In April 1877 Wade Hampton, III, Confederate military hero and, now political “savior,” declared to a Columbia crowd on his return from Washington that they should “…forget we are Democrats or Republicans, white or colored, and remember only that we are South Carolinians.” Although Hampton may have used some political hyperbole to soothe a fractious electorate, the now undisputed governor of the Palmetto State, wanted to convince the white Democracy that blacks, most of them former slaves, should be allowed to participate in the political process. Of course the litmus test for this to happen had to be that African Americans repudiate the Republican party. This party, which in the minds of most South Carolina whites had corrupted and nearly ruined the state since 1866, had championed the rights of the former slaves. While white Democrats appeared united in their hatred of the Radical Republican regimes of Reconstruction, their rule had ended in 1877 and now Hampton offered an olive branch, of sorts, to those whom he had reviled for over a decade. And most of Hampton’s Democratic allies supported the former general’s overtures since they expected that African Americans would have few alternatives. But some allies of the Hampton in 1876 disagreed. Thus former Confederate officers, Matthew C. Butler and Martin Gary, had no patience for reconciliation with blacks. The battle for the state government, for the very integrity of a white South Carolina, in their minds, was to eliminate all opponents, white or black, making sure that the reviled Republicans, but most particularly political participation of all non-whites. Did Hampton believe his prestige and personal qualities strong enough that he could overcome such powerful hatreds or was his Columbia rhetoric just that, something to offer the opposition until he and his lieutenants could eliminate them completely from the political arena? This paper will review his motives and relations with people up to the election of 1876 and argue that perhaps there was a little of both. But in the final analysis
Hampton represented white resurgence and retrenchment, and while he may have believed that former slaves could be a part of the political process, it was only on the terms of Hampton and his white lieutenants. In their minds only whites had the ability, indeed the very right, to govern the state. But to find out what led Hampton to his redeemer leadership role in the crucial election of 1876, one must first review his background.¹

Until secession, Hampton had little to suggest that he would be embroiled in contentious politics. Although his grandfather had held prestigious military posts, first in the Revolution and later in the War of 1812, and his father also attained distinction in the latter war, the family focus was to attain land, slaves and wealth. By the time Wade, III, was born in 1818 he became part of one of the most privileged families in the American South. The Hampton family already controlled vast acreage in the South Carolina Midlands, owned hundreds of slaves, and made millions dollars from growing cotton. They had few social or economic peers. Wade Hampton, III, was not just a wealthy son of a prominent family, but well educated and traveled, having attained a degree from South Carolina College and toured extensively in Europe and the Northeast during his young adult life. Nonetheless his most important station in life was to become a successful plantation manager who would direct a vast estate of cotton lands from which great wealth would continue to be derived. In 1843 he began to manage the family plantation in Mississippi that included 12,000 acres and nearly one thousand enslaved workers. Between these holdings and those in the Midlands of South Carolina, Hampton traveled regularly to manage both. His favorite activities, hunting and fishing, could also be assuaged in such endeavors. Like his father and grandfather, Wade, III, viewed politics as a secondary role in society that he reluctantly assumed. In 1852, for the first time, Richland District constituents elected him to the South Carolina House of Representatives and, six years later, the same voters elevated him to the State Senate. In neither did he distinguish himself, rarely speaking while serving on legislative committees on Federal relations, agriculture, and redistricting. And not until his last years

¹ The author wishes to thank Jennifer Fitzgerald, a colleague at the South Carolina State Museum, for reading this paper and providing valuable comments and suggestions.
in the antebellum legislature did he even speak out on major issues before the legislature. In short it seems that he served in the State House because his social position required it.²

