THE PROCEEDINGS

of

The South Carolina

Historical Association

1973

OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATION, 1973-74

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Vice President	Wylma Wates, South Carolina Archives Department
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Editor of Proceedings

Hewitt D. Adams, Clemson University

The South Carolina Historical Association supplies the PROCEEDINGS to all its members. The Executive committee elects the Editor. Beginning in 1935, every fifth number contains an index for the preceding five years.

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Editor

ANDERSON
THE SOUTH CAROLINA
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

THE FORTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING
SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

The forty-third annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association was held on Saturday, April 7, 1973, at Converse College, Spartanburg, South Carolina. About sixty members attended one or more sessions.

Following registration in Carmichael Hall, the first session was called to order with presentation of papers in parallel sessions in Hartness Auditorium (U.S. History) and Room No. 200 (European History). Papers presented in the U.S. History session were "The Palmetto Regiment Goes to Mexico" by Dr. E. M. Lander, Jr., of Clemson University, discussed by Dr. Robert Moore of Columbia College; and "Ben Tillman and the Annexation of Hawaii" by Dr. Jamie Moore of the Citadel, discussed by Dr. Joseph Stukes of Erskine College. Papers presented in the European History session were "Some Important Aspects of the French Policy of James I, 1610-1619" by Dr. Thomas V. Thoroughman of Wofford College, with Dr. B. O. Bargar of the University of South Carolina as discussant; and "The Naval Policy of England's Liberal Government, 1906" by Mr. Rodger E. Stroup, a graduate student at the University of South Carolina, with Dr. John Y. LeBourgeois of Clemson University as discussant. After the morning session, a meeting of the Executive Committee was held.

Luncheon was served at 1 p.m. in the College Dining Hall, followed by the annual business meeting. The minutes of the forty-second meeting were approved as printed in the PROCEEDINGS. The treasurer's report was distributed to all members present and was approved.

The Executive Committee nominated the following slate of new officers for 1973-1974:

President: C. W. Bolen, Clemson University
Vice-President: Wylma Wates, State Archives
Secretary-Treasurer: Dr. Joseph Stukes, Erskine College
Executive Committee Member (term to expire 1976)
Dr. Richard M. Gannaway, U.S.C. at Lancaster

There were no nominations from the floor, and the motion that the slate be accepted by acclamation was seconded and passed. Hewitt D. Adams of Clemson University was named Editor of the PROCEEDINGS.

President J. M. Lesesne Jr. of Wofford College announced that the 1974 meeting would be held at the University of South Carolina campus at Conway. He thanked Converse College for its hospitality and expressed the appreciation of the association to Dr. N.F. Magruder and the local arrangements committee.

In the afternoon parallel sessions the American History papers included "Conservation Attitudes toward Cuba, 1895-1898" By Dr. G. Wayne King of Francis Marion College, with Mr. Foster Farley of Newberry College as discussant; and "President Theodore Roosevelt and Army Reform" by Mr. John A. Matzko of Bob Jones University, with Dr. Robert K. Ackerman of Erskine College as discussant. The European History papers were "Great

Britain, India, and Napoleon's Invasion of Egypt" by Dr. Edward B. Jones of Furman University, discussed by Dr. Frederick F. Ritsch of Converse College; and "The Motivational Underpinnings of British Exploration in East Africa" by Dr. James A. Casada of Winthrop College, discussed by Mr. Wayne Culp of Wofford College.

After a social hour between 5:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. at the Spartanburg Arts Council Building, the Banquet Session convened in the Dining Hall. Following dinner, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of South Carolina Owen Dudley Edwards, of Edinburgh University, delivered a stimulating talk on "The American South and Northern Ireland"

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 9:30 p.m.

BEN TILLMAN AND GOVERNMENT FOR HAWAII,

Jamie W. Moore

* Research for this study was completed under a grant from The Citadel Development Foundation.

The disparate elements in the title of this paper are related in an uncomplicated way. An important contributor to the Organic Act of 1900, albiet in an inadvertent and indirect manner, Senator Benjamin H. Tillman of South Carolina helped bring into being an instrument of government more democratic and more protective of individual rights than the Hawaiian Islands had ever known. As one might suspect, however, the process by which this contribution occured was not simple.

For most of the nineteenth century the native monarchy of Hawaii ruled over an economy dominated by Americans, dependent upon Oriental muscle for its labor, and located within a sphere of influence of the United States. The authority of the white minority was pre-eminent, and directed to the promotion of political stability, economic efficiency, and protection of property rights. Power in government derived from the land, the plantation system utilized to gather in the islands' cash crops, and the labor laws which protected commercial agriculture. [1]

Laborers brought into Hawaii and most of the native plantation hands worked under contracts first authorized in 1850 in an "Act for the Government of Masters of Servants." It closely followed the form of "The Seaman's Shipping Act of the United States," from which it had been taken, and subsequent legislation amending or relating to this law did not change its major features. The contract laws allowed the making of labor contracts for a term not exceeding five years. To spur recruitment of labor, the laws permitted contracts to be made in a foreign country for service in Hawaii. To encourage the labor to work efficiently, the laws provided that if a person bound by contract absented himself from service he might be brought back and compelled to serve double the time of his absence. If a laborer refused to work he could be committed to prison at hard labor until he consented to serve, and the costs of the court action were assessed against him. The master too had obligations. If he was guilty of cruelty, misusage, or violation of the contract, he could be fined from five to one hundred dollars and in default of payment could be imprisoned at hard labor until the fine was paid. But because the master was given the advantage in the eyes of the law, the contract system developed abuses, and in time the labor practice became abhorrent to foreigners and many Hawaiian whites who considered the punishment provisions barbaric. [2]

The contract labor system and the coolie traffic—the terms contract laborer and coolie were used interchangeably—received a substantial boost after the conclusion of the United States-Hawaiian Reciprocity Treaty in 1876. The treaty admitted Hawaiian sugar to the United States duty free, increasing the demand for the great cash crop. More labor was needed to produce the

sugar, and Polynesians, Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese were imported in increasing numbers.

Plantation Labor Imported[3]

Nationality	Years	Number of Laborers
Chinese	1852-1900	46,000
Polynesian	1859-1885	2,450
Japanese	1868-1907	180,000
Portuguese	1878-1913	17,500
Norwegians	1881	615
Germans	1882-1897	1,280
Galicians	1898	370
American Negro	1901-1902	200
Puerto Ricans	1900-1901, 1922	5,885
Koreans	1903-1910	7,420
Russians	1906-1912	2,475
Italians	1900-1908	85
Spanish	1905-1916	7,500
Poles	1913	20
Filipinos	1906-1929, 1945	110,000

By concluding the Reciprocity Treaty the United States had made Hawaii's prosperity possible. But the American government took another action which contributed to a basic dilemma confronting the sugar planters.

In the United States, interest in excluding Oriental immigration had led to the passing of laws prohibiting the transportation of coolies by American citizens in American vessels. And in some quarters, there was a growing movement to eliminate the competition of Hawaiian sugar by terminating the Riciprocity Treaty.[4] The planters met this threat with suggestions that Hawaii become American territory so the benefits of the bounty given on sugar could be kept. But growing sugar at a profit meant utilizing a cheap labor system, and annexation would prohibit automatically the entrance of Chinese laborers into Hawaii. Complicating the problem still further was the debate over the contract system. The American government continued to enact more stringent legislation affecting labor in the United States. In Hawaii suggestions for wholesale reforms were put forward. But the contract laws were always renewed without serious amendment, the most telling argument in their favor being that more laborers were needed, and no one had any alternative means of acquiring them.

Between 1870 and 1890 the interplay of the factors involved in sugar production created a stronger demand for annexation. The sugar economy became more prosperous and more important,

Sugar Exports — Teas.[5]

1837	4	1880	31,792
1850	375	1890	129,889
1860	720	1900	289,544
1870	9,392	1910	517,090

and more labor was required to produce the sugar. The labor which was brought in was mostly Oriental, predominately Japanese. As the proportion of Orientals in the population of the islands began to rise, the white minority increasingly became alarmed about the possibility of losing political control. Race became the most important issue in local politics, and it was inextricably comingled with the questions of economic development and relations with the United States. [6]

The growth and development of large scale commercial agriculture capped a century of change in Hawaii which had been destructive to the native culture. In an effort to restore Hawaii to control by Hawaiians, Queen Liliuokalani attempted to inaugurate a revolution from the top to depose the whites. The reaction of the planters, who had anticipated just this development, was prompt and decisive; in 1893 by *coup d'etat* they estiablished a provisional revolutionary government and ended the monarchy. Convinced their future depended upon getting the United States to accept Hawaii as a territory, they made their desire to be annexed clear. Benjamin Harrison was sympathetic, Grover Cleveland was not. He withdrew the treaty Harrison had sent to the Senate, opposed annexation behind the scenes, and backed the report of James H. Blount's investigating commission that showed the annexationist cause in an unfavorable light. Blount's report recommended against admitting Hawaii as a territory, concluding, among other things, that not only had the revolutionaries overturned a legitimately constituted government, they expected to govern the islands by so abridging the right of sufferage as to retain control in their hands.[8] But even though rejecting territorial gain, the American government acted to extend its informal sphere of control over Hawaii. Congress, on February 7, 1894, in the House and May 31 in the Senate, passed resolutions warning foreign states that intervention in the islands would be considered an act unfriendly to the United States. [9]

Protected from outside interference, the Provisional Government of Hawaii turned to consolidating its power. In 1893 it promulgated a new constitution, dedicated to the principle that the dominant white American minority which had made the revolution and which owned the property was going to rule.

Control of the land, now secure in the hands of the revolutionaries, had always been important. Originally title to all island land had been vested in the Kamehameha monarchs. During the reign of Kamehameha III (1825-1854), sweeping changes in the feudal system were made. The fundamental modification, called the Great Mahele (literally "division"), allocated some

1,600,000 acres, about two-fifths of the entire land area of the islands, to the Hawaiian chiefs. Kamehameha III divided the remainder into "crown lands" (nearly a million acres) for the support of the royal family and "public lands" (about a million and a half acres) to support operation of the government. Less than 30,000 acres was vested in the commoners of the kingdom. Consequently, the family farm and homesteading never became a major force in Hawaii's agriculture. When the monarchy was terminated, the crown lands which had not been sold off were merged with the still extant public lands. All this wealth accrued to the provisional Government of Hawaii.[10]

The Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii[11] which protected this property provided for the control of persons or groups dangerous to the government; contained various articles restricting freedom of religion, speech, and the press; limited use of the writ of *habeas corpus;* defined citizenship and the rights of citizens in a way to exclude Orientals; and outlined the procedures for becoming a member of the electorate in a manner whereby property, loyalty, and examination requirements limited the right to freeholders, a group predominately white and native that numbered only 6,327 in 1896.[12] Under the Constitution of 1893 the economically privileged white minority tightend its grip on the islands. But it was a delicate task. For even as the voting rolls were being purged—the number eligible to vote was lowered from 14,217 in 1892 to 2,693 in 1893 and the number of Americans eligible dropped from 670 to 409—the inescapable fact of the Republic was the minority status of the whites. In Hawaii there were 3,086 Americans, 4,161 Europeans, 15,191 Portuguese, 21,616 Chinese, 24,407 Japanese, and 39,504 Hawaiian natives or part-native Hawaiians.[13]

The basic weakness of the Republic was its domination by the "other Caucasians," a term including Americans and West Europeans but excluding others, chiefly the Portuguese. One alternative means of carrying out the dual purpose of maintaining the political supremacy of the class the government represented and abetting its economic prosperity was to sit atop a carefully balanced multi-racial society, arrange labor importations with great care so as not to disturb the balance, play off the antagonists of one race against the others, and allow no one group to get too strong. The other alternative would be to build a population base that would support the government. Both means were tried, and both failed. For the planters, this meant that annexation to the United States was their only feasible course of action. Once part of the mainland, the American people would become Hawaii's new population base, and the island's white minority would instantly be transformed into a majority. Thus the planters pressed for annexation, and put away consideration of potential ill effects or complications. They assumed, for instance, that because of the peculiar conditions in Hawaii, the American laws against contract labor would not be applied.[14]

Until the outbreak of war with Spain, the American government was unresponsive. But on May 4, 1898, three days after the victory of Commodore Dewey at Manila Bay, Representative F. G. Newlands of Nevada introduced a

resolution for the annexation of Hawaii into the House of Representatives[15] and a brief but sharp debate preceded its adoption by Congress. The race question was not the central issue. Far more important to the Congress caught up in the emotionalism of the struggle to free Cuba was the strategic and economic desirability of Hawaii. But the race issue did arise, partially condition the character of the debate, and by its presence did indicate that in the near future Congress was going to have to grapple anew with an issue fundamental in both American and Hawaiian society.[16]

To the extent that the subject of race did enter the debate, discussion took place within a framework laid out first in the reports of the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Relations.[17] Originally written in connection with the annexation effort of 1893, both had been quickly updated to emphasize the national interest, national security aspects of annexing Hawaii. Each deprecated "alleged objections" which related "to the character of population we will acquire from those islands." Both found the whites of Hawaii "united in support of good government" and "the supreme governing powers in the islands," a characteristic viewed as "the natural condition" which existed "whenever white and colored races were admitted, on equal terms, into the exercise of civil rights connected with government." The reports drew an analogy between the American Negroes and Indians and the Hawaiian natives; they were groups "not unfit for citizenship," but who, if they filled the executive, legislative, and judiciary departments, "could not conduct the government for a year in a proper constitutional way." Firmly equating white rule with good rule, the Committees on Foreign Relations upheld in principle government by the white minority in Hawaii as the basis for annexation.

In the debate in Congress, annexationists argued seven themes regarding the race question. They admitted that natives and Orientals could not be considered desirable acquisitions to American society. But they contended that because the non-whites could be controlled, they posed no dangers. Annexationists suggested that taking in Hawaii was a unique event. They intimated that in time, somehow, the non-white races of Hawaii would disappear or become less numerous and important.[18] The basic annexationist thesis was quite simple; Hawaii, it said, raised no new problems which could not be solved. The solution they implied was similar to that which had been found for "the Negro problem" in the United States—persisting difficulties were to be handled by local people within their own institutions, even if guaranteed constitutional rights were lost in the process. The most usual argument for an annexationist, none of whom made any mention of non-whites of Hawaii in any context other than their innate inferiority to the Anglo-Saxon race, was to conclude that the overwhelming and obvious reasons for taking Hawaii were of such importance that annexation should not be denied because of the "undesirable population elements."[19]

Opponents of annexation used precisely the same arguments to prove their case. They postulated that because the natives and Orientals were the different, inferior recipients of an advanced Western civilization whose institutions they

could not maintain, Hawaii was incapable of self-government and had only the choice between anarchy and non-republican forms of rule. To Tillman, this proved the impossibility of any benefits coming from annexation. Tillman's views on the question of mixing races and democratic politics were down to earth; the commonsense way of dealing with the franchise problem, he said, was to exclude all but whites from government. [20]

Tillman looked upon the debate over Hawaiian annexation as an opportunity to state again his reasons for having launched a one man oratorical campaign to educate the North to the Southern persuasion, and he made the most racially oriented argument that was to be heard in Congress on the subject of Hawaii. The acquisition of "103,000—well, I do not know what they are properly called; I will just say colored people," he said, would be an opening wedge to further acquisitions of territory containing "aliens in blood, aliens in language, aliens in thought and feeling" "I come from a Commonwealth where there are 750,000 (N)egroes and only 500,000 whites," he added, (where) "every thoughtful man...has been lying awake at night thinking...how that race problem would be settled so as to preserve the Anglo-Saxon race in its purity . . . " For Tillman, the only real issue was the prevention of racial amalgamation, which he knew would lead to mongrelization, by the wisest possible statesmanship. He pointed out to his fellow Senators that South Carolina, by constitutional amendment, "as far as the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments of the National Constitution would permit," had been able to temporarily put down the danger by disfranchising "this ignorant mass." But in Hawaii, Tillman warned, unlike in South Carolina, there were too many "colored people" to disfranchise all of them. In the end, he predicted, the United States would be forced to declare that the Constitution did not extend to "conquered territories." [21]

Tillman's agrument, and the arguments of others who spoke against annexation and used race as their theme, had a domestic basis. Aware that it was theoretically possible for the rest of the nation to end the South's re-institution of white supremacy, southerners wanted no precedents set in Hawaii by the extension of full political rights to the natives and Orientals. Conversely, they desired very much any precedent for excluding non-whites from the ballot. The fact that these arguments did not meet with more success does not detract from the potential of this appeal. Only by agreeing that white supremacy was the natural order of things and by then suggesting that in practice in Hawaii the institutions by which the white minority maintained its control would not be disturbed did the annexationists negate this anti-imperialist tactic. So sucessfully was the race issue minimized in just this fashion, that the vote on annexation, while showing strong opposition from the South and border states, correlates upon political rather than sectional lines. [22]

The annexation having been consumated, the problem of fitting Hawaii into the body politic of the United States remained. Immediately a special Commission was charged by Congress with making recommedations for organizing a government for Hawaii, but until it reported and Congress acted

the existing Hawaiian government was to remain in power.

The report of the commission, transmitted to Congress July 7, 1898, made it obvious that the members assumed it would be possible to realize the American ideal of universal sufferage and a republican form of government. And, as in the United States, government was to be of, by, and for the people. The basic question, of course, was which people. The Commission recommended that the privileges of citizenship be extended to only those persons who were born or naturalized citizens under the Republic of Hawaii. This group included native Hawaiian landowners, most Americans and Europeans, about seven hundred naturalized Chinese, and one Japanese policeman. Sub-Committees of the Commission stated a variety of reasons why the American element should be allowed to dominate the islands. The committee on the Judiciary found that the Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii had given the people political institutions which compared favorably with those of any government. It concluded that the maintenance of a fair standard of legislative quality depended upon resting citizenship upon educational and property qualifications for the electorate, "a satisfactory means of distributing authority." The Sub-Committee on Public Lands recommended the retention of existing land laws, which restricted ownership. The Sub-Committee also noted the high degree of education in the islands, and credited it to the system of open institutions which mixed races in the classrooms.[23]

Debate in Congress over the type of government to be provided for Hawaii had begun before the Commission finished its work. Basic positions were established in a verbal exchange between Senators George Vest of Missouri and Thomas C. Platt of New York. Vest argued that since under the Constitution of the United States no powers were given to the government to hold colonies, all acquisitions had to be organized and governed so as to eventually become a part of the United States. It followed, said Vest, that all persons "born within said lands were citizens of the United States, irrespective of the nationality of their parents," and held the same rights, including the right of self-government, as did citizens of the United States. These rights, concluded Vest, applied to Orientals as well as Hawaiian natives and whites. Platt argued that the territory was not to be organized under the Constitution but under the Congress which, being given by legislation an absolute power to organize government in a territory, was limited in the exercise of that power only by the rights conferred by the Federal Constitution upon citizens. To the important question of who was to be considered a citizen in Hawaii now had been joined the equally important question of what American rights the citizens of Hawaii had.[24]

The Congressional deliberations, often shoved aside for matters pressing and otherwise, went on for over a year, a circumstance deplored by President McKinley in his 1899 annual message to Congress. But Congress was bogged down in the issue of how to keep the machinery of government in Hawaii in the hands of the white Americans without overturning the Constitution.[25] Few Congressmen doubted that franchise restrictions of some kind were needed to preserve "good rule," but anti-annexationists like Tillman kept raising the

embarrassing race question. Losing no opportunity to chastise his opponents for their hypocrisy, Tillman alternated between piously suggesting that the natives and Orientals be given full rights of citizenship and demanding that citizenship rights be established solely on the basis of skin color. On the one hand, the Senator said, perpetuating white control by means of property qualifications was clearly a violation of fundamental American law. On the other hand, if it were wrong to take government out of the hands of the whites in Hawaii, if the natives and Orientals had to be protected against themselves, as the annexationists alleged, if self-government for all classes would be an evil, then surely the same arguments applied within the continental limits of the United States.[26]

Tillman did not win his point; Congress was not in a mood to grant the precedent of excluding voters by race that he sought. The Senate sent to the House a proposed Organic Act which defined citizenship in terms of property and-or other economic status. But the House was full of Populists enthusiasm for doing away with political control by vested economic interests. It struck the entire text of the Senate bill and substituted a measure that stated that voters in Hawaii had only to be male, United States citizens, registered, paid up tax-payers, and able to "read, speak, and write English or Hawaiian." No less desirous to maintain white government than the Senate, the House members had no thought of admitting natives and Orientals to the ballot *en masse:* they intended for the language provisions to secure white domination. But in reality, the action by the House foreshadowed the lowering of a number of the barriers to citizenship. In Hawaii 962 out of every 1000 school age children attended school, and out of every 1000 people over the age of six, 639 could read and write enough to satisfy the language requirement. Moreover, while dismantling the economic devices of political control in Hawaii, the House threw out sections of the Hawaiian law codes which had empowered officers of the Republic to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* and the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii which established property qualifications for voting and holding office.[27]

The changed proposed Organic Act was returned to the Senate, where it promptly ran into substantial opposition. In the House version, sufferage was to be restricted by the retention of language qualifications and examinations and by requiring proof of payment of poll taxes. But certain laws of Hawaii allowed the government to confiscate property if taxes were not paid and these could be interpreted to apply in case poll taxes were not paid. If payment could not be made the laws contained such sanctions as imprisonment for debt and punishment by forced labor while imprisoned. For those under labor contracts even more stringent controls could be applied. To the fore, in full cry with righteous indignation at this economic royalism, came Tillman and the rest of the anti-imperialists. The South Carolina senator still wanted apartheid for Hawaii, but for the moment he was more interested in wrenching power from "the sugar trust," a group Tillman had a history of attacking.[28]

The fight against economic oligarchy was more successful than the fight for white supremacy. The Organic Act of 1900, which became the fundamental law of Hawaii on April 27, 1900, was a statute which created a government far more liberal from that envisioned by individual contributors to its provisions. The Act conferred citizenship in the territory of Hawaii upon all persons who were citizens under the Republic, repealed laws inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, as Congress found them to be inconsistent, and gave the right to vote to registered male citizens residing in the territory who could read, write, and speak English or Hawaiian.[29]

Although broadening the franchise, the Organic Act did not establish political democracy in Hawaii and did not change the fact that the white minority controlled the land. But it had a number of features to commend it. The Act freed the people from the more odious provisions of the Constitution of 1893. It was a fundamental law more democratic and less restrictive than the constitution proposed by the last native monarch in 1892. It took strong exception to existing practices: penal contracts were forbidden, Chinese exclusion laws were applied to the islands, and all labor contracts were terminated automatically as of June 14, 1900. Like the original Federal Constitution, while it did not establish a democratic government, it did establish a government in which democracy had a part.[30]

In its final form, the Organic Act was a document consistent with American idealism, but it had not been brought to this state by moralists and idealists. Rather, the establishment of a more liberal government in Hawaii is directly traceable to the work of anti-democratic factions in Congress. There are three proofs of this contention. The first is that from 1900 onward Hawaii had more political and economic democracy. For a few days after passage of the act work stoppages were common; afterwards the status of labor and treatment of laborers improved. The reaction of the governing minority was to deplore the difficulty caused them by the more open sufferage and less strict labor laws. But the Act was consistent with Hawaii's constitutional experience, pragmatic, and therefore acceptable to this group.[31]

The second proof is that the number of voters and percentage of the population eligible to vote rose consistently after 1900. In 1893, under the Republic, 2,639 persons, about 1.2 percent of the population, could vote. After 1900:[32]

Year	Registered Voters	Total Population	Percent Eligible
1900	11,216	154,001	7.8
1910	14,442	181,874	7.6
1920	26,335	255,881	10.3
1930	52,127	368,300	14.2
1960	183,118 (1959)	632,772	29.9

The third proof reveals itself after an examination of the process by which was decided the constitutional status of the inhabitants of possessions acquired as a consequence of the Spanish-American War.

