Olmsted was equally delighted by the friendliness and geniality of his German hosts; he also enjoyed mingling with the local intelligentsia, many of them political refugees of the European Revolutions of 1848/49, in the course of which he won several friends. Olmsted’s verdict on the liberal German settlers, thus, was unambiguous:

The Germans in the Southwest form an exceedingly important element in both the material and the moral and political prospects of our country. And the great majority of them are Democrats – not pseudo Democrats, but Democrats with a meaning; Democrats strengthened by transplantation, exiled for the love of Liberty.³

The romantic image Olmsted attached to the German-born intellectuals-turned-farmers on the Texas frontier sheds light on some of his more fundamental social and political views. Olmsted, to be sure, had been harboring pro-German sentiments ever since tramping up the Rhine in 1850.⁴ But even more significant for him was the way in which the exiled revolutionaries contributed to the intra-American controversy over free and slave labor. Olmsted, while staying aloof from radical abolitionism, was convinced that free labor capitalism was in every aspect superior to slavery, and his tours provided him with the material he needed to make his case. They seemed to confirm that free labor societies were not only economically more profitable but also offered educational and cultural opportunities which the laboring classes of the South widely lacked.⁵

How, then, did the German Texans differ from the Southern mainstream? Like their Anglo-Southern neighbors, they invested most of their resources in cotton-growing and other agricultural pursuits. During his stay in Neu Braunfels, Olmsted “saw no other negroes in town” but one young domestic servant, concluding that he had

located an antislavery, free-labor enclave in the middle of slave country.⁶ However, more recent works have established that Olmsted's view that slavery was virtually non-existent where Germans had settled is not entirely accurate, and that his narrative of freedom-loving German farmers with no ties to the "peculiar institution" has to be taken with a grain of salt. There were indeed some, though comparatively few, German-speaking slaveholders; German-Texan public opinion was also far from being united on the slavery question – politically the few but highly politicized refugees had little in common with the older, more conservative German-Texan majority.⁷ Olmsted, on the contrary, crossed the line between ethnography and political journalism more than once, thus helping to fabricate the myth of a German-Texan population collectively opposed to slavery.

Olmsted's accounts of the German Texans were published at a time of great political turmoil. The debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act were pushing opposition to slavery to new extremes. With the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the application of the popular sovereignty doctrine to the question of slavery in the territories, the "peculiar institution" had become intimately connected to the nation's westward expansion. Many abolitionists and Free-Soilers disliked popular sovereignty, arguing that it allowed slavery to spread all over the continent. But there were also those in the antislavery movement who believed that popular sovereignty could be employed in favor of their cause. If each political community had the right to choose its own domestic institutions, including slavery, did this not also include the right to vote against slavery?

Such ideas were put to the test in the Western Texas Free-Soil movement. It was a relatively small and little-noticed campaign but nonetheless remarkable in that it brought together antislavery intellectuals of both Anglo-American and German descent. United by their will to prevent the further expansion of slavery, these intellectuals encouraged immigration of Northern and European settlers into Western Texas to make it a free state. This paper takes a closer look at four individuals who spearheaded the movement: Frederick Law Olmsted, Adolf Douai, Charles Loring Brace, and Friedrich Kapp. It compares their antislavery beliefs and ideologies and reconstructs the intellectual network in which these ideologies were discussed. In addition it outlines the democratic visions that inspired their fight against slavery and identifies major similarities and differences between them.⁸

The event that set the ball rolling took place in San Antonio on May 14, 1854. The Sisterdale *Freier Verein*, a local association of German-American freethinkers, organized a convention to discuss aspects relating to democratic life in Texas. Some one hundred and twenty of them adopted a platform containing a sharp denunciation of slavery.⁹ This and the other resolutions were printed in Adolf Douai's *San Antonio Zeitung*. Douai, like most attendants of the San Antonio meeting, was a Forty-Eighter,

a refugee of the German Revolutions of 1848/49 who had been forced to leave his home country because of his radical views. Now radicalism was once more the charge brought against Douai and his fellow revolutionaries. To the ears of conservative German- and Anglo-Texans the San Antonio platform sounded inflammatory, and they condemned it as an attack on the existing social and political order. In the wake of their indignation the stockholders of the *San Antonio Zeitung* split and decided to sell the paper. Douai, however, despite financial setbacks and threats of lynching, held on to his editorship. His friends eventually persuaded him to buy the *Zeitung* himself so that he could continue to bring his views on slavery and democracy before the public. One of these friends was Frederick Law Olmsted.¹⁰

Douai and Olmsted first met in the early days of 1854. The German émigré's political convictions and erudition made a strong and lasting impression on the New Englander. Accompanying Douai on a visit to his Forty-Eighter friends in Sisterdale, Olmsted and his brother John "listened to some details of a varied and stormy life [. . .] and were not long in falling into discussions that ran through deep water, and demanded all our skill in navigation."¹¹ As the enmity against Douai and his paper mounted, Olmsted decided to help. Back in New York he went on a fundraising tour which brought in a considerable part of the money Douai needed to afford the purchase.¹² But Olmsted's support did not stop there. He also wrote and backed a number of articles for the *San Antonio Zeitung*, the *New York Times*, and other northern newspapers, highlighting the achievements of the German Texans and praising Western Texas as a place of settlement.¹³

Among those who followed Olmsted's descriptions of life on the Texas frontier with great interest were Charles Loring Brace and Friedrich Kapp. Brace, an old school friend of Olmsted and an abolitionist of the more passionate sort, shared the latter's fascination with German culture. Both had visited England and continental Europe in 1850. Brace prolonged his stay and traveled extensively through Germany and Austria-Hungary. Intrigued by the customs of the local population, Brace wrote *Home-Life in Germany*, in which he portrayed the Germans as a modest and spirited people. Like Olmsted he stressed their sociability and attributed to them the capacity to work hard and live ungrudgingly even under the harshest of circumstances. These same stereotypes reappear in an article Brace wrote for the *National Anti-Slavery Standard* to inform a larger abolitionist public about the antislavery sentiments among the German Texans.¹⁴

The ability of the Germans to flourish in a rough environment is also a recurring theme in the texts of Friedrich Kapp. A Forty-Eighter exile like Douai, Kapp had relocated to New York where he became one of the more prolific German-American writers. His main field was history, and slavery was one of his preferred subjects.

Kapp joined the antislavery efforts of Olmsted, Douai, and Brace in January 1855. He had just published his book *Die Sklavenfrage in den Vereinigten Staaten*, which Olmsted praised as the “most comprehensive introduction to American politics that has yet been written by a foreigner.” Olmsted was also present at a lecture Kapp gave on the history of Texas, listening to Kapp’s statement that the liberal Germans, with their prospering free-labor agriculture, had been quietly laying the foundations for a free state in Western Texas.¹⁵

It is striking to observe that the language of free labor plays a central role in the antislavery agitation of all four individuals. “Is there not a cheer in the very sound of FREE LABOUR COTTON?” Brace emphatically asked his readers. “The many handed, industrious free labour of German families is found cheaper, and of course far cleaner and more thorough than slave labour.” Kapp argued in a similar vein, maintaining that fortune favored only those who, like the German Texans, relied “on themselves and their workmanship.” Douai insisted that democrats had to be “free tillers of their own soil,” and with Olmsted he agreed “that slavery must not be attacked by philanthropic and humanistic reasons, but by economic ones.”¹⁶

As Eric Foner points out in his seminal *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, the ideology of free labor was especially strong in the dynamic, expansive, and capitalist society of the antebellum North. Rather than defining what came to be known as the industrial working class, labor was seen as a temporary state and necessary instrument for the individual striving to rise beyond the burdens of the moment. Pointing the way to material success and social importance, free labor gave people the chance to get ahead in life and escape from their original social position, and, because of that, they viewed their country as fundamentally better than the rest of the world.¹⁷

From a free-labor perspective, slavery was less a moral problem than an obstacle to economic progress. If evidence was needed to show that America offered unlimited opportunities, the West seemed to provide it. Abundant lands and resources promised individual self-fulfillment and inspired those who dreamed of a greater American nation. No phrase reflected the desire to expand more adequately than “Manifest Destiny,” which expressed the most powerful nation-building initiative of the time: the idea of a society of white farmers and merchants that would span the entire continent. Those championing it hoped that all the basic ingredients of civilization – schools, churches, lyceums, businesses – would follow in the footsteps of the first pioneers and testify to the world that their republic was bound for continual expansion.

The success of this quest for national prosperity, Olmsted suggested, was to be determined by the rapidity with which it unfolded. Therefore he was particularly troubled by people who seemed to lack the incentive for improving their own situation.

Southern slave society, he noted, had a disastrous effect on its inhabitants. For him the low standard of workmanship among poor, non-slaveholding Anglo-Americans was more alarming than slavery itself. As a class they seemed indolent and produced only that which was necessary to survive. Measured against the principles of free labor, the majority of Southerners, Olmsted argued, were out of touch with national development, violating the ethics of self-advancement and social improvement.¹⁸

In search of a remedy, Olmsted, Brace, and other anti-nativist free-labor advocates turned to the immigrants who were arriving on America's shores in record numbers. In the 1840s and 1850s the prospects of social mobility and a better life lured millions of Europeans across the Atlantic. Many Anglo-Americans hoped that the idea of free labor would eventually "Americanize" the newcomers. According to a Republican delegate from Iowa, this meant embracing the notion that "even the poorest and humblest in the land may, by industry and application, attain a position which will entitle him to the respect and confidence of his fellow-men."¹⁹ Being an American, the *New York Tribune* added, had to do less with nationality than with believing in a political creed:

The man who is imbued with a genuine democracy [. . .] is in his very heart's core American, though he first landed from an emigrant ship this morning; while the aristocrat, the tyrant, the filibustering slaveholder, the demagogue plotter against the liberties of the people is an alien and a foreigner, though native American blood has flown in his veins since the first Pilgrim child was born in the colony of Plymouth.²⁰

A popular German-American aphorism before the Civil War said that if Germany was a nation and a culture looking for a state, America was an infant state that was still looking for a culture and had not yet become a nation. The idea that America was an ever-expanding agrarian republic, a society where everything was in flux and nothing fixed, not only appealed to Anglo-American thinkers but also fired the imagination of German-American intellectuals. In early nineteenth-century German literature the New World was often depicted as a *tabula rasa*, with large portions of the land still unoccupied and a history still in the making. Many Forty-Eighter democrats saw America not only as an asylum but also as a place worthy of colonization. The stream of German emigration to the United States fanned hopes that the vision of a new Germany that had gone down with the revolution might live in the New World. Out in the West the German settler, Kapp predicted, could acquire that "pride of free citizenship" that was not to be had in a land governed by kings and princes. In this situation settlement projects such as those in Western Texas became litmus tests

whether *Neudeutschlands* – model communities that encouraged their inhabitants to retain their Germanness while giving them American liberties – could survive on the American frontier.²¹

Douai and Kapp soon found out that the colonization schemes they supported faced enormous opposition. Promoting a democratic, free-labor German-America, they were cast into the torrents of antebellum politics and, consequently, into the maelstrom of the slavery controversy. Speaking out against slavery was then no longer a theoretical issue but one that defined social affiliations and political identities. Threatened by the proslavery Texans, Douai felt reminded of the oppressive structures he and his fellow emigrants had left behind. The harsh attacks of the proslavery elite and the propaganda campaign against him smacked very much of the Prussian police state he had so vigorously opposed in Germany. Invoking the right to free speech and using slavery as a metaphor to illustrate his own condition, Douai told his critics “that we did not come to Texas to find ourselves reduced to slavery in any way whatsoever.”²²

In the confrontation with slaveholders and nativists nothing less than the Forty-Eighters’ self-image as a democratic elite was at stake. Did a people that had led the fight in Europe for the same ideals on which the United States was founded – individual rights, representative government, national unity – not deserve that country’s respect? Kapp, a shrewd observer of American political culture, was outraged by American commentators impertinent enough “to suggest that the Europeans who have been tossed hither ought to first learn what it is to be a free people.” What he expected to find in the United States were students willing to learn from the revolutionary experience of the German democrats. His publications on slavery were meant to show that intellectuals of his ethnic stock were at least as, if not more, capable of grasping the implications of the current crisis than the average white native.²³

Kapp’s example suggests that the veterans of 1848 joined the antislavery movement not only out of moral and political reasons but also out of a strong sense of ethnic pride. Unlike other – less political – immigrant groups, the Forty-Eighters came to the United States as a defeated people. In this situation the antislavery movement seemed like a chance to continue the fight for freedom under changed circumstances. Answering the challenge of the slaveholders, who stirred bitter memories of the European aristocracy, allowed the revolutionaries to rid themselves of the stigma of defeat and reclaim their role as vanguards of democratic progress. The attempt to reconcile the European past with the American present also led to a redefinition of the slavery controversy: instead of being treated as an American problem, slavery was seen as a universal problem, as “one of the manifold phases of the ancient struggle between aristocracy and democracy which has shook the civilized world for more than two thousand years.”²⁴

Together with the language of free labor, the language of universal democracy was a key factor in the alliance between Anglo- and German-American antislavery intellectuals. It created a sense of common cause and mitigated ideological differences. Religion, for instance, was a particularly contentious subject. And yet, even though he disagreed with their religious skepticism, Brace admired the Forty-Eighters as “men of high culture and intelligence” to whom “the laws of the code of Slavery were as old as their hatred of tyranny.” Douai, on the other hand, had problems accepting the Christian faith of his American friends but that did not weaken his determination to work with them against any “system dooming mankind to ignorance and humiliation.” Kapp, while distancing himself from the notion that Americans were a chosen people, stressed that the conflict over slavery was too important to be ignored since the whole world would be affected by its outcome.²⁵

Its international composition notwithstanding, the Western Texas Free-Soil movement did not achieve its main objective. It took a war, not a newspaper campaign, to end slavery in Texas. Debt-ridden and outnumbered by his opponents, Douai sold the *San Antonio Zeitung* in 1856 and moved north. But Douai, Kapp, Olmsted, and Brace went on with their public careers, rallying friends and followers against a common enemy, although from different perspectives and with different agendas. They sustained their republic of letters, seeing and writing each other on a regular basis, reviewing each others’ works, and borrowing from them for their own.²⁶

Perhaps the most striking feature of their alliance was that it combined nationalist and internationalist tendencies. While the languages of free labor and universal democracy opened channels for intercultural cooperation, they also softened the ethnic rivalries that shaped the antislavery policies of each side. They obscured the fact that the antislavery democracies that were envisioned were, in a sense, competing democracies, closely tied to the ethnic and national communities from which they emerged, and which they were above all meant to serve.

Because of these ethnocentric outlooks the antislavery democracies of both groups were also racially limited. Much has already been written on the significance of race in “Manifest Destiny” and other Anglo-American visions of democracy. In the nineteenth century the American republic was essentially conceived as a white Anglo-Saxon project; those outside the ethnic margins of that culture were not regarded as fit to partake in it. This also explains why African-Americans, the main victims of slavery, played such a marginal role in the antislavery thought of Olmsted and Brace. Their main concern was the future of white America, and the damage slavery inflicted to its reputation as the land of liberty and progress. Hence, Brace turned red in shame at a dinner party in Berlin in response to a

guest who had argued that American slavery made the wrongs of European feudalism seem trifling.²⁷

Douai and Kapp remained equally silent on the African-American dimensions of slavery. Firmly entrenched in their Germanocentric *weltanschauung*, they were unable to gain a more comprehensive view of the slavery question which would have sensitized them to the African-American struggle for freedom. For the German revolutionaries antislavery was as much a tool as it was a conviction, a means to refurbish their tarnished self-image as a revolutionary elite and find their place in a new society. They understood the importance of slavery but were rather indifferent about the slave. Even a radical like Douai, who championed human equality in many of his later speeches and writings, forgot about his Enlightenment humanism when pondering over the future of his people in the United States. The Indians, he believed, were doomed to extinction; the African slaves would eventually abandon the northern hemisphere after emancipation as the climate was only suitable for European races. And Kapp, in his second book on slavery, reached the stunning conclusion: "The slavery issue is not a negro issue!"²⁸ Were statements such as these simply a matter of racism? I argue that they also point to the priorities and concerns of a group who participated in the antislavery movement because it helped them reaffirm their identity as a revolutionary people.²⁹

NOTES

1. Frederick Law Olmsted to a friend, 12 March 1854, in *Frederick Law Olmsted Papers*, Correspondence, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (if not cited otherwise, all letters to and from Olmsted have been taken from this collection).
2. In *Cotton Kingdom*, Olmsted argued that the cotton picked by German laborers in New Braunfels, Texas, was worth up to two cents per pound more than that which was picked by slaves. See Olmsted, *The Cotton Kingdom: A Traveler's Observation on Cotton and Slavery in the American Slave States, 1853-1861* (New York, 1996), 503. See also "A Tour in the Southwest, No. 12," *New York Times*, 3 June 1854. Olmsted used the pseudonym "yeoman" for his letters from Texas that were published in the *New York Times*. They constitute the core of his book *The Journey Through Texas: Or a Saddle-Trip on the Southwestern Frontier*, which appeared in 1856 and was translated into German the following year.
3. "A Tour in the Southwest, No. 5," *New York Times*, 31 March 1854.
4. Olmsted's support of the Revolutions of 1848/49 and his appreciation of certain strains in German republican thought come to light in his letter to Charles Loring Brace, 1 December 1853, in *The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted, II: Slavery and the South, 1852-1857*, Charles E. Beveridge et al., eds. (Baltimore, 1981), 238-56.
5. See Olmsted's 12 January and 26 January 1854 reports for the *New York Daily Times*, printed in *The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted, II*, 238-56.