Such modest political ambitions began to change, as the rift between North and South grew more intense at the end of the 1850s. Hampton spoke out against John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry in fall, 1859, warning that if the North did not condemn the radical abolitionist the Union could not survive. Although he did not lead the charge, when Lincoln became the standard bearer as the Republican presidential nominee, the South Carolina planter supported plans for a secession convention if the Illinois lawyer were elected. He not only voiced his support for such a body but also joined the Minutemen, groups of men in many communities around the state that supported secession prior to the elections. Throughout the fall campaign season these groups held public demonstrations in their own regalia and wrote a manifesto supporting secession. In the wake of Lincoln's election victory, Hampton continued to support calling of a convention although he was not elected to that body. But when the state seceded, Hampton immediately offered his services to defend the newly independent "nation." But in the midst of the crisis, as South Carolina faced off against the federal government over the status of Fort Sumter at the mouth of Charleston harbor, Hampton saw fit to leave the state in March, 1861, to check his holdings in Mississippi. It was after his return to the Palmetto State two weeks after Sumter surrendered, that Hampton began to organize his now famous Legion. Not only its founder, the planter-turned-soldier became the Legions financier, using his vast wealth to pay for its soldiers’ uniforms, equipment, and firearms. By late spring the Confederate high command ordered Hampton’s Legion north to defend the newly anointed capitol in Richmond, Virginia.³

Hampton’s many exploits as a military leader, first of his legendary Hampton Legion and then as cavalry commander, are well known. After the Confederate armies reorganized in spring, 1862, the Legion was split up and its commander became a subordinate under the renowned cavalry general, Jeb Stuart. Upon this legendary figure's death in May, 1864, Hampton's distinguished service and abilities led to his promotion as Stuart's successor as commander of all Confederate cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia. During his long
and distinguished service, the South Carolinian received many wounds in daring attacks against federal cavalry and infantry from Manassas and Gettysburg to Petersburg. In the last months of the war Hampton went home in a doomed attempt to stop William T. Sherman’s march through the Carolinas. Loyal and determined to war's end, Hampton’s resilience seems more tragic because of his own personal losses. First his brother, Frank, fell mortally wounded at Brandy Station in June, 1863. Then more than a year later, one of his sons, Preston, was killed in an engagement near Petersburg. To compound these tragic deaths, at the war's end Hampton's family home at Millwood, just outside Columbia, was burned to the ground by Sherman’s troops. Likewise his holdings in Mississippi, including three steam cotton gins and 4,700 bales of cotton were lost. Perhaps Hampton’s greatest capital loss, however, was the more than one-thousand enslaved workers who now were free. The state’s most distinguished Confederate military commander, in spite of all his dedication to the Southern cause, found himself virtually destitute financially, if not emotionally. Despite his best efforts Hampton could only recover a small portion of his holdings following his declared bankruptcy in 1868.

In the midst of such personal and capital losses Hampton was slow to accept the new social and political order dawning on post-war South Carolina. Although he rejected immigration to South America or Europe that some of his former Confederate comrades had done, he was slow to reconcile himself to the Confederacy's demise. In summer, 1866, he told his former commander in chief, Robert Lee, that, “I am not reconstructed yet...” and declared to his former commander-in-chief that, “Time will prove that you have not fought in vain.” While such attitudes are understandable it is clear that Hampton would not easily concede that four years of bloodshed and personal loss had been a national and personal waste.

As the defeated Confederate tried to cope with his own personal loss, the political and economic changes occurring within his state became more alarming. For a brief period it appeared that former Confederates would be able resume the reigns of power with the blessings of President Andrew Johnson. But a Republican Congress soon refused to accept Johnson's lenient terms for the former Confederacy and reversed Presidential
Reconstruction with a series of laws in 1866. Instead they imposed severe restrictions on most of the old leadership and required the Southern States to accept former slaves as equals on the political and social arenas for the first time. This was an affront, if not worse, to most whites such as Hampton. And they soon showed their opposition.