Shortly after passage of the annexation resolution, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that because the Constitution of the United States "in its fullness" did not immediately extend to the territory the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights did not apply.[33] The Supreme Court of the United States established a similar doctrine in 1901, thus getting around the question of admitting the population in the territories to rights of citizenship equal to those enjoyed by citizens in the United States. Saying that the inhabitants of Hawaii were under the jurisdiction of congress rather than the Constitution, the Court rested part of its argument on its faith in the Anglo-Saxon race and in Congress as an institution of Anglo-Saxon character. In fact, the Court went so far in its determination that it opened up the question of whether or not people inhabiting the territories had any inherent political rights at all. These appeared to be left to the discretion of Congress. Not until 1904 was a more orderly doctrine brought into focus: that guarantees in the Constitution differed as to their force (some rights were fundamental and followed automatically into new territories, others were procedural and might or might not be in force as Congress saw fit), that Congress retained the power to make laws for territories without being subject to all the restrictions which are imposed when laws are passed for the United States (but Congress did not have the power to act unconstitutionally), and that the powers of Congress when legislating for the territories were not without limitation.[34]

During the six year interim between the annexation and the determination by the Supreme Court, the legal safeguards accorded the people depended upon Congress. In this period of almost absolute legislative supremacy the opportunity to turn to other means of government certainly existed. Congress might have elected to establish some type of imperial system, might have defined citizenship rights in the manner desired by the elite who had governed the Hawaiian Republic, and might even have written the kind of laws Tillman wanted. It did none of these thing. What Congress did do was to return to the principle of establishing a fundamental law guaranteeing individual rights, and then allow these rights to be subverted in certain instances in a manner consistent with practices in the United States.

As a matter of justice and ethics, this outcome might appear shocking. But in an age when the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race was a doctrine so firmly established that the point was not even debated—in an age where the laws of many states of the union showed clear distinctions that were applied on the basis of color—the consequences of territorial acquisition might have been radically different, both for the peoples overseas and the minoritites at home. Both racists and economic oligarchs made the reforms in Hawaii's future possible. Tillman and his supporters espoused a doctrine of white supremacy and tried to get it legitimized. But they lost that fight. Having a deep rooted hatred of economic exploitation by vested interest groups, they then refused to

go along with the establishment of rule in Hawaii on the basis of property. Because some Congressmen were unwilling to write white supremacy laws and because other Congressmen were unwilling to endorse economic royalism, factions ground together. The grinding resulted in the creation of a territorial government better than the doctrine of either faction was capable of creating alone.

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[1]Always sought by the Americans but seldom attained was the optimum state where Hawaiian monarchs reigned but did not rule, a condition which combined stability with opportunity. The definitive study for this period is the three volume work, Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation* (Honolulu, 1939); *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874, Twenty Critical Years* (1953); *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty* (1967), On the evolution of the American sphere of influence see Merze Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom* (New Haven, 1965).

[2]Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, I, 185-95, 328-29, II, 177-95; Donald Rowland, "The United States and the Contract Labor Question in Hawaii, 1862-1900," *Pacific Historical Review*, II (Sept., 1933), 249-69; Edward Johannessen, *The Hawaiian Labor Movement, A Brief History* (Boston, 1956), 49.

[3]Johannessen, *Hawaiian Labor Movement*, 25-26. See Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, III, 153, for figures for Chinese immigration and emigration.

[4]On the reciprocity treaty see Merze Tate, *Hawaii: Reciprocity or Annexation* (East Lansing, 1968), *passim;* Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, II, 217-30, 247-57, III, 17-40. Both authors conclude that the main reason for concluding the treaty in the United States was geopolitical. To the Congress, control over the islands was a vital American interest. The way to exercise control, it was felt, was by building up American commerce and furthering American interests in the islands. (The use of economic devices to achieve political objectives was a common theme in American diplomacy in the Pacific. See Jamie W. Moore, "Economic Interests and American-Japanese Relations: The Petroleum Monopoly Controversy," *The Historian*, XXXV (August, 1973).

[5]State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Research, *Statistical Abstract of Hawaii*, 1962 (Honolulu, 1962), 11; Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, I, 315, II, 141, III, 83.

[6]From a present day perspective the contract system, plantation agricultural practices, and the political system appear exploitive. Payment of eleven cents a day plus food and shelter to Chinese labor, for example, evokes little sympathy. But on balance, it can be said that for most of the people involved in the system it represented an improvement in their lot. The ordinary worker found life under the Kamehameha monarchs tyrannical rather than idyllic, and the immigrant labor was usually the product of domestic upheaval at home. Johannessen, *Hawaiian Labor Movement*, 4-49; Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, III, 51-78.

[7]Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, III, 479-605; William Adam Russ, Jr., *The Hawaiian Revolution 1893-94* (Selinsgrove, Pa., 1959) is favorable to the revolutionaries; Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story* (Boston, 1898), is not.

[8] W. Stull Holt, *Treaties Defeated by the Senate* (Philadelphia, 1933), 152-54; U. S. Congress, House, *President's Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands*, H. Ex. Doc. 47, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 1893, III-XVI, 73-80. This "Blount Report" also contains the text of the annexation treaty rejected by the Senate and an approximate text of the constitution proposed by Queen Liliukalani, pp. 6-9, 581-90. The administration also provided a published resume of the diplomatic correspondence between the American government and the Hawaiian Kingdom, U. S. Congress, Senate, *Message From the President of the United States Transmitting Correspondence Respecting Relations Between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands from September, 1820, to January, 1893*, S. Ex. Doc. 77, 52d Cong., 2d sess., 1893. To counter the revelations which were hurting their cause, the annexationists conducted their own inquiry into the revolution. See the report, largely the work of the pro annexationist Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations*, S. Rept. 227, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 1893, 310-11.

[9] Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom, 1874-1898*, 650.

[10] Robert H. Horwitz and Norman Meller, *Land and Politics in Hawaii* (East Lansing, 1963), 2-3; Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, I, 137, 145-46, 155-56, 175-76, 269-98.

[11] Printed in U. S. Congress, House, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894: Affairs in Hawaii*, H. Ex. Doc. 1, 53d Cong., 3d sess., 1895, Appendix II, 1350-71.

[12] For a summary of the attempt to combine minority rule with representative government see Ralph S. Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, *Hawaii: A History* (Englewood Cliffs, 1961), 183-202.

[13] Robert C. Schmitt, *Demographic Statistics of Hawaii 1778-1965* (Honolulu, 1968), 76. Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, III, 116, gives the percentage change for major groups between 1876 and 1900: Hawaiian and part Hawaiian, 89.2 per cent to 26.0 per cent; Caucasian, 6.3 per cent to 17.5 per cent; Oriental, 4.5 per cent to 56.5 per cent.

[14] Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868-1898* (Berkeley, 1953), 131-38. The natives shared with the whites the fear of the Orientals growing numbers.

[15] The timing was significant. A resolution for the annexation of Hawaii had been introduced in the Senate on March 16, but had not yet been called for consideration. Recognizing that in the Senate a majority favorable to annexation could be counted upon, but not the two-thirds necessary for ratifying a treaty, Newlands introduced a joint resolution which could assure annexation after a simple majority vote in both houses. U. S. Congress, 55th Cong., 2d sess., *Congressional Record*, 2853, 4600; U. S. Congress, House, *Government for the Territory of Hawaii*, H. Rept. 305 To Accompany H. R. 2972, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1899, 1-2. The Senate vote was exactly a two-thirds majority. For an exploration of whether or not this was imperialism and if so what kind see Ernest R. May, *American Imperialism A Speculative Essay* (New York, 1968).

[16] Merze Tate, "Slavery and Racism as Deterrents to the Annexation of Hawaii, 1854-55," *Journal of Negro History*, XLVII (1962), 1-18, makes the case suggested by the title convincing. Rubin Francis Weston, *Racism in U. S. Imperialism* (Colum-

bia, S. C., 1972) concludes that the common denominator for expansionists and anti-imperialists was racism. For the former, it operated to exclude non-whites from the letter and spirit of the Constitution. For the latter, it inhibited the urge to acquire overseas possessions. This is not to be doubted, but any study which focuses upon race as the central issue of imperialism is. For a generation which didn't worry about what is called "racism" today, the entire issue was a complication to larger questions. If any issue raised enough strategic interest in the United States it was always possible to minimize racial problems that might be involved. The New York *Journal*, May 2, 1900, for example, carried an editorial calling for the admission of Nicaragua, then the site for the proposed Isthmian canal, to the union. But the Baltimore *Sun*, Nov. 12, 1898, castigated President McKinley for his comments on the "blessed influence of the Spanish-American War in healing sectional divisions." Because McKinley was also expressing alarm at the overthrow of Negro rule in South Carolina, said the *Sun*, and as it was his administration which had cheerfully endorsed the successful overthrow of the blacks who owned Hawaii, the Chief Executive was something less than consistent. See these and related items in the Arthur P. Gorman (U. S. Senator, Maryland) Mss., Vol. 34, 305-06, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. In the case of the Hawaiian annexation, as Earl S. Pomeroy, *Pacific Outpost, American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia* (Stanford, 1951), 5-18, points out, it was the exceptional character of the strategic value of Hawaii that was important. But even then it took a merging of commercial interests with the events of the Spanish-American War to impell Congress to act.

[17] U. S. Congress, Senate, *Annexation of Hawaii*, S. Rept. 681 To Accompany S. R. 127, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 1898, 10-12; U. S. Congress, House, *Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands*, H. Rept. 1355 To Accompany H. Res. 259, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 1898, Part I, 6-7, Part II, 1.

[18] The natives supposedly were becoming extinct "by the laws of nature," which had contributed to a "mysterious decline" in the population; Orientals, bound by "a natural love of their homeland," returned thence as quickly as possible; and the course of development indicated that Hawaii was to be filled up in the future with the white race. Blount had already demolished these ideas as a facade to encourage annexation (House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 73-80, 138) and the population decline, traceable to contact with Western diseases, had been reversed in 1875 or 1876 (Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, II, 177). But the arguments were more than a facade; the people who made them tended to believe them, despite rather obvious evidence to the contrary. For an inquiry into this phenomina see Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston, 1972).

[19] The debate over the annexation of Hawaii brought out all the arguments which later were to be applied in determining the destiny of the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific Islands. For blow by blow accounts and analyses see: William Adam Russ, Jr., *The Hawaiian Republic [1894-98] And Its Struggle to Win Annexation* (Selinsgrove, Pa., 1961), 338-56; Marion Mills Miller, ed., *Great Debates in American History* (New York, 1913), III, 169-324; D. Dedmon, "Analysis of the Arguments in the Debates in Congress on the Admission of Hawaii to the Union," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (State University of Iowa, 1961).

[20] Francis Butler Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman, South Carolinian* (Baton Rouge, 1944), 393-407; Francis Butler Simkins Mss., box 1, Southern Historical, UNC; Tillman, "The Struggles of 1776, How South Carolina Was Delivered from Carpet-Bag and Negro Rule," speech at the Red-Shirt Re-Union, Aug. 25, 1909; Tillman, "The Race Problem," remarks in the Senate, Feb. 23-24, 1903, Tillman Mss., Clemson University, Clemson, S. C.

[21] U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 2d sess., *Congressional Record*, 6532-34. Use of the phrase "conquered territories" was a debating tactic. Tillman knew better.

[22] An analysis of the votes on the House Resolution and the last minute amendments designed to cripple it shows the border states against annexation by a slim margin and the solid South overwhelmingly against. But a number of southerners were determined annexationists. The Joint Resolution passed 209-91 in the House, 49 members not voting, 42 to 21 in the Senate, 26 not voting. Tillman was in the negative. 55th Cong., 2d sess., *Congressional Record*, 6019, 6712; Barbara Ann Morin, "The Reaction of Congress to the Annexation of Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands," unpublished M. A. thesis (Smith College, 1944), 137-50.

[23] House Report No. 305, 2-5; U. S. Congress, Senate, *Message From the President of the United States Transmitting the Report of the Hawaiian Commission*, Senate Doc. 16, 55th Cong., 3d sess., 1898, 3,10,18,97-104, 136, 149. Between 82 and 86 per cent of the children of white parents, 1014 children, were in public schools with an enrollment of 14,286. The Committee concluded, p. 136, that mixing the races in educational institutions "operated to break up racial antagonisms and unite the diverse races in the schoolrooms."

[24] U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 3d sess., *Congressional Record*, 20, 94, 287-90, 292, 432-9.

[25] The measures being considered in Congress were S. 222 and H. R. Res. 2972. Each was reported as being the substance of the recommendations contained in the Report of the Commissioners to Hawaii. S. 222 appears to have been nearer the mark. For McKinley's message see House Doc. No. 1, Part 1, 56th Cong., 1st sess., LII-LIII.

[26] U. S. Congress, Senate, 56th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record*, 1923, 1981, 2031, 2084; Simkins, *Tillman*, 353-57.

[27] U. S. Congress. House, 56th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record*, 2490, 3747, 3751, 3853-66, 3964-65, 4072, 4508, 4528; U. S. Congress, House, *Government for the Territory of Hawaii*, H. Rept. 305 To Accompany H. R. 2972, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1899, 1; House Report No. 305, Appendix A, "Memoranda of Hawaiian Laws to be Repealed," p. 39, Appendix B, "Rules and Regulations for Administering Oaths and Holding Elections," pp. 32-36; William Franklin Willoughby, *Territories and Dependencies of the United States* (New York, 1905), 65-6; Schmitt, *Demographic Statistics*, 78.

[28] Tillman's opposition was genuine, and his remarks on this occasion should be compared with his views on the contemporary issue of the second phase of the Spanish-American War. As indicated by his speech in Congress on February 7, 1899, Tillman viewed the struggle in the Philippines as a Filipino war of national liberation. See U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 3d sess., *Congressional Record*, 1530-32, portions of which are reprinted in Leslie E. Decker and Robert Seager II,

eds., *America's Major Wars: Crusaders, Critics, and Scholars*, (Reading, Mass., 1973), II, 57-59.

[29] It took two conference committees to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate versions of the Organic Act. For the discussions and debate: U. S. Congress, 56th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record*, 3964-65, 4072, 4508, 4528, and 4458-82 in particular. The text of the conference committee report is to be found on p. 4733. The Organic Act is printed in Charles Kettleborough, *The State Constitutions and the Federal Constitution and Organic Laws of the United States of America* (Indianapolis, 1918), 1567 ff.

[30] Johannessen, *Hawaiian Labor Movement*, 51-53.

[31] Ethel M. Damon, *Sanford Ballard Dole and His Hawaii* (Palo Alto, 1957), 339-40.

[32] *Statistical Abstract of Hawaii, 1962*, 11. According to the census of 1900 there were 58,931 Hawaiians or part-Hawaiians, 4,284 Americans from the United States, 6,512 Portuguese, 3,570 Other Europeans, 21,741 Chinese, and 56,234 Japanese. Schmitt, *Demographic Statistics*, 121.

[33] W. C. Peacock & Company, Ltd. v. Republic of Hawaii; Hawaiian Star Newspaper Association, Ltd. v. H. B. Saylor, reprinted in U. S. Congress, House, *Decrees of the Supreme Court of Hawaii*, H. Doc. 237, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 18-25.

[34] Brief of the plaintiff in Fourteen Diamond Rings, Emil J. Pepke v. United States, U. S. Congress, House, *The Insular Cases*, H. Doc. 509, 56th Cong., 2d sess., 457; *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U. S. 244; *Fourteen Diamond Rings*, 182 U. S. 176; *Hawaii v. Mankichi*, 190 U. S. 197; *Kepner v. United States*, 195 U. S. 100; *Dorr v. United States*, 195 U. S. 141.

THE NAVAL POLICY OF ENGLAND'S LIBERAL GOVERNMENT, 1906

Rodger E. Stroup

In early December, 1905 the Conservative government of Arthur James Balfour was replaced by a Liberal government under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. During the following year the new Liberal government reduced the naval budget and cut back on the construction of new vessels. Throughout 1906 some conservatives and other big navy advocates accused the Liberals of abandoning previously established guidelines as outlined by the Conservative government in November and December of 1905. In addition to contemporary critics, the Liberals have been portrayed by many distinguished historians as departing from established policies. As early as 1918 Bernadotte E. Schmitt wrote that "the Cawdor programme had been abandoned" by the Liberals so there would be more money for their costly social reforms.[1] In 1936 R. C. K. Ensor wrote that the Liberals, "by abandoning the Cawdor programme," lost the British lead in the construction of dreadnoughts.[2] As recently as 1963 George Monger spoke of Campbell-Bannerman's "reduction of the Cawdor programme."[3] It is the contention of this paper that the Liberals did not abandon previous guidelines, nor were the reductions made during 1906 a departure from either the Cawdor Memorandum or the policy of the Balfour government. A brief survey of preceeding naval policy will aid in understanding the Liberal program of 1906.

The Naval Defense Act of 1889 reinstituted the two-power standard first established in 1770 by the Earl of Chatham. The act provided that Great Britain would build sufficient vessels each year to insure that the British navy would remain stronger than the next two most powerful navies. In the first years following 1889 the English based their naval construction on the size of the French and Russian fleets.[4] However, the German naval program soon became an important factor in determining British policy. The German Naval Law of 1898 attracted little attention in Westminister, because the German navy was small and the proposed construction would not affect the balance of power. In 1900 Germany passed a revised naval law which did cause some concern in England, but the British were still building on the basis of the French and Russian fleets.

The advent of the Balfour government in 1902 resulted in an expanded version of the two-power standard. Balfour was obsessed with the question of national security, especially the absolute necessity for English naval superiority. In a private letter in 1909 Balfour stated that "If we fail in maintaining our sea power, it does not matter in the least where we succeed; tariff reform, social reform, all reforms are perfectly useless. As a nation we shall have ceased to count."[5] In March, 1904 Balfour hypothesized that Great Britain could become involved in a war with the two next most powerful navies while the third strongest remained aloof from the destruction. In this situation, Balfour argued, the British navy might not be in as commanding a position as

desired.[6] In early 1905 the government adopted a recommendation by two parliamentary committees that the British navy maintain a two-power standard plus a ten per cent margin over a possible Franco-German combination. By July, 1905 the two-power plus ten per cent standard was the accepted policy of Balfour's government.[7]

In addition to the advent of this new standard, several other important changes were occuring in the British navy. With Admiral Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord, the navy embarked in 1904 upon a revolutionary reform program which aimed at reduced expenditures and increased efficiency. Most observers agreed that by the end of 1905 the British navy was well above the two-power standard, but the question which remained to be answered concerned the rate of German construction.[8]

The signing of the Anglo-French agreement in 1904 and the defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905 affected the question of a standard for the navy. The Russian fleet had disappeared, and the French fleet was not likely to be combined with that of another power against the British. However, the growth of the German fleet was alarming, and it was now potentially more dangerous than the Russian fleet was a few years earlier. In the years from 1904 to 1914 the two-power standard was gradually abandoned, and the size of the German navy became the yardstick used by the Admiralty to determine British needs. However, the shift away from the two-power standard was never complete, because it always alarmed the British to see statistics depicting the navy below a two-power standard.[9]

In November, 1905 shortly before leaving office, Balfour's Conservative government outlined its proposed naval policy for the next several years. Known as the Cawdor program, the proposals detailed the needs of the navy so that British naval superiority would not be endangered by the construction programs of the other powers. The core of the policy was new construction, calling for between £9 and £10 million to be spent each year for this purpose. The Cawdor policy proposed that to maintain the necessary superiority over France and Germany, that four large armoured vessels be laid down each year. The 1906-1907 program was outlined in detail, calling for the construction of four large armoured vessels of dreadnought design, twelve submarines, twelve coastal destroyers, and five destroyers. The program recommended that the construction program for each year be formulated on a year by year basis. The guidelines for determining the level of new construction included, first, the construction programs of the other powers, second, the trend of British foreign policy and international relations, and third, the limitations on naval expenditures created by the needs of national finance.[10]

In addition to outlining naval policy, the Cawdor program assured the public that Great Britain had a sufficient force of battleships to insure superiority over the combined fleets of Germany, France, and Russia. While affirming that Great Britain had, at present, naval superiority, the Cawdor program pointed out that it was necessary to build four large armoured cruisers each year since the advent of the dreadnought brought a completely new type of

vessel onto the scene. The new policy asserted that Great Britain must maintain superiority in each new type of armoured vessel that might be developed.[11]

A strength of the Liberal victory at the polls in January, 1906 was an important factor in the naval policy pursured by Campbell-Bannerman's government. In the House of Commons the Liberals won 402 seats and could count on the support of 83 Irish Nationalists and 29 Labour members. The opposition consisted of only 132 Conservatives and 25 Liberal Unionists. In addition, the new parliament was the first middle class parliament in history, one in which the majority of the members worked for a living.[12] The parliament definitely had reform on its mind, though some Liberal members envisioned more radical measures than others.

After the January, 1906 election the new Liberal government had little time to consider the question of expenditures before it was necessary to place the naval estimates before parliament. On February 15, a memo from the Board of Admiralty to the Cabinet requested that the Cawdor program be accepted without change. The Board argued that while alliances may disappear naval power was the best way Great Britain could insure continued peace in the world.[13] Campbell-Bannerman's government decided to accept the Cawdor program, and prepared to introduce it in parliament.

On March 1, 1906, Edmund Robertson, the Secretary of the Admiralty, introduced the naval estimates in the House of Commons. Robertson stated that because of the brief amount of time available to prepare the budget, the Liberals accepted the Cawdor program without amendments. However, Robertson pointed out, the limited time available also meant that the Liberals did not feel irrevocably committed to the Cawdor program. Robertson emphasized that only a small sum was contained in Vote 8, that part of the estimates dealing with new construction, since the four large crusiers called for in the Cawdor program would not be laid down until late in the year. Furthermore, Robertson requested that, as in previous years, Vote 8 be considered late in the session, about June, so that more time could be given to the details of the vote.[14]

In June, 1906 before Vote 8 was considered by the Commons, the Board of Admiralty sent a revised naval estimate to the Cabinet, stating that it would be possible to reduce naval expenditures by reducing the amount of new construction, cutting the number of personnel, and redistributing the ships in the fleets. The Board reported that it was unanimous in dropping one armoured cruiser from the 1906-1907 program, and substituting for the three ocean destroyers and four submarines, one small unarmoured ship. In addition, the fleets were reorganized to strengthen the Channel fleet, and the number of men was reduced from 129,000 to 127,000.[15]

Though it is difficult to prove, it is probable that the government suggested the reduction to the Admiralty. In the parlimentary debates during July, 1906 when the reductions were announced, the Liberal government denied suggesting the reductions to the Admiralty and claimed that the impetus came from the Sea Lords. However, Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty,

stated in the House of Lords on July 30, that he first suggested to the Sea Lords the possibility of a reduction in new construction. Since Tweedmouth favored a large navy, in this instance he was probably acting on instructions from the Cabinet.[16]

Though the June report from the Admiralty suggested a reduction, one can see traces in the report that the Board of Admiralty was not altogether overjoyed at the prospect. The report stated that although the present strength of the navy was excellent, and relations with foreign nations were good, "still alliances and *ententes* are not everlasting, and the unexpected must never be neglected." It was further suggested that Great Britain should not sit back and allow other countries to close the gap in the construction of the newest types of vessels, as this would be a dangerous experiment that could possibly lead to future disasters. The Admiralty report also contained several tables which showed that Great Britain would lose some of its advantage by reducing construction to only three armoured vessels each year.[17] The suggestion from the Board to reduce new construction does not fit the tone of the remainder of the report and provides further evidence that the Admiralty did not instigate the reductions.