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6. Olmsted, *A Journey Through Texas* (New York, 1857), 181. In all fairness, Olmsted did mention that twelve German-born slaveholders allegedly lived in the San Antonio area but also said that he did not meet one of them; *Journey Through Texas*, 432.
7. See especially Jordan, "Germans and Blacks in Texas," in *States of Progress: Germans and Blacks in America over 300 Years*, ed. Randall Miller (Philadelphia, 1989), 89–97; Randolph Campbell, *An Empire for Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas, 1821–1865* (Baton Rouge, 1989), 214–16. Walter D. Kamphoefner, on the other hand, emphasizes that German Texans who could afford slaves were far less likely to engage in slaveholding than Anglo-Southerners; Kamphoefner, "German Texans: In the Mainstream or Backwaters of Lone Star Country?," *Yearbook of German-American Studies*, 38 (2003), 119–138.
8. For a brief history of the Western Texas Free-Soil movement, see Laura Wood Roper, "Frederick Law Olmsted and the Western Texas Free-Soil Movement," *American Historical Review* 56 (1950), 58–64, and Justine Davis Randers-Pehrson, *Adolf Douai, 1819–1888: The Turbulent Life of a German Forty-Eighter in the Homeland and in the United States* (New York, 2000), 183–215. According to Olmsted, "A Tour in the Southwest, No. 12," the U.S. Act of Annexation for Texas contained a provision which gave its people the option to divide Texas into as many as five separate states once the population was big enough to warrant such a separation.
9. See Roper, 58. Randers-Pehrson, 203, states that "about two hundred persons took part in the San Antonio meeting." Douai, arguably the most reliable source here, mentions a group of "120–150 Germans" in his letter to John H. Olmsted, 4 September 1854.
10. See Douai to John H. Olmsted, 4 September 1854.
11. Olmsted, *Journey Through Texas*, 187–88. Olmsted also claimed that the San Antonio Zeitung "contained more news of matters of general interest than all the American Texan papers I had come across since entering that state," *Journey Through Texas*, 133.
12. Those contributing to the cause, either as donators or subscribers, included prominent abolitionists and reformers such as Theodore Parker, Henry Ward Beecher, Henry H. Elliott, and Charles Loring Brace. Olmsted and his brother also assisted Douai, who wanted to reach out to Anglo-American readers as well, in getting an English type for his German-language newspaper. See Douai to John H. Olmsted, 15 September 1854, John H. to John Olmsted, 31 October 1854, and Douai to John and Frederick Law Olmsted, 28 March 1855.
13. "Texas and its Capabilities," *New York Tribune*, 9 November 1854; "The German Immigration," *New York Times*, January 6, 1855; "Emigrants and Texas," *New York Times*, 19 January 1855. Douai to Frederick Law Olmsted, 28 October, 17 December 1854.
14. Brace, *Home-Life in Germany* (New York, 1853). See also his description of German emigrants in New York in *The Dangerous Classes in New York and Twenty Years' Work Among Them* (New York, 1880), 36, 147–48. "The Germans and Slavery," *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, 4 April 1854.
15. "The Slavery Question Judged by a European Republican," *New York Times*, 15 January 1855. "The History of Texas – Early German Colonization," *New York Tribune*, 20 January 1855. Frederick Law and John H. Olmsted to John Olmsted, 22 January 1855.
16. "The Germans and Slavery." Kapp, "Die Deutschen Ansiedlungen im westlichen Texas und der Mainzer Verein deutscher Fürsten, Grafen und Herren," in *Aus und Über Amerika: Thatsachen und Erlebnisse*, ed. Friedrich Kapp (Berlin, 1876), I, 290. "The South and the Middle-Class," *San Antonio Zeitung*, 5 January 1855. Douai to Frederick Law Olmsted, 16 December 1854.
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17. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York, 1971), 30–45.
18. See Olmsted, “A Letter to a Southern Friend,” in *A Journey Through Texas*, viii, and his reports to the *New York Times* from 30 March, 28 April, 30 June 1853, 12, 26 January and 25 February 1854. Olmsted later compiled his views of the Old South in *A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States* (1856) and *A Journey in the Back Country* (1860).
19. *The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Iowa* (Davenport, 1857), I, 193, taken from Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, 16.
20. “America for Americans,” *New York Daily Tribune*, 7 November 1854.
21. See Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Phantom Landscapes of Colonization: Germans in the Making of a Pluralist America,” in *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800–2000*, ed. Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore (New York, 2001), 11; Hans-Jorgen Grabbe, “Weary of Germany – Weary of America: Perceptions of the United States in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” in *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America Since 1776*, ed. David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt (Cambridge, 1999), 69–75.
22. Douai (unknown editorial, *San Antonio Zeitung*) to Frederick Law Olmsted, 26 August 1854.
23. Kapp, *Die Sklavenfrage in den Vereinigten Staaten; Geschichtlich Entwickelt* (Göttingen, 1854), 184. Kapp to his father, 6 November 1855, and to Ludwig Feuerbach (early 1856), in Friedrich Kapp Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. For the reception of Kapp’s works on slavery, see his letter to his father, 24 January 1855, where he states that writing about slavery “has been happy coincidence and helped me win many friends among the Americans.”
24. Kapp, *Die Geschichte der Sklaverei in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (New York, 1860), 26–27.
25. Brace also deplored what he saw as a general decline of religious sentiment among the Germans at large, *Home-Life in Germany*, v–vi. “The Germans and Slavery.” Douai to Frederick Law Olmsted, 16 December 1854, and 28 March 1855. Kapp to Becker, 2 January 1857, and to his father, 3 May 1857.
26. Brace and Olmsted appear to have been frequent guests at the Kapp household; see Kapp to Frederick Law Olmsted, 22 February 1861. Kapp reviewed Brace’s *Home-Life in Germany* for a German readership in *Atlantische Studien*, 3 (1853). He is quoted in Olmsted, *A Journey Through Texas*, 170f. Olmsted is quoted in Douai, *Land und Leute in der Union* (Berlin, 1864), 320, and in Kapp, *Die Geschichte der Sklaverei*, 514. Kapp gave Olmsted the first printed copy of this book, who then reviewed it in an unpublished essay. See Kapp to Frederick Law Olmsted, 19 October 1860, and Olmsted, *Nebraska in Germany*, in Frederick Law Olmsted Papers.
27. Brace, *Home-Life in Germany*, 272. An insightful study on the racial foundations of nineteenth-century Anglo-American expansionism is Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, 1981).
28. Douai to Frederick Law Olmsted, 17 November 1854. Douai, *Land und Leute in der Union*, 324. Kapp, *Die Geschichte der Sklaverei*, 517. Randers-Pehrson and Philip Foner in his book *American Socialism and Black Americans: From the Age of Jackson to World War II* (Westport, 1977) portray

Douai as an advocate of civil rights but largely ignore the racist undercurrents in his antislavery ideology.

29. In her recent publication *Kulturkontakt und Racial Presence: Afro-Amerikaner und die deutsche Literatur, 1815–1914* (Heidelberg, 2005), Heike Paul makes a similar point contending that the Forty-Eighter generations' interests in the antislavery movement were to a large extent self-serving. She finds that they tend to "emphasize German heroism" in the fight against slavery, thereby trying to compensate for the loss against the reactionary forces in Europe (162).

A Small State in a Big War: Writing the History of Latvia in World War II, the Principal Issues

Valdis O. Lumans

THE PRINCIPAL LESSON TO BE LEARNED from researching and writing *Latvia in World War II* is that the small states of Europe swept up in this conflict, such as the Baltic nations, had no meaningful options in regards to their wartime experiences.¹ History, geography, and other factors partly predetermined their fates, but even more so these countries were at the mercy of circumstances dictated by the diplomatic, political, and above all, military decisions and actions of the main combatants. This paper identifies and addresses a few of the issues germane to the wartime experiences of Latvia, whose story illustrates in many ways the experiences common to most small states caught up in this greatest of all wars.²

The most fundamental factor related to Latvia's wartime involvement is geopolitical. From the thirteenth century to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, Latvians have found themselves wedged between two often aggressive peoples, the Germans to the west and the Russians to the east. From the west Latvians encountered the medieval *Drang nach Osten* (or German eastward expansion) driven by crusading orders and the commercial enterprises of Hansa merchants. Concurrently Russian rulers came to covet the Baltic shores as their country's strategically vital access to the western world. The Russian westward drive culminated in the eighteenth century both with Peter the Great's conquest of much of the territory that comprises modern Latvia and Estonia, and with Catherine II's participation in the partitions of Poland, which brought the rest of the Baltic region into the Russian Empire. Although Russia won this early round of strategic competition, the German-Russian rivalry over the Baltic would continue. World War II was the most recent, and hopefully the final act in the historic struggle between the Russians and Germans over the region.

The next notable episode in the contest for the northeast Baltic region was World War I. For Latvia the critical event of this conflict was the Russian Revolution of 1917, which destroyed the Russian Empire and enabled the Latvians to win their national independence. In their war for independence Latvians fought a complicated, multi-sided conflict against disparate factions of both Germans and Russians. Of special importance for the Latvians were the Russians, divided into the "Whites," who battled to preserve imperial Russia and its territorial integrity, and the "Reds"

or Bolsheviks, who sought to export their socialist revolution to the Baltic. The Latvians themselves also split politically and militarily between the nationalists, who had declared independence in November 1918 and intended to create a western-styled nation-state, and the “Red” Latvians, who joined with the Russian Bolsheviks hoping to build a socialist Latvia in partnership with a Soviet Russia.³

This chaotic struggle defined future Latvian-Russian relations. Of particular significance was the seizure of much of Latvia and the city of Riga by Latvian and Russian Reds in early 1919 and their proclamation of a Soviet Latvia. What followed was a ruthless, bloody Red terror, as the Bolsheviks executed several thousand “class enemies,” primarily nationalists and members of the middle, professional, and propertied classes. Although the nationalists eventually evicted both Russian and Latvian Reds with the help of Germans, Estonians, and even Poles, this fleeting episode horrified nationalists and predetermined that post-war relations between independent Latvia and the Soviet Union would be fraught with fear and suspicion – at least on the Latvian side. When the Soviets occupied Latvia in 1939 and annexed it outright in 1940, they claimed that the incorporation was the culmination of the popular socialist uprising of the Latvian people that in 1919 had been interrupted by outside intervention.

As Latvia emerged from the cauldron of war and revolution onto the international stage, it placed its hopes in the newly formed League of Nations and its trust in the rule of international law. But when Latvia’s statesmen found their new state trapped between a defeated, embittered Germany and a menacing revolutionary Soviet Union, they adopted a policy of neutrality suitable for the 1920s, when both threatening neighbors were still licking their wounds. By the 1930s, however, as both regained their strength and confidence, Latvia’s neutrality satisfied neither Hitler’s Germany nor Stalin’s Russia and instead became increasingly a vain exercise in tragic folly.⁴

As a counterbalance to its neutrality and its reliance on the League of Nations, in the 1920s Latvia nurtured closer ties to the western democracies. But as the competition between Germany and Russia intensified in the 1930s, and as the League proved impotent to enforce international justice, both France and Great Britain lost their resolve to guarantee European order, as demonstrated at the September 1938 Munich Conference. Consequently Latvia – like several other small states – was left at the mercy of its two aggressive neighbors, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. But on 23 August 1939 the two rivals briefly set aside their belligerency and committed themselves to “friendship” and “non-aggression.” In a secret clause hidden in the Nazi-Soviet Treaty, Hitler conceded Latvia, Estonia, and eventually Lithuania to

Stalin, to do with as he pleased. The collapse of western resolve at Munich and the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Treaty of 1939 are the supreme examples of how the smaller states of Europe, such as Latvia, had few meaningful options regarding their fates in World War II.⁵

Latvian domestic circumstances were no better. Like most of the new small postwar states, Latvia was politically inspired by the western democracies and had constructed in 1919 a democratic constitutional parliamentary system of proportional representation. A broad range of parties practiced democracy until many Latvians realized that their lofty national expectations had not materialized. As became true for most every state in Central and Eastern Europe, Latvia therefore abandoned democracy. In May 1934 nationalists, agrarians, and the conservative right supported a military coup that brought Karlis Ulmanis to power as an authoritarian dictator. The pre-eminent Latvian statesman of the inter-war years (educated, interestingly enough, at the University of Nebraska), Ulmanis depended on a constituency that shared his vision of a rural, agricultural Latvia for ethnic Latvians only. Although Ulmanis's dictatorship was benign by contemporary standards, nonetheless it suspended the parliament, abrogated civil rights, suppressed dissent, and imposed censorship, but with the promise to resurrect democracy once "order" was restored and a new, more national constitution was promulgated – conditions that never happened.⁶

One further condition affecting the course of events in Latvia was its national or ethnic composition. Here too Latvian developments reflected the experiences of most other new European states, whose democratic inclinations succumbed to nationalist urges. Although Latvian nationalists envisioned a state exclusively for ethnic Latvians, like most other Eastern European states Latvia was multiethnic, with ethnic Latvians constituting 75 percent of its population of nearly two million, and non-Latvians the other 25 percent; the three largest minority groups were Russians, Jews, and Germans. With the onset of the economic depression, chauvinistic nationalism infected the population, fueled grievances (both real and imagined), and culminated in Ulmanis's 1934 coup. Intolerant nationalism was a seminal ingredient of the Ulmanis dictatorship, albeit it never attained the venomous levels of the Nazi dictatorship. The most injurious nationalistic measures appeared in the economic sector, as Ulmanis sought to eradicate non-Latvian influences in the economy, especially German and Jewish interests. He mostly targeted non-Latvian enterprises, but even ethnic Latvian-owned concerns suffered what amounted to state expropriation. By the outbreak of World War II little industry and commerce in Latvia remained under private control. The rapid growth of the state-controlled and state-owned economic sector under Ulmanis – which among European states was estimated to

be proportionately second only to that of the Soviet Union – was critical to wartime developments.⁷ Unwittingly Ulmanis had prepared the ground for the initial Soviet nationalization of the Latvian economy during 1940–41. Since the state had already seized or brought most private enterprises under its control, all that was left to do was to transfer property – with the exception of land, which until then had remained under private ownership – from the Latvian state to the Soviets.⁸

When war erupted with Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, Latvia was spared hostilities. Its 20,000 man army was alerted but not mobilized. The main response from the regime was to declare repeatedly its neutrality, especially to its two primary nemeses, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.⁹ One cannot fault Ulmanis and his clique for fomenting hostilities, since his dictatorship was anything but warlike. One can, however, reproach the regime for its censorship and for stifling dissent and criticism, policies that concealed the harsh realities from the Latvian people and denied them any voice in their fate. Whether a democratic Latvia and better informed Latvians could have fared any better than did the muzzled Latvia under Ulmanis remains a matter of conjecture. But at least a freer citizenry could have had the satisfaction of participating in a national dialogue in this time of mortal danger.

The reason for Latvia's evading a shooting war at this point was the Nazi-Soviet Treaty of August 1939. This treaty, which gave Hitler the green light to attack Poland, spared Latvia for the time being, but its secret clause abandoned it to the mercies of Stalin. Although many Latvians suspected unpleasant ramifications from Nazi-Soviet rapprochement, they did not know the details of the treaty. Two momentous consequences for Latvia resulted from this document and revealed the tragic truth. One was the resettlement of 60,000 Baltic Germans from Latvia to the Reich in the fall of 1939 in order to remove them as potential spoilers of the "friendship" between Germany and the USSR. With their evacuation the Latvians lost their insurance against a Soviet takeover, which, so they had believed, would not occur as long as the Germans remained.¹⁰

At about the same time, Stalin decided to cash in his chips with Hitler. On 30 September the Soviets summoned Latvian emissaries (including Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters) to Moscow to discuss security interests, and, as with Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland, forcefully requested that Latvia sign a Mutual Assistance Pact to allow the stationing of Soviet troops on its soil and the occupation of Latvia's ice-free ports of Liepaja and Ventspils as Soviet naval bases. Ulmanis yielded, and on 5 October 1939 his government signed the Mutual Assistance Pact, in which the Soviets promised to respect the integrity of Latvia's internal institutions and not to meddle

in its domestic affairs. And so began a brief episode of partial Soviet occupation. Although at first the Soviets honored their hands-off commitments, by the spring of 1940 the Soviet legation in Riga began orchestrating provocations that eroded the fragile harmony.¹¹

Evidently German military successes in the West in May and June 1940 prompted Stalin to seize the prizes secretly awarded to the USSR in the 1939 agreement. On the pretext that Latvia had failed to abide by the Mutual Assistance Pact and had acted unfriendly toward the Soviet Union, the Soviets demanded on 16 June 1940 that Latvian envoys return to Moscow, where Foreign Commissar Vlacheslav Molotov and Stalin in person berated them and issued an ultimatum: the Latvian government must either permit a total occupation or suffer the consequences, a Soviet invasion. They also demanded the creation of a new Latvian government friendly to the Soviets. Although a few hotheads counseled at least token military resistance, Ulmanis rejected such a response as suicidal and allowed the Soviets in.¹² Stalin's intimidation of the Latvians, comparable to Hitler's diatribes against the Czechs prior to his occupation and destruction of Czechoslovakia, represented the common wartime behavior of powerful aggressors toward the small and weak.