Hampton expressed this bitterness to President Andrew Johnson in greater detail. He denounced what he perceived as a vindictive Congress that was led by Radical Republicans who usurped their authority and ignored the constitution by forcing the Southern states to adopt the 13th and 14th amendments without due deliberation of its respected leaders. To Hampton the amendments were forced upon the South illegally. Somehow Hampton could not accept that Congress responded to thwack the South Carolina legislature who the previous year passed a series of “Black Codes” that severely restricted the movement of freedmen and, essentially, returned them to a life of servitude, which they had recently left. Nor could Hampton see the purpose of what he called a corrupt Freedmen’s Bureau and “a horde of barbarians- your brutal negro troops” that imposed law and order in the South. Such organizations were an effrontery to whites, but especially to former slaveholders who had had virtual life and death mastery over blacks barely a year before. Such a response was natural for men like Hampton who had grown up and been taught that only they had the ability, the right, to govern the affairs of their state. Now that former slaves were free men who Congress had given political rights, Hampton could not fathom such a monolithic shift in social position, even if his beloved South was defeated.

His bitterness slowly waned in the following months but Hampton remained true to his upbringing as a planter and former slaveholder. Even though he advocated limited political rights for freedmen he advised his white friends that they could still control the state legislature by controlling the black vote. Like planters of the antebellum era, Hampton and most of his class could not conceive that former slaves had the ability to behave rationally in the political arena. In a sense former slaveholders believed, metaphorically, that freedmen were still imbued with secondary status as they had been in slavery. African Americans needed people like Hampton to instruct and “prevent” them
from harming themselves. Such a conclusion came from a paternalistic, racist assumption that blacks were unable to think for themselves or realize their own best interest. By 1867 he told James Connor, a fellow Confederate veteran of South Carolina, that it was the duty of "every Southern man" to secure the "good will and confidence of the negro." But it was acceptable to send blacks to Congress since Hampton considered that they could be trusted more than "renegade[s] or Yankees." In conclusion he advised that "respectable negroes" should be recruited. Presumably this meant freedmen that whites knew could be relied upon, whether by bribery or intimidation, to accept and serve Southern whites in a loyal, ie. subordinate manner.7

The assumptions of Hampton and his associates were sorely tested during the following decade as the battle with Republican rule in the state ebbed and flowed. First, most white voters tried to forestall the election of delegates to a new state constitution convention mandated by Congress. Since the federal body mandated that a majority of the state registered electorate had to ratify the call of such a convention, the large number of white voters that registered never caste their ballots on election day in November 1867. Despite this unity, the vast majority of registered black voters (85%), who voted for such a body, were enough to validate the elections for the Constitutional convention that met two months later. Not surprisingly its majority of black delegates drafted a new constitution that ushered in tax and land reform, the first formal public education system and more. Nonetheless the former cavalry leader continued to believe that whites could influence enough freedmen so that Democratic conservatives could control the legislature when the next round of fall elections occurred. But Hampton's assumptions proved false. The Radical Republicans won a significant majority and began to implement their reform agenda- including raising taxes, implementing land redistribution, and installing a grass roots public education system. These bold moves threatened white conservatives who feared losing control of black labor and political control to a Republican party with majority black support. It was the intention of most whites leaders that they had to prevent this and take back the reigns of power to forestall political and social chaos. Although some whites, even Hampton for a time, advocated some peaceful accommodation with the Republicans, most believed that only intimidation and violence
against the other side could resurrect white control. Former Confederates such as Martin
Gary and Mathew C. Butler argued the dire nature of this new struggle as an attempt to
place the “negro over the white man” in which Republicans were “at war with the noblest
instincts of our [white] race.” To whites, who tried to reach an accommodation by
political means with former slaves, conservative radicals such as Butler believed they
were badly misled, if not traitors to their race. Butler and his supporters, known as
“straight outs,” began a campaign of intimidation and violence to attain victory for
conservative Democrats. Such violence ranged from beatings to murder, one of the more
extreme cases being the assassination of a black leader, Benjamin Randolph. In October
1868, while campaigning for a seat in the legislature in Abbeville, several shots rang out
in the local train station killing him instantly. Yet even in this violent atmosphere blacks
and their white allies went to the polls in November and elected a radical ticket.⁸