On July 13, the Cabinet considered the revised naval estimates and agreed to the program suggested by the Sea Lords.[18] The most controversial proposal, and the one which drew the loudest attacks from the Conservatives, was the reduction of one dreadnought from the 1906-1907 program and the construction of only two dreadnoughts in the 1907-1908 program, or three dreadnoughts in 1907-1908 if the upcoming Hague Conference was not successful.[19]

On July 26, Edmund Robertson introduced the reduced estimates in the House of Commons. The new program recommended by the Admiralty included the elimination from the 1906-1907 program of one dreadnought, three ocean destroyers, and four submarines. Robertson said the Sea Lords proposed the revised program and they did not think the balance of sea power would be endangered by these changes. The major reason for the reduction, according to Robertson, was that the building programs of the other powers had not advanced as fast as believed when the estimates were originally framed.[20]

The Conservative attack on the reduced program was led by Balfour. Like most Conservatives, Balfour did not think the Liberals were fit to govern, and his comments on the new program reflected this bias.[21] While admitting it was the government's prerogative to alter the program, Balfour believed the change was too rapid and did not allow the House an opportunity to fully discuss the reductions. Since the Liberals suggested that the new proposals were forced on the government by the Amiralty, Balfour accused the Liberals of concealing their real motives behind the Sea Lords. Additionally, Balfour argued, no reason was given for the reduction, except that the Sea Lords felt it would not endanger naval superiority. Balfour further feared that if only three dreadnoughts were built each year, Great Britain would fall below the two-power standard. Furthermore, the former prime minister was not

convinced that Great Britain would be able to maintain her advantage in the speed at which she could construct a dreadnought.[22]

Campbell-Bannerman presented the government's argument in the Commons. He assured the House that the proposed reductions were unanimously approved by the Sea Lords who "expressly asked that the House of Commons should be informed that it (the reduction) was their recommendation . . ." No pressure, he added, was placed on the Sea Lords to reduce the estimates for new construction. At present, the prime minister continued, England could build faster than any other nation. What the other powers might do in the future was unknown, but Great Britain should proceed on what was known.[23]

The main argument Campbell-Bannerman presented centered on the current diplomatic situation, and the coming Hague Conference. The prime minister believed it was the duty of Great Britain to take the lead in arms limitation, and the proposed reductions would show the world that the British were sincere.[24] As early as December 21, 1905, in his first public speech as prime minister, Campbell-Bannerman fervently stated his continued hope that the arms race among the powers could be halted.[25]

The policy followed by the late Conservative government gave Campbell-Bannerman another strong argument. In studying the naval program for the two preceeding years, the Liberals found that the Balfour government made reductions in the number of vessels scheduled for construction. In the 1904-1905 program one armoured cruiser was dropped from a total of four, and thirteen destroyers were eliminated. The 1905-1906 program was short one armoured cruiser. Not only were cutbacks made, Campbell-Bannerman pointed out, but the government never revealed that these vessels were not constructed.[26]

On August 2, 1906, the new naval estimates came up in the Commons for second reading. Again Balfour and Campbell-Bannerman were in the forefront of the debate, but this time the controversy revolved around the question of the two-power standard. Balfour argued that a Franco-German combination was not impossible, and England should build against the next two strongest navies, regardless of the current diplomatic situation.[27]

In replying to Balfour, Campbell-Bannerman said it was not reasonable to build against the two powers who were "more likely to be antagonistic to each other than any other two Powers you can find on the continent of Europe." Campbell-Bannerman added that the two-power standard was convenient, but it was not everything. Instead, the government "ought to consider what the requirements of the Navy are, just as we consider what the requirements of the Army are, and see that we have a sufficient Army and Navy for these requirements."[28]

The debate on the new naval estimates took place in the House of Lords on July 30. While the debate in the Commons revolved around disarmament and the assertion that the Sea Lords wanted the reduction, the debate in the House of Lords took on a more technical tone. The main debate in the Lords

was between Lord Cawdor and Lord Tweedmouth. Lord Cawdor complained that the government had abandoned the two-power standard without establishing any other yardstick to measure British naval requirements. The fact that no other nation had accelerated their building was the only justification given by the government for a twenty-five per cent reduction in battleship construction, and to Lord Cawdor, this did not constitute a satisfactory explanation.[29]

In defending the new program, Lord Tweedmouth pointed out that a cutback made late in the year was not a new innovation. The present reduction, the First Lord continued, was possible because no new battleships were laid down abroad during the current year.[30] The cutback of three ocean destroyers, Tweedmouth stated, was decided upon because the new type currently entering service was complex, and the navy wanted experience with the new design before an entire fleet was constructed. The elimination of four submarines was also attributed to the design of a newer type, because the Admiralty did not want to construct a fleet of obsolete submarines.[31]

The House of Lords appeared more satisfied with Lord Tweedmouth's presentation of the reductions than the House of Commons was with the prime minister's defense of the cutback. Viscount Goschen, twice First Lord of the Admiralty in the late nineteenth century, wondered why the technical reasons detailed by Tweedmouth were not used by the government in the Commons.[32] It appeared in the Commons debate, Goschen added, that the government merely wanted to cut expenses and gave no good reasons for a reduction. But in the Lords, Tweedmouth gave good reasons for the reduction. It seemed, Viscount Goschen concluded, that the government badly mismanaged the whole affair.[33]

Though there was considerable opposition to the new program, especially from the old line Conservatives, the naval estimates were passed within a few days. The Conservatives and other big navy advocates continued to stir up opposition to the new program, and discontent rumbled on through the fall. This opposition did not worry the front bench, however, as Germany had not laid down any dreadnoughts and England was still well above a two-power standard.[34]

The Sea Lords, as technical advisors, did not become publicly involved in the debate on the new estimates. Sir John Fisher, as First Sea Lord, was primarily responsible for a memorandum dated February, 1906 which called for strict adherence to the Cawdor program, and stated that the Admiralty "cannot base their plans upon the shifting sands of any temporary and unofficial international relations."[35] By fall, however, Fisher was a strong advocate of the new estimates, and was fully in favor of the reduced expenditures on new construction.[36] In a letter to Lord Tweedmouth, Fisher said the Admiralty would not be scared by paper programs, "the bogey of agitators," but would build only when other nations did so. Fisher continued, saying, "our present margin of superiority over Germany *(our only possible foe for years)* is so great as to render it absurd in the extreme to talk of anything

endangering our naval supremacy, *even if we stopped all shipbuilding altogether.*"[37] Fisher concluded that the Sea Lords would not allow anything to happen which could in any way endanger British naval superiority.[38]

By the elimination of one dreadnought, three ocean destroyers, and four submarines from the 1906-1907 program, did Campbell-Bannerman's government appreciably alter the naval policy as outlined by the previous Conservative government? It does not appear so.

During the first half of 1906 Great Britain was well above the two-power standard. Even many of the Conservatives who attacked the July reductions admitted that the navy was over the two-power standard.[39] The various Admiralty reports recognized Great Britain's superiority over the next two strongest navies. The Admiralty's concern was not for the present, but, in light of the announced building programs of the other powers, for the future. Thus when the reductions were recommended in July, 1906 Great Britain was in no immediate danger of falling below a two-power standard.

The prospects for the future also appeared bright to the government. Great Britain already had one dreadnought built and three more were to be laid down shortly. No other power had laid down any dreadnoughts by the end of 1906. This meant, considering the British advantage in the speed of construction, that the English would have four dreadnoughts before any other power had completed one. Since the British could build faster, the government reasoned, it would be a simple matter to watch the foreign powers and lay down the number of dreadnoughts needed each year to maintain a comfortable lead.

The reductions in themselves were not an innovation by the Liberal government. As pointed out by Campbell-Bannerman and Lord Tweedmouth, there had been similiar unannounced reductions in the past two years, and no one had said these would endanger British naval superiority. In fact, the Balfour government did not consider it necessary to inform parliament at the time of the cutback. Yet when the Liberal government came to the parliament, and openly recommended a reduction, some members of the late Conservative government were certain a cutback would mean a loss of British naval superiority.[40]

According to Admiral Fisher, no change occured at the Admiralty with the advent of the Liberal government. In fact, Fisher pointed out that nothing drastic was done, and Admiralty policy was only a continuation of that started when Fisher became First Sea Lord in October, 1904. Fisher also mentioned the reductions of the past two years under the Balfour government, and explained that the reason for those cutbacks was the lack of construction abroad.[41] However, when the Liberals advanced that explanation as a reason for the July reductions, a cry arose from the opposition leaders, who declared that such a weak reason was not an adequate explanation.

The guidelines established in the Cawdor program remained the Liberal policy through the year 1906. In mentioning the naval programs, the Cawdor

policy stated that the Admiralty formulated British policy "for the next year and next year alone....This years' design may be comparatively obsolete next year." The program pointed out that to publish more than an annual schedule was foolish, because it would give possible enemies a chance to arrange their programs. Additionally, the three factors which the Cawdor program established to determine shipbuilding needs, namely, the construction programs of the other powers, the trend of British foreign policy, and the limitations on naval expenditures created by the needs of national finance, were followed by the Liberals, and resulted in a decision to cutback the amount of new construction.[42]

It is evident, at least to the end of 1906, that the new Liberal government made no drastic changes in the naval policy pursued by the previous Conservative government. The reductions of July, 1906 were not unusual since cutbacks were made by the Conservatives. The reasons for the deletion of several vessels from the 1906-1907 schedule were based on guidelines laid down in the Cawdor program. The reforms initiated by Admiral Fisher in 1904 continued untouched through 1906; they were, in fact, advanced by the Liberal government. The fleet, because of Fisher's reforms, was more efficient than it was five years earlier.

The desire to cut armament expenses was present in the minds of many Liberals in early 1906. The social legislation which the Liberals favored would require more money than was available without a reduction in defense spending. The need for social legislation, coupled with a sincere hope that a British arms reductions would lead to disarmament discussions, spurred the government onward. However, the guidelines for the 1906 reductions originated in previous Conservative practices and the policies stated by the Conservatives in the Cawdor program. The possibility of the navy losing command of the seas was never in question. The following statement which Campbell-Bannerman made during the July debates serves as an appropriate conclusion to the question under discussion: "No man here wishes the Navy to be weak for all the manifold duties which it has to perform....We are all as keen as anyone can be to maintain the efficiency of the Navy, but extravagance never procures efficiency. You get efficiency only when expenditure is kept within reasonable bounds."[43]

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[1] Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *England and Germany, 1740-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1918), 182-183.

[2] R. C. K. Ensor, *England 1870-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 364-365; 401-402.

[3] George Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Limited, 1963), p. 310.

[4] Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era, 1904-1919,* (5 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1961), I, 123-124.

[5] Blanche Elizabeth Campbell (Balfour) Dugadle, *Arthur James Balfour, first earl of Balfour* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937 2 vols), II, 32.

[6] Ernest L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935), 460-461.

[7] Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, I, 124.

[8] Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy*, p. 462.

[9] *Ibid.* 460-462.

[10] *Cabinet Papers, 1880-1914*, Cab 37-81, No. 173. Report of the Naval Estimates Committee to the Cabinet. These large armoured vessels were to be of dreadnought design.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Colin Cross, *The Liberals in Power, 1905-1914* (London: Barrie and Rockliff with Pall Mall Press, 1963), 23-26.

[13] Cited in Monger, *End of Isolation*, p. 310.

[14] *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 4th Series, CLII, 1327-1334.

[15] *Cabinet Papers, 1880-1914*, Cab 37-83, No. 60. Report of the Board of Admiralty.

[16] *The Times* (London), July 31, 1906.

[17] *Cabinet Papers, 1880-1914*, Cab 37-83, No. 60. Report of the Board of Admiralty. In Table C of this report the Admiralty predicted that by March 31, 1911, Great Britain would have only ten dreadnoughts to twelve for France and Germany.

[18] *Cabinet Letters in the Royal Archives, 1868-1916*, Cab 41-30-69, July 13, 1906.

[19] *Cabinet Papers, 1880-1914*, Cab 37-83, No. 60.

[20] *Hansard*, 4th Series, CLXII, 67-75.

[21] Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, II, 17-18.

[22] *Hansard*, 4th Series, CLXII, 107-113.

[23] *Ibid.* 114-117.

[24] *Ibid.* 117-118.

[25] John Alfred Spender, *The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman* (2 vols. Boston: Houghton, 1924), II, 208.

[26] *Hansard*, 4th Series, CLXII, 114. These vessels were not actually dropped, the government simply never let out contracts for their construction.

[27] *Ibid.* 1395-1398.

[28] *Ibid.* 1400-1401.

[29] *Ibid.* 291-299.

[30] *Ibid.* 300-307. No new battleships were laid down abroad since October, 1905. All the powers were awaiting the outcome of the sea trials of the *Dreadnought* before constructing any new battleships. Archibald Hurd, "The Government and the Navy," *Nineteenth Century*, LX (November, 1906), 732.

[31] *Hansard*, 4th Series, CLXII, 303.

[32] The main reason, Robertson explained, was that foreign navies were not building. Tweedmouth also used this explanation, but added the technical explanations and more detailed information on the lack of foreign construction.

[33] *Hansard*, 4th Series, CLXII, 315-318.

[34] Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, I, 127-128.

[35] Monger, *End of Isolation*, p. 310.

[36] Fisher had a strong preference for the Liberals and called the Conservatives

"hopeless" and "stupid." Fisher's liberal leanings are probably due to the fact that he was born of average parents and advanced on merit and ability alone. Marder, *Fear God and dreadnought; the Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone* (3 vols, London: Cape, 1952), II, 105.

[37] Fisher's emphasis.

[38] Marder, *Fear God and dreadnought*, II, 91; 96.

[39] During the spring, before the reductions were announced, Balfour wrote a colleague: "As regards the strength of the Fleet, the difficulty is this. So far as my information goes, our strength is now very far above the two-power standard. Foreign nations are not building, and, according to the view of the Admiralty, neither now nor for some years, would Germany have even a 'look in' if they went to war with us." Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, II, 31-32.

[40] The probable reason for their change of mind was the German Naval Law of 1906. However, as pointed out by the government, so far, it was only a paper program.

[41] Marder, *Fear God and dreadnought*, II, 95.

[42] *Cabinet Papers, 1880-1914*, Cab 37-81, No. 173. Report of the Board of Admiralty to the Cabinet.

[43] *Hansard*, 4th Series, CLXII, 118.

PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND ARMY REFORM

John A. Matzko

After the Spanish-American War, cartoonists had a never-ending field day picturing Theodore Roosevelt as the "Rough Rider." The dullest newspaper reader could hardly have failed to recognize the half-military, half-cowboy figure sporting spectacles and prominent incisors. Yet despite the military imagery conjured up by Roosevelt's five months of active duty, the "Colonel"—a title he relished—retained only a secondary interest in the Regular Army. The navy of Alfred Thayer Mahan remained his first love. Indeed, he wrote in the *Autobiography* (1913) that during the well-known charge up "San Juan" Hill, his spontaneous thoughts ran to naval tactics gleaned from *The Influence of Sea Power upon History!* [1]

Nevertheless, it was during Roosevelt's post-war career that the Regular Army of the United States was transformed from a frontier constabulary to an armed force decisive in a global conflict. Admittedly Roosevelt's contributions to the important military reforms of his Administration were of decidedly lesser importance than those of his personal friend and advisor, Secretary of War Elihu Root, but the President's interest in various major and minor aspects of army reform has been virtually ignored by both military historians and Roosevelt biographers. One possible reason for this disinterest is subconscious mental division between Roosevelt the Progressive and the Roosevelt whom Richard Hofstadter has called "the herald of modern militarism." [2] The real Roosevelt, however, was of one piece, many-faceted but consistent in reflecting the views of a turn-of-the century Progressive.

Actually despite Roosevelt's sometimes brutally militaristic figures of speech which horrify modern sentimentalists, army strength declined during the Roosevelt Administration; and while the President condemned Congressional critics who wished to whittle it down even further, he regarded the size of the Army as relatively suitable for the needs of the United States, though her responsibility in international politics had greatly increased. [3] When, for instance, he advised Elihu Root on points to be included in a speech for the campaign of 1904, he cited "building up the navy" on one hand, but "proper organization of the army and the national guard" on the other. [4]

Roosevelt's army policy was, in fact, typical of Roosevelt the judicious politican. An attempted increase in the army would have produced strong opposition from those who equated higher troop strength with a more powerful anti-democratic force. Then too, Roosevelt realized that for the army, organizational reforms were more important than increased manpower and appropriations. Perhaps he could not have had both. In the Navy, for instance, where a building program was his primary objective, Roosevelt achieved no notable administrative reforms. [5] Furthermore he had a strong opinion that the Regular Army would never fight a major war itself but would act both as an effective first line of defense and as a cadre for the volunteers who would flock to the standard. Rather than increase its size, Roosevelt sought to raise the

army to its highest possible efficiency and effectiveness.[6]

As one of the most broadly (if not deeply) knowledgeble of American Presidents, Roosevelt applied all his past experiences and studies to the problems of army reform—from his struggles as a Civil Service Commissioner to his interest in the Boer War. But, of course, his personal participation in the War of 1898 greatly influenced his judgments. In a negative sense it fixed part of his military understanding firmly in the nineteenth century. Even as President, Roosevelt "thought of war in terms of man-to-man combat, dashing cavalry charges and brilliant tactical maneuvers; not of mass carnage, germ infested prison camps and endless stultifying boredom."[7] Yet his powers of observation were keen, and he learned much from the young officers who surrounded him.

Numerous minor reforms and suggested reforms stemmed directly from his own army service. Expressing an advanced point of view, he advocated loosely fitting field uniforms in camouflage colors which would provide "absolute ease and freedom" for the wearer.[8] He called the ramrod bayonet "about as poor an invention as I ever saw" because it broke easily and recommended that its replacement be a triangular weapon more nearly resembling the modern knife bayonet.[9] Remembering that his own saber had been worse than useless during the Santiago Campaign—" . . . it kept getting between my legs when I was tearing my way through the jungle"—he suggested that officers carry rifles or at least swords that could "do damage."[10] Machine guns had fascinated Roosevelt from the first time he had seen them in action against Spanish postitions, and he requested (but Congress refused) funds to develop this weapon further, including the organization of an experimental machine gun troop of cavalry.[11]

The President was more successful with a reorganization of the Medical Corps, the serious deficiencies of which he had well noted in the Spanish-American War. He believed it was not enough that the army doctor be a competent professional; he should be a military professional as well, having "knowledge of the administration and sanitation of large field hospitals and camps." In April, 1908, Congress did put the Medical Corps on a firmer basis and increased its personnel.[12]

Roosevelt was also concerned with the doubtful quality of army chaplains. He expected them to be men with the Progressive virtues "of practical sense, of genuine morality, of deep religious feeling, with the attainments of a gentleman," not men who desired the position as a "soft job."[13] He suggested that applicants pass an examination administered by their own denominations, thus making each church body more directly responsible for its own candidates. Instead a governmental examination was devised which Roosevelt disliked, especially the section on mathematics which he believed was being given too much weight.[14]

There is no indication that Roosevelt ever attended a performance of Gilbert and Sullivan's *Pirates of Penzance*, but he would undoubtedly have been amused by the "modern Major General" who knew "many cheerful facts

about the square of the hypotenuse" but less of "tactics than a novice in a nunnery." Roosevelt had a special dislike of mathematics, having done poorly in the subject during his freshman year at Harvard, but, in any case, it was the practical rather than the academic that he wished to see emphasized in the training of army officers.[15] Once he personally reviewed the case of an enlisted man cited for bravery but denied a commission on the basis of a test in mathematics.[16] Even the post-graduate service schools established under the hand of Elihu Root received only perfunctory recommendations in Roosevelt's Annual Messages to Congress, and he warned his Secretary of the "danger of too much book learning" at the Army School of the Line. "My brief military experience was enough to show me (he wrote Root) that the men upon whom I had a right to count were the young fellows who were naturally good with horse and rifle, naturally eager, pushing and resourceful and by no means bookish."[17]

Roosevelt's attitude toward education at the Military Academy followed naturally. Only the Superintendent's Congressional influence prevented the President from ending much of the Academy's program in the more theoretical aspects of mathematics.[18] On the other hand, Roosevelt ordered all the classes at West Point to participate in a system of calisthenics devised by the German gymnast Hermann J. Koehler and strongly suggested that modern languages be taught for speaking rather than for reading knowledge.[19]

While Roosevelt was quite tolerant of hazing at the Point, a reflection perhaps of his Social Darwinist theory of leadership, he displayed a typically Progressive sense of patrician responsibility for army enlisted men who, he believed, were "peculiarly a people who have no one specially interested in them and who must trust to justice and the abstract sense of right of the people at Washington."[20] In the Annual Message of 1907 he recommended pay increases for the army which would be "relatively greater" for the enlisted man, and these increases were voted by Congress in 1908--the first such raise since the Civil War. Roosevelt also asked Congress for the establishment of warrant officer grades, assuming that the new ranks would be largely filled by veteran enlisted men.[21] He helped end discrimination against enlisted men in uniform by threatening to cancel the license of any public establishment in the District of Columbia which so discriminated and by suggesting that officers be ordered to wear their uniforms more often.[22] As an incentive for exceptional initiative, the President supported the commissioning of enlisted men to fill positions left vacant by a lack of West Point graduates, and to combat the serious problem of desertion, he suggested that after twelve years of honorable service the veteran be given preference in civil service positions.[23]

Roosevelt accepted Leonard Wood's argument that desertions occurred because "we do not play the game seriously." Both former Rough Riders felt a soldier's instruction should be "full of field problems," "night marches and attacks," "not six months of walking around the parade ground."[24] Roosevelt hoped, in fact, that the importance of practice in military duties would be emphasized at all levels. "there is no use in providing new field artillery or heavy guns for the coast defense unless our men can handle them," he once

wrote.[25] Impressed by the improvement which target practice had wrought in the navy, the President proposed a similar program for the army, even recommending pay raises for expert marksmen.[26] It was also Roosevelt's desire to assemble a whole division once a year and hold extensive maneuvers, for he believed that "only by actual handling and providing for men in masses while they are marching, camping, embarking and disembarking, will it be possible to train the higher officers to perform their duties well and smoothly." [27]

As a man who prized non-material values, Roosevelt also understood the necessity of providing military awards and honors. He personally upgraded the value of the Medal of Honor which he had once called "the greatest distinction open to any American," ordering that future recipients be presented the Medal by "the President, as Commander-in-Chief" in a "formal and impressive" ceremony.[28] It was also during the Roosevelt Administration that the grounds for the award were made more restrictive, and the Medal itself was redesigned. Documentation for Roosevelt's personal participation' in suggesting these changes is lacking; however, the President did order a campaign medal struck for the Cuban Pacification of 1906-1909. [29]

Roosevelt's passion for "the strenuous life" of physical fitness provided another very personal contribution to army reform. He had, of course, made building his body a lifelong crusade, and was impressed in Cuba with the natural advantage he and the Rough Riders had over the older regular army officers and the state troops who were unused to exertion. Perhaps the most celebrated forms of exercise in which the President participated were the rides and walks he took around the Washington area. Usually some army officers accompanied him, sometimes applicants for promotion to brigadier general or above. As Leonard Wood wrote later:

> The officer's ability to follow the President was the equivalent of a first-class medical certificate. If he could not follow him, his chance for final selection was a pretty slim one, for Roosevelt believed the senior officers who would come into command in war should be not only mentally but physically fit....A tramp with the President usually meant that the invited ones would arrive rather smartly turned out. They usually departed, however, more or less complete wrecks.[30]

The number of anecdotes about these half-scramble, half-swim, point-to-point jaunts through Rock Creek Park are, as might be expected, numerous. On one occasion a rather ponderous officer slid down the banks into the river and in the process tore his clothing and lost his glasses. Wood recalls that

> ...he was a very sad-looking specimen,

> nearsighted and absolutely lost as to his whereabouts. The President noticed a mounted policeman in the distance and, calling the officer, said to him with great solemnity: "Officer, this is a general of the United States army. He wants to go to Washington. Take him to where he can get the streetcars...Don't fail to remember that he is a general in the army." [31]

After more than one such "unpleasant experience" with high ranking officers, Roosevelt "issued directions that each officer should prove his ability to walk fifty miles, or ride one hundred in three days."[32] Perhaps the final step was taken after the President realized that a mandatory march or ride would accomplish two objectives simultaneously: it would raise the level of fitness in the officer corps while eliminating many of the older desk officers who had blocked his plans for merit promotions. A final sentence in one of Roosevelt's letters to his Chief-of-Staff, ostensibly concerning physical fitness, queries: "Are there any other ways that can be devised for getting the dead wood among the field officers before retiring boards?" [33] Roosevelt demanded that he be given the names "in every case" of those who failed to take the test or who fell out while taking it, and a physical examination required in the same army order automatically disqualified 12 per cent of the colonels on active duty.[34]

Those most adversely affected, the Washington bureaucrats, began mobilizing their political power, and there was accordingly much grumbling in both Congress and the press. To silence the critics who called the test excessive, Roosevelt rode over a hundred miles on one icy January day and as usual, the worse the weather, the more difficult the country, the more he reveled in the test. Roosevelt hoped that sentiment generated by the ride would counter the pressures of the "great coterie" who were only waiting for him "to leave the White House to deluge the next President with applications to modify the order." [35] In this he was unsuccessful; the tests *were* abandoned during the Taft Administration. Nevertheless he was able, as he had also intended, to instill the perpetuation of concern with physical fitness into the army as a matter of *esprit de corps*. Mental Colonel Blimps remained, but physical ones became a rarity--somewhat ironically since improvements in transportation were making it increasingly less necessary for field grade officers to be physically agile.