On the following day, 17 June, massive Soviet forces invaded and occupied Latvia completely. Along with the Red Army hundreds of NKVD police agents also arrived. As had been his policy since the coup of 1934, Ulmanis kept bad news from the public and did not inform the Latvian people of the occupation until Soviet tanks were rolling through Riga. The Latvian government resigned, although Ulmanis retained his post as president. Andrei Vyshinski, the man who directed events from the Soviet legation in Riga, then selected a provisional government composed mostly of leftists and opponents of the Ulmanis regime. Backed by the Red Army and the NKVD, Vyshinski also orchestrated pro-Soviet demonstrations in the streets of Riga and other cities that increasingly demanded a socialist or even a Soviet Latvia.¹³

As promised, Vyshinski organized elections for mid-July. The Soviets compiled a political coalition called the Working People's Bloc, which offered an approved list of candidates. The predetermined results overwhelmingly approved the government's list by 97.6 percent, and consequently the People's Government of Latvia took office. Ulmanis resigned the presidency, and when offered a place of exile anywhere in Europe, he chose Switzerland. The Soviet authorities had a change of heart, however, and instead shipped him to Soviet Central Asia where he died in a prison camp in 1942.¹⁴ The new People's Government commenced with purges throughout the Latvian state system, but its most urgent task was to request Latvia's admission into the Soviet Union as a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). In early August a delegation traveled to Moscow,

where on 5 August 1940 at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet – attended also by envoys from Estonia and Lithuania – the Latvian emissaries asked for and received Latvia's admission to the Soviet Union as the fourteenth SSR.¹⁵ This process, as depicted by the Soviets, concluded the socialist upheaval started by the Latvian people in 1918–1919, a spontaneous, popular, and indigenous socialist revolution. Most Latvians perceived it differently – as an aggressive military occupation by a foreign state.

The Soviet Union proceeded to assimilate Latvia and the other two Baltic states into its political, social, economic, and even cultural system in a process of sovietization. Ulmanis's earlier nationalization facilitated the economic transformation, since Soviet managers simply took over the mostly state-controlled Latvian economy. In the countryside, where landed property had remained private, the Soviets confiscated all land and redistributed it to smallholders and the landless. The Soviets had just begun moving toward collectivization when the German invasion in late June 1941 interrupted the process.¹⁶

Another aspect of sovietization was the imposition of the repressive Stalinist police system. The NKVD extended its terror network across the land and began rounding up the “enemies of the people,” including, among others, war veterans, military officers, civil servants, educators, nationalist intellectuals, and clergy. People simply disappeared, first into prisons, and then were either murdered or deported to slave labor camps throughout the Soviet Union. The NKVD campaign climaxed on the night of 13–14 June 1941, with massive deportations that swept away entire families by the trainloads – an operation similar to Nazi deportations of Jews. On that night alone the Soviets seized and deported over 14,000 men, women, and children.¹⁷ Nationalist Latvians have described this action as genocide, but the victims included not only ethnic Latvians, but also Jews, ethnic Russians, and others. Since the operation targeted certain social classes and not all ethnic Latvians – indeed, communist Latvians joined in the roundups – the case for ethnic genocide of the nature and scale of the Jewish Holocaust is difficult to sustain.

One final institution designated for “socialization” was the Latvian army, which first turned into a “People's Army” and then was absorbed into the Red Army. The provisional government began by replacing the army's highest commanders with officers more sympathetic to the “people's” cause, and removing lower officers with known anti-Soviet attitudes. Many enlisted men were also released, as the government pared down the military. With the annexation of Latvia, the Red Army incorporated the “People's Army” as the 24th Territorial Strelnieki Corps. Eventually even the “democratic” commanders were sent away, ostensibly for training in the USSR, but actually they ended up in Siberian slave labor camps. The final liquidation of the already

depleted Latvian officer corps occurred simultaneously with the civilian deportations of June 1941, when the 24th Corps was ordered to Camp Litene in northeastern Latvia. Here many enlisted men were sent home, and those officers who did not manage to escape were seized by the Soviets and executed. By the time the Germans attacked two weeks later the 24th Corps had been reduced to 3,000 men, who at gun-point retreated eastward with the rest of the Red Army. These Latvian soldiers were destined to fight in the ranks of the Red Army for the duration of the war.¹⁸

Hostilities arrived in southern Latvia a few days after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941. By 1 July German troops entered Riga. Because the Soviets had beaten a hasty retreat, Latvia was spared heavy destruction in the initial phase of the campaign. Latvians that had endured the horrors of the Soviet occupation and referred to the year of Soviet rule as the “Year of Terror” (*Baigais Gads*) – and this by no means included all Latvians – at first elatedly welcomed the Germans as liberators who had driven out the despised Bolsheviks.¹⁹ Much of this initial good will and enthusiasm gradually dissipated and even turned to resentment as more and more Latvians came to realize that their “liberators” did not intend to free them and restore an independent Latvia, as many naively had expected, but instead planned to exploit Latvia no less than had the Soviets. Hitler had already designated Latvia, along with Estonia and Lithuania, to be part of the conquered *Lebensraum*, the additional living space into which Germans would ultimately expand and colonize. The Germans regarded Latvians and Estonians as being superior to the Slavs racially – which did allow for certain privileges in the cultural, religious and educational realm; however, Hitler’s top priority in respect to the economy was the German war effort, which demanded total mobilization and exploitation of all human and material resources. Facilitating German plans was the fact that the Soviets had left behind mostly intact the nationalized Latvian economy. Indeed, the Germans found the Soviet economic system to their liking and declared that the centralized system would be preserved.²⁰

When the German army resumed its drive toward Leningrad, its prime objective in the northern sector of the Eastern Front, it turned Latvia over to the civilian administration of Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories (*Ostministerium*). His realm also included the other Baltic states, which along with White Russia were designated as the *Reichskommissariat Ostland*, including the General District of Latvia (*Generalbezirk Lettland*).²¹ Although Rosenberg’s administrators became the nominal officialdom, other Reich institutions tendered jurisdictional claims, such as Hermann Göring’s multifarious economic offices and enterprises dedicated to unbridled plundering. But of all these competing interests the most

formidable and the most instrumental in determining Latvia's wartime fate was Heinrich Himmler's SS. The SS became preeminent in respect to Latvian military participation in the war, both in matters of organization and deployment.²² As for police matters, the entire spectrum of terror activities, which included the Latvian phase of the Holocaust, also remained Himmler's exclusive domain. All these and other activities raise critical questions regarding Latvian collaboration, war criminality, and the nature of Latvian service to the Germans. These issues already assumed importance during the war, but gained even greater significance after the war when Latvians, both as refugees in the West and at home in Latvia under re-imposed Soviet rule, had to account for their individual as well as collective actions during the German occupation.

German rule began on 1 July 1941 with the entry of German troops in Riga. Although the army was nominally in control, SS-Brigadeführer Walther Stahlecker, commander of *Einsatzgruppe A* and in charge of security, initiated the reign of SS terror.²³ The SS also became involved in the deliberations over Latvian governance. As the result of negotiations between Reich authorities (the SS, the temporary army administration, and Rosenberg's civilians) and several rival Latvian factions, the Germans agreed to no more than a Latvian Self-Administration (*Paspārvalde*). The Latvians had naively hoped for at least political autonomy as an Axis partner, a status similar to Slovakia's, but that would not be.²⁴

The powerless Latvian Self-Administration simply executed German orders. This subservience, falling far short of nationalist expectations, nonetheless allowed the Latvians more latitude than most other peoples of the occupied East. The Latvians never lost hope for greater autonomy, but they had to wait until the tide of war turned against Germany in early 1943. Only then, as their material and manpower needs escalated, did the occupiers concede small doses of autonomy in return for continued Latvian contributions to the war effort.²⁵

The issue of governance elicits the critical question of collaboration. Although the Self-Administration's authority fell far short of effective autonomy, the Latvians could exercise a few limited prerogatives as long as they met German requisition quotas. Surviving members of the Self-Administration claimed after the war that what some deemed as collaboration had in fact mitigated the harshness of the occupation.²⁶ But at what price? The Self-Administration aided the Germans in their economic exploitation, including the requisitioning of Latvian manpower for the Reich labor force. Without Latvian cooperation the Reich could not have extracted nearly so much from Latvia, and it is doubtful that the Latvian people would have suffered any more than they already did if the Self-Administration had been less compliant.

Another aspect of the occupation relevant to the issue of collaboration was the

participation of Latvians in the armed forces of the Reich, specifically the Waffen-SS, as soldiers in the fabled Latvian Legion. Latvian officers trained in the Reich had accompanied the initial military occupation by both Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS troops. These officers, along with others that had hidden in Latvia, anticipated rebuilding a Latvian army that would help restore Latvian sovereignty. Hitler, however, had dictated that only Germans could bear arms in the East. But in contravention of the Führer's ruling, the German army began enlisting Latvian auxiliaries, the *Hilfswillige* or *Hiwis*. And as early as 1 July 1941 the SS armed Latvian volunteers to help maintain order, which at first meant rounding up and executing Soviet officials, Red Army stragglers, local communists, and Jews. From this point on the SS, and not the regular army, commanded most armed Latvians.²⁷

At first thousands volunteered, mostly former soldiers who had survived Soviet rule, and in such numbers that many had to be turned away. The SS organized these willing accomplices into battalions of *Schutzmannschaften* (defense personnel), *Schuma* for short, which eventually were called Police Battalions, a ruse to circumvent Hitler's prohibition against arming non-Germans as soldiers. These units first operated inside Latvia, performing "security" duties, but shortly they crossed the border into White Russia to fight partisans. In October 1941 the first of many Latvian battalions was deployed to Leningrad, which became the principal combat venue for Latvian soldiers.²⁸

When in January 1943 Heinrich Himmler visited the Leningrad front, he was so impressed by the morale, demeanor, and accomplishments of the Latvian battalions that he declared them part of the Waffen-SS and designated them as the 2nd Latvian SS Volunteer Brigade. He then posed the idea of establishing a Latvian Legion to Hitler, who agreed to do so in early February. The Latvian Legion would consist of the 2nd Latvian SS Volunteer Brigade as well as a new Latvian division built of new recruits, the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Division. The Brigade soon was expanded into the 19th Latvian SS Volunteer Division, which along with the 15th Division was combined into the Latvian VI. SS Army Corps.²⁹ Unfortunately for the Germans and the Latvian promoters of the Legion, the founding of the Legion coincided with the reversal of German military fortunes in early 1943. By then the initial luster of volunteering had faded, and enlistments declined. Both Latvian and German recruiters increasingly had to coerce "volunteers" to join, since the Waffen SS preferred to retain its "volunteer" image. Eventually in late 1943 the authorities discarded even the pretense of voluntarism and introduced obligatory induction for Latvians.³⁰

Due to the linkage between Latvian military formations and the Waffen-SS, the question of Latvian membership in the SS became essential. Latvians commanded Legion units up through regimental levels, but at the division level and above the

commanders were German Waffen-SS officers. The highest Latvian position was Legion Inspector General, held by Latvian General Rudolfs Bangerskis. His was not a command position, but rather a liaison post with little to do but look after the welfare and interests of Latvian Legionnaires.³¹ Although distinctions between Latvians and Germans were maintained through the nomenclature of the units, ranks, insignia, and numerous personnel regulations, these were not always honored. Consequently, to the present day controversy whirls around the issue of whether or not these Latvians formally belonged to the Waffen-SS. This issue was critical at the time, since SS status was both an advantage, entitling a soldier to better equipment, more rations, and higher pay, and a disadvantage, especially toward the end of the war when belonging to the SS could result in harsher treatment as POWs or even summary executions. The Soviets already regarded all Latvians fighting for the Germans as traitors, and wearing the SS uniform made matters even worse. In the West the British and Americans at first deemed all SS men as war criminals and the Waffen-SS as a criminal organization. Ultimately, however, they conceded that determining the status and complicity of Baltic SS men was so complicated that they would no longer come under the collective SS criminal indictment, and only individual guilt for known war crimes would be weighed in one's post-war disposition.³²

The issue of voluntarism also came up in determining one's willingness or enthusiasm for the German cause. All of the early Latvian enlistees indisputably were volunteers, but distinguishing the reluctant from the true volunteers becomes less certain for those joining in 1942 and later. With the creation of the Latvian Legion in 1943, obligatory inductions became the order of the day. To exonerate the Legionnaires, apologists for the Legion resort even today to arguments analogous to those offered by German Waffen-SS veterans who distance themselves from SS crimes: they were soldiers fighting against the Russians, and they had nothing to do with SS crimes. But as was true for members of the German Waffen-SS, for whom Waffen-SS service did not preclude service in other SS units, namely in the operation of concentration camps or in the murderous *Einsatzkommandos*, service in the Legion did not exclusively mean conventional soldiering. The first Latvian armed units, the *Schuma* and the Police Battalions, performed precisely those duties later deemed criminal. To this day the nature of the Legion and its participation on the German side remains a contentious issue. At least 110,000 Latvians served with the German armed forces, and of these, just over 32,000 or as many as 87,000 (depending on the definition of the Legion) fought as Latvian legionnaires under the auspices and in the uniforms of the Waffen-SS.³³

Latvian soldiers originally were dispatched all along the Eastern Front. But during the fall of 1941 most *Schuma* and Police battalions were assigned to the Len-

ingrad front. It was along the Volkhov River sector that the Legion came into being and where Latvians would do most of their fighting, until the Russians cracked the Leningrad encirclement and in early 1944 began pushing the Germans back toward the Baltic. The Latvians retreated along with their German comrades, and by July they crossed the Latvian border, pursued closely by the Red Army.³⁴ This time Latvia would not be spared the devastation of war it had escaped in 1941. Latvia went up in flames and down to destruction.

The two Latvian divisions fought an ongoing rearguard action westward across Latvia until by August 1944 the 15th Division was decimated and withdrawn from action. The 19th continued its fighting retreat into southwestern Latvia (Kurzeme or Kurland), and there joined nearly 500,000 Germans to defend an impregnable “Fortress Kurland” that withstood one Soviet assault after another until surrender to the Russians on 8 May 1945. One of the most puzzling questions regarding the war asks why Hitler maintained this isolated Kurland bastion until the very end of the war, only to have it surrender *en masse*, when these forces could have been withdrawn to help defend the Reich itself. One explanation avers that control of the Baltic seacoast secured the development and training of a new class of super submarines that Hitler believed would save Germany at this eleventh hour.³⁵

As for the remnants of the 15th Division, in August 1944 the Germans shipped them to the Reich, where they were replenished with Latvians working in the Reich, regrouped and refitted, and sent out again to halt the Red Army in eastern Germany. During late 1944 and early 1945 these Latvians reeled from one bloody defeat to another and finally quit the war, surrendering unit by unit to the Western allies at the first opportunity. Nonetheless, it was a small group of Latvians from the 15th Division assigned to Berlin that defended the Reich Chancellery and the Fuhrer’s bunker to the very end.³⁶ After the war the survivors of the 15th Division, Latvian conscript laborers, and tens of thousands of civilian refugees – those who had fled from Latvia to Germany after October 1944 – formed the nucleus of the Latvian Diaspora in the West that in the post-war years would challenge Latvians remaining in Latvia under re-imposed Soviet rule for legitimacy and the right to claim continuity with the Latvian national tradition.

One final crucial aspect of the Latvian wartime experience still requires some discussion, namely the Holocaust. During the war Latvia became one of the main venues for the murder of Jews, whether Latvian or from other parts of Europe. Historically the Jews of Latvia had gotten along relatively well with ethnic Latvians – although cultural, social, and religious differences had kept the two groups from assimilating. But except for the 10,000 to 15,000 Jews that managed to escape eastward

as the Germans entered Latvia, most of Latvia's pre-war Jewish community of over 90,000 souls perished during the war at the hands of both Germans and Latvians.³⁷

Although today most everyone concurs that both Germans and Latvians murdered Jews, controversy and debate still surround the issues of Latvian complicity and motivation. Some, including the leading scholar of the Latvian Holocaust, Andrew Ezergailis, conclude that the Germans encouraged the Latvians to kill Jews, and that only small numbers of Latvians responded to these incitements.³⁸ Others, such as Bernhard Press, claim that the murder of Jews by Latvians began spontaneously and needed no prodding from the Germans.³⁹ Many Latvians have justified or explained Latvian culpability in this grim project as revenge for the alleged complicity of Jews in the Soviet takeover of Latvia, and especially for the purported Jewish role in the deportations and murder of Latvians during the year of Soviet terror. While it is true that some Latvian Jews cooperated with the Soviets, many more ethnic Latvians joined the Red occupiers in persecuting fellow Latvians. And in the June 1941 deportations, a larger percentage of the Jewish community in Latvia suffered from Soviet terror than did ethnic Latvians.⁴⁰

Motivation aside, as soon as the Germans arrived in Latvia, pogrom-like attacks on Jews erupted in the cities and spread across the Latvian countryside. Latvians, some commanded by Germans, others by fellow Latvians, arrested or simply rounded up Jews and executed them *Einsatzkommando*-style, that is, by shooting them. Within the first month of the German occupation rural and small-town Latvia was *Judenfrei*, cleansed of all Jews. In the larger cities the survivors were rounded up into ghettos, at least in part operated and guarded by Latvians.⁴¹

By the fall of 1941 orders came from on high to liquidate the ghettos, including the Riga ghetto, and with the arrival of SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln, the choreographer of the Babi Yar massacre of Jews in the Ukraine, the slaughter resumed. In late fall the SS and several thousand Latvian helpers in two separate actions murdered the Jews of the Riga ghetto in the killing field of Rumbuli, a few miles east of Riga. Other liquidations of ghettos occurred at Daugavpils and Liepāja. Having exterminated almost all native Jews, the SS, with Latvian assistance, continued to murder non-Latvian, that is, Western European Jews transported to Latvia for execution. Prior to the mass genocide in the death camps in Poland starting in 1942, the Germans used Riga and its environs as one of the primary killing sites for Europe's Jews.⁴² Latvia also became a principal location for Nazi concentration camps, including some of the largest and most brutal at Kaiserwald and Salaspils. In all, perhaps as many as 240,000 Jews were murdered by one means or another in wartime Latvia, by both Germans and Latvians.⁴³ As a result Latvia lost forever a

cultured, industrious, and highly valuable segment of its diverse pre-war society. As a nation, Latvians also lost much of the moral credit and sympathy they had earned through their own suffering.