Hampton could not legally run for political office because Congress barred high ranking
Confederate officers from public service, yet his work behind the scenes was not impeded
by the Republican victory of November 1868. Since his prediction that whites could
control the black vote failed he seemed to discard his hope in that arena. Instead Hampton
tacitly supported the Klan violence that accelerated in the wake of the 1868 elections.
Primarily in the upstate bands of vigilantes, often clad in frightening regalia, intimidated
and attacked Republican supporters, white and black, with impunity. Unable to end the
violence, the Republican governor, Robert K. Scott, appealed to the President and
Congress for federal troops to help stem the carnage. When the President invoked the
Third Enforcement Act, commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, in April 1871,
Federal troops soon arrested several hundred-suspected Klansman. Even though Hampton
publicly spoke out against the violence, he nonetheless led a subscription effort on behalf
of the accused for their legal defense. Although at least one historian has called the
federal law timid, that it should have been imposed earlier and more forcefully, the action
ended most of the violence. Hundreds were incarcerated and trials were held.
Unfortunately for the federal authorities so many suspects turned themselves in, along
with those captured, that the courts and jails could not process the huge backlog that it
created in the justice system. This, coupled with the expert defenses that the accused
received through the moral support and the financial backing of people such as Hampton and Mathew C. Butler, only a token number of accused Klansmen received convictions. And those that did generally received light prison sentences. Even though the violence came to an end, it proved only temporary. As the elections of fall, 1876, began in earnest white conservative elements re-ignited their campaign of intimidation and violence. And this time Hampton led the effort by running for governor.  

Although former Confederates at all levels were given amnesty by Congress in 1872 Hampton had remained too preoccupied with personal family issues and his poor finances to take a leadership role in the fight against the Radical Republicans. His efforts to improve his finances collapsed when the insurance company he joined went into bankruptcy less than a year after his appointment to its board. Nevertheless he still had a keen interest in the political future of his home state. Thus when old Confederate leaders approached him in June 1876 to be the Democratic Party's nomination for governor he accepted.

Hampton’s social position and heroic role as a Confederate leader during the war made him the best standard bearer for the conservative Democrats. Unanimously nominated in an August convention, the soldier-turned-politician started a campaign across the state, from the upcountry to the lowcountry, defending the virtues of his party and castigating the corrupt and spendthrift ways of the Radical Republicans. But Hampton's speeches and his obvious public appeal as a hero of the defeated Confederacy was possible largely because of the political army- mounted Red Shirts- that bolstered his appeal and protected him in every community he took his campaign. From Anderson, Sumter, Winnsboro and Yorkville during the fall campaign Hampton was met by an impressive entourage of local dignitaries, admiring young ladies and scores, sometimes hundreds, of mounted Red Shirts. For one campaign rally in Winnsboro on 16 October 1876, an elaborate itinerary was created and fliers posted throughout the community. It outlined where the local Democratic dignitaries were to stand, the place of "colored clubs" and how the "mounted men" arraigned themselves so that "colored people of both parties" could be admitted in front of them. In Yorkville a grand parade met Hampton at the train
station and turned out for the Democratic nominee’s stump speech where he appealed not only to whites but also blacks. After castigating the corrupt Republicans in Columbia and their governor, Daniel Chamberlain, for the umpteenth time he appealed for black support. Ironically Hampton claimed that blacks had become “slaves to your political masters” and that to be “freemen they must leave the Loyal League” and join with him to bring “free speech, free ballot, a free press.” And yet just a decade before most blacks had been slaves for life to Hampton and his class devoid of any right whatsoever. Fear prevented many minority voters to assert the courage to openly disagree with Red Shirts ready to pounce on any dissenters in the crowd. Except in the lowcountry, where blacks outnumbered whites, few of these grand political rallies allowed the opposition to rebut Hampton’s claims.11