Secretary of War Root and his young military advisors were, however, only slightly concerned with this type of symptomatic remedy for an army which needed important organizational changes. Building upon the military theories of Emory Upton, Root proposed that a general staff and a Chief-of-Staff replace the anomalous Commanding General who in peacetime had little to command. Roosevelt certainly supported his Secretary in what was to become one of the most far-reaching military reforms of the decade, but it is possible that the President would not have thrown so much of his political weight behind the measure had it not been for the opposition of the current Commanding General,

Nelson A. Miles.[36]

Roosevelt had acquired a distinct distaste for the old Civil War general as early as the Spanish-American War, but Miles' fatuous political ambitions--Roosevelt said he had "the Presidential bee in his bonnet"--completed the alienation.[37] Miles had funneled army documents into the hands of War Department critics, claimed that the Roosevelt Administration's plan to consolidate small army posts was an attempt to overawe organized labor and attacked the handling of the Philippine campaign. As a final touch Miles hinted broadly that Roosevelt had never been present at the engagement on San Juan Hill.[38] When the old general denounced the General Staff bill before the Senate Military Committee and dealt it a severe setback, Roosevelt with difficulty restrained himself from retiring the General, fearing that direct action might create more political repercussions.[39] Instead the President leaked his displeasure to important editors and Senators and compiled a dossier on the massacre of Wounded Knee where Miles had been in command.[40]

When the bill came up again during the Second Session of Congress, Roosevelt and Root planned a long round-the-world tour for their Commanding General, and passage of the measure seemed assured.[41] Nevertheless on the morning of January 31, 1903, as Root and Roosevelt were leaving the White House for a ride in Rock Creek Park, they received an unexpected report that the bill, "in which we were greatly interested," had failed of passage. ". . . In consequence Mr. Root looked gray and worn when we started and our conversation during the ride was of . . .a melancholy type . . . . But when we got home we found the bill had passed after all, so that our woe was unwarranted."[42]

Roosevelt's highly personal opposition to Miles was perhaps an indication that should both the old general and the Secretary of War leave office (which they did several months later), the extent of innovation in the command structure would be more apparent than real. T. Harry Williams, for instance, has called the early workings of the General Staff "highly anticlimatic" when compared with the theoretical outline.[43] A number of command problems remained to be resolved in the traditional American fashion of extemporization, but it is noteworthy that nothing like the Wood-Ainsworth or Pershing-March controversies occurred during the Roosevelt Administration. In part the reason why the inherent conflicts in the general staff system did not manifest themselves during Roosevelt's term of office was that the President himself remained non-doctrinaire in his dealings with the War Department, sometimes acting through the Chief-of-Staff, sometimes through the Adjutant-General, sometimes through the Secretary of War. Even during the most serious military action of his Administration, the Cuban occupation of 1906, Roosevelt channeled his orders indirectly through Adjutant-General Ainsworth.[44] As for military *advice*, Roosevelt seems to have sought that as regularly from his friend, Baron Speck von Sternberg, the German Ambassador, as from his Chief-of-Staff.[45]

Perhaps the greatest influence which President Roosevelt had upon the army was his attempt at reform in promotion policy, an extension of his sincere belief in merit appointments. William Henry Harbaugh has written that "civil service reform was at once the most confirmed and most sustained cause of Roosevelt's career, and he read into it both the gospel of efficiency which is the conservative's creed and the open society which is the democrat's dream." [46] Roosevelt was as consistent when he dealt with the army as Commander-in-Chief as he had been when he was Police Commissioner, Civil Service Commissioner and Governor of New York.

In his pre-Presidential years Roosevelt directed an enormous barrage of letters at Washington officials recommending various officers whom he had known in Cuba--so many in fact, that it became something of a joke among his friends.[47] As President in his own right he used his prerogatives to further military careers by assigning favored officers to staff duty, occasionally using the same powers to pack off disfavored officers to some insignificant post. [48] But with the contraction of the army during his Administration, Roosevelt lost the ability to assign regulars to higher ranks in the volunteers. Under the law, the President could exercise his appointive powers only in the selection of second lieutenants and general officers. Other ranks in the Regular Army were awarded strictly on the basis of seniority.

Believing that ability, not seniority, should be the criterion for advancement, Roosevelt explained that he wanted "men. . . who now and then make mistakes but. . .also do the big things" rather than overcautious officers who "never do anything bad." [49] There was a low rumble of protest when Roosevelt began implementing his merit promotion policy by advancing junior field grade officers like Tasker Bliss and William Carter, but it did not compare with the howl which arose when he tried to appoint his old friend, Leonard Wood, to the rank of major general. A good deal of the opposition was simply personal and political. Wood had entered the service through the Medical Corps and had risen to the rank of brigadier general because of his friendship with prominent Republicans like McKinley and Roosevelt. The West Point-educated senior officers understood perfectly that should this unorthodox officer be confirmed as major general, he would within a few years be making army policy as Chief-of-Staff.[50]

After some rather disagreeable Congressional hearings, Wood's promotion was confirmed, but the fight virtually destroyed Roosevelt's attempts at making merit promotion the rule rather than the exception. "No one incident of my administration," Roosevelt wrote later to a naval aide, "has caused me more criticism, more difficulty, more trouble of every kind, than getting Wood made major-general. The army was against it, Congress was against it, and the people at large were overwhelmingly against it." [51] This growing opposition was, in fact, clearly evident in the Senate's reaction to the President's nomination of another friend, A. L. Mills, to be brigadier general. Mills, a Regular Army man and a Medal of Honor winner, had his appointment voted out of committee by the same vote as Wood's, but anti-Administration forces staved off a vote in the

Senate for nearly a year.[52]

Despite Congressional pressure, Roosevelt made his most radical, and yet most deserving appointment in September, 1906, when without precedent in peacetime, he promoted a captain, John J. Pershing, to brigadier general. Pershing was hardly an ordinary captain, however, having acquired three college degrees and having distinguished himself in action against Apache and Zuni Indians, Spaniards at San Juan Hill and Moros in the Philippines. Characteristically, Roosevelt tried to promote him immediately to brigadier general in 1903, but Root contemplating the political results, dissuaded him.[53] The President did transfer Pershing to the General Staff and at the same time addressed a strong message to Congress demanding a reform in the method of promotion whereby recommendations of higher officers would determine the ranking of their juniors.[54]

Congress did nothing. Pershing, however, courted and married Helen Francis Warren, daughter of Senator Francis Warren, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. Perhaps Roosevelt considered the relative ease with which a promotion could then be made; at least some of the 862 officers over whom Pershing was jumped thought so.[55] In any case, this was the President's first and last promotion of a company grade officer to the rank of general. The Senate positively refused to ratify any more nominations unless the men in question were already colonels. Attempts to retire officers "not necessarily unfit, but least fitted to remain in the service"--Roosevelt at his euphemistic best--were also ignored by Congress.[56]

Yet it is probably no exaggeration to claim that Roosevelt's greatest influence upon the army was in the area of personnel rather than policy. "I have always been more interested in the men themselves," he once wrote Frederick Jackson Turner, "than in the institutions through and under which they worked."[57] Roosevelt seems to have been an excellent judge of character, for most of the men whom he recommended or promoted became distinguished officers, many of them ranking generals of the First World War. Only when the President met solid opposition from both Congress and the army did he reluctantly agree to discontinue this private extension of the merit principle and resume appointing generals on the basis of seniority.

That Roosevelt bowed to the wishes of Congress on what was one of his most strongly held convictions is an indication that in action he was a political realist. It was typical of Theodore Roosevelt the Progressive to promote relatively mild reforms with a great deal of vehemence yet in the process rarely stray far from the American tradition of pragmatism, compromise and unsystematized arrangements.

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[1] Theodore Roosevelt, *An Autobiography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), p. 242.

[2] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 206.

[3] Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 736, 718. "Annual Message, 1901" in Hermann Hagedorn, ed. *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, "National Edition" (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), XV, 122. Elting E. Morison, ed. *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), V, 358; Aug. 14, 1906.

[4] *Letters*, IV, 811; June 2, 1904.

[5] *Ibid.*, VI, 980 note.

[6] c. f. *ibid.*, VIII, 1146; Jan. 10, 1917.

[7] William Henry Harbaugh, *Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961), p. 98.

[8] *Letters*, III, 163; Oct. 8, 1901.

[9] *Ibid.*, IV, 1090; Jan, 4, 1905; IV, 1260; July 3, 1905.

[10] Theodore Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders*, *Works*, XI, 63. *Letters*, IV, 1090; Jan. 4, 1905.

[11] *Letters*, VI, 1319; Oct. 26, 1908. See also Preface by Theodore Roosevelt to John Henry Parker, *History of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps at Santiago* (Kansas City, Mo.: Hudson Kimberly Publishing Company, 1898).

[12] "Annual Message, 1907," Works, XV, 468-469. William G. Ganoe, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 431.

[13] *Letters*, VI, 958; Mar. 4, 1908; III, 272; June 10, 1902.

[14] c. f. *Letters*, VI, 903; Jan. 11, 1908.

[15] *Ibid.*, IV, 907-908; Aug. 26, 1904.

[16] *Ibid.*, VI, 903; Jan. 11, 1908.

[17] *Ibid.*, VI, 903; Jan. 11, 1908.

[18] *Ibid.*, IV, 907; Aug. 26, 1904. "Annual Message, 1906," *Works*, XV, 406. Thomas J. Flemming, *West Point* (New York: William Morrow & Company Inc., 1969), p. 278.

[19] Stephen F. Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 246. *Letters*, IV, 907; Aug. 26, 1904.

[20] *Letters*, V, 30l; June 16, 1906.

[21] "Annual Message, 1907," *Works*, XV, 469-470. Ganoe, p. 432.

[22] *Letters*, V, 435; Oct. 1, 1906; III, 385; Nov. 27, 1902.

[23] *Ibid.*, III, 70; May 4, 1901; V, 123; Jan. 1, 1906; V, 511; Nov. 28, 1906. "Annual Message, 1907," *Works*, XV, 470.

[24] *Letters*, V, 205; Aug. 2, 1906 note.

[25] *Ibid.*, V, 148; Feb. 7, 1906.

[26] *Ibid.*, V, 750; Aug. 21, 1907. "Annual Message, 1907," *Works*, XV, 470.

[27] "Annual Message, 190l, *Works*, XV, 124-125. See also Roosevelt's testimony before the Dodge Commission in *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain* (Washington: GPO, 1900), V, 2270-2271. "The Duties of a Great Nation," *Works*, XIV, 290-297.

[28] Executive Order, Sept. 20, 1905, printed in *The Medal of Honor* (Washington: GPO, 1948), p. 440. In most earlier cases the Medals had been sent to winners by registered mail; sometimes they were returned to the War Department because the soldiers who had won them had been discharged and their whereabouts were unknown.

[29] Lawrence F. Abbott, ed. *The Letters of Archie Butt* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1924), p. 155; Nov. 5, 1908. The best work on the progressive upgrading of the Medal of Honor is John J. Pullen, *A Shower of Stars: The Medal of Honor and the 27th Maine* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1966).

[30] Leonard Wood, "Roosevelt: Soldier, Statesman and Friend," introduction to *The Rough Riders*, *Works*, XI, xiii-xiv.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

[32] *Letters of Archie Butt*, pp. 119-120. *Letters*, III, 377; Nov. 12, 1902; V, 651; July 31, 1907; V, 715; July 13, 1907. James G. Harbord, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Army," *Review of Reviews* LXIX (Jan., 1924), 70. *Autobiography*, p. 47.

[33] *Letters*, V, 652; Apr. 20, 1907.

[34] *Ibid.*, V, 861; Dec. 2, 1907.

[35] *Letters of Archie Butt*, p. 286-90. *America and the World War*, *Works*, XVIII, 177-178.

[36] c. f. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), pp. 155-156; William H. Carter, *Creation of the American General Staff* (Washington: GPO, 1924, 68th Cong. 1st Sess.), *passim*. T. Harry Williams, *Americans at War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), p. 101. Elihu Root, *Five Years of the War Department Following the War with Spain as Shown in the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899-1903* (Washington: GPO, 1904), p. 165 & *passim*. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) pp. 251-252. Philip L. Semsch, "Elihu Root and the General Staff," *Military Affairs* XXVII (Spring, 1963), 16-27. *State Papers*, *Works*, XV, 122-127.

[37] *Letters*, III, 242; Mar. 7, 1902.

[38] Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time* (New York: Scribner's Son's, 1920), I, 171-172. *Letters*, III, 95; June 18, 1901; III, 98, June 22, 1901; III, 232; Feb. 18, 1902. The controversy was largely one of semantics. Roosevelt later wrote in the *Autobiography:* "We certainly charged some hills; but I did not ask their names before charging them." (p. 257).

[39] Carter, pp. 31-35. Edward Ranson, "Nelson Miles as Commanding General, 1895-1903, *"Military Affairs* XXIX (Winter, 1965-66), 192-194. *Letters*, III, 271; June 10, 1902. *The Independent*, LIV, (Apr. 24, 1902), 953-954.

[40] *Letters*, III, 247; March 24, 1902; III, 271; June 10, 1902; III, 232; Feb. 18, 1902; III, 241; Mar. 7, 1902.

[41] Ranson, p. 197. Virginia W. Johnson, *The Unregimented General: A Biography of Nelson A. Miles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), p. 355. Carter, p. 49.

[42] *Letters*, III, 415; Feb. 1, 1903.

[43] Williams, pp. 100-116; c. f. Hammond, pp. 17-48; Huntington, pp. 298-299, 252-53 and Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 322-23. Root's incomplete grasp of the problems involved in a general staff is a thesis of Mabel E. Deutrich, *Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of Fred C. Ainsworth* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962).

[44] *Letters*, V, 391; Sept. 1, 1906.

[45] See for instance *Letters*, II, 1303; May 19, 1900; III, 297-298; July 19, 1902.

[46] Harbaugh, *Power and Responsibility*, p. 287.

[47] c. f. *Letters*, II, 1056; Aug. 14, 1899; II, 1957; Aug. 14, 1899; II, 1027; July 1, 1899; II, 1297; May 16, 1900; II, 1357; July 20, 1900; III, 84; June 1, 1901; III, 12; Mar. 12, 1901.

[48] *Ibid.*, III, 186; Nov. 1, 1901.

[49] *Ibid.*, IV, 1296-1297; Aug. 1, 1905.

[50] Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood: A Biography* (New York: Harper Brothers, Publishers, 1931), II, 22-24. Weigley, pp. 327-328.

[51] *Letters*, VI, 100-101; Apr. 10, 1908. Wood was rather unappreciative, and Roosevelt went into great detail about how he had countered Congressional forces; IV, 759; Mar. 19, 1904; IV, 820; June 8, 1904; IV, 826-828; June 8, 1904.

[52] *Ibid.*, IV, 820; June 4, 1904; IV, 827; June 8, 1904.

[53] Harbord, "Roosevelt and the Army," p. 71. Richard Wormser, *The Yellow Legs: The Story of the U. S. Cavalry* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1966), p. 438. Roosevelt had met Pershing in Cuba—there is a photograph showing them together— but there is no indication that the Rough Rider ever saw the Regular in action. *Letters*, III, 517; July 14, 1903; III, 520; July 17, 1903; III, 531; July 25, 1903.

[54] Carter, p. 55. "Annual Message, 1903," *Works*, XV, 200.

[55] Frank E. Vandiver, *John J. Pershing and the Anatomy of Leadership* (USAFA, 1963), p. 13.

[56] *Letters*, VI, 1000-1001; Apr. 10, 1908; VI, 1039; May 28, 1908 and note.

[57] *Ibid.*, I, 440; Aug. 10, 1898.

HENRY DUNDAS, INDIA, AND BRITISH REACTIONS TO NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF EGYPT, 1798-1801

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That India was the pivotal concern in British reactions to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt is hardly a new or startling idea. It is also well known that both the oversight of Britain's Indian affairs and the conduct of the renewed war with France from 1793 to 1801 were entrusted to the same man, Henry Dundas. But the precise role of Dundas in shaping the government's response to Napoleon's eastward thrust bears further study. His words and actions on this issue bespeak the strength of his belief in the fundamental importance of India to the nation's permanent interests and of Egypt to the security of India. Against apathy or opposition from colleagues who did not fully share his imperial perspective, including even the King on occasion, Dundas persistently asserted his influence from both the India and the War offices. And out of it all he emerges as the single most important figure in determining British policies in response to Napoleon's eastern adventure.

From the outset of the younger William Pitt's first ministry Dundas was destined to play a key part. It was partially by his efforts that the seals of office were offered to Pitt in the last weeks of 1783, following the downfall of the notorious Fox-North coalition. Charles Fox floundered essentially because of the King's displeasure but it was his controversial India bill that provided the immediate occasion for it. And in the new Pitt ministry it was Dundas who was and remained the India expert without peer. He virtually wrote Pitt's India Act of 1784, and under its provisions as head of the governmental "Board of Control", supervised the East India Company's Asian affairs over the next seventeen years.[2] He was also the political manager for Scotland and, with Pitt, the government's leading spokesman in the House of Commons. As Pitt's boon companion and drinking partner, Dundas was widely believed by contemporaries to have exerted an inordinate amount of influence over the young minister, ten years his junior. Within the administration, indeed, it was Dundas and Pitt together with the latter's young cousin William Grenville who formed an effective inner circle capable of dominating most policy decisions.[3]

With the outbreak of hostilities with revolutionary France in 1793, Pitt called upon Dundas, his most trusted colleague at that point, to marshall and manage Britain's war effort. The national and imperial outlooks and values of the two men closely coincided. Their war strategy, a leaf from the great Chatham's book, stressed overseas commercial-imperial values over Continental objectives. Among their associates there was some disagreement about this general strategic concept and about particulars within it.[4] These basic differences and the tenacity with which Dundas held to his course underlie much of the discussion about the French campaign in Egypt.[5]

On taking up his responsibilities for Indian affairs, Dundas immediately moved to find out all he could about Egypt and its relevance to Britain's

Eastern interests. He examined papers and reports on the subject and consulted with a Levant expert and former resident of Egypt, George Baldwin.[6] His study in 1784-85 confirmed him in the belief that England's vital interests would be threatened if Egypt should ever fall into French hands. Within the context of the continuing eighteenth century Anglo-French rivalry, which was about to run its final course, there was urgent fear that "France in possession of Egypt would possess the Master Key to all the trading Nations of the Earth." Dundas was advised that the Red Sea-Suez-Mediterranean route remained the potentially most efficient Eastern trade route, provided only that the Egyptian land link was stabilized, as only a European power could, to assure safety of passage. France in control of the region might well short circuit Britain's Eastern commercial dominance via the Cape of Good Hope. But still more ominous, Baldwin warned, France in Egypt could ". . . make it the awe of the Eastern World by the facility she would command of transporting her forces thither by Surprise in any number and at any time -- and England would hold her possession in India at the mercy of France.[7] Baldwin's theme in 1785 was to be echoed repeatedly by Dundas and others over the next fifteen years.

Up to the end of 1787 British diplomats in Paris continued to provide persuasive documentation of French designs on Egypt and on possible routes to India by way of Mesopotamia. The ultimate objective was believed to be the subversion of British interests in the East.[8] Nevertheless, the best Dundas could do was to have George Baldwin dispatched to Cairo in 1786 as British Consul. He was instructed to set up regular lines of communication with India, as a security measure, and to observe and report on French activities in the region.[9] Apparently that was as much as the Cabinet would support at that point and some thought even that was of dubious value. Some years later, after the early rounds of revolution in France, Grenville at the Foreign Office inquired of Dundas if Baldwin's mission in Cairo was worth the expense of his annual salary.[10]

Even after the outbreak of War in 1793, Lord Spencer at the Admiralty and Grenville, among others in the Ministry, remained skeptical that the French could or would attempt a thrust at India by way of Egypt or Mesopotamia. The idea of such a move seemed to them too fanciful to be credible.[11] Their incredulity persisted despite a series of warnings from normally reliable sources. In January, 1795, Sir W. Sidney Smith, a naval officer with experience in the Levant, wrote directly to Grenville warning that a French move on Egypt might come shortly and expressing deep apprehension especially for British commercial interests. He pointed out that the French had long contemplated establishing themselves in that region for commercial and strategic reasons, that they were thoroughly familiar with conditions there, and that circumstances within the Ottoman Empire would make Egypt an easy prey. Within the context of the war, declared Smith, a French expedition to Egypt would enable them to create a diversion to draw off Austrian forces, and ". . . our Turkey trade, already at its last effort, will be totally transferred to the hands of the French." Still more serious, according to Smith, a French

establishment in Egypt would enable them to realize their enduring ambition to direct the India trade back into its ancient channel via Egypt and the Red Sea, reducing the British share to the level of their own consumption. He contended that trade had shifted from the old route to the more circuitous Cape passage only because Portuguese naval power under Albuquerque had destroyed Arab competitors and that nothing but the internal disorder of the Turkish Empire had prevented its shifting back to the more direct route. He suggested the immediate destruction of French naval power in the eastern Mediterranean to prevent their movement into Egypt.[12] Smith did not specifically mention the prospect of France's using Egypt as a base for military and naval operations against India. But a few months later, the French consul in Egypt was recommending to his superiors an assault on Egypt with just such an object in view. With French mastery of the Red Sea area, he asserted,

> . . .we should not be long in giving the law to the English and in ousting them from India . . . by way of Suez, during the favorable monsoon, a quantity of troops could be transported to India with few vessels. Our soldiers would not need to be on the sea more than sixty days, instead of, by way of the Cape of Good Hope, a matter of six months. By way of Suez we should not lose one man in a hundred; by the other way, we should be very fortunate not to lose ten per cent.[13]

Early in 1796 William Wickham, the British agent in Switzerland working under Grenville's authority, reported that a French mission had recently been dispatched to the Iman of Muscat, near the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The objective was to establish a more regular communication between France and the East Indies and to disrupt British communications, by conniving with the local princes. He believed this was part of their general scheme for undermining British power in India, which also included alliances with Indian native powers.[14] Later in the year he warned Grenville that ". . . the projects of the enemy in the Mediterranean and the Levant are again vast and dangerous, and that everything will be put in practice to extend them to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulph." While Wickham saw a connection between these French activities and their efforts to secure alliances with native powers in India, he did not venture to suggest that a French force might move directly from the Middle East to India.[15]

Wickham's warning came shortly after British naval forces had been withdrawn from the Mediterranean as a result of Spain's entry into the war as an ally of France. Dundas castigated his Admiralty colleague, Lord Spencer, for abandoning this vital area. He declared that such a move meant giving up all connection with the countries bordering on the Mediteranean, including the

whole of southern Europe. He wanted Spencer to reduce the naval complement in the English Channel and the North Sea in order to provide the force necessary to hold the Mediterranean, which he considered more important than either Trinidad or the project he had contemplated in the Pacific.[16] His failure to mention the exposure of Egypt and the Levant to a French invasion as a result of the withdrawal of British naval forces from the Mediterranean was probably deliberate, as he sought to persuade his colleague to reverse his policy. He emphasized the importance of southern Europe, expecting this to carry more weight with Spencer, who thought the idea of a French move against India via the Levant or Egypt was visionary and too improbable to be taken seriously.[17]

By the middle of April, 1798, Grenville received an intelligence item from a reliable agent in Italy indicating definitely that a French expedition was being assembled in her Mediterranean ports. The agent believed that the force under the command of General Bonaparte would land in Egypt, but ". . . the Blow is meant against the East India Company's power in India," and if not frustrated" . . . the consequences may be fatal." Whether the French proceeded with an immediate assault on India after securing Egypt, or decided to delay it until later, their presence in Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez, would place India in perpetual jeopardy. Grenville's informant also mentioned the possibility that Napoleon's forces might move toward the Black Sea area, with the consent of the Ottoman Porte, but the ultimate objective would still be India.[18] At about the same time this opinion was being dispatched, another writer, probably Captain John Blankett, emphasized the commercial importance of Egypt to France. He thought Cairo was a natural mart joining Europe to Africa and Asia. France, he believed, undoubtedly expected to restore the commerce with India and China via the Red Sea route. It would be on a scale far in excess of that in the Venetian-Arab heyday, since the British and others had greatly expanded the demand for Eastern goods in Europe in the intervening decades.[19] Within a few days Dundas wrote to Spencer commenting on a paper of Captain Blankett on Egypt, " . . . a subject," said Dundas, "I have long considered and think myself tolerably master of. People are so little accustomed to look to contingencies so very remote that I have never made it the subject of separate discussion." Had it not been for this and all the other demands on British naval forces, he declared,

> . . . I should long since have endeavoured to draw the attention of Government to the propriety of getting into the possession of Egypt . . . If any great European Power shall ever get possession of . . . (Egypt), the keeping it will cost them nothing, and that country . . . will in my opinion be possessed of the master key to all the commerce of the world.[20]

Spencer refused to take Dundas' warning seriously. He mentioned it in a

dispatch to Peter Rainier, on station in the Indian Ocean, but remarked that he would not have written on that subject if he had not been sending out a dispatch anyway.[21] From later remarks of Dundas and others, it is evident that Grenville also thought the idea of France's moving against India through the Middle East was too fantastic to be taken seriously.[22]

Early in June, 1798, British officials learned that the French expedition had sailed and that its destination was in the eastern Mediterranean. One greatly exaggerated report indicated that Napoleon had 40,000 elite troops and, assured of support from native powers enroute, he planned to secure Egypt, cross Arabia and Persia, and join forces with Indian border princes and with Tipu Sultan.[23] Dundas was alarmed. ". . . I have ever since my connection with the administration of India (began)," he wrote to Grenville on 13 June, "been at great pains to collect information by every means, and have long made up my mind to a Conviction that the possession of Egypt by any great European Power would be a fatal circumstance to the Intersts of this Country . . ." he discussed in considerable detail the routes Napoleon might contemplate between Egypt and India, and in equal detail he listed the countermeasures he considered necessary to thwart French plans. Dundas believed that ". . . the Possession of Egypt has been long a favorite object both with the old and new French Governments, and was always considered by them as the most obvious means of undermining the British Power in India . . ." Yet, said Dundas, even if the French should rest content with only the conquest of Egypt. ". . . without extending their views further at present, I should think they had performed the most masterly stroke they have ever done for their future aggrandisement in power and in wealth."[24] Dundas placed some hope in the belated detachment of Captain Horatio Nelson's squadron to attempt an interception of the French force before it could land in Egypt, but he felt it was essential to act on the assumption that Nelson would fail. ". . . I am free to confess," he wrote to Spencer, "that I feel an anxiety I never experienced in public life before."[25] This was no exaggeration. He had never been so agitated.