Post-war Latvians have had to grapple with this disturbing wartime legacy, the Holocaust in Latvia, which most of them would prefer to ignore. In comparison with other European peoples Latvians have one of the shortest lists of “Righteous Gentiles,” those non-Jews who risked their own lives to save the lives of Jews. But just as the Germans had to assuage their collective guilt and come to terms with this reprehensible part of their wartime legacy in order to forge a new and different Germany, so too must the Latvians. As Latvia regained its independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Latvians have had to face and resolve the issue of their complicity in the Holocaust.

Since 1945 Latvians have had to address tough issues as they reflect on their wartime experience, ranging from participation in the Holocaust to collaboration, both political and military, with the Soviets and Nazis. These and other issues not covered in this brief discussion of the Latvian wartime experience are still being examined as Latvia today seeks to enter an entirely new European state system. This new Europe is far different from the one Latvia left over seventy years ago when it discarded democracy and set out on its tragic and complex wartime journey. It remains to be seen whether today’s Latvia can make the necessary adjustments to become an integral part of the new Europe. Understanding the major issues of its wartime experience will help in this process.

NOTES

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“Crusading Sentimentality”: British Intellectuals and the Clash Over National Self-Determination in Central and Eastern Europe, 1914–1918

Rob McCormick

THE VICTORY OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 signaled that nationality was a proper foundation on which to establish states. Long-lived polities such as the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires had been destroyed and replaced by a bevy of new states and new borders, in the main conforming to national identity. During World War I, however, there had been a vigorous discussion among British intellectuals about the wisdom of breaking apart multi-ethnic states (like Austria-Hungary) to establish new states based upon ethnic identity. To some observers, such as Robert Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed, national self-determination for minorities, especially those in Austria-Hungary, was a progressive ideology, closely linked to democracy and justice as outlined in the writings of J.S. Mill and enunciated in the policies of William Gladstone. National self-determination became the lynchpin for satisfying national demands and thus ensuring future peace. There was, however, a notable opposition, largely forgotten due to the subsequent defeat of its position, which rejected national self-determination as the panacea for Eastern Europe's ethnic turmoil and instead favored the preservation of multi-ethnic states like the Dual Monarchy. These intellectuals, many of them part of various peace movements, believed that establishing states on the basis of nationality would only deepen the ethnic hatreds that were so much a part of the causes of World War I. Austria-Hungary need not be torn asunder to establish a lasting peace in Europe. Following principles established by Lord Acton, this second group of thinkers reasoned that states had to be founded on the basis of natural law, not some arbitrary concept of ethnic identity. They even argued that Great Britain was not fighting World War I to gain the national independence for national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Most of this intense debate about national self-determination has been ignored in part because national self-determination has maintained a certain fashionable cachet. Since 1945, the United Nations has been a consistent advocate for national self-determination through passing several resolutions supporting the ideal. To many casual and well-educated observers, only a fringe element, certainly not a progressive or liberal one, could have favored in the past the preservation of empires in Eastern Europe.¹

Nineteenth-century theories of the nation-state and national self-determination laid the foundation for the arguments voiced during World War I. John Stuart Mill, the leading proponent of national self-determination during the late 1800s, asserted that, "among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government can not exist."² If a single nationality lived within the borders of a state, the best chance for representative government was at hand. Although the concept of the multi-ethnic state was a "noble" idea, Mill argued that it was the antithesis of representative government when nationalities of relatively equal strength resided within the same state. In multi-ethnic states the power to oppress always rested in the hands of the most powerful nationality, and therefore such states failed to foster liberty or stimulate the creation of representative governments. Even individuality was inhibited by multi-ethnic states.³ Mill was not alone in these opinions, which seemed to gain further justification and political sanction from William Gladstone's policy towards the Bulgarians in 1885. Gladstone believed that governments had the duty to protect liberty to foster progress. Morally offended by Turkish atrocities, he furiously condemned the Ottoman Empire and rejected its right to govern the Bulgarians. Gladstone's opinions were significant and influential in Britain, because most wartime theorists on national self-determination there were Liberal Party members or at least sympathetic to its positions. As historian R.B. McCallum observed, "In many [Liberal Party members'] hearts there was a deep-seated conviction that the domination of one people by another on the ground of superior force and on the pretext of superior culture was at best hypocrisy and at worst sin."⁴

Lord Acton thought differently. He feared that a state based on a particular nationality was destined to abuse all those persons who were not part of the majority nationality. The will of the dominant nationality would supersede all other aspects of authority in a state. The dominant nationality would likely form an absolutist state and destroy liberty, instead of recognizing any type of equal political and civil rights. When nationality was the justification for political power, the will of the dominant nationality brought tyranny to the state. To Acton, the best way to prevent authoritarian rule was to establish and nurture multi-ethnic states based on natural law instead of nationality.⁵ "The greatest adversary of the rights of nationality is the modern theory of nationality. By making the state and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary."⁶ Acton also felt that multi-ethnic states stimulated progress by promoting contact between advanced and backward nationalities that, in turn, helped foster peace, understanding, and higher forms of civilizations. To

many Britons weaned on British imperial glory, Acton's arguments made sense. This debate, while critical to Europe's future, did not reach its mature stage until World War I, although the Irish question and Home Rule simmered around it during preceding decades.

As Europe went to war in 1914 under the blue skies of a magnificent summer, questions immediately arose about Allied wartime goals and the war's potential outcomes. Even before British troops reached the front lines, a small but loud minority strongly expressed its disapproval of Britain's entry into the conflict by forming peace organizations. One of the most significant, the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), sought any path to end the war as hastily as possible, including keeping the multi-ethnic empire of Austria-Hungary fully intact.⁷ In fact, ideological battle lines based on the wisdom of national self-determination had not yet been drawn, since most Britons did not entertain the notion of destroying Austria-Hungary for the sake of establishing independent entities nor of hastening the war's end. After all, few in 1914 believed that the war would extend beyond Christmas. It was widely believed by many, including Seton-Watson, the famed East European scholar and later outspoken proponent of national self-determination, that nationalities could be satisfied through autonomy. In the case of Austria-Hungary he believed that a policy of "trialism" – i.e., a constitutional arrangement recognizing autonomy for Austria, Hungary, and a South Slav polity – held many more chances of success than dividing the Dual Monarchy into its constituent parts. Seton-Watson even warned that Austria-Hungary's, "disappearance from the map, so far from settling existing disputes, would create a legion of new and thorny political problems."⁸ Complementary to Seton-Watson's views were those held by Henry Noel Brailsford, a profound opponent of national self-determination. In his 1906 book on the history of Macedonia, Brailsford wrote that, "National freedom and cultural self-expression were the prerequisites of a peaceful international community."⁹ But in Brailsford's opinion national freedom did not necessitate national independence, for it could be reached with some form of federalism. Brailsford, however, came to this conclusion following a different path than many of his contemporaries. He was a socialist who believed in the practicality of establishing a world government or some type of federal arrangement of states that would be the harbinger to peace.

In a similar vein, Gilbert Murray, the brilliant Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford who had served as the teacher of illustrious students such as Arnold Toynbee, Norman Angell, and Brailsford himself, was wary of the enthusiasm that some held for nationalism. Murray argued, as did many of the era, that there were ruling and subject races in the world. Following the Actonian line of thought, he remarked, "I

venture to suggest that if, from the great story of human progress, you were to blot out all that has come to various peoples from contact – and compulsory contact – with higher races than their own, the remainder would be a rather miserable affair.”¹⁰

For the first two years of the war, support for the continuation of multi-ethnic states was widely accepted by intellectuals. The popular classicist at New College, Oxford, Alfred Zimmern, strongly argued that the common adherence to natural law, not the focus on nationality, was the key to the success of a multi-ethnic state. Emphasizing his opposition to national self-determination, he declared such emphasis on maintaining the commonwealth “the most pressing political need of our age.”¹¹ The focus on national self-determination, he reasoned, would lead to jealous independent states feuding about borders, identity, internal minorities and that ilk. Zimmern supported nationality, not as a “political creed,” but as an “educational creed” for peoples living in large multi-ethnic states. He envisioned it as a tool in developing an individual’s psyche while avoiding nationalism’s harsher consequences, such as animosity between differing nationalities.¹² Heterogeneous peoples with a common concept of civic loyalty would be the harbinger of a successful commonwealth or multi-ethnic unit. He explained that the opposite of nationality was not oppression, as theorized by some liberal thinkers, but “spiritual atrophy.”¹³ Zimmern’s views were influenced by his own association with the British Empire as well as extensive trips to Italy and the United States.

Zimmern closed the year 1915 with a blistering assault on national self-determination in a speech delivered before the Sociological Society. He expressed his full distaste for the nation-state, condemning it as “one of the most formidable and sinister forces on the side of our enemies and one of the chief obstacles to human progress.”¹⁴ Zimmern agreed with Acton, who “[f]oresaw that to base government on anything less than a quality common to all the governed, in virtue of their common humanity, was for the State to surrender its moral pretensions and its role as a factor in the moral progress of the world.”¹⁵ Zimmern had support from the political scientist A.D. Lindsay, from L.T. Hobhouse, a professor of sociology at the University of London, and from many other intellectuals who believed that the strength of national identity was fading due to the growth of extensive economic connections between countries.¹⁶ Although Hobhouse was willing to accept state subservience to an international organization, very few saw any movement towards eliminating the state – whether national or multi-national – in favor of a world state as encouraged by socialists like Brailsford. Nationalities did not have to enjoy independence, but they had to willingly accept the state in which they lived, which made Home Rule – as proposed for Ireland – a viable alternative to the creation of nation-states.¹⁷ It was obvious that the Irish Home Rule debate had influenced some of the arguments

surrounding national self-determination for Central and Eastern Europe. By the end of 1915, there was a significant bloc of intellectuals who argued that nationality-based states imperiled the future of a peaceful and progressive Europe. Natural law, which could be accepted by all, should be considered the proper foundation for any state, not some illogical concept of nationality based heavily on Romanticism and ethnic myths. It appeared that Lord Acton's views had won the debate.

As Europe endured the slaughter of 1916 at Verdun and the Somme, however, it became more difficult for Allied governments and public opinion to favor the continuation of multi-ethnic states in Central and Eastern Europe, since the Central Powers enemy was now perceived as sub-human. Calls for independence from national leaders in exile, such as Tomas Masaryk, gained some ground, but the majority of intellectuals continued to favor the maintenance of the Dual Monarchy. The elevation of Karl to emperor of Austria-Hungary in December 1916 only fueled the belief that the war's end could be hastened if Vienna could be detached from Berlin. A federalized Austria-Hungary, rumored to be favored by the new emperor, seemed to be the chief hope for ending the war soon. But Seton-Watson and the famed *Times* reporter and editor Wickham Steed rejected the notion of preserving the Dual Monarchy and instead led the charge for national self-determination, Steed from the onset of war and Seton-Watson from 1915. They even gained adherents like Lewis Namier, at the time a young and somewhat controversial figure who fervently favored Polish independence, in part because of his Polish ancestry. After visiting the Balkans in 1915 and meeting with Serbs and Croats, Seton-Watson became convinced that a South Slav state, independent of Austria, was not only necessary, but practical. In Seton-Watson's influential newspaper, *The New Europe*, founded in 1916 with the urging and assistance of his dear friend Tomas Masaryk, he argued that only a complete victory over the Central Powers, which included a re-drawing of East European borders based on nationality, would provide the opportunity for a lasting peace. To achieve a complete victory, war needed to be waged until the Central Powers were destroyed. Hostility to Pan-Germanism, therefore, became a useful tool in winning the war for national self-determination. Steed, who harbored a deep hatred of Austria-Hungary from his days as a reporter in Vienna, was the most vocal of the bunch, consistently insisting that the war bring about the demise of the Dual Monarchy.¹⁸ It almost went without saying that the Ottoman Empire, the epitome of cruelty and injustice in the eyes of most British intellectuals, was destined for destruction as well.

By this point it was clear that these intellectuals were splitting into two camps. The war had eliminated most thoughts about a middle path that would satisfy national desires without independence, although the British government continued to entertain this

notion. Pacifists and those who opposed Britain's involvement in the war, excepting Alfred Zimmern, were inclined to promote the continued existence of multi-national states. Pacifists such as Charles Trevelyan, Arthur Ponsonby, and the brothers Noel and Charles Buxton – all but the first members of Parliament – were horrified by the war and argued that peace needed to be achieved as quickly as possible. The greatest likelihood for quickly ending the war and establishing a lasting peace, they believed, was to favor merely autonomy for minorities in Austria-Hungary, a policy probably acceptable to Vienna. An Allied demand for national independence of minorities meant that the war would rage until the Central Powers were fully defeated, a prospect that could take many more years. This approach to the minorities question had developed from Liberal Party thought, the Irish Home Rule debate, and a firm belief in ending the Great War as rapidly as possible. The four were convinced that multi-ethnic states were necessary for a lasting peace and cultural progress. They argued that as multi-national states increased in size, the opportunities for general war decreased because the number of friction points between states would decline. In addition, more backward peoples would profit from mixing with more advanced societies. The isolation of nation-states stimulated animosity and a lack of understanding between nationalities.

Seton-Watson, Steed, Namier, Allan Leeper (a government official and newcomer to East European affairs), and others who favored a radically changed Europe formed the other group that believed the nation-state to be the panacea for Europe's troubles. If nationalities were able to practice their culture free from oppression, Europe would not fall into warring nation-states, but would enjoy a democratic and progressive existence. National self-determination and democracy had become intricately linked, thus a new and liberal Europe could only be achieved by fighting the war until pan-Germanism was completely defeated. Only then would a redrawing of borders in Central and Eastern Europe be possible. There was an acceptance, however, especially by Seton-Watson, that a separate nation-state for each nationality in Central and Eastern Europe would not be the final solution. Federations of several national groups – Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croats and other South Slavs – were also under consideration. Such groupings could be justified by arguing that any peace had to be founded on the, "free development of all races, whether as independent states or international minorities."¹⁹

In 1917 and 1918 the tide was slowly turning in favor of the national self-determination forces, in part because its supporters were well-represented in the British government. As early as 1916, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith had requested that the Cabinet War Committee analyze and study the major issues that the Allies would

confront at the end of the war. The committee sought information from important scholars familiar with Central and East European history and politics. The foundation was being laid for the creation of the Political Intelligence Department (PID) in March 1918. The PID would give recommendations to the government that helped craft British post-war policy. Some of the important specialists employed or consulted by the government included Leeper, Namier, Seton-Watson, and Toynbee. All favored national self-determination. Seton-Watson went as far as to compile a list of key works that called for the destruction of Austria-Hungary to be used for propaganda purposes among the British public.²⁰ Among these books were Steed's *The Habsburg Monarchy* and Namier's *The Case of Bohemia*, both titles that vilified the Dual Monarchy and called for its destruction. The key to their policy goals was to demonize Austria-Hungary and to argue that European security necessitated waging the war until the Central Powers were completely defeated. Austria-Hungary's destruction was a necessary component of the policy, because it was argued that Vienna was simply a pawn of Berlin's ambitions. The publication of Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa*, a work that proposed a German-dominated Central and Eastern Europe, had opened the door to fears of Pan-Germanism that were skillfully exploited by *The New Europe* crowd. It was even theorized that new independent states would form a buffer against future German aggression, a theory that would become fraught with catastrophe.²¹

With the war seemingly never ending, war weariness and the desire for an immediate peace prodded opponents of national self-determination to make their most convincing case. Noel Buxton's comments, delivered on the floor of Parliament on 24 June 1917, were indicative of those British intellectuals who hoped to end the war quickly. At that point, it remained unclear whether national self-determination would be accepted officially as a wartime goal, since the British government had hitherto coyly kept its options open. Tired of the war and the fight over nationality, Buxton, a peace supporter and evangelical Anglican (not unusual traits for supporters of multi-ethnic states), admitted that ideologically he favored the creation of nation-states and opposed Germany's aggressive expansion. But as a longtime Balkan hand who had spent much time in Bulgaria, Turkey, and Macedonia, he had seen too much ethnic strife to think that national self-determination would end conflict. Buxton called the obsession with establishing nation-states, no matter the situation, "crusading sentimentality." Since Slav leadership within Austria-Hungary loyal to the empire "advocated the fulfillment of the national destiny as parts of a genuine Eastern Federated State, combining nationalism with Habsburg continuity, there was no reason to fight a long war for the liberation of nationalities."²² Voicing the opinions of almost all who favored the continuance of the Habsburg state, Buxton feared that

new nation-states would face crushing economic problems which would tempt the new states into attacking their neighbors in hopes of securing their existence. Turmoil in Central and Eastern Europe would allow Germany many new opportunities to expand. He could not see how states such as the proposed South Slav State (the future Yugoslavia) could withstand the onslaught of a Germany with several times the population and considerable more resources. These were prophetic words that Buxton would see become all too true in the 1930s and 1940s. He proposed instead that Britain limit its demands to creating a federalized Austria-Hungary with local diets representing the different nationalities. Since the Dual Monarchy had been moving in that direction before the war, it was the best and most acceptable option for all parties. It was also the only hope for bringing the war to a quick end.