In spite of Hampton’s appeals on the stump and his professed opposition to campaign violence, his Red Shirt supporters ruthlessly used intimidation and violence throughout the upstate to suppress Republican opposition. One Laurens County Republican group appealed to Governor Chamberlain for protection because no one “dares to speak nor act with respect of his franchise privileges without being in extreme danger.” Individual acts of violence sometimes expanded into major battles that led to injury and death on a large scale. Just as the campaign began in earnest, the Ellenton riots of September 1876 saw black militia carry on a running battle with Red Shirt companies for almost two days before federal troops intervened to end the carnage. At least 50 blacks and one white Red Shirt lay dead at its conclusion. Similarly at Cainhoy, in the low country, blacks and whites faced off again. Here the black militia got the better of the action but still whites inflicted nearly as many casualties on the Republicans before they fled. With such brutal violence going on all around him Hampton seemed to remain above the fray, arguing before black audiences why they should support his election. Through an alliance with the whites, he argued, "who owned the land . . . pay the taxes . . ." blacks could redeem the state “together.” But, he warned, if they continued with their "carpet-bag friends (the Republicans)" they would lose aid or support when needed, presumably from whites.12
Some former slaves seem to take Hampton’s words to heart because as Edmund Drago shows in his recent study, the white Red Shirt clubs had black allies. According to this historian there were at least eighteen black Democratic Clubs organized during the 1876 political campaign. How many of these clubs actually were formed by political coercion from whites or from genuine disillusionment by blacks with the Republican leadership is difficult to determine. Evidence gathered by Drago suggests that these black organizations had members that joined for a variety of reasons, some from conviction, others out of necessity. Some African Americans felt that even if the Democrats were not their best political allies they did not think that the Republican party could protect them. Consequently in order to continue to continue living and working in their communities some former slaves believed they needed to gain favors from white Democrats that would protect and sustain them during and after the elections.2

Even though Black Red Shirts did exist it is clear that most African Americans remained loyal to the Republican party despite the growing divisions within its ranks during the election campaign. And for those minority voters that switched their allegiance most faced severe rebuke from fellow blacks, including their wives. Within most black communities such betrayal often led to expulsion from their household, and sometimes, even physical assaults. Nonetheless white intimidation by the Red Shirts and their allies was far greater. Even so the results at the polls were very close when the November ballots were tallied. Although the conservative Democrats had a lead of just over one thousand votes across the state, this was initially nullified by the vote count in Laurens and Edgefield Counties. In these two districts county commissioners reported voter fraud where Democrats received more votes than actual voters available. This began the long stalemate over who had won the election. For the next several months Republicans and Democrats claimed victory.13

In spite of this stalemate Hampton declared himself the winner. He demanded that his Republican opponent step down. Backed by Federal troops Chamberlain refused, almost leading to a bloody riot during the last days of November 1876 as both Republican and Democratic legislators declared victory for themselves and proceeded to occupy the same
chamber in the South Carolina State House. Led by duel speakers, E.W.M. Mackey for
the Republicans and William H. Wallace for the Democrats, a tense atmosphere
continued for four days with both sides refusing to leave the chambers. Surrounded by
Federal troops, on the morning of the fourth day the Democrats reluctantly voted to leave
voluntarily when the troops outside seemed poised to remove them by force. However, as
this occurred, disgruntled whites had begun to arrive in Columbia from many areas of the
state to gather around the still unfinished State House, seemingly bent on throwing out
the Republican members regardless of the federal troops. Before violence could break out
Hampton showed his true leadership. Going before the mob he requested that the mob
disperse. As they did so the authority of Hampton was obvious and the legitimacy of the
Republican governor and his party compromised irrevocably.14

Yet while Chamberlain tried to hang on with the aid of federal troops and Congressional
backing, Hampton had enough public support to have himself inaugurate governor even
though he lacked legal authority. In December 1876 Hampton declared in his acceptance
speech that he owed much of his success to black voters who “rose above prejudice of
race and honest enough to throw off the shackles of party.” Yet even though Hampton
publicly claimed this support, others in his own party realized that it was the Red Shirt
bands, with their intimidation tactics and recourse to violence, had really “won” the
election for him. On election day in one Lexington precinct a Democratic observer
admitted that only ten blacks voted the conservative ticket. Although it is difficult to say
how many blacks actually voted Democratic across the state one historian estimates that
probably no more than 100 blacks in each county voted for Hampton and his party.15