The prospect of an enemy thrust into Egypt was seen by Dundas against the background of the political situation in India itself. As he reminded Grenville in June 1798,

> . . . we are an upstart power (in India) and our Dominion there is established on the foundation of the Conquests or Cessions made to us by a variety of Native Powers; It is impossible to suppose that they do not feel uneasy under such Circumstances and therefore a more easy prey to the Representations, Seductions, and Intrique of another power who comes in the plausible form of offering to deliver them from English Bondage without desiring any recompence in return . . .[26]

Dundas had long been convinced that no individual or combination of native princes posed a lethal threat to Britain's power in India. What he did fear was a combination of Indian powers in league with the French.[27] Thus in June, 1798, as news of the French move on Egypt came in, Dundas dispatched instructions to Lord Wellesley, the recently arrived Governor-Gerneral of India. His concern was with a perennial antagonist. Tipu Sultan of Mysore, and the Afghan ruler Zeman Shah. Evidence of French support of Tipu had been mounting. Dundas sent Wellesley a copy of a proclamation by the governor of Mauritius offering the Mysore ruler a French alliance. If the document was authentic, he assumed, ". . . we are probably by this time at war with Tipu Sultan." If the refractory Sultan should claim he had not authorized the use of his name Dundas wanted more than a half-hearted denial. Should you not receive a full and sincere disavowal, he instructed Wellesley, ". . . when you think it the proper moment for doing so, bring him to an explanation in the only way such conduct merits."[28] While the imperial pretensions of Wellesley leave no doubt of his own aggressive designs in South India it is equally clear that Dundas' instructions were intended as a defensive response to this latest French menace to India, by way of Egypt and the Red Sea.[29]

At the same time Dundas was busy with other measures to counter the French thrust. He urged Lord Spencer to station a naval squadron at the mouth of the Red Sea. Writing at an early morning hour, Dundas confessed that "India has occupied my thoughts all night." The decision which he pressed upon his colleague, Dundas declared, ". . . is upon the first stake of the Empire, the *fact* of which may turn upon an hour . . . It is *impossible* that any other service can be equally pressing, nor is there another on which so much may turn."[30]

So critical did Dundas consider the crisis that he immediately ordered 1,500 troops to be sent from the Cape of Good Hope to India. In view of his sentiment concerning the importance of the Cape ". . . to the permanent and essential interests of this country in India," he wrote to Governor Macartney, ". . . nothing but the circumstances which appear more immediately to threaten those interests, could have induced me. . ." to detach troops from the Cape.[31] Other reinforcements for India were taken from British regiments in Gibraltar and in Portugal, and Dundas sent detailed instructions to Wellesley on emergency measure to be taken in India.[32] An agent named Harford Jones was appointed to the Court of the Bacha of Baghdad ". . . for the special purpose of prevailing if possible, on His Highness, should the French direct their views to India, either over the Desert or by the Red Sea, to counteract and oppose them by every means in his power . . . " Significantly Jones was to be an agent of the East India Company and was authorized to draw on Bombay for expenses.[33] His mission was partly based on the supposition that the French might land in Syria instead of Egypt, or that they might attempt to follow the route of Alexander the Great through Syria.[34] Meanwhile William Wickham reported that the French mission to Muscat, having been delayed, was finally dispatched early in 1798.[35] Captain Blankett, about to embark for the Arabian Sea, was

instructed to investigate French activities in that region as well as at the mouth of the Red Sea.[36]

Dundas directed his attention first to halting the progress of Napoleon's forces and then to expelling them from Egypt. He hoped for favorable news from Nelson but, he declared " . . . neither that nor any other success will compensate to the country . . . for the misfortune it has undergone by the French with a large army getting possession of Egypt. The circumstance haunts me night and day . . ." He insisted that the Admiralty take sufficient action to prevent the reinforcement of Bonaparte's troops in Egypt. Yet he feared that the incredulity of his colleagues on the subject of France's ultimate designs on India might frustrate effective action.[37] He bitterly complained of Grenville's having refused to send an agent to Russia to warn that country, and to concert with it, against the possibility of Napoleon's moving toward the Black Sea. The fact was, said Dundas, that Grenville believed Napoleon would remain in Egypt at least for a while and that a mission to Russia was unnecessary. "In (the)future, "he declared, "if other Departments will not concur with me in such measure as I think necessary for the successful execution of my Duty, I must be positive on the subject, and act by agents of my own." He gave instructtions to send a qualified agent to Russia. "...He shall be sent by myself without regard to the opinions of any other department." The expense of the mission would be paid by the East India Company.[38] Despite Spencer's assurance that his colleagues, including even Grenville, had generally accepted his view that the French in Egypt were a grave threat to British India,[39] Dundas continued to blame the incredulity of his associates for the sad state of affairs regarding Egypt.

News of Nelson's victory off Alexandria, which arrived in England late in September, eased Dundas' pain somewhat. He hoped that it was sufficiently decisive to put ". . . us on velvet in the Mediterranean, and indeed every where in Europe; but alas! it comes too late for India." Considering how much better the news might have been if his associates had heeded his advice to take action sooner, Dundas concluded in a fit of anguish, "I must close the subject, for it almost drives me mad to think of it."[41]The objective after Nelson's victory was to prevent the French from supplying or reinforcing their army in Egypt and to forestall any attempts by that force to move toward India.[42] By late December, 1798, Dundas believed that India was reasonably safe from any action by French troops in Egypt.[43]

It was late in 1798 when Dundas first broached, gingerly, the subject of expelling French troops from Egypt by force. Several people, he informed Grenville, had mentioned such a project to him, but he had set it aside because of the expense it would entail. He had even mentioned it cursorily at a Cabinet on a recent occasion. With these preliminary remarks, Dundas revealed that he had decided to dispatch one Colonel Maitland to the Red Sea area with a credit of L10,000 or L15,000 to investigate the feasibility of an attack on Napoleon's army. He was particularly anxious to know if an assault from India would be practicable.[44] By October, 1799, Dundas believed it was then impossible for

Bonaparte to do much in Egypt. "If however he should not soon die out of himself, and by the force of the country itself, it may be right to give him some help by sending a force from the Mediterranean for that purpose." [45]

By September, 1800, it was clear to Dundas that France must be expelled from Egypt as quickly as possible. A scheme to allow the French force to leave Egypt voluntarily and to return to France had been repudiated by the British cabinet earlier that year. At that time it was thought preferable to leave the French force in the unfriendly climate of Egypt rather than permit its return to Europe to fight against Britain's allies. Dundas, having been absent in Scotland when that decision was made, had always doubted its wisdom.[46] In September, however, sentiment for negotiating a peace arrangement with France was rising both within and outside the Cabinet. Dundas was convinced that in any negotiation with France Egypt would be the key issue. Great Britain, he assured the King, would negotiate under infinite disadvantage if France remained in possession of Egypt. ". . . From the most recent communications which have taken place," wrote Dundas,

> there seems to be no doubt . . . that the French put more value upon retaining the possession of Egypt than they do upon recovering any of the possessions taken from them . . . in the course of the war. Mr. Dundas personally never entertained a doubt that the French would make a good bargain if they allow Great Britain to attain all its conquests, provided they were allowed to consolidate their power in Egypt . . .[47]

If France were permitted to hold Egypt on conclusion of peace, Dundas warned Pitt, the threat to British India would be more formidable than ever. France could accumulate forces there in such strength as she chose; she could then launch an assault across the relatively short expanse of the Arabian Sea without warning and at her convenience.[48] Because of the public clamor for peace, England would not have the option, said Dundas, of breaking off peace negotiations if France refused to evacuate Egypt. Thus, he asserted, it was essential to get an expedition to the coasts of Egypt as quickly as possible. Even if the force could only get as far as Rhodes or Cyprus before peace was concluded, it would indicate that the French claims to Egypt were not undisputed.[49]

George III did not actually reject Dundas' idea of invading Egypt, but he believed Portugal should be relieved and that the Minorca and the Gilbraltar garrisons should be augmented before an expedition to Egypt was considered. He thought 5,000 men would be adequate for the Egyptian campaign,[50] whereas Dundas called for three times that number. Despite the King's sentiment, his war minister proposed to the Cabinet that an army of 15,000 men be dispatched to Egypt, which ". . . not for obvious reasons . . . is the object most important. . ." to the true interests of Great Britain.[51] The Cabinet

adopted Dundas' proposal on the ground "that it is of the utmost importance that the French should not be allowed to avail themselved of the Possession of Egypt in any Negotiation that may take place between this Country and France . . ." The troops were authorized, and General Sir Ralph Abercromby was designated to command the operation. Both Grenville and Windham recorded their dissent from the Cabinet's resolution.[52] The King was not surprised at their dissent. "I confess," he wrote to Dundas, "It is with the greatest reluctance I consent to the proposed disposal of troops in the Mediterranean by sending 15,000 of them . . . to Egypt . . ." He feared disastrous results analogous to those in the unhealthy environs of the earlier campaign in St. Domingo.[53]

Although he regretted that the King's consent was only reluctantly given, Dundas persisted in the pursuit of his scheme, professedly out of a deep sense of duty. "Every day tends more to convince. . .(me)," he informed the King, "that upon the Success of that measure must depend the permanency of the best Interests of Your Majesty's Dominions."[54] Time was now an urgent factor, he impatiently reminded Windham, as ". . . six weeks of the best time of the year was lost in Cabinet deliberations, which I submit to, as I suppose it is a necessary Evil, but it tells always . . . against the person who happens to hold the pen on such occasions."[55]

Having secured his point, Dundas quickly began dispatching orders for what he doubtless considered one of the most important undertakings of his career. In early October, 1800, strategically situated Malta was captured as part of the British move on Egypt.[56] Sir Ralph Abercromby, commanding the main expeditionary force, was orderd to attack Alexandria and the adjacent region and to co-operate with a Turkish force already assembling in Syria. Captain Home Popham's squadron, taking aboard a British regiment at the Cape of Good Hope, was dispatched to the Red Sea. Abercromby was expected to land at his assigned destination in December, 1800, while Popham would arrive in the Gulf of Aden in February, 1801. Dundas ordered Wellesley and the governors of Madras and Bombay to dispatch 1,000 Europeans and 2,000 Sepoy infantry to rendevous with Popham at Mocha as soon after his arrival as possible.[57]

Contemporaries widely credited Dundas with the conception and successful execution of the British campaign in the Levant in 1801. Even those who had earlier opposed him were lavish in their acclaim. The King reportedly drank a toast to the man "who proposed and carried into execution the expedition to Egypt, for in my opionion, when a person has been perfectly in the wrong, the most just and honourable thing for him to do is to acknowledge it publicly."[58] Some historians have been less kind. Holden Furber concluded, along with J. W. Fortescue, that the expedition's success was due less to Dundas than to the gallantry of Sir Ralph Abercromby and the blunders of the French commander.[59] Whatever the facts may be about the soundness of conception and implementation of the expedition, it is clear that it would not have taken place at all at this juncture without the vigorous exertions of Dundas. His design was to assure that France would not be left with an

uncontested claim to Egypt if and when peace broke out. From that standpoint his efforts seem to have been highly successful. The French were duly ousted from Egypt and, more importantly, from the bastian of Malta. Dundas foresaw that, with Malta in British hands, the entire eastern Mediterranean would be protected from any future French menace and Indian security would be correspondingly enhanced.

Yet, prospects for his strategic designs in the Mediterranean were abruptly altered in the early months of 1801, while the Egyptian campaign was still in progress. The Pitt ministry floundered over the issue of Irish Catholic emancipation,[60] and a new government led by Henry Addington took up the seals of office. Supported by Pitt and others from the former ministry, the Addingtonites prepared to respond to the public clamor for peace. But, in doing so, they effectively ignored Dundas' designs in the Levant and the strategic concepts underlying them. Almost alone among the important veterans of his late ministry, Pitt supported Addington's peace terms. They provided that Britain should retain two captured possessions, Ceylon and Trinidad. The Cape of Good Hope was to be restord to the Dutch and turned into a free port. Malta was to be returned to the Order of the Knights of St. John and to be independent of both France and Britain while Egypt would be restored to the Ottoman Porte. "On the whole," wrote Pitt, "I see nothing very materially to regret but the loss of the Cape; and even important as that is, I think the terms may be considered as on the whole highly creditable, and, with respect to both the East and West Indies, very advantageous."[61] Most of the former associates Pitt consulted strongly opposed the peace proposal. They were unanimous in deploring the relinquishment of the Cape and Grenville, Lord Mulgrave, and Lord Camden joined Dundas in insisting upon the importance of Malta or Egypt to the future security of Britain's Eastern interests.[62] Dundas had assumed that Malta and the Cape, along with Trinidad and Ceylon would be *sine qua non* in the projected peace. He saw Malta as the means by which the Levant, and therefore India, could be insulated from future French threats without incurring the expense of a permanent British occupation of Egypt. ". . . I had never allowed myself even to suspect the abandonment of the Cape and Malta. . .," he wrote to Grenville. "By giving up the Cape we have given up one of the essential points of security to India; and we have done even worse by giving up Malta, for we have abandoned Egypt to a future danger from France . . ." He could see no reason why either Egypt or Malta should have been subject to the treaty in view of the complete success of British arms in both places. Dundas expressed a deep sense of gloom, both to Grenville and to Pitt, about ". . . the calamitous consequences . . ." which he foresaw resulting from the settlement. His best consolation, he lamented, was that at his age he may not live to witness it all.[63]

Dundas' vision of ultimate calamity was not vindicated by events after 1801. Yet the soundness of his assumptions about the strategic significance of a French force in Egypt is not thereby discredited. One can only speculate on what might have developed if the French had been left in Egypt by the Amiens

settlement. Whatever misgivings Dundas had over Britain's failure to retain Mala, he had assured the French exodus from Egypt. And he had done so against formidable opposition.

Even at the outset of his tenure as unofficial minister for India, Dundas clearly perceived the potential of a French presence in Egypt in relation to Britain's interests in India and beyond. By his account, only the prevailing incredulity and consequent apathy of his colleagues restrained him from taking early actions to thwart a potential French eastward move. Yet it is doubtful what actions he could or would have taken before 1793, beyond sending an agent to Cairo as he did. He did strongly oppose the withdrawal of British naval forces from the Mediterranean in 1796. When hard evidence of a projected French expedition to Egypt was first received in April 1798, he clamored for immediate countermeasures while other key figures such as Lord Spencer refused to take the reports seriously.

News of Napoleon's successful landing in the Nile region brought Henry Dundas nearer to abject panic than any other event in his public career. By nature and by years of political seasoning he was not easily ruffled and there can be no doubt that his anguish on this occasion was genuine and deep. Yet, with the belated support of his Cabinet colleagues, he moved with cool efficiency to counter any contingencies he could anticipate growing out of the French expedition. Once it was clear that the French force was isolated and incapable of expansion beyond the immediate area Dundas was again at ease. So he remained, guardedly, until he perceived a renewed threat in the fall of 1800 with the prospect of a French force being left in Egypt on the outbreak of peace.

Dundas consistently regarded a French presence in the Levant in terms of the security of Britain's Eastern interest. As a war minister with a long and dedicated preoccupation with India, his strategic perspective was probably unique. This explains his extreme and quite uncharacteristic agitation over this issue while none of his cabinet associates showed comparable concern. Dundas' vexation with skeptical colleagues and his persistance in pursuit of his strategy, even in the face of royal displeasure, reflect the intensity of his feelings on the subject. Moreover his difference with several colleagues over Egypt and the Mediterranean is part of a more fundamental divergence of opinion on Britain's general war strategy and objectives. William Windham, conspicuously, and others to a lesser extent, stressed a continental strategy and called for British efforts to restore the Old Regime in France.[64] Dundas, supported by Pitt and most of their colleagues, opposed undue involvement in Europe while divesting the enemy of their overseas possessions which could be made useful to Britain's vital interests. In July, 1800, Dundas proposed expeditions to capture some of the island bases yet remaining to France as a

> . . . means of strengthening ourselves or weaking our Enemies . . . It was by the direction of our force at the early period of the war to the

> annihilation of the Colonial and Commercial Resources of the Enemy, that we have been able during the later period of it, to maintain our own preeminence and administer so bountifully to the necessities of others. [65]

With this conception of national interests combined with his peculiar India orientation Dundas, more than his associates, viewed a French presence in Egypt as a potentially lethal threat to British interest in India. And the complex of commercial-imperial interests centered in India were of foremost importance in his scheme of relative imperial values. Thus his actions in response to the French menace in Egypt were vigorous and pivotal. He did not prevent the initial landing but he played a key role in neutralizing it. He keenly feared the consequence of Britian's relinquishment of Malta at the Peace of Amien but his earlier exertions had played a decisive part in liquidating the French presence in Egypt and thus enhancing British security in India.

Lucy S. Sutherland, *The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 402-414, and *passim;* Cyril Matheson, *The Life of Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville, 1742-1811* (London, 1933), p. 92, and *passim.*

[2] C. H. Philips, *The East India Company 1784-1834* (Manchester, 1961), pp. 23-80.

[3] Holden Furber, *Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville, 1742-1811* (Oxford, 1931). Furber's is the best biographical study of Dundas. He gives extensive attention to his management of Scotland, his position in the government and devotes two concise chapters to his management of India and one to his conduct of the war with France. See also John Ehrman, *The Younger Pitt* (2 vols., projected; New York, 1969 -), I, 575-603, and *passim.*

[4] Dundas to Windham, 10 April, 1798, British Museum, Additional Manuscripts 37, 877, ff. 296-301, Windham Papers XXXVI; Dundas to Huskisson, 3 September, 1800, B. M. Add. MSS 38, 736, f. 162, Huskisson Papers III. (Both William Windham and William Huskisson served under Dundas at the War Office) A caustic remark on this subject was attributed to the Duchess of Gordon in 1794 when she was said to have predicted ". . .that before the end of this war the King would be in possession of every island in the world except Great Britain and Ireland." Auckland to Lord Henry Spencer, 27 July, 1794, *Journals and Correspondence of William, Lord Auckland,* ed. R. Eden (4 vols.; London, 1861-62), III, 223.

Dundas' strategic concepts are spread throughout his correspondence. Three particularly plain pronouncements are: Dundas to Grenville, 24 November, 1799, Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission (No. 30), *Report on the Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore* (10 vols; London, 1892-1927), VI, 37-39. Dundas' Memorandum for the Cabinet, 31 March, 1800, Duke University, Dundas Manuscripts; Dundas' Memorandum on the State of the Cabinet, 22 September 1800, ff. 76-77 B. M. Add. MSS 40, 102, Melville Papers III.

[6] Unsigned paper on the overland routes to India, London, (1783) Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, (No. 27), Twelfth Report, Appendix, Part IX, *The Manuscripts of the Duke of Beaufort, the Earl of Donoughmore, and others* (including "The Manuscripts of P. V. Smith of Lincoln's Inn") (London, 1891), p. 344. The papers in the hands of P. V. Smith were those of his grandfather, Joseph Smith, Pitt's private secretary, 1787-1801. Hereinafter cited as H. M. C. *I. Smith Papers;* Heads of a Conversation between Dundas and George Baldwin (about Egypt) in February, 1784; Paper prepared by Lord Mulgrave for the use of Dundas (undated; probably prepared in April, 1785), Great Britain, Public Records Office 30-8-360, ff 288-89; 338-44, Chatham Papers.

[7] George Baldwin's thoughts upon the subject of Egypt, 3 May, 1785; Baldwin to Dundas 4 May, 1785, P.R.O. 30-8-361, ff. 12-14, 16-23, Chatham Papers.

[8] See letters from the Duke of Dorset and Daniel Hailes (British Ambassador and Charge d'affaires in France) to the Foreign Office printed in *Des-patches from Paris 1784-1790,* ed. Oscar Browning (2 vols.; Royal Historical Society, Camden, 3rd series, XVI, XIX; London, 1909, 1910), I, 5, 16, 61, 97-98, 244-245.

[9] Halford L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (Philadelphia, 1928), p. 35. Hoskins' book is dated and of dubious reliability in places but it remains an important (and the only) study on this subject and has been reprinted by Octagon Books, 1966.

[10] Grenville to Dundas, 1 April, 1792 H.M.C. *Fortescue Papers,* II, 263. Baldwin's salary was £1,400. Grenville actually did recall Baldwin the next year but Dundas managed to transfer him to the East India Company's service so that he could remain at his post. Dundas' move was made after the resumption of war with France became known. Dundas to Grenville, 17 August, 1794, H.M.C. *Fortescue Papers* II, 621.

[11] Dundas to Spencer, Tuesday 3 P.M. (24 April, 1798), *Private Papers of George, Second Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1794-1801,* ed. Julian S. Corbett and Admiral Sir H. W. Richmond (4 vols.; 1913-14, 1924), II, 318; IV, 169-70.

[12] W. Sidney Smith to Greenville, (private and secret), aboard the ship *Diamond,* off Brest, 13 January, 1795. H.M.C. *Fortescue Papers* IV, 4-5.

[13] Charles Magellon to ( ), 17 June, 1795, and Charles Magellon to the Commissioner of Foreign Relations, 1 October, 1795, quoted in Hoskins, *British Routes to India,* pp. 52, 53.

[14] Wickham to Mr. Liston and to Mr. Baldwin, Lausanne, 22 January, 1796, and Wickham to the English Resident at Basra, Bern, 30 June, 1796, *The Correspondence of the Right Honorable William Wickham from the Year 1794,* ed. William Wickham (2 vols.; London, 1870), I, 252-253, 384-388.

[15] Wickham to Greenville (in cypher), Bern, 27 November, 1796, and 22 December, 1796, *Ibid.,* I, 482, 499-500.

[16] Dundas to Spencer (private), Wimbledon, 6 A.M., 28 October, 1796, *Spencer Papers,* I, 321-323.

[17] Spencer to Peter Rainier, 30 May, 1798, *Ibid.,* I, 169-170.

[18] Extract of a letter from Mr. Udney to Lord Grenville, Leghorn, 16 April, 1798, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Colonial Office 77-58, ff. 90-91.

[19] Unidentified paper on the importance of Egypt to the French, 20 April, 1798, enclosed in Dundas to Grenville, 13 June, 1798, B. M. Add. MSS 37, 274, ff. 46, 57-61, Wellesley Papers (Ser. II) I. Dundas mentioned in his note to Grenville that this was put into his hands by Spencer, and ". . . I certainly concur in every Idea (the

writer) . . . states, with many additional ones, which my official situation has led me to revolve upon."

[20] Dundas to Spencer, Somerset Pl., Tuesday, 3 P.M. (24 April, 1798), *Spencer Papers*, II, 318. Only a week before (17 April) Dundas had urged Spencer to reassert British maritime power in the Mediterranean, referring on that occasion to the importance of Egypt to both England and France. Matheson, *Dundas*, p. 246.