As 1918 dawned, few people believed that the war would end by the end of the year. Nation-state advocates were upset by the slow progress for their cause, chiefly because the British government had carefully avoided calling for the destruction of the Dual Monarchy in hopes that it could be separated from its alliance with Germany. Lloyd George's war aims speech delivered at Mansion House on 5 January 1918 continued this British policy. The prime minister spoke of preserving Austria-Hungary while explaining that, "unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for the removal of those causes of unrest. . . ." ²³ Lloyd George's statements and even Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, which called for the "autonomous development" of Austro-Hungarian peoples, seemed timid and halting to advocates of re-drawing the European map. ²⁴ Leeper's response to the Fourteen Points was typical of *The New Europe* supporters. In his diary he wrote, "read Wilson's speech: disappointed over childish demands re Austro-Hungarian Nationalities (autonomy!)." ²⁵ Wilson's suggestion that there was potential for a peace without total victory infuriated *New Europe* supporters, but gave heart to those such as Brailsford and Noel Buxton who had favored an end to the war on this basis.

As German troops were launching their last great offensive of the war, Buxton and Seton-Watson engaged in a heated exchange of articles and letters that clearly defined their views on national self-determination and the war. Buxton could not envision how national self-determination would unleash anything but conflict and hatreds. In one of these exchanges, Buxton declared, "Dismemberment must make several 'Ulsters' subject minorities to the unchecked rule of majorities, and raise in the ports and on the railways difficult problems of communication. Nor could the little states . . . become effectively independent; they would have to lean on greater allies for protection and this implies the guidance of their diplomatic, military, and

commercial policy.”²⁶ Buxton’s friend and colleague Ponsonby echoed Buxton’s remarks explaining that the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary would increase the balkanization of Europe and serve as a prescription for unrest.²⁷

Seton-Watson’s response to Buxton’s arguments was rapid and intense, and even included questioning the editor of *The Contemporary Review* as to the wisdom of publishing Buxton’s anti-national self-determination article. In a response to Buxton, Seton-Watson emphasized that the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was necessary to achieve a lasting and democratic peace in Europe, adding that national self-determination for the peoples of the Dual Monarchy was, “a vital part of any democratic settlement.”²⁸ He saw no evidence of legitimate federal-style reform in the Dual Monarchy, and noted that even Emperor Karl, who had promised a reformed monarchy, repudiated federalism and “has laid down the principle that any reform must respect the existing internal frontiers between the seventeen provinces of which Austria[-Hungary] . . . is composed.”²⁹

International events eventually worked against those who opposed national self-determination and dimmed their hopes. On 11 April 1918, Georges Clemenceau published the Sixtus Letter, which seemed to indicate that Vienna had for months conducted peace negotiations with the Allies without notifying Germany. From Vienna came a series of denials and allegations that the letter was a forgery. The upshot was that any hope for detaching the Dual Monarchy from its German embrace was lost. Another boost to national self-determination supporters came from the Congress of Oppressed Austrian Nationalities, which convened on 10 April 1918. The two day meeting in Rome proclaimed the right of the Dual Monarchy’s subject peoples to enjoy national self-determination. Combined with these events was an avalanche of documents written by the PID that argued for national self-determination. Although these reports all favored the break-up of Austria-Hungary, they now began to focus on the myriad of questions that would arise from a new nationalist order in Central and Eastern Europe, since it was becoming clear that national self-determination was winning. The future League of Nations was increasingly viewed as critical to enforcing peace among the newly-to-be-established small states. It was envisioned that the League would support these new states and help advance their new democracies. It was accepted as fact that once national self-determination was recognized, new nation-states would be democracies. This would prove to be a serious miscalculation. Even some form of supra-national federalism among nation-states in the east was discussed.³⁰

The complete defeat of the Central Powers on 11 November 1918 and the concomitant collapse of Austria-Hungary meant victory for supporters of national

self-determination. The principle of nationality was to be a guiding force for the peace settlement the following year. During the war years, the key arguments about the wisdom of encouraging national self-determination had been fleshed out for the rest of the century. Opponents to national self-determination had doggedly argued that such an ideology would not only lengthen the war, but its implementation would generate future ethnic tensions and wars. They asserted that national self-determination required the creation of numerous petty nation-states with limited economic viability and jealous of their neighbor's possessions. They long predicted that new "Ulsters" would destabilize new states and foment violence. Arguments in favor of founding states on natural law instead of nationality went unheeded. Concerns that ethnicity was being recognized instead of civic values had deeply disturbed these opponents of national self-determination, but because they had been outside of government service and usually supporting peace movements during the War, they had had an uphill battle. On the other hand, proponents of national self-determination had gained considerable momentum by 1916. Government service, wartime events, and national leaders in exile helped them gain victory in this struggle of ideas, even though their opinions remained open to considerable question. Steady efforts from Steed, Seton-Watson and *The New Europe* group overwhelmed opponents of national self-determination. They had successfully utilized fear of Pan-Germanism to argue for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and had simultaneously linked national self-determination to democracy. There was a sense of inevitability that surrounded national self-determination. As J.A. Hobson, the famed economist, political liberal, and opponent of British involvement in World War I, wrote in his memoirs, "'self-determination' had a captivating sound and the liberations of Poland and other nationalities seemed an earnest goal of a new and Liberal Europe."³¹

NOTES

1. Historians have neglected the opponents of national self-determination, emphasizing instead those who favored breaking apart the Austro-Hungarian Empire to form newly independent states based on ethnicity. Discussions of the opponents of national self-determination have been limited to only brief and often oblique mention in books and articles, as in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson's *The Making of a New Europe*. This outstanding work details Robert Seton-Watson's role in trying to convince the British government and public to accept the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, but does not directly examine the arguments of those who strongly opposed his position.

2. John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (London: Harper, 1862; reprint, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1991), 310.

3. *Ibid.*, 310.

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4. R.B. McCallum, *The Liberal Party from Earl Grey to Asquith* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963), 73. For further elaboration on this point see Anthony Morris, *Radicalism against the War, 1906–1914: The Advocacy of Peace and Retrenchment* (London: Longman, 1972), 11–12.£
 5. John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1907), 288–297. Acton’s essay on nationality was first published in *Home and Foreign Review* in July 1862.
 6. Acton, *The History of Freedom*, 289.
 7. *Union of Democratic Control*, September 1914, Arthur Ponsonby Papers, MS.Eng.hist. c. 661. The Ponsonby Papers are housed at the Bodleian Library, Oxford. For more information see Morris, *Radicalism against the War*, 11–12. For detailed information about the UDC see Marvin Schwartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971) and Helena M. Swanwick, *Builders of Peace: Being Ten Years’ History of the Union of Democratic Control* (London: Swarthmore, 1924).
 8. R.W. Seton-Watson, *The Future of the Habsburg Monarchy: Disruption or Reform?*, c. 1913–early 1914, Robert W. Seton-Watson Papers (hereafter RWSWP), Box 1. The Seton-Watson Papers are housed at The University of London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies.
 9. H.N. Brailsford, *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future* (London: Methuen, 1906), 92–93. This landmark work on Macedonia was a product of Brailsford’s keen interest in the Balkans. Between 1897 and 1913, he traveled to the peninsula six times.
 10. Gilbert Murray, “Empire and Subject Races,” in *The Sociological Review*, 3 (July 1910), 227. *The Sociological Review* printed in their entirety Murray’s remarks at the Conference on Nationalities and Subject Races held on 28 June 1910 at Caxton Hall, Westminster. Copies of the speech may be found in the Gilbert Murray Papers, c. 441, housed at the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
 11. Alfred E. Zimmern, “German Culture and the British Commonwealth,” in R.W. Seton-Watson, ed., *The War and Democracy* (London: Macmillan, 1915), 380.
 12. Alfred E. Zimmern, *Nationality and Government: With other War-Time Essays* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1918), 64–67. Zimmern’s address, “True and False Nationalism,” was presented on 28 June 1915 in Swanwick.
 13. *Ibid.*, 67.
 14. Alfred E. Zimmern, *Nationality*, 46. The speech was delivered on 20 November 1915. It also appeared in the *Sociological Review*, 9 (January 1916).
 15. Zimmern, *Nationality*, 47–50.
 16. L.T. Hobhouse, *The World in Conflict* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915), 66–69; A.D. Lindsay, “The Political Theory of Mr. Norman Angell,” *The Political Quarterly*, no. 4 (December 1914), 131–33.
 17. Arthur Greenwood, “The Nature of Nationality,” *The Political Quarterly*, no. 5 (February 1915), 87–89.
 18. Henry Wickham Steed, “The Quintessence of Austria,” *The Edinburgh Review* 222 (October, 1915), 246.
 19. R.W. Seton-Watson, “Balkan Notes,” 9 August 1916, RWSWP, Box 4.
 20. R.W. Seton-Watson, “Subjects of Propaganda re Austria-Hungary,” c. June 1917, RWSWP, Box 6.
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21. Wickham H. Steed, "Austria and Europe," *The Edinburgh Review* 225 (January 1917), 16.
22. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 96 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917), cols. 1175–77. Buxton helped found and was longtime chairman of the Balkan Committee, an influential group of intellectuals with interest in Eastern Europe, especially Macedonia and Bulgaria.
23. G. Lowes Dickinson, ed., *Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims* (December 1916–November 1918) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1919), 113.
24. President Woodrow Wilson's Address to Congress, 8 January 1918, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. 44, 537.
25. A.W.A. Leeper, Diary Entry, 9 January 1918, AWALP, LEEP 1/1. The Leeper Papers are housed at Churchill College, Cambridge.
26. Noel and Wedgewood Buxton, *A Decisive Settlement* (London: Pelican, 1918), 5. A copy of the pamphlet is found in the Charles Rhoden Buxton Papers at Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
27. Arthur Ponsonby, "Just and Reasonable Settlement," c. July 1918, Arthur Ponsonby Papers, MS.Eng.hist. c. 667.
28. R.W. Seton-Watson, "Austria-Hungary and the Federal Solution," RWSWP, Box 6. The article was published in *The Contemporary Review* 113 (March 1918), 257–64.
29. Seton-Watson, "Austria-Hungary and the Federal Solution," RWSWP, Box 6.
30. More information about these discussions may be found in the files of the Foreign Office (F.O.) located at the Public Record Office in London. In particular see: "Situation in: Austria," 12 April 1918, F.O. 371/4358; "The Habsburg Policy," 6 May 1918, F.O. 371/4358; "The Broad Lines of a Balkan Settlement," 2 August 1918, F.O. 371/4366; "Memorandum on Constitutional Reform in Austria," 18 September 1918, F.O. 371/4358. A copy of this last document is also found in the RWSWP, Box 6.
31. J.A. Hobson, *Confessions of an Economic Heretic* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), 114

Traveling Women: Three Mid-Nineteenth-Century South Carolina Female Travelers Abroad

Ann Russell

ONE OF THE ENDURING IMPRESSIONS of nineteenth-century South Carolina is that of the archetypal lily-white southern lady, a lovely vision of beauty, breeding, and charm. The three women in this study – representatives of elite southern womanhood and its glorification of domestic virtues – exemplify this intriguing image. Anna Calhoun Clemson, Harriet Lowndes Aiken and Lucy Holcombe Pickens shared gender, race, and class in common. These women of gentility were among the many of their compatriots who engaged in European travel during the mid-1800s at a time when the popularity of this cultural phenomenon had greatly increased. The expanding American economy could finance long-distance foreign tours by society's elite. And while the voyage across the Atlantic involved considerable expense, time, and potential danger, improvements in transportation technology (the North Atlantic steamships) and in navigational charts shortened the voyage. Once in Europe, American tourists utilized the burgeoning railway networks to facilitate their travels. Although the three subjects in this select sample were among the wave of Americans going abroad, their experiences in Europe were by no means typical, and thus merit our attention.¹ Hopefully this study will provide several more case histories for larger historical inquiries regarding nineteenth-century Americans abroad and the range of activities or experiences open to upper-class American women.

While Anna Calhoun Clemson and Lucy Holcombe Pickens actually established residence in Europe for extended periods of time, Harriet Lowndes Aiken went there on three separate vacation trips. She and Lucy lived in style supported by their rich spouses, while Anna, the mother of two young children, struggled to make ends meet on her diplomat husband's wages. The travel tales of these women are each of interest in their own right and show how individually they graced the European social scene in a manner that surely enhanced the general impression of American women abroad.

In a letter twenty-seven-year-old Anna Clemson told her father, Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, what she felt about the weighty matter of going abroad with the responsibility of two small children at the most troublesome age: "...were I a few years younger or my children a few years older I should enjoy the idea of visiting Europe much[,] but as it is[,] I expect to have more of the fatigues & disagreeables

of travel than the pleasures.” The children – Calhoun at three and Floride almost two years – were not yet old enough to enjoy or even benefit much from the trip that their mother would have preferred not to make. And their care would require much of their mother’s attention. Anna found her husband Thomas Clemson’s diplomatic appointment as *Chargé d’Affaires* to the Belgian royal court – with its obligatory ceremonies and etiquette – to be rather an annoyance more than anything else. Nevertheless, in support of his interest in living once again in Europe, she readied the family in 1844 to leave their Canebrake plantation home in the Edgefield District of South Carolina. They had been there for less than a year.²

Accompanied by a black slave boy (Basil), the Clemsons sailed from New York in September 1844, and after docking at Le Havre then proceeded to Paris en route to Brussels. Within two weeks of arriving in Brussels with his family on 4 October, Thomas Clemson was received privately by the Belgian ruler on 16 October. Their conversation preceded Anna’s own presentation to King Léopold I and Queen Louise-Marie, followed by a dinner at the Belgian royal court.³ While Anna’s letters to her father from Europe gave astute political commentary on prevailing conditions around her in Belgium and throughout much of the continent, her world abroad, as it had been at home, centered around domesticity. Planning to be the instructor of her children, she began at the end of the year to take French lessons to prevent them from feeling the awkwardness and from encountering the difficulties that had beset her since arrival in a foreign land.

A month or so after her presentation at the Belgian court, Anna’s main concern centered around her son’s health, for Calhoun became very ill as the result of an inflammation of the eye. Although she did not at all regret that her son’s sickness prevented her from going out much, she saw there to be an absolute need to mix somewhat in high society as the wife of a diplomat. The attendant social “business” and ceremony, she thought privately, were largely nonsense, yet she determined to participate as gracefully as she could and to enjoy herself when she took the trouble to attend social events. However, the most serious objection to the whole situation, she told her father, was the lack of money, for Thomas Clemson’s annual salary of \$4,500 could not afford even the plainest and cheapest dress. She doubted that they could live off of their income abroad even with the additional \$4,500 outfit allotment for such expenses as appropriate dress and the maintenance of the strictest household economy.⁴

After a few weeks’ visit to Paris in the summer of 1845, the Clemsons resided in the little village of Torveuren during the fall while the house they had acquired in Brussels was being furnished. Provoked by the intolerably slow habits of Belgian

workers, Anna characterized them as dishonest and mean. Aware of the hard character she gave to such people, she nevertheless felt her observation to be just, and thought that her mother would consider the conduct of black slaves to be perfection after six months experience with the white “slaves” of Belgium.⁵ As a member of the American social elite suddenly in contact with the laboring masses abroad, Anna’s snobbery was clearly apparent in her harsh estimation of Belgian workers.

Comfortably settled in Brussels by early November 1845, Anna grew proud both of her husband’s diplomatic success in the negotiations of a commercial treaty between Belgium and the United States, and of the fact that he was “a personal favourite” at Court. She was also pleased at her children’s fine growth and flourishing development. Calhoun was a “saucy little fellow, & full of fun,” and his sister Floride had become “a great bouncing miss, with a round face, & red cheeks.” Though much humored by both parents, Anna, in truth, however, could not say that they were spoiled.⁶

News from home in January 1846 about conditions at Canebrake pleased the Clemsons; Anna was especially glad at what her mother had to say about the welfare of the slaves. She often felt quite sad lest they should be neglected or mistreated by their overseer. Solicitous for their safety, she showed genuine, albeit elitist, concern for those whom she considered racially inferior. Anna always staunchly defended the South’s “peculiar institution.” Critical talk regarding slavery irritated her since she felt that she had never seen in all her life in the South the amount of suffering and misery that she saw all around her abroad in one month. The German *émigré*, Karl Marx, who at this same time prepared to launch his career in Belgium as a revolutionary writer and agitator, might well have agreed with Anna’s perception of the plight of the poor. “Make your working classes in Europe as happy as our slaves,” Anna said to all who mentioned the subject to her, “& then come back to me, & we will talk about the abolition of slavery.”⁷

After almost a year-and-a-half abroad, domestic demands, her assumption of secretarial duties for the American legation, and the acceptance of social invitations for evening affairs took up all of Anna’s time. Needing more money to keep from going into debt – her family did not even keep a carriage during the winter – she thought the U.S. government should provide funds for whomever did their work. Anna worked primarily to help her husband, who now had taken over the consular business at Antwerp in addition to his assignments for the legation in Brussels. At that time a small vocal fringe group of feminists in Europe and the United States felt that women should be paid for whatever job they did, but the abolitionist ideals that in part characterized the early movement of feminism would have made it abhorrent to such a staunch defender of slavery as Anna. Raised as a southern lady to be

submissive and domestic, she also would surely have taken exception to the public behavior of female activists.⁸

In the meantime Anna, always the dutiful mother, watched her children grow. In the spring of 1846 she characterized them to her father as very hearty and lively, and by the fall she found them to be “quite smart enough, & quite good looking enough” to suit her as their mother. She was glad that they were so healthy and happy despite their wild romps about the house that often tried her patience during the morning lessons’ hour.