Nonetheless, even without substantial black support, Hampton eventually forced his
Republican rival to resign his office. As he and Chamberlain disputed each other's
legitimacy into the spring of 1877, the hopes of Republicans that somehow the Radicals
ticket could still win grew ever dimmer. Hampton and his Red Shirts advised its
supporters to pay taxes to the Democracy, not Columbia, so that the Republican regime
could not operate the daily duties of government. In fact, the power of the conservative
democracy had grown so that just before Chamberlain resigned his office in April 1877
Hampton reputedly claimed that if the former governor had not given up his office he would have had every tax collector in the state hanged. But the final chapter in Republican rule only ended after Hampton visited the President in Washington. There, after he assured the newly inaugurated Rutherford B. Hayes that he would guarantee political rights and protection to blacks as well as whites, regardless of party, the President agreed to pull out all remaining federal troops from the state. With federal protection now gone Chamberlain had no other recourse but resign his office and leave the state.16

With Hampton and the Democrats finally undisputed victors the former cavalry hero continued to claim that he regarded both races as equals before the law and that African Americans should enjoy the same political rights and protections as whites. Perhaps the Redeemer governor truly believed this but some, if not most, of his lieutenants did not. Men such as Matthew C. Butler and Martin Gary, just as they had directed the Red Shirt campaign, proclaimed the elections of 1876 as a campaign in which “Southern Society . . . will not have these people [blacks] rule over us.” Or as another Red shirt leader and future governor of the state, Ben Tillman, put it when looking back at that pivotal year- it was a battle between “civilization” (white) and “barbarism” (black).17

Whether Hampton considered that racial dominance was the essence of the struggle or not, it’s obvious that he viewed blacks as second-class citizens who could only participate in politics under white supervision. Old Confederates such as MC Butler were determined to eradicate black political participation, regardless of who might supervise black voters. Although Butler’s extreme position to remove African Americans from the State House, and eradicate those in local offices as well, failed in the early post-Reconstruction era, over time black political participation was steadily eroded. And it started within months of Hampton assuming undisputed office in spring 1877. In Richland County Senator Beverly Nash and State Supreme Court Justice Jonathan Wright were forced to resign their offices by the fall of 1877 after trumped up charges of corruption and drunkenness were brought against them. By the early 1880s most black politicians resigned even if they weren’t directly threatened once they realized how
tenuous their own position in the white-dominated government had become. But a few African Americans held onto their offices through the 1880s because they came from predominately black counties. Yet even the few who clung to political office had little but symbolic impact on policy. By the 1890s white supremacy would be complete and remained so for nearly a century.\(^{18}\)

As for Hampton his political leadership continued to have impact through the 1878 election. He worked to improve funding for the budding public education system created by the Republicans and expenditures per pupil continued to rise for both blacks and whites through the decade of the 1880s under those who succeeded Hampton. But while Hampton’s legacy for equal education appeared genuine, that for equality in the political process never did. Constitutional offices during the Hampton years became all white. With legal means that excluded more African American voters from exercising their rights at the ballot box, the former general’s party lieutenants found ways to stuff ballots and restricted minority voters through literacy tests and grandfather clauses. And while Hampton oversaw new voting rights restriction he did little to support the few remaining African Americans in local offices, even if they were Democrats. The few that gained local offices did not keep them long after Hampton left to become US Senator in 1879.\(^{19}\)