[21] Spencer to Rainier, Admiralty, 30 May, 1798, *Spencer Papers*, IV, 169-170.

[22] Dundas to Huskisson, Scotland, 27 August, 1798, B. M. Add. MSS 38, 735, ff. 110-111, Huskisson Papers II.

[23] Secret intelligence from Frankfurt, (11 June, 1798), P.R.O., C. O. 77-58, ff. 89-90.

[24] Dundas to Grenville, Wimbledon, 13 June, 1798, B.M. Add. MSS 37, 274, ff. 45-49, Wellesley Papers (Ser. II) I. Napoleon and the Directory seem to have had no definite plan in view, beyond securing Egypt and the Red Sea region. They envisioned a canal through the isthmus of Suez as part of a scheme to establish a French trade route which would enable them to undermine English predominance in the India commerce. Since England then occupied the Cape, they considered the Suez route essential to continue French commerce with the East. Once established in the Red Sea area, Napoleon could contemplate several alternative plans, one of which was a possible attack on India. Bonaparte to the Directory, Paris, 23 February, 1793; the Directory's resolution (on Egypt), Paris, 12 April, 1798, *Letters and Documents of Napoleon*, selected by John E. Howard, Vol. I: *The Rise to Power* (London, 1961), pp. 223-26, 232-33. See also J. Christopher Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* (New York, 1962), p. 19 and *passim*.

[25] Dundas to Spencer, Wimbledon, 7:30 (P.M. (?), between 9 and 16 June, 1798), *Spencer Papers*, II, 450.

[26] Dundas to Grenville, 13 June, 1798, B.M. Add. MSS 37, 274, ff. 48-51, Wellesley Papers (Ser. II), I.

[27] Dundas to Pitt, Scotland, 23 October, (1785) and 1 December, 1785, P.R.O. 30-58-1, items 17 and 22, Dacres Adams Papers; Board of Control to Madras (signed: Dundas, Walsingham, Grenville, Mulgrave), 26 August, 1785; Board to Bengal (signed: Pitt, Dundas, Mulgrave), 19 July, 1786; Board to Bombay (signed: Pitt, Dundas Mulgrave), 20 September, 1786, Great Britain, India Office Library, Board's Drafts of Secret Letters. . . to India, Vol. 1: all presidencies.

[28] Dundas to Mornington, 16 June, 1798, P.R.O., C. O. 77-58, ff. 69-70. This was the dispatch in which Dundas enclosed a copy of "Secret Intelligence from Frankfurt," cited above. For convenience I have used the family name and later title, Wellesley, as the usual identification for the Governor-General even though his correct title until 1800 was The Earl of Mornington. See also Mornington to Dundas (private, no 1), Castle of Cape Hope, 23 February, 1798, *The Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondence of the Marquess of Wellesley, During his Administration in India*, ed., Montgomery Martin (5 vols; London, 1836-37), I, 1-6. See also Board to Bengal (secret), 19 June, 1798, I.O.L. Board's Drafts of Secret Letters . . . to India, Vol. 26: Bengal, pp. 149-51.

[29] This contention is developed in the editor's introduction of *Two Views of British India, The Private Correspondence of Mr. Dundas and Lord Wellesley: 1798-1801*, ed. Edward Ingram (Bath, 1970), pp. 1-14. That Wellesley's intentions

were aggressive and grandiose is shown, for example, in his letters to Grenville, 18 November, 1798, and 21 February, 1799, H.M.C. *Fortescue Papers*, IV, 381, 474-75.

[30] Dundas to Spencer, Wimbledon, Saturday 8 A.M. (between 9 and 16 June, 1798), *Spencer Papers*, II, 449.

[31] Dundas to Macartney (secret), 18 June, 1798, P.R.O., C. O. 49-9, ff. 170-174.

[32] Dundas to Mornington (secret), 16 June, 1798, P.R.O., C. O. 77-58, ff. 72-75.

[33] Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to Bombay (approved by order of the Board), 25 July, 1798, I.O.L. Board's Drafts of Secret Letters . . . to India, Vol. 29: Bombay.

[34] Extract of Harford Jones to Hugh Inglis, Baghdad, 21 October, 1798, B. M. Add. MSS 41, 767, f. 35. Harford Jones Papers I.

[35] (Wickham) to Sir Evan Nepean (secret), 30 June, 1798, *Wickham Correspondence*, II, 70-73.

[36] Blankett to Spencer, Portsmouth, 3 July, 1798, *Spencer Papers*, IV, 175-177.

[37] Dundas to Spencer (private), Tyingham, 27 August, 1798, *Spencer Papers*, II, 454-455.

[38] Dundas to Huskisson Scotland, 27 August, 1798, B. M. Add. MSS 38, 735, Huskisson Papers II.

[39] Spencer to Dundas (private), Admiralty, 30 August, 1798, *Spencer Papers*, II, 455-456.

[40] Dundas to Grenville, Dunira Lodge, 28 September, 1798, H.M.C. *Fortesque Papers*, IV, 328; Dundas to D. Scott, Dunira Lodge, 13 September, 1798, *The Correspondence of David Scott, Director and Chairman of the East India Company, Relating to Indian Affairs*, 1787-1805, ed. C.H. Philips (2 vols.; "Royal Historical Society, Camden 3rd series, "LXXV-LXXVI; London, 1951) I, 151.

[41] Dundas to Grenville, Dunira Lodge, 28 September, 1798, H.M.C. *Fortescue Papers*, IV, 328. See also, Dundas to Huskisson, Dunira Lodge, 1 October, 1798, B.M. Add. MSS 38, 735, f. 154, Huskisson Papers II.

[42] Dundas to Spencer, Arniston, 5 October, 1798, *Spencer Papers*, IV, 187; Board to Bombay (signed: Dundas, Pitt, Grenville), 19 November, 1798, I.O.L. Board's Drafts of Secret Letters . . . to India, Vol. 2: all presidencies.

[43] Dundas to Mornington (private), 29 December, 1798, B.M. Add. MSS 37, 274, ff. 80-82, Wellesley Papers (Ser. II) I. The East India Company formally passed resolutions of gratitude for the service rendered to the Company by Nelson in his naval victory near the mouth of the Nile during the first three days of August, 1798. The Court of Directors voted a grant of L 10,000 to Nelson. In adding its approval of the Company's resolutions the Board of Control did ". . . not conceive how the Court could have done less than they have proposed" for Nelson. Resolutions of the General Court of the East India Company, 20 March. 1799; Resolution of the Court of Directors, 24 April, 1799; Resolution of the Board of Control (signed: Dundas, Pitt, William Dundas), Whitehall, 7 May, 1799, B.M. Add. MSS 34, 911, ff. 20-24, Nelson Papers X.

[44] Dundas to Grenville, Wimbledon, 13 December, 1798, H.M.C. *Fortescue Papers*, IV, 413-414.

[45] Dundas to Mornington (secret and confidential), 12 October, 1799, B.M. Add. MSS 37, 274, f. 273, Wellesley Papers (Ser. III) I.

[46] Dundas to Wellesley, Cheltenham, 4 September, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS 37, 275.

f. 186, Wellesley Papers (Ser. II) II; Arthur Paget to Grenville (private), Florence, 12 March, 1800. *The Paget Papers, Diplomatic and other Correspondence of Sir Arthur Paget, 1794-1807*, ed. Sir Augustus B. Paget (2 vols.; London, 1896), I, 188-189.

[47] Dundas to the King, 28 September, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS 40, 100, ff. 284-286, Melville Papers I.

[48] Dundas to Pitt, Wimbledon, 19 September, 1800, quoted in Rose, *Life of Pitt*, part II, p. 387.

[49] Dundas to Sir Ralph Abercromby, (undated; September or October, 1800), quoted in James Abercromby, Lord Dunfarmline, *Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby*, 1793-1801 (Edinburgh, 1861), pp. 247-248.

[50] The King to Dundas, 29 September, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS 40, 100, f. 289, Melville Papers I.

[51] Dundas' Memorandum on the state of the Cabinet as to the disposable forces, 1 October, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS 40, 102, ff. 83-84, Melville Papers, III.

[52] Minute of the Cabinet, 3 October, 1800, (present: Lord Chacellor, Portland, Spencer, Chatham, Camden, Liverpool, Grenville, Pitt, Windham, Dundas), .B.M. Add. MSS 40, 102, ff. 87-88, Melville Papers III; Sylvester Douglas later recorded Liverpool's indicated that, of those who spoke at the meeting, the Cabinet was about equally divided. But Pitt counted in favor of the measure three members who had voiced no opinion and, contrary to his usual practice, had called on Liverpool for an opinion because he knew he favored the measure, though with reservations. Entry of 4 A.M., Monday, 9 February, 1801, *Diaries of Sylvester Douglas, Lord Glenbervie*, ed. Francis Bickley (2 vols.; London, 1928), I, 159-60.

[53] The King to Dundas, Weymouth, 5 October, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS 40, 100.f. 293, Melville Papers I; a copy of this letter is in the Duke Univ. Dundas MSS.

[54] Dundas to the King, 6 October, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS 40, 100, ff. 295-296, Melville Papers I.

[55] Dundas to William Windham, 29 October, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS 37, 879, f. 298, Windham Papers XXXVIII.

[56] Windham to Spencer, 11 October, 1800, *Spencer Papers*, IV, 131-132; Dundas to Mornington (private) 29 December, 1795, B.M. Add. MSS 37-274, ff. 82-83, Wellesley Papers (Ser. II) I.

[57] Dundas to Wellesley (secret), Downing St., 6 October, 1800; Board to Dengal (signed: Dundas, Pitt, Portland), 7 October, 1800, I.O.L. Board's Drafts of Secret Letters . . . to India, Vol. 2: all presidencies.

[58] *Douglas Diaries*, I, 233; see also his entry on p. 264; see also Mr. Chapman to Dundas, 2 October, 1801, National Library of Scotland, Melville Papers, MS 1071, f. 41.

[59] Furber, *Dundas*, p. 122. Furber cites J.W. Fortescue's *History of the British Army* (Volume IV, pp. 856-9).

[60] The cabinet fell when Pitt misjudged the intensity of the King's opposition to his Irish Catholic emancipation proposal. Donald Grove Barnes, *George III and William Pitt, 1783-1806* (London, 1939), pp. 327-85.

[61] Pitt to Spencer, Park Place, 1 October, 1801, *Spencer Papers*, IV, 304. Pitt's views had changed significantly in the course of a year. Earlier he held the view that both the Cape and Cochin (on the Malabar coast of India) as well as Ceylon should be

sine qua non. He would make French evacuation of Egypt (before the British expedition was launched a subject of negotiation but was willing to offer a great deal to oust them. He was also doubtful about whether it was reasonable to talk of giving up both Malta and Minorca or either of them. Cabinet sketch of a Plan of Peace (probably October), 1800, and Pitt to Addington, 8 October, 1800, quoted in George Pellew, *The Life and Correspondence of Henry Addington, First Viscount Sidmouth* (3 vols.; London, 1847), I 257-60, 263.

[62] Lord Camden to Pitt, 30 August, 1801, Grenville to Pitt, Dropmore, 1 October, 1801, Spencer to Pitt, 3 October, 1801, Lord Mulgrave to Pitt, 4 October, 1801, P.R.O. 30-58-4; items 46-46i, 48, 49, 50. Another colleague was more supportive. Lord Hawkesbury to Grenville, Downing St., 1 October, 1801, H.M.C. *Fortescue Papers*, VII, 45.

[63] Dundas to Grenville (private and confidential), Dunira, Lodge, 10 October, 1801, H.M.C. *Fortescue Papers*, VII, 56-58; Dundas to Pitt, Aberdeen, 6 October, 1801, P.R.O. 30-58-4, item 52.

[64] Dundas to Windham, 31 March, 1796, and Windham to Dundas, 1 May, 1796, B.M. Add. MSS 37, 876, ff. 39-42, 89-90, Windham Papers XXV. Windham to Burke, 27 April, 1797, *Correspondence of Edmund Burke and William Windham with other Illustrative Letters from the Windham Papers in the British Museum*, ed. J.P. Gilson (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 238-239.

[65] Dundas' secret Memorandum to the Cabinet, 22 July, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS 40, 102, f. 62 Melville Papers III; Dundas to Colonel James Murrey, Whitehall, 16 April, 1793, B.M. Add. MSS 34, 450, ff. 167-168, Auckland Papers XXXIX.

THE MOTIVATIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE BRITISH EXPLORATION OF EAST AFRICA

For centuries men had marvelled at the mighty river which traced a verdant strip through the Egyptian desert and wondered where its life-giving waters originated. Yet in mid-nineteenth century the source of the Nile remained as shrouded in mystery as it had been when the Roman poet Lucan wrote:

> Yet still no views have urged my ardour more
> Than Nile's remotest mountains to explore.
> Lucan, *The Civil War.*

It was, as the eminent explorer and Africanist Sir Harry Johnston later stated, "the greatest geographical secret after the discovery of America." [1]

In 1856, two English explorers, John Speke and Richard Burton, entered the intralacustrine regions of East Africa in search of the legendary "Mountains of the Moon" and a solution to this ancient enigma.[2] Through a combination of fortuitous circumstances, tenacious work and prescient intuition, Speke discovered Lake Victoria, which ultimately proved to be the legendary well-spring of the Nile. Speke's revelation and the excitement and controversy it engendered captured the imagination of his countrymen, and two generations of British explorers following in his footsteps virtually completed the geographical conquest of Africa. The combined activities of these men formed a key constituent ingredient in contributing to knowledge of and molding opinion on the "dark continent." They provided a frame of reference within which the early participants in the "scramble" for Africa worked, and the explorers' functions in this capacity leave little doubt that they were precursors of imperialism. In light of these considerations, it is apparent that if the explorers' activities are to be studied in the proper context, some awareness of why they initially were drawn to Africa is essential. The purpose of this paper is to provide such an analysis by focusing on the motivational factors which underlay the explorers' African endeavors.[3]

The careers of ten individuals form the basis of this study. All thought themselves explorers, although the distinctions between explorer, missionary, adventurer, and similar categorizations are not always readily discernible. The men vary considerably in accomplishment and present-day renown, but collectively they epitomize the exploration factor in East and Central Africa. They are, in addition to Burton and Speke, John Petherick, James Grant, Samuel Baker, Verney Cameron, Henry Stanley, James Elton, Joseph Thomson, and Harry Johnston. With the obvious exception of David Livingstone, who better fits the mold of missionary than that of explorer, this group represents the bulk of British discoveries in East Africa during the years 1856 to 1890.[4]

To a man, the explorers were tinged by the adventurous romanticism which attaches itself to subjects that capture the popular imagination. Exploits

in unknown or perilous regions always have attracted such fancies, and an intense desire to discover the origin of the mighty stream which had made Egypt its gift was a thought which loomed large in the minds of all the early British explorers of the East African hinterland. One of the goals expressed by the doyens of the Royal Geographical Society, who supported the researches of Burton and Speke, was that "the expedition m(ight) lead to the solution of that great geographical problem, the determination of the sources of the White Nile." [5] Furthermore, visions of discovering the Nile's fabled "Coy Fountains" had been implanted ineffaceably in the minds of both Burton and Speke. [6]

As early as 1853, Burton's fertile imagination had been stirred by a conversation with the German missionary, Johann Krapf, regarding "The White Nile, Killamanjaro (sic) and (the) Mts. of the Moon." He invidiously characterized the missionary as reminding "one of a de Lunatico," yet Burton's skepticism did not deter him from questioning Krapf extensively on "what has been done and what remains to be done." [7] By February, 1855, Burton was positively enamored of the Nile sources. He wrote to Norton Shaw, the secretary of the Royal Geographical Society: "Privately and '*entre nous*,' I want to settle the question of Krapf and (the) 'eternal snows.' There is little doubt of the White Nile being there abouts." [8]

Speke's interest in the Nile's headwaters, although obscure as to origin, was even more pronounced in its single-mindedness than Burton's. The subject became a consuming passion with Speke, whom a contemporary described as "the most determined dare-devil possible," and in mid-1857 he candidly admitted: "I feel myself practically bedded with, and instinctively impelled on to the prosecution of geographical research, the same way as formerly the attainment of sport was the culminating point of my ambition." [9] Thus both men, in the words of Burton's wife, "pined for the honour of discovering the sources of the Nile." [10]

A murderous native attack in Somaliland aborted the explorers' first footsteps toward the Nile, but following an interlude in which both men served in the Crimean War, Burton "again turned lovingly to Africa. . . resolved to renew (his) original design of reaching the unknown regions and of striking the Nile sources via the eastern coast." Inasmuch as Speke had suffered with him "in purse and person" in his earlier attempt to penetrate Africa, Burton invited him to accompany the new expedition. The story of their ensuing journey, culminating in great discoveries but also irreconcilable differences between the two, is a familiar one.

After struggling to overcome inadequate resources, debilitating sickness and the recalcitrance of the natives, Burton and Speke reached Lake Tanganyika. Burton belived this was their goal, "the reputed Lake of Nyassa," but Speke thought otherwise.[11] En route he had garnered information concerning a second lake, "described by the Arabs to be both broader and longer than the Tanganyika. . . which they call Ukerewe," that he was "burning to see." [12] Speke resolutely insisted on exploring this second lake

in order to fulfill the Royal Geographical Society's instructions to the letter, but overriding this sanctimoniously expressed sense of duty was, as Speke later admitted, an intense personal desire "to carry out my long-cherished hopes of discovering the sources of the Nile." [13] Burton, exasperated by Speke's persistence and happy "to get rid of him!," granted his subordinate permission to push onward alone to this second inland sea. He was thereby "betrayed into the greatest mistake of his life." [14]

Speke made a rapid and relatively trouble-free march to the lake, and on August 3, 1858, he sighted a vast expanse of water which he intuitively concluded was the source of the Nile: "I no longer felt any doubt that the lake at my feet gave birth to that interesting river, the source of which has been the subject of so much speculation, and the object of so many explorers." [15] Burton scoffed at Speke's claims and likened his conclusions to those advanced by Lucetta to justify her preference for Sir Proteus: "I have no other but a woman's reason—I think him so because I think him so." [16] Such caustic sentiments were wasted on Speke, who had become so engrossed by the Nile's sources that his convictions superseded all doubts. Burton, for his part, became increasingly disconsolate in the face of Speke's irrepresible ebullience, and when the two explorers finally returned to England, the seething controversy burst wide open.

The debate that ensued was acrimonious and unedifying, and it culminated in tragedy with Speke's unfortunate death in a hunting accident followed by Burton's thinly veiled hints that it had been suicide. Yet it demonstrates the extent to which the two men, once the best of friends, had succumbed to the Nile's spell. Furthermore, many uncertainties concerning the exact nature of Nile geography remained even after Speke had made yet another journey to the lake he named Victoria, after his sovereign. These ambiguities naturally were seized upon by armchair geographers, and this factor, together with the attention focused on the Nile by the public airing of the differences between Burton and Speke, soon attracted other adventurers.

Speke's anxiety to visit the lake a second time was acute, as he candidly admitted: "I felt as much tantalised as the unhappy Tantalus must have been when unsuccessful in his bobbings for cherries in the cherry-orchard, and as much grieved as any mother would be at losing her first-born, and resolved and planned forthwith to do everything in my power to visit the lake again." [17] As his companion for this journey he chose James Grant, a Scot of the "highest personal courage and perseverance" whose adventurous character made him a likely candidate to succumb to the Nile's spell. While he never experienced the same degree of emotional fervor which motivated Speke, Grant rejoiced at his opportunity to participate in the search "to determine the locality whence the head waters of the White Nile take their rise." [18]

Eventually two other explorers, John Petherick and Samuel Baker, also were involved in the Speke-Grant Expedition. Petherick, a hulking man "like a rampant hippopotamus" who Lord John Russell characterized as having "a wild Arab sort of manner, fitter for those districts (the interior of Africa) than

St. James's Street," was involved in the expedition for primarily economic reasons. Yet despite his remarkable rapaccity he shared Speke's eagerness "for ripping open Africa together." [19] Petherick, accompanied by his recent bride, was to lead an auxiliary expedition up the Nile, with the primary purpose of effecting a meeting with and succouring Speke and Grant on their voyage down river from Lake Victoria. However, he privately informed his brother-in-law of an ambition to "explore . . . (the) source . . . of that mighty River," and in a published prospectus soliciting support for his endeavor, Petherick openly stated that "sixteen years' experience on the Nile, and the brilliant examples of illustrious countrymen," had instilled him with "the desire and ambition" to assist "in the discovery of the sources of the Nile." Thus even the shrewd, materialistic mind of Petherick was captivated by the glamor and romance associated with the search for the Nile.[20]

For Samuel Baker, a close friend of Speke's, the reported discovery of Lake Victoria and its supposed connection with the Nile must have acted as a stimulant as well as coming as something of a shock. From a series of letters Baker wrote to the Royal Geographical Society in 1858, it is clear that he already had begun to consider approaching the area from the south, and from that point onward one senses a gradual encroachment finally reaching the point of preoccupation of the Nile sources in Baker's mind.[21] He acknowledges as much in an 1861 letter to his sister in which he states: "For some time past I have cherished a secret determination to make a trip into the Unknown. . . ever pushing for the high ranges from which the Nile is supposed to derive its sources." Following the departure of Speke and Grant for Africa, Baker decided to organize his own expedition. By this time the lure of Africa had become so great that he confided to a family member his resolve that "nothing but death shall prevent me from discovering the *sources* of the Nile." [22]

Stanley, the last explorer to be significantly involved in the problem of the Nile's sources, deviated somewhat from the norm established by his forerunners. He was, according to Francis Galton, who knew many of the explorers intimately, "essentially a journalist aiming at producing sensational articles." Nonetheless, his intercourse with Dr. Livingstone had imbued him with lasting geographical ambitions, and news of the great missionary's death fired Stanley "with a resolution to complete his work, to be, if God willed it, the next martyr to geographical science, or, if my life was to be spared, to clean up not only the secrets of the Great River throughout its course, but also all that remained still problematical and incomplete of the discoveries of Burton and Speke, and Speke and Grant." Ultimately Stanley was to avoid the suicidally oriented plan first proffered and to succeed gloriously in its alternative.[23]

It required two decades for explorers to completely corroborate the correctness of Speke's solution to "the Matterhorn of the RGS, the grandest feat and the longest delayed." In the interim, the charismatic influence of Africa created heated rivalries, sometimes accompanied by personal rancor, and the attraction of the continent's geographical mysteries was a major motivating factor for all of the first generation of British explorers in central

Africa. "Chinese" Gordon may have declared, while serving the Egyptian Khedive in the Sudan: "I do not care whether there are two lakes or a million, or whether the Nile has a source or not."[24] Yet for Burton, Speke, Grant, Petherick, Baker and Stanley, the appropriately styled "Coy Fountains" of the Nile had an effect not unlike that the Sirens exercised on Odysseus.

The fascination surrounding the quest for the Nile's sources and the controversy which was an outgrowth of this search was but one aspect of a broader phenomenon which affected all the explorers under consideration. The alluring enticement of Africa attracted them in the same way their colorful beads and gaudy cloths attracted the natives. Africa's magnetism extended beyond the narrow if intriguing confines of a single geographical mystery and contemporary commentators were fully cognizant of this fact. Laurence Oliphant captures the essence of the matter when he writes of the explorers: "The object which has impelled these gentlemen to place themselves in these various attitudes of discomfort and danger, has, in the majority of cases been simply, ' the fun of the thing'—a love of adventure."[25] Even the cynical Burton admitted:

> The theme (African travel) has remoteness and obscurity of place, difference of custom, marvellousness of hearsay; events passing strange yet credible, sometimes barbaric splendour, generally luxuriance of nature, savage life, personal danger and suffering always borne. . . with patience, dignity, and even enthusiasm.[26]

In a word, a true aura of romanticism surrounded exploration.