The commencing of fine spring weather in 1847 made Anna more homesick than ever as her thoughts turned to the fresh country air at her Calhoun family’s Fort Hill plantation back in South Carolina. However, in keeping with her father’s advice and example she determined to content herself with things as they were, even if she did not find living in Europe more agreeable to her taste. Her own personal feelings aside, she was pained by the thoughts of so many “suffering fellow beings” in her midst. The poorer classes hard hit by the potato famine during the long and severe winter of 1847 caused her concern. An unjust political system contributed to the “immense disproportion in the classes of society,” she wrote to her father.⁹ Her reaction against monarchical rule in Europe was a common one among American southerners even at a time when their concept of “republicanism” did not necessarily embrace the ideal of equality, but instead countenanced its contradiction in the practice of slavery.

From all that Anna could learn, the outbreak of revolution in Paris in February 1848 resulted in a lamentable state of anarchy. For her part, she thought the French too corrupt and their republican ideals too wild to have any confidence not only in France’s future, but in French leadership for solving the great problems of government throughout the continent. With all Europe in agitation, she felt it impossible – like everyone else – to say where things would be in six months.

Despite this most unsettled state, Clemson applied for a leave of absence to return home to attend to business at his Canebrake plantation and to visit his ailing mother in Philadelphia. By August 1848 Anna was in the midst of preparations for her family’s departure for America. Remembering the pleasure of seeing her loved ones at home once more, she tried not to think of all the suffering and fear that she faced on the long sailing voyage ahead. (The preferred passage by steamer proved to be too expensive.)¹⁰ After a six-months’ stay in America, the Clemsons sailed back to Europe. They encountered a stormy thirty-six days’ crossing made even more anxious when the children came down with measles. The long and tedious journey ended in July 1849 with their arrival back in Brussels. There Anna was much occupied with

settling her family in a smaller but more comfortable house with a garden where Calhoun and Floride could play.

During her almost four years abroad Anna felt gratified to have been treated with the greatest kindness by everyone in Belgium, including the king. She believed, she told her father, that Americans living in Europe who asserted an independent spirit could nonetheless be respected and well received if they avoided hurting the feelings of those with whom they sincerely differed. The puzzling state of things in Europe, she continued, appeared to be one of political corruption in which the silly policies of all parties displayed ignorance. She now had no patience any more to read about politics.¹¹

Anna mentioned to her father early in 1850 a very complimentary notice of her husband and herself in a newspaper description of a beaux-arts ball. In the midst of the winter merriment of balls and parties that she found to be “as tedious as a twice told tale,” she was invited, she wrote to her brother Patrick, to “walk a quadrille” with the Crown Prince (the future King Léopold II). Although until then she had never danced in Brussels, the request was one that she could not refuse.¹² Anna’s last letters to her father, who had served in the U.S. Senate since 1845, pictured her children as healthy and strong. Much distressed to hear of their grandfather’s illness, they sent him “a thousand kisses,” at the same time that Anna bade him “Adieu” and, joined by Clemson, sent him their love.

A little over two months after the 31 March 1850 death of John C. Calhoun, his father-in-law, Clemson proposed privately to the Secretary of State John Clayton the desire for a leave of absence in the United States. Receiving no response from Clayton before the latter’s retirement in July, Clemson contacted Clayton’s newly appointed replacement, Daniel Webster, but received from him an official denial to his request in September. Although Clemson was also notified of the upcoming appointment of a new *Chargé d’Affaires* for Brussels in December, he had already made arrangements to spend the winter in Europe and did not leave for home with his family until the spring of 1851.¹³

Although initially reluctant to go abroad, Anna had proved herself capable of coping with the challenges of her European experience during her Belgian years. Dutifully following her husband, she had cared for her family in a foreign land while detailing for her father the intricacies of politics in Belgium and throughout much of the continent. Supportive of Clemson’s diplomatic endeavor and devoted to Calhoun and Floride’s development, she was proud of his success and pleased at their growth. Despite her disinterest in the pomp and ceremony of the Belgian royal court, she was presented there in style, accepted with good grace obligatory social

invitations, and even danced with the Crown Prince at a beaux-arts ball in Brussels. However, homesick for her family in America and “dear old Fort Hill,” she longed to return to her own beloved country, as all the “luxuries & splendours of Europe” were no compensation for what she had left behind.¹⁴

Unlike Anna Calhoun Clemson, who went abroad for six years to do her domestic duty as a wife and mother, Harriet Lowndes Aiken, one of Charleston’s grandest hostesses, journeyed to Europe three separate times. She traveled under circumstances quite different from those experienced by Anna, and her purposes also differed. Harriet went to Europe primarily for pleasure, intellectual and cultural enrichment, and in order to purchase items for her house at 48 Elizabeth Street. She was well-educated, spoke three foreign languages, and played several musical instruments. As a member of Southern planter society she traveled to Europe with her husband, William Aiken, Jr., taking - as the essayist Wendell Garrett put it - “the intellectual Grand Tour and making the cultural pilgrimage” along with a number of other Charlestonians. Upper-class Americans like the Aikens traveled to Europe not only to vacation as rich people, but to pursue the desirable elements of gracious and refined living.¹⁵

Harriet’s town house at 48 Elizabeth Street had been inherited by her husband in 1833, two years after their marriage. Almost immediately after acquiring the residence, the young couple began to remodel the more than fifteen-year-old structure by enlarging it in the Greek Revival style then fashionable. Leaving behind the renovations they had just started, the Aikens traveled in 1833 to Paris where they bought household furnishings and especially crystal and bronze chandeliers.¹⁶

Upon their return visits to Europe in 1848 and again in 1857, the Aikens were mainly interested in the fine arts and began to acquire one of Charleston’s noteworthy collection of sculpture and paintings. On their trips abroad they made notable purchases of the works of Salvator Rosa, David Teniers, Carlo Marratti, and Michelangelo. Their most significant acquisitions, works of sculpture bought mostly in Florence and Rome, included such surviving pieces as *Mary Magdalene* by D. Menconi, an unsigned *First Grief*, and busts of *Proserpine* and *Shepherd Boy* by, respectively, the American artists Hiram Powers and Edward Sheffield Bartholomew. Considered to be connoisseurs, the Aikens were among those collectors who supported the new Carolina Art Association developed, according to art historian Maurie D. McInnis, in the belief of its founders that a “picture gallery [w]as an important feature of modern city life.” During their trip to Europe in the 1850s, an art gallery in the ornate popular Rococo Revival style was added to the Aikens’ home in their absence; floor plans were mailed to them abroad so that purchases could be made with specific

measurements in mind. A smaller scale copy in marble of Antonio Canova's *Venus Italica* was bought to fill one of the statuary niches in the newly built gallery. By this time William Aiken, who had served as South Carolina's governor and a member of the U. S. House of Representatives, had become one of the state's wealthiest planters. According to the 1850 slave schedules, he owned 878 slaves.¹⁷

A small travel notebook kept by Harriet Aiken during her trip to Europe in 1857–58 gives at least a glimpse of some of the places where she stayed, the sights that she saw, and the people whom she met. Of special interest are the sometimes rapid travel pace, the frequent changes of venue, and the demanding social schedule of her European tour. Accompanied by her husband, twenty-one-year-old daughter Etta, and, in all likelihood, some personal slaves, she left from New York on 19 August 1857 on the British Steamer *Persia* bound for Liverpool. Traveling by train to London after a few days in Manchester (where she attended an art exhibition), Harriet Aiken stayed in the metropolis for only one day before going on to the Isle of Wight. There she was visited by U.S. Minister Dallas's wife as she prepared to depart, once again by steamer, for the continent, where she took the train to Paris. With an admittedly excessive number of trunks packed in three carriages, she arrived at the very magnificent Hotel du Louvre. Although disappointed in not securing the services of a French maid, she saw many acquaintances as well as U.S. Minister Mason prior to her departure for Cologne on 19 September en route to Berlin.¹⁸

Visiting palaces and public buildings for seven days in the Prussian capital, Harriet Aiken also met with U.S. Minister Wright and was honored to be introduced to Count Datzfeldt, a member of the German nobility, before leaving for Leipzig at the end of the month. After one night at the Hotel de Pologne, where a band of musicians serenaded the guests of the restaurant in the evening, she proceeded to Dresden and arrived at the Hotel Bellevue. In that city's main painting gallery she met friends from home, notably members of the Izard family as well as John and Caroline Preston, accompanied by their widowed sister-in-law, Ann Fitzsimons Hampton. Following their visit in Dresden, the Aikens left by rail for Prague, the capital of Bohemia in the Austrian Empire.¹⁹

After a day's train trip from Prague, Harriet Aiken began her stay in Vienna on 10 October at the Hotel de l'Imperatrice Elisabeth. She was invited to dine by U.S. Minister Jackson, later attended the ballet and opera, and spent several days touring churches and galleries in the Austrian capital before leaving by train for Graz and Trieste on the way to Italy. On traversing the Adriatic Sea at night, she had a very stormy and unpleasant passage before arriving in Venice in the middle of the afternoon of 23 October. Harriet spent a week there sightseeing from a gondola, and

admired the beautiful churches and their paintings. She then left Venice by rail for Verona and Mantua before continuing on to Milan.²⁰

After a week in the capital of the province of Lombardy, Harriet traveled to Tuscany and Florence for about a six-weeks' stay at the Hotel d'Italie. Settled in Rome just before Christmas, she found Lewis Cass still the U. S. Minister there and attended what she described as a "very stupid" reception given by his wife. Leaving by coach for Naples on 25 February 1858, Harriet found the trip's postillions or mounted guides to be very annoying; the beggars in the town of Gaeta proved also to be a serious nuisance. Once safely lodged in Naples, one of the favorite destinations with travelers on the Grand Tour, she took excursions to Pompeii and Mt. Vesuvius, where continuing small eruptions fascinated her and other tourists. Other outings made during her month-long stay in the Neapolitan environs were to Sorrento, Salerno, and Paestum, where she observed that she did not find the ruins there worth seeing after what she endured to get there.²¹

The Aikens spent Holy Week back in Rome, attending Palm Sunday services at Saint Peter's. Leaving the "Eternal City" within a few days, the Aiken party went by carriage to Siena, where they took the train to Pisa, and then resumed their travels by coach along the Mediterranean to Genoa. Harriet Aiken's travel notebook ends with her departure for Nice, but notations made inside the back cover indicate that from May to August she wrote letters from Paris and London to friends and family back home.²²

While Harriet Lowndes Aiken was ending her "Grand Tour" of Europe in the summer of 1858, Lucy Holcombe Pickens, the third wife of Anna Calhoun Clemson's wealthy cousin Francis, arrived in Liverpool with her husband. A South Carolina planter and politico, he was the newly appointed U.S. Minister to Russia. The steamship *Persia* that had brought Harriet abroad a year earlier was the same one that carried Lucy, Francis, two of his daughters, two slaves, and an official secretary across the Atlantic. Traveling as a bride, the twenty-five-year-old Lucy suffered misgivings at the last minute about going so far away from her beloved family in Texas. Persuaded to go by assurances from the Cunard fleet's Captain Charles Judkins that he and the ship would bring her home if she wanted to come back after they landed, she was actually invigorated by the seven-day passage that made the rest of her party seasick. Enjoying the attention and companionship of her fellow passengers on board, Lucy arrived in Europe hoping to dazzle the most magnificent court on the continent.²³

Beginning with her steamship passage to Europe, Lucy started to send to the *Memphis Eagle and Enquirer* unofficial letters that gave the newspaper's readers interesting details about her activities abroad. (Lucy's original hometown of LaGrange,

Tennessee, was about fifty miles from Memphis.) As the primarily descriptive personal accounts of a diplomat's wife, Lucy's letters testified to her own privileged experience and represented the most simple form of the nineteenth-century travel chronicle. Lucy's letters to the *Memphis Eagle and Enquirer*, for which she received no monetary remuneration, exemplified what William Stowe's work on European travel in nineteenth-century American culture cites as "the only respectable public channel for the voice of the supposedly private and domestic female."²⁴ While Southern upper-class women would have looked askance at the marketing of a woman's literary skills, Lucy's letters were written within the realm of genteel respectability.

During a several days' stay in England, Lucy enumerated and embellished with details the events that she attended. While enjoying London's beautiful sights, she was nevertheless not sorry to leave, for she found that there was nothing charming about the comfort of an English hotel. In Paris, a city Lucy portrayed as the lovely capital of fairy land and pleasure, she was received by Emperor Napoleon III and regaled the readers back home with an elaborate description of her court dress. Nevertheless she complained in a letter to her mother from Berlin that the stay in Paris was nothing but dresses and balls, and vowed that her love for the simplicity and affections of home would not be changed by European society and its pretensions.²⁵

Boarding a ship at Stettin on the Baltic after spending a day in Berlin, the Pickens party sailed to Russia. Upon their arrival on the morning of 6 July at the port of Kronstadt, a short distance from St. Petersburg, Lucy reported a strange sensation that came over her as she stood for the first time on Russian ground. The sight of men with long beards and in strange foreign dress, coupled with the confused sounds of such unfamiliar speech, made her feel truly isolated for the first time.

Lucy did not meet the Romanov ruler, Czar Alexander II, and his wife, the Czarina Marie, until an imperial dinner and ball held in mid-July at the Peterhof Palace. To an undoubtedly impressive audience at home she described both her dinner and ball gowns of silk and lace, the magnificence of six palace drawing rooms leading into a large ballroom, and the grand entrance of the emperor preceded by a blast from a silver trumpet.²⁶ Easily enamored by feminine charm, the middle-aged Alexander, though not a natural flirt like Lucy, became infatuated with her uncommon beauty. Often invited to sit in the Imperial Box at the Opera and ride in the royal carriage to the theater or ballet, she enjoyed the czar's hospitality during that first summer of new experiences in Russia and even developed a friendship with his wife.

Apparently quite proud of the interest shown to his wife by the Russian ruler, Francis Pickens wrote to her mother early in 1859 that at a large ball the Emperor had singled Lucy out to converse with him on a special stand reserved for the imperial

family. Honored in such a way seldom seen concerning a foreigner, Lucy was, her husband said, soon paid special attention by all in attendance at court. News of her pregnancy prompted the czar and czarina in mid-February to provide the Pickens family with living quarters in the Winter Palace during the confinement period. The palace guns sounded and the imperial band performed in celebration when Lucy gave birth to a baby girl on 14 March 1859, and with all the fanfare befitting a royal child she was later christened Eugenia for Lucy's mother.²⁷

Although Pickens had promised Lucy that she could spend the fall and winter of 1859–60 in Rome in lieu of returning to America to see her sick mother, he sent her with an escort in October to enroll her thirteen-year-old stepdaughter in a German boarding school. Upon her return to St. Petersburg from Frankfurt, the homesick Lucy, who missed the companionship of her family back home, had come to feel the "miserable emptiness of European society," much as Anna Clemson earlier had felt high social ceremonies to be such nonsense in Belgium. Although Anna and Lucy had lived abroad under quite different circumstances, both had been received with great kindness at ruling courts, yet neither had lost her republican perspective in the midst of pomp and ceremony.²⁸

Not only was Lucy ready to return to America, but Francis, who was eager to take part in the political events that would decide the future of the United States, also wanted to leave Russia. He resigned his post in St. Petersburg in April 1860, but was unable to finalize arrangements for the trip home until fall. Leaving from Southampton by steamship on 23 October, the Pickens entourage arrived home on 5 November. The country they had left in peace was now upon their return on the brink of civil war between unionists and secessionists. The Pickens family's arrival in New York was noted in the *Charleston Mercury* of 8 November, the same issue that announced the election of Abraham Lincoln as President.²⁹

As travelers to Europe in the nineteenth century, Anna Calhoun Clemson, Harriet Lowndes Aiken, and Lucy Holcombe Pickens were representative of the elite in South Carolina white society, and each in her own way made an impact abroad. Anna's loyal support of her husband and loving devotion to her children must have been obvious to all who knew her in Belgium. Harriet's purchases of paintings and sculpture, all acquired with her husband while touring Europe, resulted in one of the most acclaimed fine arts collections in Charleston and undoubtedly earned her the respect due to a connoisseur, both at home and abroad. Twenty-six-year-old Lucy, though like Anna homesick for her family back in America, captivated Czar Alexander II and the opulent Russian court with her beauty and charm. Certainly all three individuals not only graced the European scene, but also surely contributed in their

unique ways to the general impressions made by and experienced by American women who travelled abroad in the mid-nineteenth century. Finally, their experiences in a variety of female roles – homemaker, mother, helpmate spouse, amateur newspaper correspondent, art connoisseur, and high society “ornament” – illustrate the range of options open to an upper-class American woman of that era.