In 1878 Hampton was elected to a second term as governor but plans were already afoot to send him to Washington where his influence on state politics would be minimized. Although the war hero’s prestige as a redeemer leader would survive as a symbol of white supremacy over the hated Radical Regime, his power on the political stage was no longer essential to white political dominance. Now over sixty Hampton’s age was probably affecting his ability while there were younger leaders, and some former Confederates, who were ready to take over the reigns of real political control. In late 1878, following a serious hunting accident, Hampton’s very survival seemed precarious. The conservative regime that Hampton had returned to power in 1877 continued to maintain political control through most of the 1880s but their days were numbered as Ben Tillman’s star began to rise. Even though the hero and leader of the 1876 election survived his accident and continued his political career in Washington for another decade
Hampton became largely a symbol of the old guard who influence on state politics was steadily eroded. While respected by most of his colleagues in the US Congress Hampton’s tenure had little significance for the state or the nation. He rarely spoke to the assembled body and often missed sessions because of illness or infirmity. By the end of the 1880s even his symbolic value to the state’s young Turks, led by Tillman, was done. At the end of the decade the State Senate voted him out of office.20

Hampton lived for another decade struggling to support his family while attending Confederate Reunions inside and outside the state when his health permitted. When he died in April 1902 he was praised for his determination and bravery as a soldier who did all in his power to protect his state during four years of war. There is no denying that he was one of the last of the old cavaliers who fought ferociously for his state, but his political leadership during and after Reconstruction is not so clear. While Hampton continued to fight for his state he did so from the perspective of an old guard trying to return the state to some semblance of its pre-war days. Steeped in the old white planter class where blacks and most whites accepted the planter oligarch without question, Hampton envisioned an ordered world, as he perceived it had been before secession. Although he opposed violence after Appomattox, he still acquiesced in the Red Shirt campaign of 1876. Even though he continued to claim that he had garnered a significant number of black votes to win back the state in 1876, most white supporters from that election later admitted that Hampton was misled. According Ben Tillman, reflecting on these events years later, despite Hampton's claim that he had won 16,000 votes from black constituents in 1876, “… every active worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully mistaken.” A noble soldier, Wade Hampton was at best a resolute but reactionary politician. While willing to accept blacks in the political arena it could only be on white terms. Despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Hampton accepted white methods of intimidation and violence to save the state from what he and other white leaders considered chaos under a black dominated Republican Party. He, like most whites, believed that the best options for all, blacks and whites, was a paternalistic society that controlled the economic and political course of the state. To Hampton equitable distribution of political power and economic freedom for recently freed slaves was a
recipe for disaster. His philosophy and upbringing made his political career one of reaction and retrenchment.21

Endnotes:

5 Hampton to R.E. Lee, July 21, 1866, HFP.
7 Hampton to John Connor, April 9, 1868, HFP. For the general attitude towards blacks by most whites in the state after 1865 one of the best overviews is in Stephen Kantrowitz, *Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction of White Supremacy*, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2000), 41, 44.
11 For details about the Hampton political rallies see Handbill entitled “Celebration in Honor of General Wade Hampton at Winnsboro,” October 16, 1876, HFP and *Yorkville Enquirer*, October 19, 1876; the author wishes to thank Debra Franklin, Museum researcher, for taking extensive notes of the latter for this study.
14 For review of the vote tallies and the stalemate that ensued see Zuczek, *State of Rebellion*, (1996) 193. For black attempts to switch to the Democratic side and how insignificant this actually was see Joel Williamson, *After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction, 1861-1877*, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1965), 408-412. Nevertheless, Cisco tries to claim that many blacks did switch to the Democrats, see *Wade Hampton* (2004), 232-234. Also see Richard M. Gergel, “Wade Hampton and the
For an account of the stalemate in the State House after the election see Cisco, *Wade Hampton*, (2004), 250-252.

For an account Hampton's inaugural address and its contents see *Charleston News and Courier* "extra" December 14, 1876, HFP and Cisco, *Wade Hampton*, (2004), 256-258. For estimates on the number of black voters that supported Hampton see Williamson, *After Slavery*, (1965), 411.

On the claim by Hampton see Cisco, *Wade Hampton*, (2004), 267. For the end of Chamberlain's tenure see ibid. 266-269.


Kantrowitz, *Ben Tillman*, 78-79. Kantrowitz argues persuasively that Hampton’s paternalistic view of race was really little different from the violence which Ben Tillman and MC Butler advocated in 1876. In the end both sides believed that the only proper order of society was for whites to dominate blacks because that was the only conceivable way.