Afromania was a disease defying rational explanation. The seemingly irresistible impulses which motivated men to search initially for the Nile continued unabated. Baker found himself "made up of queer materials, averse to beaten pathes," and harboring a demon of discovery of which he wrote: "A wandering spirit is in my marrow, which forbids me rest. Africa has always been in my head."[27] Burton too shared this affliction, as is indicated by his own diagnosis: "Discovery is mostly my mania."[28] Stanley, who served as a link between the first and second wave of East African explorers, wrote: "As yet I see no sign that ever I shall love civilization better than I love roving."[29] Even the comparatively steady James Elton styled himself an "idler and wanderer."[30] Since childhood Joseph Thomson had been captivated by the writings of men who were his fore-runners in Africa, and he was a man whose "stomach rebelled) against the infliction of sedentary occupation." It is scarcely surprising that, in the words of his brother, "the mystery and pathos of Africa's darkness. . . laid hold of his imagination."[31]

The lives of Verney Cameron and Harry Johnston reveal similar symptoms of wanderlust, and Africa offered a ready and attractive arena for their superfluous energies. Cameron had led a roving life since boyhood, and his initially fruitless, but nonetheless persistent, entreaties to the Royal

Geographical Society requesting permission to participate in the search for Livingstone symbolize the earnestness with which he sought African adventure. Johnston, having once been introduced to the continent while painting in North Africa, felt "the real Africa beyond the Sahara . . . drawing him with an irresistible allurement," and he inwardly wondered: "Shall I ever look back with longing regret to the quiet happy home I have left and sigh for the thousand miles of land and sea that separate me from it?" [32] They, like all the explorers, were tinctured to a considerable degree by the enthrallment of Africa.

The resulting inner drive probably stands foremost as a motivational force when the explorers are considered as a group; however, for many of the men overtones of escapism quickened and gave added impetus to their headlong rush towards the Dark Continent's vortex. Africa naturally exercised an especially potent influence among those men who placed little value on the venerated constancy of British life, and this factor introduces a degree of duality into what might be termed the obsessive element of the explorers' motivation. The intriguing mysteriousness inherent in East Africa's unexplored state certainly drew adventurous men, but the area also offered many of them an avenue of escape. The explorers were, after all, extraordinary individuals. Flamboyant eccentrics, loners or protesters out of sympathy with and frequently ostracized by "proper" society, they sought relief and redress in the comforting loneliness provided by the wilds of Africa.

Burton, for example, was an arrogant social misfit who delighted in ostentation and revelled in scandal. Stifled by conventiality and the restricting mores of Victorian England, he chose to spend most of his life roaming the unknown frontiers of geography and ethnology (particularly taboo sexual customs) in reckless attempts to assuage his insatiable inquisitiveness. In a rare moment of introspection, he wrote a friend: "Starting in a hollowed log of wood— some thousand miles up a river, with an infinitesmal prospect of returning! I ask myself 'Why?' and the only echo is 'damned fool! . . . the Devil drives." [33] Speke likewise found England's narrow confines restricting, and there seems little doubt he was driven by an inner compulsion to find himself. He liked to be alone, loosing his hidden frustrations and inner complexities in tremendous bursts of energy or in useless slaughter of African animals. Moreover, society has a way of preferring company other than that of a man who purportedly had a penchant for shooting pregnant animals and then eating the unborn fetus in an almost ritualistic manner. Burton's vitriolic pen even suggested that Speke "openly declared that being tired of life he had come to be killed in Africa." This seems unlikely, but easily frustrated and unable to satisfy his pent-up emotions by accepted methods, Speke found the solace and solitude he desired in Africa.

There is similar evidence of escapism influencing other explorers, particularly Stanley and Johnston. Stanley's own *Autobiography* provides graphic evidence that his entire adult life was an effort to sublimate a childhood and paternal background over which he had exercised no control. Exploration offered him a means of compensation and redemption for both real and

imagined personal shortcomings that resulted from his status as a bastard child. He "knew no man well and, conversely, no man knew Stanley." Africa constituted an avenue of withdrawal which resulted from Stanley's inability to establish lasting friendships among Europeans.[35] Escapism may not be exactly the appropriate term to apply to Harry Johnston, yet he was a decidedly distorted reflection of Victorian intellectual curiosity and geographical scholarship. He took inordinate delight in shocking staid associates, and the presence of this curious little "prancing proconsul" enlivened more than one Victorian tea party. His poem, "A Cannibal's Ode to His Aunt," never ceased to fascinate half-believing listeners:

Search through the crowed market,
Visit each cannibal feast,
Where will you meet
With a corpse so sweet
As that of the dear deceased?

Juicy she was and tender,
And little did we discern
The good we should reap
From the cost of her keep:
She has made us a noble return.

Beauty we scarce remember,
Virtues we soon forget,
But the taste of our Aunt Eliza
Clings, clings, to my palate yet.[36]

The motivational factors of allurement and escapism explain the ambivalence which affected the explorers' thinking on Africa. Sooner or later every one of them expresses complete disgust with a land they find devoid of civilization and inhabited by a people who were the embodiment of original sin and who possessed no redeeming cultural features. Such emotions were transitory, but the sentiments of Samuel Baker are typical: "This country is no paradise, be assured: it is exactly the other place, without one redeeming point. Both morally and in its natural features, it is hell itself, in plain English."[37] Hellish or not, Africa was the equal of some insidious drug which, once established, cast those under its spell into a perpetual enslavement from which there was virtually no escape. So great was the encroachment of the "dark continent" on their minds and imaginations that like lemmings the explorers seemed impelled to return to its embrace until it killed them. An enraptured Joseph Thomson knew he would die "with the spirit of Africa at my lips," and Baker, who so often spoke of Africa in derisive tones, admitted: "The hard soil of Africa is a more fitting couch for the last gasp of an African explorer than the down-pillow of civilized home."[38]

Other factors, while not as pervasive or influential, also directed the

explorers to Africa. Strangely, many of the men who found that Britain bound them in chains of convention were moved by sincere feelings of patriotism, although this pride in their country may have been intermingled with desires for personal prestige.[39] Certainly some aspects of the explorers' motivations were basically personal in nature. Speke, Grant, Baker and Thomson all welcomed the unrivalled opportunities for hunting provided by African travel, and John Petherick hoped for material gain.[40]

Yet he was alone among the explorers in seeking personal enrichment. Although they usually returned from Africa with grandiose visions of the continent's economic potential, none of the other men under consideration demonstrated any significant concern with embellishing their fortunes. Equally curious is the relative absence of a feature which serious students of Victorian England would expect to be virtually omnipresent. Expressions of the humane purposefulness that nourished the age's evangelical outlook are scarcely noticeable preceding the explorers' first ventures in Africa. Pious platitudes abound in their printed works, and several of the men demonstrated sincere interest in introducing Christianity to Africa; however, their altruism was primarily the product of afterthought. Nonetheless, once established it was a very real feature of their total outlook, and many of the explorers made significant contributions to strengthening humanitarian impulses in Britain. This factor, together with the near-total absence of greed on the part of the explorers, emerges as a redeeming characteristic in lives which were not, as the foregoing indicates, altogether praiseworthy.

They were highly individualistic, egregious men, yet there are striking similarities in their motivations. They belonged to a common breed branded by unusual qualities which cumulatively explain why they chose to lead lives of adventure. Ascription to them of traditional motives such as "God, gold and glory" is both overly simplistic and in large measure inaccurate. Underneath the thin veneer of scientific purposes which ostensibly served as a primary goal in all their explorations lay a complex structure composed of many animating elements, some of which have been enumerated in this paper. At the heart of the edifice were fundamental themes such as restlessness, egocentric romanticism and an innate love of adventure. Dreamers, vagabonds cast aside by a world which whirled those vested with idiosyncracies into its eddies, Africa offered these rootless men a natural outlet for the inner turmoil and unquenchable curiosity which were an integral part of their life styles.

These gypsy-like features were their distinguishing marks—that which set them apart—but the totality of the explorers' passionate love affair with Africa included more commonplace components. Even though tinged by wanderlust and abnormality, the explorers must be viewed against their age. Thus their motivational make-up includes, in varying degrees of intensity, facets such as patriotism, humanitarianism and the dogged resolution to achieve which typified an era that never tired of extolling the virtues of self-improvement. Alongside these stand diverse scientific motives—natural corollaries of geographical exploration—and a host of less widely diffused influences. In

short, a variety of interdependent and interacting factors drew the explorers to Africa. Together these attributes formed the explorers' mental baggage in their African journeys.

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[1] Quoted in Alan Moorehead, *The White Nile* (New York, 1960), p. 7.

[2] For a full discussion of pre-nineteenth-century Nile exploration, see Robin Hallett, "The European Approach to the Interior of Africa in the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of African History*, IV (1963), pp. 191-206.

[3] Relatively little has been written concerning the motivational influences which acted on the explorers, although Robert Rotberg (ed.), *Africa and Its Explorers: Motives, Methods, and Impact* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) is an important pioneering work which accords some treatment to this subject. However, Rotberg, while correctly asserting that "No single explanation (of motivation) suffices," feels that "without the benefit of a wide and penetrating range of psychoanalytically relevant data, detailed autobiographical statesments, revealing biographies, the candid reminisces of associates or relatives, or, at least a wealth of circumstantial evidence, it is impossible to reach any irrefutable conclusions about the underlying motivation and deep-seated drives of the explorers" (p. 4). This is undoubtedly true, but, as this essay suggests, the nature and range of available sources is adequate to undertake such an examination.

[4] The year 1856 saw Burton and Speke begin their journey inland from Zanzibar, and 1890 heralded the end of the era of exploration and the dawn of a new age with the signing of the Heligoland Treaty.

[5] R(oyal) G(eographical) S(ociety) Committee Minutes, Apr. 12, 1856. The purposes of the expedition are discussed at considerable length in correspondence found in F(oreign) O(ffice) 2-37.

[6] See, for example, Richard Burton, *First Footsteps in East Africa* (London, 1856), p. 312n; Fawn Brodie, *The Devil Drives* (New York, 1967), p. 119; John Speke, *What Led to Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (London, 1864), pp. 1-2.

[7] Burton to Norton Shaw, Cairo, Nov. 16, 1853. RGS Correspondence File.

[8] Burton to Norton Shaw, Aden, Feb. 25, 1855. RGS Correspondence File.

[9] Speke to Shaw, Zanzibar Consulate, May 20, 1857. RGS Correspondence File.

[10] Isabel Burton, letter to the editor, *The Times* (London), Nov. 13, 1869.

[11] Speke, *What Led to Discovery*, p. 191; Lord Elphinstone to Atkins Hammerton, Bombay, Nov. 30, 1856. Quoted in Alex Maitland, *Speke* (London, 1971), p. 62.

[12] Speke, *What Led to Discovery*, p. 251.

[13] John Speke, "Explorations in East Africa." Unpublished manuscript in RGS Manuscripts and Referees' Reports File. This paper, which reached proof stage in three parts, was withdrawn from consideration for publication at Speke's request. Although it offers important insight into a crucial period in Speke's relations with

Burton, Maitland apparently overlooked it in researching his biography of Speke.

[14] The judgment is Fawn Brodie's in *The Devil Drives*, p. 161.

[15] Speke, *What Led to Discovery*, pp. 266, 305-07.

[16] Richard Burton, *The Lake Regions of Central Africa*, 2 vols. (London, 1860), II, p. 383.

[17] Quoted in Maitland, *Speke*, p. 86.

[18] Speke to William Blackwood, Jordans, Apr. 11, 1859 N(ational) L(ibrary of) S(cotland), Ms. 4154; Grant to Blackwood, Tivita (?), Oct. 22, 1866, NLS, Ms. 4209; RGS to Speke, London, May 21, 1860, RGS Out-letters.

[19] Speke to Shaw, Oct. ?, 1859, RGS Correspondence File; Russell Minute on Petherick to Russell, no place given, Mar. 29, 1861, F. O. 78-1612.

[20] Petherick to Sir Roderick Murchison, London, Jan. 19, 1860, RGS Correspondence File; P. B. McQuie (Petherick's brother-in-law) to Blackwood, Liverpool, Jan. 18, 1863, NLS, Ms. 4183; "Petherick's Succouring Petition," (printed), NLS, Ms. 4874.

[21] See Baker's letters to Murchison of Jan. 19, Feb. 5 and 18, Mar. 5 and 18, and May 4, 1858, all in RGS Correspondence File. See also RGS Committee Minutes, Expedition Committee, Mar. 17, 1858.

[22] Extract from Baker's private journal quoted in T. Douglas Murray and A. Silva White, *Sir Samuel Baker: A Memoir* (London, 1895), p. 43; Baker to his sister, no place given, Oct. 20, 1862, quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[23] Francis Galton, *Memories of My Life* (London, 1908), p. 207.

[24] (Anonymous), "The Sources of the Nile," *Littell's Living Age*, LXXVIII (1863), p. 382; George B. Hill (ed.), *Colonel Gordon in Central Africa* (London, 1885), pp. 147-48.

[25] (Laurence Oliphant), "African Travel," *Blackwood's Magazine*, LXXX (1856), p. 489. John Trotandot (pseudonym for G. P. R. Pulman) uses almost the same words to describe Speke's motivation in *Rambles, Roamings, and Recollections* (London, 1870), p. 92.

[26] Richard Burton, *Zanzibar; City, Island and Coast*, 2 vols. (London, 1872), II, pp. 140-41.

[27] Quoted in Murray and White *Baker*, pp. 40-41, 59.

[28] Foreword to the *Carmina of Gaius Valerius Catullus*, which Burton translated. The work, was privately printed in 1894.

[29] Stanley to Sheldon, London, June 25, 1885. RGS Correspondence File.

[30] Elton to Dillon, Paris, Dec. 29, 1867. India Record Office, Napier Papers, Ms. European 114-4(h).

[31] Thomson to H. W. Bates, Thornhill, Aug. 19, 1884. RGS Correspondence File. See also James Thomson, *Joseph Thomson: African Explorer* (London, 1896), p. 17. Thomson, once in Africa, wrote to a friend: "Certainly the days of romance are not yet past." Thomson to Williamson, no place given, May 27, 1880. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[32] Alex Johnston, *The Life and Letters of Sir Harry Johnston* (London, 1927), p. 35; Johnston's diary, quoted in Roland Oliver, *Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa* (London, 1957), p. 7. for Johnston, the lure of Africa rapidly increased. While on Mount Kilimanjaro he wrote: When my social instincts draw me back to Europe, my stronger love of natural beauty ties me here." Johnston to H. W. Bates,

Mandara's kingdom, June 18, 1884. RGS Correspondence File.

[33] Burton to Monckton Milnes (Lord Houghton), May 31, 1863. Quoted in Brodie, *The Devil Drives*, p. 15.

Burton, *Zanzibar*, II, p. 382. Speke gives momentary insight into the matter of fetuses in *What Led to Discovery*, p. 356. Enraptured by the placidity of life he encountered in Buganda, Speke described his feelings in a manner which demonstrates that he saw much in Africa that England could not offer: "I . . . felt as if I only wanted a wife and family, garden and yacht, rifle and rod, to make me happy here for life, so charming was the place." John Speke, *Journal of Discovery of the Source of the Nile* (Edinburgh, 1863), p. 431.

[35] Quoted material from Byron Farwell, *The Man Who Presumed* (London, 1957), p. 80. Other useful sources on this subject include Stanley's *Autobiography;* William Garstin, "Fifty Years of Nile Exploration, and Some of Its Results," *Geographical Journal* XXXIII (1909), pp. 117-52; Hugh R. Mill, *The Record of the Royal Geographical Society, 1830-1930* (London, 1930), p. 114.

Johnston, *The Life and Letters of Sir Harry Johnston*, p. 108. The poem offers striking support for Roland Oliver's contention that Johnston "never knew the meaning of discretion." See Oliver, *Johnston*, p. viii.

[37] Baker to one of his brothers, Khartoum, Nov. 3, 1862. Quoted in Murray and White, *Sir Samuel Baker: A Memoir*, p. 81.

[38] Thomson to Thomas Gilmour, June 26, 1893. Quoted in Thomson, *Joseph Thomson*, p. 293; Baker to President of the RGS, Mar. 8, 1867, RGS Correspondence File.

[39] Xenophobia also figured in the explorers' patriotism. On one occasion Speke said: "Fancy my disgust if any vapouring Frenchman went and got the credit of this discovery (the source of the Nile) for France." Another time he stated he would "rather die a hundred times" than have "any foreigner. . . take from Britain the honour of the discovery." See Speke, "Captain J. H. Speke's Discovery of the Victoria Nyanza Lake, the Supposed Source of the Nile," *Blackwood's Magazine*, LXXXVI (1859), p. 412n; Mrs. G. H. Blackwood Porter, *Annals of a Publishing House: John Blackwood* (Edinburgh, 1898), p. 56.

[40] Hunting was one of many actuating factors which served to reinforce the primary motivations of the explorers. For examples of Petherick's excessive concern with the benefits he expected to reap from his African exertions, see F. O. to Murchison, Mar. 8, 1860, F. O. 2-37; Lord Stanley to Consul Stanton, Dec. 8, 1868, F. O. 84-1290; R. P. Collier, J. D. Coleridge *et al* to Lord Granville, Sept. 25, 1871, F. O. 83-2362; Vivian draft on Petherick's case, Nov. 14, 1873, F. O. 84-1371; Consul Stanton to Lord Granville, Dec. 4, 1873, F. O. 84-1371. A number of the slave trade volumes also treat Petherick's claims.

End

SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH POLICY OF JAMES I, 1610-1619

Thomas V. Thoroughman

During the second decade of the seventeenth century the three most powerful rulers in Western Europe were at peace with one another and inclined to remain so. An empty treasury, mounting debts, a difficult parliament, an indolent temperament, and a genuine conviction that most wars were wasteful and unnecessary disposed James I to peace. For Marie de Medicis, Queen Regent of France, peace was essential for the maintenance of royal authority and public order during the minority of Louis XIII. Even Philip III of Spain hoped to avoid hostilities for at least the duration of the Twelve Years Truce concluded in 1609. After an exhausting and unsuccessful forty year struggle with the Dutch, he needed time to rebuild his empire's economic and military potential before resuming the fight. With these three rulers anxious to avoid war, only relatively minor conflicts troubled Western Europe until 1620, when the Bohemian revolt expanded into an international contest. But despite the absence of a major war, armed conflict presented a constant threat to the statesmen of the day. Any development that promised to enhance or decrease materially the power of Spain or its enemies or to alter the existing Protestant-Catholic balance in Europe, dangerously strained the fragile diplomatic machinery that kept the peace.

In such a state of affairs, relations between England and France concerned all the other states of Western Europe. Divided, they were weaker than Spain; united, they were at least a match. Furthermore, in a very literal sense, the two powers, standing between militant Catholicism and militant Protestantism, acted as the arbiters of Europe. Together or separately, they involved themselves, by invitation or insistence, in every dispute of any consequence that threatened the precarious peace. As long as these two nations cooperated effectively, peace seemed assured.

Statesmen in both England and France saw the importance of maintaining good relations and working together in the interests of the peace which both needed and desired. In spite of this recognition, however, the two powers became ever more estranged as the decade wore on. Their increasing inability to act in concert and their declining prestige allowed the powerful religious animosities and territorial ambitions of lesser powers to erupt and drag Europe into one of its most disastrous wars. This result, tragic enough in itself, marked the failure of the foreign policies of both countries. This was particularly true of England and James I, who saw his aspiration of being the peacemaker of Europe dashed, his son-in-law stripped of his inheritance, and his domestic enemies capitalizing on his failure. Part of James's misfortunes must be attributed to the failure of his French policy. For this, he was as much to blame as anyone.

The fundamental aim of English foreign policy was simple. France and Spain must be kept apart so that they would not unite their awesome powers against England and Protestant Europe. To accomplish this, the King of Eng-

land hoped to perpetuate the dissension between the two major Catholic States which had existed throughout Henri IV's reign, while he himself kept on good terms with each. The execution of this policy was not so simple. By committing several bad mistakes in trying to effect it, James contributed to the failure of an already difficult task.

There were no major problems in Anglo-French relations as long as Henri IV lived. Because of his fixed antagonism toward the House of Habsburg, Henri felt the need of friendship with England. Moreover, the lingering good will left over from the grand alliance of France, England, and the United Provinces against Spain in the 1590's facilitated good relations between the two powers. They negotiated a beneficial commercial treaty in 1606, supported Venice in her dispute with the papacy in 1607, arbitrated the truce negotiations between Spain and the Dutch in 1607-1609, and supported the Protestant claimants or "Possessioners" in the Cleve-Julich crisis of 1609-1610. Only the repayment of a sizeable debt incurred when Henri borrowed money from Elizabeth in the 1590's troubled relations between the two crowns in 1610.

Yet the debt proved to be of diplomatic importance. When the King of France was preparing for war against the Habsburgs in 1610, he sought a firm military alliance with Britain to strengthen his hand. [1] But the English were justly suspicious of Henri's ultimate goals in the imminent conflict and used the difficulties over the debt as an excuse to prolong the negotiations for an alliance. Although James had agreed to support the Possessioners with the 4000 English troops already in the Netherlands, he had no desire to be drawn by Henri into a general conflict that might aggrandize France without profiting himself. [2] Therefore the alliance treaty was still far from concluded when the most catastrophic event of the decade occurred—the assassination of Henri IV on May 4, 1610.

Henceforth, the anti-Spanish policy of the French monarchy, which had proved so helpful to Protestants in the past, could no longer be taken for granted. Unless something were done, there was indeed some danger that France might withdraw into a strict neutrality. Worse still, she might become a satellite of Spain or a new victim of civil or religious wars. But the English were more immediately concerned with the three items left pending by Henri's death: the Cleve-Julich dispute, the defensive alliance being negotiated, and the future orientation of France in foreign affairs.

Since there was no English ambassador in France at this crucial time, James I hastened to send Sir Thomas Edmondes to till that vacancy. Having served as minister to the Archdukes in Flanders from 1605 to 1609 and on several missions to France in the 1590's, Edmondes was one of the most seasoned diplomats in England. His principal tasks as ambassador were to determine the effects of Henri's death and to urge the French to render their promised support to the "Possessioners" in Cleve. [3]

Edmondes arrived in Paris on May 24 and enjoyed the honor of being the first foreign representative to perform the office of condolence to the Queen Mother and young Louis XIII. But afterwards, when he spoke to the French

ministers about the promise to assist the Possessioners, he found them reluctant to commit themselves.[4] In the following weeks the French government nevertheless decided to abide by its previous agreements with the Protestant allies of Henri IV. Edmondes felt that his efforts at persuasion, along with those of the Dutch Ambassador, had contributed materially in bringing the French to this decision.[5] By August 12, the French army had joined the other allied forces commanded by Maurice of Nassau at Julich. After a gallant defense by the Imperialist garrison, the town surrendered on honorable terms, and the allied armies disbanded shortly thereafter.

By this time, Marie de Medicis found it extremely desirable to avoid further activity abroad. She needed to concentrate on domestic problems and the conservation of her authority. Immediately following the assassination, it appeared that Henri's death would unite the entire nation behind her. But when the fears of war with the Habsburgs and domestic disturbances did not materialize, the spirit of unity evaporated. The impulse of self-interest among the magnates inevitably began its triumph over public responsibility. The Duc d'Epernon soon instituted a dangerous precedent by seizing control of the citadel at Metz with the obvious intention of using it as a personal power base in northeastern France. Other magnates followed his example in their provincial governments. Almost every letter from Edmondes to the Earl of Salisbury, the Secretary of State in late 1610 and early 1611 contained news of the duels, feuds, intrigues, and contests in France.[6] Marie had neither the means to appease, nor the force to suppress, all the nobles.

In view of the circumstances the Queen Regent naturally endeavored to establish amicable relations with foreign powers, particularly those in a position to foment the factious nobility, the Huguenots and the militant Catholics. Henri IV had concluded alliances with the Dutch in 1609 and the German Protestants in 1610. To complete her circle of treaties with neighboring Protestant states, Marie had only to conclude the defensive treaty being negotiated with Great Britain. But to do this, there had to be a settlement of Henri's debt to the English crown.[7]

After considerable haggling, Marie and her advisers made an offer in June to pay L60,000 within two years, the remaining claim of L280,000 to be paid by the United Provinces.[8] The English accepted the proposal.

Agreement on the debt cleared the way for the conclusion of the defensive alliance, which James hoped to use to keep France from drifting too far from her old allies.

The treaty[9] concluded in London on August 19 dealt primarily with defensive arrangements between the two kingdoms. If either of the two suffered an attack from a third power, then the other must provide specified military aid, regardless of any agreements made between the second kingdom and the attacking power. Neither king nor any of his subjects could give aid to declared enemies or rebels of the other or grant them asylum. A substantial portion of the treaty dealt specifically with commercial problems, such as compensation for goods or property seized arbitrarily, restitution to rightful owners of goods

recovered from pirates, and permission for the resident ambassador or his deputy to attend courts trying cases involving the lives or properties of his countrymen.

Besides retaining the friendship of the Protestant powers, the Queen also hoped to forestall any trouble from Spain. She soon found an opportunity. She broke off the marriage negotiations that Henri IV had begun with the Duke of Savoy and began new ones with Spain.[10] A startled world discovered in August, 1611, that not one, but two marriages had been arranged. Louis was to wed the Infanta Anne; and his sister Elisabeth, the future Philip IV.