NOTES

1. William Stowe, *Going Abroad: European Travel in Nineteenth Century American Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), xi, 8.
2. Anna Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 1 June 1844, in Julia Wright Sublette, “The Letters Of Anna Calhoun Clemson, 1833–1873,” vol. 1 (Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University, 1993), 382. Hereafter Sublette.
3. John W. Rooney, Jr., *Belgian-American Diplomatic And Consular Relations 1830–1850* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1969), 189, 196. Clemson to Calhoun, 17 October 1844, in *Despatches From United States Ministers To Belgium, 1832–1906* (Washington: The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service General Services Administration, 1950), *Microcopies of Records in the National Archives: No. 193, Roll 4, Volume 3*, 17 October 1844 – 8 January 1851. See also Alester G. Holmes and George R. Sherrill, *Thomas Green Clemson: His Life And Work* (Richmond, Virginia: Garrett & Massie, Incorporated, 1937), 8.
4. Anna Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 1 June 1844, and 5 December 1844; in Sublette, vol. 1, 381 (n. 1), 387–389.
5. Anna Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 5 September 1845, in Sublette, vol. 1, 397–99.
6. Anna Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 10 November 1845, in Sublette, vol. 1, 402–4.
7. Anna Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 24 January 1846, in Sublette, vol. 1, 405–6. She apparently believed that African American slaves were generally content with their condition! See also Bruce Mazlish, *The Meaning of Karl Marx* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 60–62.
8. Anna Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 24 January 1846, in Sublette, vol. 1, 405–8. See also Kathryn Kish Sklar, “Women who speak for an entire nation,” in Jean Fagan Yellin and John C. Van Horne, eds., *The Abolitionist Sisterhood: Women’s Political Culture in Antebellum America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Sklar notes American female abolitionists’ appearance on the international scene at the World Antislavery Convention in London in 1840. There the rejection of female delegates by their male counterparts resulted in the eventual organization by Lucretia Mott (a delegate), and Elizabeth Cady Stanton (the wife of a delegate), of the first separate women’s rights convention at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848.
9. Anna Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 20 April 1846, 27 September 1846, and 11 April 1847, in Sublette, vol. 1, 411–12, 416–17, 420–22.
10. Anna Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 18 April 1848 and 7 August 1848, in Sublette, vol. 1, 432–33, 435–37.
11. Ernest McPherson Lander, Jr., *The Calhoun Family and Thomas Green Clemson: The Decline of a Southern Patriarchy* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1983), 120. Thomas Clemson

to John Clayton, 11 July 1849, in *Despatches From United States Ministers To Belgium, 1832–1906, Microcopies of Records in the National Archives: No. 193, Roll 4, Volume 3*. Anna Calhoun Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 12 August 1849 (Anna’s underlining of her maiden name in this letter is in response to her father’s request that she drop the “M” for Maria in her signature and, instead, substitute the “C” for Calhoun.); Anna C. Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 26 October 1849, in Sublette, vol. 1, 452–53, 457–58.

12. Anna C. Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 22 January 1850, and Anna C. Clemson to Patrick Calhoun, 1 February 1850, in Sublette, vol. 1, 463, 465.

13. Anna C. Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 18 February 1850 and 4 March 1850, in Sublette, vol. 1, 468, 470. Thomas Clemson to John Clayton, 9 June 1850; Thomas Clemson to Daniel Webster, 9 August 1850; Thomas Clemson to Daniel Webster, 25 December 1850, in *Despatches From United States Ministers To Belgium, 1832–1906, Microcopies of Records in the National Archives: No. 193, Roll 4, Volume 3*. Rooney, *Belgian-American Diplomatic and Consular Relations 1830–1850*, 222.

14. Anna C. Clemson to John C. Calhoun, 20 April 1846 and 27 September 1846, in Sublette, vol. 1, 411, 415.

15. The author toured the Aiken-Rhett House on 21 March 2003. See also Maurie D. McInnis, *In Pursuit of Refinement: Charlestonians Abroad 1740–1860* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 6, 35, 49, 228, 292, 317; Stowe, *Going Abroad*, 5.

16. The brochure, “The Charleston Museum’s Aiken-Rhett House,” (Charleston, S.C.: The Charleston Museum, n.d.) can be found in the Aiken Family Genealogical File, Reference 30-04, South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, S.C. See also McInnis, *In Pursuit of Refinement*, 3. The brochure, “The Charleston Museum And Its Historic Houses – The Aiken-Rhett Mansion” (Charleston, S.C.: The Charleston Museum, n.d.) is in the personal possession of the author. The Aiken Family Bible, Index (Charleston, S.C.: Charleston Museum, Historic Charleston Foundation, 2001), 43, in Box #80, Aiken-Rhett Collection, Charleston Museum. This index was made available by Katherine A. Saunders, Coordinator of Preservation Initiatives for the Historic Charleston Foundation, 40 East Bay, under whose auspices it was begun in 1999, four years after their acquisition in 1995 of the Aiken-Rhett House property from The Charleston Museum.

17. McInnis, *In Pursuit of Refinement*, 49–51, 228, 317. “The Charleston Museum And Its Historic Houses – The Aiken-Rhett Mansion.” Miscellaneous, Index, 44, in Box 90, Folder A, Aiken-Rhett Collection, Charleston Museum. N. Louise Bailey, Mary L. Morgan, Carolyn R. Taylor, *Biographical Directory of the South Carolina Senate, 1776–1985*, volume 1 (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1986), 40.

18. McInnis, *In Pursuit of Refinement*, 228 (n. 6). Mrs. William Aiken’s travel notebook, Aiken-Rhett Collection, Charleston Museum, courtesy of Katherine Saunders, Historic Charleston Foundation, 1. Aiken Family Bible, Index, Aiken-Rhett Collection, Charleston Museum, 43. To date there is no definitive documentation on the number of slaves traveling to Europe with the Aikens in 1857; Valerie Perry, Museums Operations Manager, Historic Charleston Foundation, telephone conversation, January 15, 2005.

19. Mrs. William Aiken’s travel notebook, 1.

20. *Ibid.*, 1–2.

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21. *Ibid.*, 3–4. See also McInnis, *In Pursuit of Refinement*, 196.
 22. Mrs. William Aiken's travel notebook, 1, 4–5.
 23. John B. Edmunds, Jr., *Francis W. Pickens and the Politics of Destruction* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 139–40. Elizabeth Wittenmyer Lewis, *Queen of the Confederacy: The Innocent Deceits of Lucy Holcombe Pickens* (Denton, Texas: University of North Texas Press, 2002), 74, 77–79.
 24. Jack Thorndyke Greer, *Leaves from a Family Album* (Waco: Texian Press, 1975), 63. Emily L. Bull, "Lucy Pickens: First Lady Of The South Carolina Confederacy," *Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (1982), 5. Stowe, *Going Abroad*, 10, 56, 61.
 25. Greer, *Leaves from a Family Album*, 63–64, 66–67. Lewis, *Queen of the Confederacy*, 82. Lucy P.H. Pickens to her Mother, 2 July 1858, in Francis Wilkinson Pickens Papers, The South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
 26. Lucy P.H. Pickens to her Mother, 2 July 1858. Greer, *Leaves from a Family Album*, 67, 70–71.
 27. Greer, *Leaves from a Family Album*, 52, 74–75, 98; see 77–78 for F.W. Pickens to Mrs. Beverly Holcombe (the last part of a letter). Lewis, *Queen of the Confederacy*, 102–104. Bull, "Lucy Pickens," 10.
 28. Lewis, *Queen of the Confederacy*, 104–106. Edmunds, *Francis W. Pickens*, 143. Lucy Pickens to Mrs. E. Greer, 20 December 1859, in Greer, *Leaves from a Family Album*, 85.
 29. Edmunds, *Francis W. Pickens*, 142, 144–46, 148.

“Toppling”—or Revising?—Statues and Monuments: The South Carolina State House and Grounds as a Case Study

Marcia G. Synnott

THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HOUSE GROUNDS overwhelmingly honor the history of the Confederacy and the white male political and military figures who controlled the state for most of the past 336 years. On the Gervais Street side of the State House, for example, is the Soldier Monument to Confederate Dead in the Civil War (erected in 1879) and a Confederate battle flag on a recently erected thirty-foot flagpole. On 1 July 2000, a protracted political battle had resulted in the removal of the Confederate Naval Jack from the State House dome. The stereotypical Confederate emblem—red, with blue cross and white stars—had flown over the State House under a February 1962 resolution of the General Assembly for the Centennial celebration of the Civil War, which probably also signified opposition to national civil rights legislation. In reaction to white legislators’ continued insistence on flying the Confederate flag, the national NAACP had called, on 15 July 1999, for economic sanctions against the state, which particularly affected its tourism business. While African Americans, civil rights groups, and Mayor Joe Riley of Charleston marched for its removal, Confederate Heritage groups clamored to keep the flag flying. After a growing number of South Carolina political, business, and professional leaders (Governor Jim Hodges, former Governor David Beasley, the State Chamber of Commerce, and university and college presidents) favored removal of the Confederate flag, the state Senate, followed by the House, approved a bill to remove the Naval Jack. However, at the insistence of such legislators as Senator Glenn McConnell of Charleston, a replica of the Army of Northern Virginia battle flag was raised on a flagpole behind the Confederate Soldier Monument in plain view of virtually anyone traveling down Gervais Street. As a result, the flag issue still “bedevils” South Carolina.¹¹

On the other side of the State House, the Pendleton Street side, the Confederacy is commemorated by an equestrian statue of General Wade Hampton III, Confederate infantry and cavalry leader, which was erected in 1906. A few hundred feet away, white women’s contributions to the Confederacy are effusively extolled by a monument “reared by the men of their state 1909–11.” Monuments to famous twentieth-century political figures are easily located: U.S. Senator “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman’s statue (1940), erected on the Gervais Street side; Governor James F. Byrnes’s statue (1972), near the corner of Gervais and Sumter streets; and U.S. Senator Strom

Thurmond's statue (1999), erected on the Pendleton Street side. Inside the State House, a statue of antebellum U.S. Senator John C. Calhoun dominates the second floor hall. This version of history based on the pervasive notion of white male supremacy is in the process of revision, but much still needs to be done to show visitors a more accurate, balanced, and inclusive history.

In February 2005, I met with reporter Robert Kittle for an interview at the statue of former governor and U.S. Senator Benjamin Tillman, on the right side of the Soldier Monument to Confederate Dead, facing Main Street. The inscription on the base of the statue honored him for supporting the establishment of Clemson and Winthrop colleges in the 1890s. Kittle was researching a story in connection with a bill passed by the South Carolina House that would prohibit the future naming of state roads, bridges or interchanges after a living person. He pointed out that someone so honored could later be proved to have said or done something that would dishonor the state. For example, the House had to pass a bill to remove the name of former Comptroller and Lieutenant Governor Earle Morris from a highway after he was convicted of securities fraud. Mr. Kittle wanted my reaction to Senator Tillman's statue, given the senator's open advocacy of disfranchising and lynching African Americans. I replied that "the sad, tragic thing is the 1890s marked an upsurge in lynching, into several hundred a year" and that lynching occurred in South Carolina until the 1940s. While we were talking, a group of students from Fairforest Middle School in Spartanburg that was touring the State House came to Tillman's statue. Kittle asked what they thought about Tillman after reading the inscription. They thought he must have been a man who helped South Carolinians, but were distressed to learn of his virulent racism. One African American student declared that he was "so wrong."²²

After the students left, I showed Kittle historian James W. Loewen's book, *Lies Across America: What Our Historic Sites Get Wrong*.³³ Tillman's statue is number 15 on Loewen's "Twenty Candidates for 'Toppling,'" because he was "one of the most racist people commemorated on the American landscape." As a U.S. senator, Tillman denounced President Theodore Roosevelt's invitation to Booker T. Washington to dine at the White House for its challenge to white supremacy. It "will necessitate our killing a thousand Negroes in the South before they will learn their place again." Unabashedly, Tillman justified the ruthless exclusion of African American men from the franchise: "We stuffed ballot boxes. We shot them. We are not ashamed of it."⁴⁴

Tillman's statue had been one of the most recent additions to the State House grounds when African Americans started demonstrating for their civil rights in the early 1960s. On 2 March 1961, more than two hundred high school and college stu-

dents, in groups of twelve to twenty, marched from Zion Baptist Church on Washington Street to the State House. Entering the grounds, they would have passed by the Tillman statue, the Confederate Soldier Monument, and the Monument to Spanish-American War veterans erected in 1941. This monument to veterans of a later war commemorates American imperialism “in the War with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, and the China Relief Expedition 1898–1902.” The African American marchers had their own mission in South Carolina. Carrying placards which stated “I am proud to be a Negro” and “Down with segregation,” the students planned to submit a protest to the citizens



Confederate Memorial

of South Carolina, along with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina, our feelings and our dissatisfaction with the present condition of discriminatory actions against Negroes, in general, and to let them know that we were dissatisfied and that we would like for the laws which prohibited Negro privileges in this State to be removed.

When they failed to stop marching after circling the building once, police arrested 187 students, among them future Congressman James Clyburn and two NAACP adult leaders, South Carolina Conference of NAACP Branches field secretary Rev. I. DeQuincey Newman and AME minister Benjamin Glover.⁵⁵

After a night in jail, the black students were released on bail. Convicted of breaching the peace, they were sentenced to a fine of \$100 (\$50 for minors) or thirty days in jail. Appealing their convictions through the South Carolina courts up to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the students had behaved in an orderly fashion at all times, attorney Matthew J. Perry argued that those who disrupted traffic were spectators, none of whom were arrested. Perry developed a trial record, said Legal Defense Fund attorney Jack Greenberg, who was also assisted by NAACP attorney Constance Baker Motley, that was “a jewel” and which left little doubt the demonstrators were peaceful and orderly. Persuaded by their arguments, the Supreme Court,

in an eight to one decision, on 25 February 1963, issued writs of *certiorari* reversing the South Carolina courts. First Amendment freedoms are protected, said Justice Potter Stewart, by the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents a state from using a “vague and indefinite” common-law statute to punish “the fair use of the opportunity for free political discussion.” This Supreme Court judgment was followed, on May 20, 1963, by its ruling on seven cases, most arising from the 1960 sit-ins in six states including South Carolina, which extended broad protection to peaceful demonstrations in business places serving the public.⁶⁶

Since the ruling, peaceful demonstrations on South Carolina’s State House grounds have become frequent, notably since the 1990s against the flying of the Confederate flag above the dome and for equal funding for public schools. Meanwhile, political moderation in South Carolina elevated both Rev. Newman and attorney Perry to higher offices. By a special election in 1983, Rev. Newman became the first African American state senator since Reconstruction, an achievement commemorated by his portrait in the Senate Chamber. About a mile away, Perry’s judicial career as the Deep South’s first black federal district judge is commemorated by the Matthew J. Perry, Jr. United States Court House at 901 Richland Street. In the courtyard, a seated statue of the judge and the standing statues of three children seem to symbolize a more optimistic future for young African Americans. Just as elections modify South Carolina’s political landscape, so also do new structures and monuments revise perceptions of its public spaces.

After finishing the interviews at Tillman’s statue, Kittle and I went inside the State House, where we discussed John C. Calhoun’s statue on the second floor. On the wall near his statue is a marble plaque commemorating the 1860 Ordinance of Secession, a consequence of Calhoun’s advocacy of state sovereignty and the nullification of federal laws. Number 7 on Loewen’s list for “toppling” are all statues of Calhoun, whom he describes as a politician “without redeeming characteristics” because of his defense of slavery and, ultimately, of “treason.” Loewen proposes removing statues of Calhoun “to museums from Marion Square in Charleston, the South Carolina State House, Calhoun College at Yale, the United States Capitol, and wherever else he sits in a place of honor.” Though one may take strong issue with Calhoun’s political philosophy and slave owning, he remains an important sectional, even national, figure because of the offices he held and his speeches, writings, and correspondence.⁷⁷

In addition to the Tillman and Calhoun statues, Loewen targets markers that claim General William T. Sherman’s Union soldiers burned Columbia on 17 February 1865. Architect James Hoban’s State House, completed in 1790, was a casualty of

the fires that in actuality were caused by retreating Confederates, stragglers, some drunken Union soldiers, and a high wind on smoldering cotton bales. Loewen also criticizes other South Carolina monuments, among them the one erected at Gettysburg in 1965. This monument does not mention the divisive issue of slavery as a major cause of the Civil War in its salute to “men of honor” who “might forever know the responsibilities of freedom” and who fought for “their heritage and convictions” and for “the sacredness of states rights.”⁸⁸

Number 13 among his candidates for “toppling” are monuments to “Afro-Confederates” that imply “many African Americans fought for the Confederacy,” which, he claims, is “a lie,” since they were not allowed to fight until 13 March 1865. Both the monument in Darlington, South Carolina to Henry “Dad” Brown and the 1895 obelisk “To the Loyal Slaves” in “Confederate Park” at Fort Mill, South Carolina, perpetuate the views of former Confederates that their slaves were devoted to the Lost Cause. The monument to Brown, included in the State Historic Preservation Office’s publication on “African American Historic Places in South Carolina,” commemorates him as a veteran of three wars: Mexican, Civil, and Spanish-American. However, Brown, who enlisted in 1861, was not an armed soldier. He was a drummer, first in the “Darlington Grays,” Co. F, 8th S.C. Infantry and then in Co. H, 21st S.C. Infantry. After he died in 1907, Darlington citizens, impressed by his “rare true worth,” erected a monument to him. In 2000, the City of Darlington Historical Landmarks Commission erected a historical marker. Loewen directed even more criticism at the inscription on the Fort Mill obelisk (not included in “African American Historic Places in South Carolina”) commending slaves “who, loyal to a sacred trust, toiled for the support of the army, with matchless devotion, and with sterling fidelity guarded our defenseless homes, women, and children, during the struggle for the principles of our Confederate States of America.” To illustrate its message the carvings on the obelisk showed a field hand under a tree and a mammy holding a white child. Monuments to loyal slaves like this one fail to acknowledge the growing resistance among slaves to the Confederacy and the thousands who supported the Union armies. In contrast to these pro-Confederacy monuments, Loewen noted that a marker in Beaufort commemorates Robert Smalls’s heroism in turning over the Confederate gunboat, *Planter*, to the Union military.⁸⁹

Historians can agree with many of Loewen’s criticisms of monuments and markers that sentimentalize history and ignore its harsh realities. However, I also told Kittle that I did not agree with “toppling” statues, but with revising their interpretation, which can be done in several ways. The place to begin is the State House and its grounds. First, the official websites should be revised to include the negative actions and white supremacist statements of Benjamin R. Tillman, John C. Calhoun,



African American Memorial

James F. Byrnes, and J. Strom Thurmond. Second, another plaque should be placed near these statues with a revised interpretation that puts their words and actions in historical context. During their career, they spoke to the racist sentiments of white southerners, but not to African Americans. Third, the assigned textbooks in South Carolina history courses should include the whole truth about former white political leaders so that students are aware of them before visiting the State House. Some revising has already occurred on the base of Strom Thurmond's statue, erected in 1999, which Kittle and I visited last. Quite conspicuous is the addition of the name of a fifth child, "Essie Mae," the daughter he fathered as a 22-year-old with Carrie Butler, then a 16-year-old housekeeper for the Thurmond family in Edgefield. This "editing" was the result of the seventy-eight-year-old Essie Mae Washington-Williams coming forward after Thurmond's death to reveal, on 17 December 2003, that the senator was her father. However, though she was the eldest, her name is chiseled after and below the names of his four white children.¹⁰¹⁰

The major revision of the history presented on the State House grounds developed from African American activism. On 11 May 2000, the African American History Monument Association broke ground for a privately funded \$1.1 million monument, the first to African Americans on any statehouse grounds.¹⁰¹¹ Dedicated on 29 March 2001, sculptor Ed Dwight's granite and bronze monument stands two stories high and is twenty-five feet wide. It tells the story, in twelve bronze panels with inscriptions and relief figures, of African Americans from slavery through the modern Civil Rights era. The figures do not literally represent any particular historical or living figure, but they do call to mind African Americans important in the state's history. Participating in the dedication ceremony were Union re-enactors and African American re-enactors, who presented flags for the Pledge of Allegiance, the Hallelujah Singers, and poet

Nikky Finney, who read a special poem for the occasion. Politicians and about four hundred people attended.¹²² Although the African American History Monument is situated only several hundred yards from the Confederate Soldier Monument and battle flag, the historical and psychological distance between these two monuments is far greater than their geographical distance. A worthwhile cultural goal will be to bridge their historical and psychological distance through a more accurate, balanced, and inclusive interpretation.

Today, African Americans have portraits in the State House, their own history monument on the State House grounds, and a federal courthouse dedicated to their most distinguished judge. Though the Confederate Naval Jack no longer flies over the dome, the cultural battle continues, as African Americans and Confederate heritage groups compete for public space and recognition. Given the contested public spaces at the State House and elsewhere in South Carolina and at other southern state capitols, one may hope that visitors learn the histories represented by their portraits, statues and monuments. The task of historians and other scholars is to provide an accurate context and interpretation. What should portraits, monuments, buildings, and flags really teach us?

NOTES

1. Joseph S. Stroud, "How it happened: Timing was key on flag," *The State*, 25 June 2000, A1, A10; and "The Confederate Flag: A Look Back," A10. Joseph Stroud, "Day of Change, Crowds expected at State House today"; Kenneth A. Harris, "Patterson's tenacity finally pays off," *The State*, 1, July 2000, A1, A7. See also Kevin Alexander Gray's criticism of the Confederate flag controversy in South Carolina, the Confederate monuments surrounding the State House, and the controversial statues of John C. Calhoun, General Wade Hampton, Benjamin Ryan Tillman, Senator Strom Thurmond, and Dr. James Marion Sims in "Dispatches from South Carolina: Same As It Ever Was," *CounterPunch*, ed. Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, 2 May 2000, <http://www.counterpunch.org/scflag.html>.
2. Robert Kittle, "Roads Named for Living People Not the Only Controversial Ones," News Channel 7, Friday, 25 February 2005, originally posted for News Channel 7, Spartanburg, at http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WSPA/MGArticle/SPA_BasicArticle/SPA_BasicArticle&cid=1031781249746. John Monk denounced Tillman's legacy in "Steeped in history: Tillman leaves legacy of fear, hatred," *The State* series on the "Long Road to Justice, The Civil Rights Movement in South Carolina," 2 March 2003, published in connection with 5-8 March Citadel Conference on The Civil Rights Movement in South Carolina, Charleston, <http://www.thestateonline.com/civilrights/day1/civilrights02.php>.
3. See James Loewen's *Lies Across America: What Our Historic Sites Get Wrong* (New York: New Press, 1999), particularly 15-50, 443-54, 455-67.
4. Loewen, *Lies Across America*, p. 466. See Benjamin Ryan Tillman - South Carolina Governor - 1890-1894, <http://www.sciway.net/hist/governors/tillman/html>.

5. *James Edwards, Jr., et. al., Petitioners, v. South Carolina*. 372 U.S. 229, 9 L. Ed. 2d 697, 83 S. Ct. 680 [No. 86]. *United States Supreme Court Reports*, October Term, 1962, 699, 701-3, 697-708. Martin Oppenheimer, "Columbia, South Carolina," *The Sit-In Movement of 1960*, Preface by David J. Garrow, in *Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1989), 155-57. Paul S. Lofton, Jr., "Calm and Exemplary: Desegregation in Columbia, South Carolina," in Elizabeth Jacoway & David R. Colburn, *Southern Businessmen and Desegregation* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 75-76, 70-81. (Columbia) *State*, 3 March 1961, 1-D.

6. *James Edwards, Jr., et. al., Petitioners, v. South Carolina*. 372 U.S. 229, 9 L. Ed. 2d 697, 83 S. Ct. 680 [No. 86]. *United States Supreme Court Reports*, October Term, 1962, pp. 698, 701-3, 697-708; *Edwards v. South Carolina*, 83 S. Ct. 680, 372 U.S. 229, 9 L. Ed. 2d 697, *West's Federal Practice Digest*, 2d, Vol. 14, Constitutional Law 268 to 277 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1980), p. 419. The Supreme Court overturned the convictions of demonstrators and sent the sit-in cases back to the lower courts for rehearing. I thank Dr. Robert J. Moore for sending me a copy of his paper, "Bridge Over Troubled Waters: Matthew Perry and the Civil Rights Movement in South Carolina," presented at the 65th annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association, Fort Worth, Texas, 4 November 1999. Jack Greenberg, as quoted in Moore, "Bridge Over Troubled Waters." WIS-TV News, 25 February 1963, 6:30 p.m.; WIS-TV News, 20 May 1963, 11:05 p.m., report by Don Upton; and WIS-TV News, 10 June 1963, 6:30 p.m., transcripts, courtesy of Joe Wieder, Ways and Means Corporation, 1231 Lincoln Street, Columbia, S.C. (WIS-TV film footage has been donated to the University of South Carolina).

7. Loewen, *Lies Across America*, 463. *The Papers of John C. Calhoun* have been published in twenty-eight volumes, supported by the National Historical Publications and Records Commission. Most of the volumes of this documentary edition, whose first volume appeared over fifty years ago, were ably edited by Clyde N. Wilson from 1969 to 2003, with the assistance of associate editors Shirley B. Cook and Alexander Moore.

8. Loewen, *Lies Across America*, 279-81, 287; 371-77.

9. *Ibid.*, 465; 273-79, and n. 2, 278. He also argues that the marker to the Beech Island Agricultural Club near Augusta should be revised to tell "how the antebellum South really worked," given that its original name was the Beech Island Agricultural and Police Society. It instituted the "notorious 'patroller' system" to apprehend slaves who left their master's plantations to go to area towns (272, 268; 268-73).

10. "Essie Mae On Strom Thurmond," 17 Dec. 2003, CBSNews.com at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/17/6011/main589107.shtml>. See also Essie Mae Washington-Williams and William Stadiem, Dear Senator: *A Memoir by the Daughter of Strom Thurmond* (New York: Regan Books, An Imprint of HarperCollins Publishers, 2005). A portrait of Governor Thurmond is in the state Senate Chamber.

11. Personal observations by the author, who attended the groundbreaking ceremony on 11 May 2000. The portrait of Benjamin Mays, president of Morehouse College, has been placed in the House Chamber. Two African American women have also been honored by portraits in the State House. The first was Mary McLeod Bethune, born in Mayesville, South Carolina in 1875, who became a renowned educator, president of the National Association of Colored Women, and member of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Black Cabinet." She was inducted into the South

Carolina Hall of Fame in 1983. The portrait of civil rights activist Modjeska Montieth Simkins was hung in the House Chamber in 1995 and her house at 2025 Marion Street has been restored and now serves as the office of The Collaborative for Community Trust.

12. <http://www.usca.edu/aasc/AAMonument.htm>; "The African American History Monument" brochure with photos courtesy of Sam Holland, available at the State House's first floor public entrance; and Charles B. Tyer, ed., "Minorities in South Carolina Politics," *South Carolina Government: A Policy Perspective* (Columbia, SC: Institute for Public Service and Policy Research, 2003).

A Notice to Contributors Concerning Style

The editorial committee invites submission of manuscripts from authors of papers presented at the annual meeting. On the recommendation of reviewers and editors, manuscripts may be published in *The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association*.

In general, manuscripts should not exceed 4500 words (about eighteen double-spaced pages) including endnotes. As soon as possible after the annual meeting, authors should submit two paper copies and one electronic copy to the editors for review. The electronic copy should be submitted as an email attachment in Word for Windows or WordPerfect for Windows format. Email addresses for the editors follow this note. The electronic text should be flush left and double-spaced, with as little special formatting as possible. Do not paginate the electronic version of the paper. All copies should use 12-point type in the Times New Roman font. Place your name and affiliation, along with both electronic and postal contact information, on a separate page. The title of the paper should be at the top of the first page of the text, in bold type. Please use margins of one inch throughout your paper and space only once between sentences. Indent five spaces without quotation marks all quotations five or more lines in length.

Documentation should be provided in endnotes, not at the foot of each page. At the end of the text of your paper double-space, then type the word "NOTES" centered between the margins. List endnotes in Arabic numerical sequence, each number followed by a period and space, and then the text of the endnote. Endnotes should be flush left and single-spaced. If your word-processing program demands the raised footnote numeral, it will be acceptable. Foreign words and titles of books or journals should be italicized. For the rest, *The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* adheres in matters of general usage to the fourteenth or fifteenth edition of *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

Editors:

Robert Figueira, Lander University, figueira@lander.edu

Steve Lowe, University of South Carolina, lowesh@gwm.sc.edu

Minutes of the Seventy-fourth Annual Meeting 4 March 2006

The South Carolina Historical Association held its seventy-sixth annual meeting on Saturday, 4 March 2006 at the South Carolina Archives and History Center in Columbia, South Carolina.

Registration was conducted from 8:30 a.m. until 9:30 a.m., with coffee and baked goodies available to attendees. Concurrent sessions began at 9:30 a.m.

Session I (9:30 – 10:45 a.m.)

A. Religion's Role in South Carolina History (Wachovia II & III)

- “‘People Were Organized When Christ Was on Earth:’ The Role of Religion in Support of Textile Mill Strikers in Spartanburg County, South Carolina” – Alexis Thompson (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
- “Charleston’s Waterfront Evangelism, 1820–1860” – Lance Bodrero (College of Charleston)
- “Antebellum Reform in the Postbellum South: The National Temperance Society and Publication House and the Freed People” – H. Paul Thompson, Jr. (Lander University)

Commentator: Thomas Brown (University of South Carolina, Columbia)

B. New Aspects on the Civil Rights Struggles (Auditorium)

- “Topplin’ or Revising Statues and Monuments: The South Carolina State House and Grounds” – Marsha Synnott (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
- “Past the Boiling Point: Protest, Politics, and the Riot at Lamar High School” – Santi Thompson (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
- “Media Coverage of Student Protests: The 1960s Rock Hill Sit-in Movement and the May 1970 University of South Carolina Activity” – Andrew Grose and Mark Evans (Winthrop University)

Commentator: Robert J. Moore (Columbia College)

C. Photographers and Film (Wachovia I)

- “Images of African Americans in the Jim Crow South” – Jackie Booker (South Carolina State University)
 - “Cameraman of the Carolinas: H. Lee Waters and *Movies of Local People*” – Stephanie Stewart (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
- Commentator:* Beth Bilderback (South Caroliniana Library)

Break (10:45 – 11:00 a.m.)

Session 2 (11:00 a.m. – 12:15 p.m.)

A. A European Potpourri (Auditorium)

- “A Small State in a Big War: Writing the History of Latvia in World War II, the Principal Issues” – Val Lumens (University of South Carolina, Aiken)
- “The Inner Relationship of Reason, Faith and Revelation in St. Thomas Aquinas” – Lincoln Mullen (Bob Jones University)
- “‘Crusading Sentimentality:’ British Intellectuals and the Clash over National Self-Determination in Eastern Europe, 1914–1918” – Rob McCormick (University of South Carolina, Upstate)

Commentator: Linda Hayner (Bob Jones University)

B. Athletics is History, Too (Reference Room)

- “Title IX and Women’s Sports at the University of South Carolina” – Elizabeth West (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
- “Athletic Archives in Southeastern Conference Universities” – Geoff LoCicero (University of South Carolina, Columbia)

Commentator: Steven Tuttle (South Carolina Department of Archives & History)

C. 19th Century Politicians (Wachovia I)

- “Going There to Demand Our Rights: Wade Hampton, III – Politician for the Conservatives, 1865–1890” – Fritz Hamer (South Carolina State Museum)
- “Senator Sam: The Senatorial Career of Sam Houston” – Joseph Stukes (Francis Marion University)

Commentator: James O. Farmer (University of South Carolina, Aiken)

Break (12:15 – 12:30 p.m.)

Luncheon, keynote address, and annual business meeting (12:30 – 2:00 p.m.)

Following a delicious buffet luncheon, Treasurer Rodger Stroup welcomed the SCHA members to the Archives and History Center and introduced the keynote speaker, Dr. Charles Lesser (South Carolina Department of Archives & History), whose address was titled, “The Story Behind the Records: Selected Moments from the History of the State Archives.”

President Robin Copp called the business meeting to order at 1:35 p.m.

Robin welcomed all members and guests, and extended thanks to all who had worked to plan the annual meeting, especially Rodger Stroup, Tracy Power, Cynthia Banks Smith, and Shelia Clause. She expressed the appreciation of the Association to Dr. Lesser for his keynote address.

Secretary’s Report – Ron Cox commented on the sporadic publication of the Newsletter, pointing out the difficulties of getting Association members to share information and news items. He urged the new president to “prod” him (not too gently, if necessary) to make sure the Newsletter is published in a timely manner in the coming year. He also requested that any members who chose to e-mail information for inclusion should mention “SCHA” in the subject line of the e-mail, as USC Lancaster is encouraging everyone to delete without opening e-mails that arrive from unfamiliar addresses.

Treasurer’s Report – Rodger Stroup discussed the Association’s finances, noting that the organization is solvent despite a small deficit the previous year. (In 2005, the SCHA sponsored a dinner but folded its regular meeting into a larger conference co-sponsored with the South Carolina Historical Society and the Department of Archives and History). He distributed copies of the report to members.

Special Report – Jim Farmer (USC Aiken) referred to his report as “a plea.” In his service to South Carolina’s Membership Committee of the Southern Historical Association, he urged those in attendance to consider becoming members of the SHA. The 2006 meeting of the SHA will be in Birmingham, Alabama.

Election of Executive Board – The following slate of candidates for the SCHA Executive Board was presented:

President	Bernard Powers (College of Charleston)
Vice President	Joyce Wood (Anderson University)
Secretary	Ron Cox (USC Lancaster)
Treasurer	Rodger Stroup (SC Department of Archives & History)
At-Large	Andrew Myers (USC Upstate)
At-Large	E.E. “Wink” Prince (Coastal Carolina University)
At-Large	Tracy Power (SC Department of Archives & History)

Co-editors for <i>The Proceedings</i> :	Stephen Lowe (USC Extended Graduate Campus) Robert C. Figueira (Lander University)
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Announcements

The 2007 Annual Meeting of the SCHA will be Saturday, 3 March at Coastal Carolina University.

With no additional business to consider, the meeting adjourned at 1:41 p.m.

Self-guided tours of the Center’s Museum and Gallery (2:45 – 5:00 p.m.)

Session 3 (2:30 – 4:00 p.m.)

A. Viewpoints of 19th Century South Caroliniana (Auditorium)

- “The American Code of Honor: John Lyde Wilson and Nineteenth Century Dueling Manuals” – Dennis Matt Stevenson (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
- “Peculiarly Suited for the Services of the Institution: Slavery at South Carolina College” – Graham Duncan (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
- “Traveling Women: Anna Calhoun Clemson, Margaret Fuller, Harriet Lowndes Aiken, Lucy Holcombe Pickens: A Select Sample of Nineteenth Century Female Travelers Abroad” – Ann Russell (Clemson University)

Commentator: Constance Schulz (University of South Carolina, Columbia)

B. Race in New Deal South Carolina (Wachovia II & III)

- “Properties Associated With Segregation in Columbia, South Carolina, 1880–1960: The Township Auditorium” – J. R. Fennell (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
 - “Reinterpreting South Carolina History: The South Carolina Negro Writers’ Project, 1936–1937” – Jody Graichen (German Village Society, Columbus, OH)
 - “Properties Associated With Segregation in Columbia, South Carolina, 1880 – 1960: The A. P. Williams Funeral Home” – Lauren Ham (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
 - “Books for Everyone: The W.P.A. Library Demonstrations Project in South Carolina, 1935–1943” – Georgette Mayo (Avery Institute)
- Commentator: Robert Weyeneth (University of South Carolina, Columbia)

C. Cultures in Conflict (Wachovia I)

- “ ‘bound to live and die in defence of their country’: Conflict and Community in Cherokee Country” – Tyler Boulware (West Virginia University)
 - “Unworthy of Modern Refinement: The Dissemination and Disintegration of English Cultural Influence in Lowcountry South Carolina and Georgia, 1750–1830” – Hunt Boulware (University of Cambridge)
 - “Free–Soilers and Forty–Eighters: The Anglo– and German American Campaign Against Slavery in Western Texas, 1854–1856” – Mischa Honneck (University of Heidelberg)
- Commentator: Michael Nelson (Presbyterian College)

Respectfully submitted,

M. Ron Cox, Jr.
Secretary, South Carolina Historical Association
USC Lancaster