James I, though not completely unprepared, felt deeply incensed at this turn of events.[11] The Spanish Ambassador, Don Alonso de Velasco, had led the King to believe that Philip III favored a match between the Infanta and the Prince of Wales.[12] On their side the French had not consulted or informed James of the advanced stage of the negotiations, to which treatment he felt entitled as an ally of long standing. That the Stuart ruler was irate soon became evident to the French Ambassador in stormy sessions with the King in September and October.[13] More serious than the affronts to James's self-esteem was the possibility that France might now favor Spain against the Protestant powers.

In order to reconcile the Protestant states to the projected marriages, Marie sent special emissaries to England, the German Protestants, and the United Provinces to give assurances that the marriages would not alter France's ties with her old allies or weaken her resolve to succor them in time of need.[14] As her representative to Britain, the Queen chose the Duc de Bouillon, a leading Huguenot magnate who was quite popular in England for his consistent opposition to Spanish influence at the French court.[15]

Besides explaining the Spanish marriages, Bouillon undertook a personal mission by promoting further the suit of his nephew, Frederick V, the Count Palatine, for the hand of Elizabeth, James's only daughter. In addition, the Duke had orders to broach unofficially the question of a match between Henry, the Prince of Wales, and Louis's second sister, Christine.[16] Bouillon arrived in England in April, 1612, but intended to play his own game and not the Queen's. He joined forces with the dying Salisbury to facilitate the conclusion of the fateful marriage between Elizabeth and Frederick but made no genuine effort to reconcile the English to the Franco-Spanish marriage alliance. Instead, he aroused James's interest in the match between Prince Henry and Christine by suggesting that the resultant negotiations might provide a means to break up the nuptials between France and Spain. It was thus during Bouillon's embassy that the King of England began the intrigues with the malcontent princes of France which made genuine cooperation between the two states increasingly difficult.[17] James chose to sacrifice his existing relationship with the French monarchy of openness and qualified trust for a low intrigue to break up the Spanish marriages which had little chance of success.

In accordance with Bouillon's suggestion, the King directed Edmondes to begin unofficial discussions with Villeroi the French Secretary of State about a

match between Christine and Henry. Neither party felt any urgency to conclude the matter, however.[18] Since Christine was only seven at the time, the marriage could not be consummated for some years to come. In accordance with contemporary practices, James was also considering at least two other possible brides for Henry: the Duke of Savoy's daughter and the Duke of Tuscany's sister, both of whom were older than Christine and could offer larger dowries.[19]

In the autumn of 1612 the English negotiations with Tuscany floundered because of the strong opposition of the Pope, but those with France and Savoy reached an advanced stage. The Queen Regent, disliking the prospect of a union between two states flanking France, increased her dowry offer to 700,000 crowns and now seemed eager to conclude an agreement. But James appeared inclined toward the Savoy marriage when Prince Henry suddenly died on November 7.[20]

The death of the Prince of Wales considerably dampened the dealings with Savoy but hardly interrupted those with France. Within three days of Henry's death, Viscount Rochester, James's favorite who now acted as Secretary of State, wrote Edmondes to begin discussions for a match between Prince Charles and Christine.[21] Very likely the French preferred Charles to Henry, for the latter had obviously been dabbling in their affairs by carrying on a suspicious correspondence with certain of the great nobles and Huguenot leaders.[22]

By this time Henry was not alone in meddling in the affairs of others. For the first several years of Louis's reign, James made no serious attempt to influence French internal and foreign policies except through direct dealings with Marie and her ministers. He probably feared alienating her and hoped that French policies would prove favorable to his interests without undue interference. Also, it took several years for the different factions in France to sort themselves out and the political situation to clear after Henri IV's death. Therefore James instructed Edmondes to make it clear that he would not support any rebellion or resistance on the part of the Huguenots unless the government drove them to it by extreme provocation. He even promised Marie that he would help suppress them if they rebelled without cause.[23]

When Marie de Medicis's determination to effect the marriages with Spain became clear, James's attitude toward France changed. The King approved of the factious conduct of the Bourbon Princes of the Blood, the Prince de Conde and Comte de Soissons, for the first time when they withdrew from Court to show their disapproval of the Spanish alliance.[24] Through Bouillon and Edmondes, James established a close communication with the Princes and their allies, the dukes of Nevers and Mayenne, and the Marechal d'Ancre.[25] But to James's disappointment, the death of the Comte de Soissons in October, 1612, deprived the conspirators of one of their strongest and most resolute men.[26] The rest could not bring themselves to attempt a *coup d'etat*. After observing their hesitation and irresolution and becoming pleased with the resumption of the marriage negotiations for Prince Charles, the Stuart monarch returned to

his former course of trying to work with the Queen and her ministers.

In the meantime negotiations for the union between Charles and Christine had progressed so well that by August, 1613, a successful conclusion seemed likely. During this time the French court greatly favored the match, which they counted on to keep the Huguenots quiet and balance the alliance with Spain. Only the religious privileges to be permitted the princess and the sizes of the dowry and jointure appeared to stand in the path of a final agreement.[27] But toward the end of the year James began to raise his demands. This hardening of the King's attitude caused Edmondes, who was anxious to conclude the matter, to return to England without orders to obtain a final decision from his master.[28]

Arriving in London early in February, Sir Thomas discovered great opposition to the marriage treaty among some lords of the Privy Council. The Catholics, crypto-Catholics, and more militant Protestants all opposed the marriage. Edmondes and Buisseaux, the French ambassador, hoped that James, who seemed to favor the match, would override all opposition. But by this time the King's difficulties with the Addled Parliament and the threat of civil war in France delayed further progress on the treaty.[29]

The crisis in France arose in January 1614. Many of the most powerful nobles, including Conde Bouillon, Nevers, Longueville, Mayenne, and Vendome, dramatically withdrew from court to their provincial governorships and began to take arms. Long discontented by the monopolization of the government by a few ministers and favorites, these princes were capitalizing on public dissatisfaction with the government and the unpopularity of the Spanish marriages and the Queen's pro-Spanish stance in the Savoy-Mantua dispute of the preceding year.

In February 1614 Conde wrote Marie an open letter complaining of the abuses and misdeeds of the Queen's chief ministers and demanding reform through a meeting of the Estates-General.[30] To avoid the threatening revolt, the Queen Regent agreed to convoke the Estates-General and to suspend the marriages until Louis had attained his majority.[31] Although the confrontation had ended and both parties looked forward to the meeting of the representative body, the Malcontents continued to intrigue, writing James and sending agents to England.[32]

Meanwhile Edmondes, the Scots, and Buisseaux tried vainly to keep James committed to the French marriage alliance, but Sir John Digby, Sarmiento, the Spanish ambassador, and the Howard faction had succeeded in reviving the King's interest in a Spanish match. Even though Sir Thomas returned to France in August with a commission to conclude the French treaty, neither his government nor the French wanted to arrive at a final settlement before the Estates-General met, the Franco-Spanish marriages either effected or broken off, and the outcome of troubles in Savoy and Cleve-Julich known.[33] The negotiations were suspended. In September the royal council proclaimed Louis's majority and in October the Estates-General convened. James I, the Malcontents, and the Huguenots hoped that the three orders would demand the termination of the marriages with Spain. But the government ministers gained

control of the assembly and extracted requests for the accomplishment of the marriages from the first two orders. Disappointed, the Malcontents again turned their thoughts toward revolt.

Soon James found himself approached by the discontented nobles, certain Huguenot elements, and the Duke of Savoy to intervene openly to prevent the marriages. As yet, the English King could not bring himself to take such a dramatic step. But he did encourage the Malcontents and the Duke of Savoy in their opposition and used every occasion to speak against the alliance. In a harangue to Buisseaux, he predicted troubles in France if the marriages took place.[34] Again, considerations of the overall European situation and his anxiety to have their cooperation in dealing with the touchy situations in Piedmont and the Rhineland made James reluctant to sponsor armed opposition to the French government.

When the Queen and her ministers made final arrangements for the marriages in the spring of 1615, however, James took stronger steps to hinder them. He directed Edmondes in June to make an official remonstrance to Marie and Louis, urging them to postpone the marriages on the grounds of Louis's youth, the unrest in France, and the unresolved troubles in Cleve-Julich and Italy.[35] Long afterward the royal council informed Sir Thomas that preparations for the trip to Bayonne and the final ceremonies had progressed too far to be delayed further.[36] James also sent an agent to the rebellious magnates and to the Huguenot assembly at Grenoble, urging them to use remonstrances and petitions to stop the marriages.[37]

Neither James's harangues to Desmarets, the new French ambassador, his personal letters to the French rulers, nor the admonitions of the Malcontents, the German Protestants, and Maurice of Nassau deterred the royal party from setting forth for the border in August.[38] Again, the discontented nobles led by Conde withdrew to their stronghold and began to levy troops. In September Conde was able to lead a very formidable army southward. But by then the royal party had already arrived at Bordeaux. There final arrangements were made party had already arrived at Bordeaux. There final arrangements were made for the marriages which took place by proxy on October 8, followed by the exchange of the brides on October 31.

By now James clearly perceived that the game was lost. Henceforth, he bent his efforts to gain an honorable settlement for the rebellious princes. Since the marriages were now accomplished, a civil war could only succeed in driving the government into the arms of Spain. To ward off this possibility, James ordered Emondes to join the court at Bordeaux and promote a reconciliation. Arriving at court by October 16, the Ambassador informed the royalists of his mission. The French, however, showed no enthusiasm at his appearance, having already informed the Stuart ruler that Edmondes's house was "the ordinary resort of all the malcontents, and ill-affected persons of the State" and that his conversations there were seditious.[39]

Although disinclined to use Sir Thomas's services, the court found itself in a difficult situation. The outcome of war with the rebels was uncertain. Conde's forces matched their own and blocked the route to Paris. Moreover, the oppos-

ing army lay in Poitou, a province notoriously Huguenot in its population and therefore favoring the Malcontents. After two months of delay, the Queen Mother and her ministers reluctantly gave Edmondes permission to join the Duc de Nevers in negotiating an agreement.[40]

Sir Thomas already enjoyed the confidence of the Malcontents and at length he gained the grudging respect and confidence of the government. Aided by the desertions, impoverishment, and privations in both camps, he and Nevers succeeded in arranging negotiations which led to the treaty of Loudun in April 1616. The agreement provided for monetary compensations and a larger share in the government for the princes, dismissal of Sillery and his brother from their posts, a guarantee of edicts granted the Huguenots, and official recognition of their recent synod at Nimes. Before the pacification was completed, Edmondes performed an additional service by going with the Duc de Sully to La Rochelle to induce the Huguenot assembly there to accept the treaty.[41]

Pleased at the prospect of a peaceful France in which Conde and other great nobles friendly to England dominated the government, the English King sent James, Lord Hay, as Ambassador Extraordinary to Paris. He instructed Hay to congratulate Louis on his marriage and the pacification of France and to urge the French King to give more support to Savory and favor a league between Venice and the Grisons. Although Hay carried a commission authorizing the conclusion of the match between Charles and Christine, his secret orders were far different.[42] He and Edmondes were to break off the marriage treaty with France, while making the French appear at fault.[43] During the late civil disturbances, James I had definitely settled on a Spanish marriage for Charles.

Accompanied by a magnificent train, Hay arrived in Paris in July, 1616. He was lavishly entertained, especially by the Prince de Conde. But this initial success did not last. He and Edmondes were already encountering difficulties in their negotiations when Conde was suddenly imprisoned without trial for conspiring against Marie and her powerful favorite, d'Ancre. Most of Conde's former associates escaped to the provinces, however, and again France stood on the precipice of civil war.[44] When the two English ambassadors pressed the Queen Mother and Villeroi for details concerning the conspiracy, they received only a very general answer. A great coolness now arose in the negotiations; the marriage treaty reached an impasse when the Englishmen demanded an entirely new set of proposals; and Hay soon returned to England, his mission generally considered an expensive failure.[45] Although the French marriage was occasionally mentioned in England as a possible alternative to the Spanish, it received no serious consideration until after James's break with Spain in 1623.

In December 1616 Edmondes took temporary leave of the French court in order to accept his new appointment as Comptroller of the Household. The suspicious French were reluctant to see him go. With reason, they feared his true purpose might be to urge James to help the magnates who had fled after the imprisonment of Conde.[46]

The difficulties between the French government and the rebellious magnates again reached the point of hostilities in March 1617. After the Conseil d'Etat and the Parlement of Paris had declared them guilty of treason and deprived them of their estates and dignities, the Malcontents bound themselves at Soissons in a union for mutual defense. But by the time hostilities had begun, James had made final preparations for a six months visit to Scotland. There he would be unable to keep in close touch with the situation in France. Before he left, however, the King instructed Edmondes to leave for France as Ambassador Extraordinary as soon as the Malcontents replied to his recent letters. Sir Thomas was again supposed to urge a reconciliation. But this time he was likely to be ignored, for the Malcontents were in a much weaker position in 1617 than in the previous year. [47]

Edmondes was still waiting in London for word from the hard-pressed magnates, when news arrived of a palace revolution in Paris. On April 14 several officers of the royal guard murdered d'Ancre, the Queen Mother's unpopular favorite, at the orders of Louis himself. The French King immediately sent word avowing this action throughout France, hoping the news would appease the Malcontents and avert further bloodshed. [48] When James received the news at Newcastle, he expressed extreme pleasure. Immediately ordering Edmondes to depart for France, he sent congratulations to Louis, urging reconciliation with the estranged nobles and help for his friend, the Duke of Savoy. [49] Sir Thomas arrived in Paris late in May and remained until November. But since James was in Scotland most of this time, there was little diplomatic activity between the two kingdoms. But to the dismay of the English, by the end of the year Sillery regained his old influence and the princes had lost what they had gained from d'Ancre's death. [50] The King of Great Britain thus met disappointment in his hope that the assassination would usher in a new era of good feeling in Anglo-French relations. By this time, too, the French had become thoroughly disgruntled with James's negotiations for a marriage alliance with Spain. It was now the English who appeared too Spanish.

It was this jealousy of Spain's influence at the English court which led the French Ambassador to take an exaggerated offence at a slight. On January 6, 1618, Prince Charles gave his customary masque on Twelfth Night. To avert the perpetual precedence controversy between the French and Spanish ambassadors at the English court, he took the usual exit of inviting one, Sarmiento, now Count of Gondomar, and not the other, Desmarets. Gondomar cleverly manipulated the whole situation to make it appear that he had gained precedence over the Frenchman. Desmarets was outraged. The affront came after a number of incidents which showed that Gondomar's influence and effectiveness were much greater than his own. When his demand for an unqualified assurance of precedence over his Spanish counterpart was refused, Desmarets begged Louis to recall him. This request was granted and the Ambassador left England in March. Despite James's repeated explanations that there had been no innovation and no slight, Louis did not send a

replacement for Desmarets for over a year.[51] Since the Stuart ruler had neglected to send one for Edmondes, who had returned the previous November, only agents remained to represent their monarchs at the respective capitals.

Another unfortunate incident came late in July 1618. At that time the French government abruptly asked Dr. Theodore Mayerne, James's court physician and a French Protestant, to leave the country for suspicious dealings with Huguenots. Although James complained about his expulsion through William Becher, his agent in Paris, and to le Clerc, the French agent in London, the French gave no further explanation of their action.[52]

Feeling over the Mayerne incident had not yet subsided when a more serious incident arose involving Sir Walter Raleigh. When that intrepid adventurer returned from his last voyage in 1618, authorities immediately arrested him for disobeying royal orders by allowing an attack on San Tome, a Spanish settlement in Guiana. While Raleigh was under arrest, le Clerc and his interpreter, la Chesnaye, came secretly to see him. Offering him asylum in France, they discussed his chances of escape. English authorities soon learned of these indiscreet visits. La Chesnaye was arrested and le Clerc brought before the Privy Council for examination. La Chesnaye soon confessed to the interviews, his story confirming statements by Raleigh. In contrast, le Clerc boldly denied any connection with Sir Walter, even in the face of overwhelming evidence.[53] When the French agent tried to see James, however, the King refused. He no longer recognized him as a minister of the French crown, although he indicated that any other representative sent by Louis would be welcome.[54] When Louis XIII heard of le Clerc's treatment, he retaliated by restricting Becher's movements in Paris.[55] Within a few weeks each monarch recalled his agent at the other's court.[56]

By November 1618, diplomatic relations between England and France were completely severed. At a time when the hostilities had already begun in Bohemia which led directly to the Thirty Years War, the two nations most willing and able to maintain the peace found themselves seriously at odds and even lacking normal diplomatic communications. The distrust and hostility between them had become so great that any effective cooperation between them had become exceedingly unlikely. Realizing the dangers of the situation, both rulers soon took steps to heal the breach; but in the meantime, the quarrels between Protestants and Habsburgs in Bohemia gathered momentum. The dipolmatic machinery which usually operated to localize such conflicts had broken down with the Anglo-French rupture. There was no longer an effective restraining force to check the advance of the Habsburgs in German politics without resort to arms.

The basic pattern of the growing estrangement between England and France during this decade seems fairly clear. Convinced that some form of rapproachment with Spain was essential for a secure and peaceful France during Louis's minority, Marie de Medicis was determined to carry out the marriages with Spain. James intensely disliked the prospect of these marriages which injured his pride, his own hopes of match-making, and his sense of

security. He could not resist giving encouragement to the rebellious magnates when they began to actively oppose the government and the marriages. His intrigues with these rather irresponsible and ambitious princes inevitably antagonized the court party in France, even though they were perfectly aware that James was not a man of action. Out of this situation grew increasing distrust and suspicion which manifested itself in worsening relations, growing disinclination to act together in crises, and increasing jealousies between their representatives abroad. A series of unfortunate and indiscreet incidents in the year 1618 led to a complete rupture at a crucial time for the peace of Europe.

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[1] Instructions to Antoine Lefevre de la Boderie, 28 Dec. 1609 n.s., *Ambassades de Monsier de la Boderie en Angleterre sous le regne d'Henri IV & la Minorite de Louis XIII.* . . 5 vols. (Paris, 1750), v, 1-29.

[2] Boderie to Vicomte de Puisieux, London, 8 Feb. 1610 n.s., Baschet Transcripts, P(ublic) R(ecord) O(ffice), 31-3-41; M. A. Correr to Doge and Senate, London, 26 Apr. and 6 May 1610 n.s., *C[alendar of] S[tate] P[apers] V[enetian], 1607-1610*, pp. 472, 479; Boderie to Puisieux, London, 20 Apr. 1610 n.s., *Ambassades*, v, 186-7.

[3] Lords of the Council to Sir Ralph Winwood, Whitehall, 18 May 1610; Edmund Sawyer, ed., *Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I.* . ., 3 vols. (London, 1725), iii, 165.

[4] John Beaulieu to William Trumbull, Paris, 23 May 1610, Sawyer, iii, 173; Edmondes to Salisbury, Paris, 2 Jun. 1610, P(ublic) R(ecord) O(ffice), S(tate) P(apers) (France) 178-56, fo. 146b.

[5] Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 14 Jun. 1610, Sawyer, iii, 182; Edmondes to Salisbury, Paris, 12 Jun. 1610, P.R.O., S.P. 178-56, fo. 172.

[6] Letter to Salisbury, Paris, 1 Feb. 1611, P.R.O., S.P. 178-57, fo. 37.

[7] Queen Regent to Boderie, Paris, 20 May 1610 n.s., *Ambassades*, v, 254-8.

[8] Queen Regent to Boderie, Paris, 28 Jun. 1610 n.s., *Ambassades*, v, 306-10.

[9] The text of the treaty in French may be found in Jean Dumont, *Corps universelle diplomatique du droit des gens*, 8 vols. (Amsterdam, 1726 etc.), v pt. 2, 149-53.

[10] Edmondes to Salisbury, Paris, 1 Feb. and 11 Feb. 1611, P.R.O., S.P. 178-57, fos. 38b, 51b-2.

[11] Edmondes to Salisbury, Paris, 24 Apr. 1611, P.R.O., S.P. 178-57, fo. 150; Sir John Digby to Edmondes, Madrid, 18 Jun., 22 Jun., and 17 Aug. 1611, B(ritish) M(useum) Stowe MSS, clxxii, fos. 93, 106, 157.

[12] Salisbury to Edmondes, n.p., 5 Sept. 1611, P.R.O., S.P. 178-58, fos. 145-6.

[13] Buisseaux to Queen Regent, London, 25 Sep. 1611 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-42, and to Villeroi, London, 2 Oct. and 8 Oct. 1611 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-43.

[14] Beaulieu to Trumbull, 28 Nov. 1611 and 30 Jan. 1612, Sawyer, iii, 309, 333.

[15] Algernon Cecil, *A Life of Robert Cecil, First Earl of Salisbury* (London, 1915), p. 286.

[16] Instructions to Bouillon, Apr. 1612, P.R.O. 31-3-44.

[17] Edmondes to James I, Paris, 3 Jun. 1612, P.R.O., S.P. 178-59, fo. 160; James I

to Edmondes, Westminster, 20 May 1612, B.M. Stowe MSS clxxii, fos. 280-280b.

[18] Edmondes to James I, Paris, 21 Jul. and 5 Sep. 1612, P.R.O., S.P. 178-59, fos. 208-12 and 178-60, fos. 69-70.

[19] Foscarini to Doge and Senate, London, 14 Aug. 1612 n.s., *C.S.P. V. 1610-1613*, p. 408; Thomas Birch, *An Historical View of the Negotiations between the courts of England, France, and Brussels . . . 1592 to 1617* (London, 1749), pp. 352-4.

[20] Buisseaux to Puisieux, London, 16 Oct. 1612 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-45; Edmondes to James I, Paris, 7 Nov. 1612, P.R.O., S. P. 178-60, fos. 189-195b; Foscarini to Doge and Senate, London, 7 Dec. 1612 n.s., *C.S.P. V. 1610-1613*, p. 458.

[21] Rochester to Edmondes, Whitehall, 9 Nov. 1612, B. M. Stowe MSS, clxxiii, fo. 205.

[22] Giustinian to Doge and Senate, Paris, 11 Dec. 1612, n.s., and Foscarini to Doge and Senate, London, 30 Nov. and 7 Dec. 1612 n.s., *C.S.P. V. 1610-1613*, pp. 453, 458, 460; Guisseaux to Puisieux, London, 12 Dec. 1612 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-45, and to Villeroi, London, 1 Jan. 1613 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-46.

[23] Giustinian to Doge and Senate, Paris, 3 May 1611, n.s., *C.S.P. V., 1610-1613*, p. 141.

[24] James I to Edmondes, Westminster, 20 May 1612, B. M. Stowe MSS. clxxii, fos. 280-280b.

[25] Edmondes to James I, Paris, 20 Jun. and 18 Aug. 1612, P.R.O., S.P. 178-59, fos. 164b-5b, and 178-60, fos. 34-6b.

[26] Edmondes to James I, Paris, 22 Oct. 1612, P.R.O., S.P. 178-60, fo. 178.

[27] Edmondes to Rochester, Paris, 13 May 1613, and to James I, Paris, 29 Jul. and 14 Aug. 1613, P.R.O., S.P. 178-61, fos. 155, 196-8, 209, 212; Buisseaux to Puisieux, London, 11 Oct. and 8 Nov. 1613 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-47.

[28] Somerset to Edmondes, Royston, 25 Nov. 1613, B. M. Stowe MSS, clxxiv, fos. 192-5; Edmondes to James I, Paris, 2 Jan. and 20 Jan. 1614, P.R.O., S.P. 178-62, fos. 1, 13-13b.

[29] Beaulieu to Trumbull, Paris, 23 Feb. 1614, Sawyer, iii, 497; Buisseaux to Puisieux, London, 11 Feb., 17 Feb., 28 Feb. 1614 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-47.

[30] Beaulieu to Trumbull, Paris, 17 Feb. 1614, Sawyer, iii, 495.

[31] Beaulieu to Edmondes, Paris, 9 May 1614, B.M. Stowe MSS. clxxiv, fo. 328b.

[32] Buisseaux to Puisieux, London, 28 Jun., 20 Aug. 1614 n.s.; Foscarini to Doge and Senate, London, 18 Jul. 1614 n.s., *C.S.P. V. 1613-1615* p. 153. James I to Bouillon, Whitehall, 17 Jul. 1614, P.R.O., S.P. 178-62, fo. 76.

[33] Extracts from despatches, Sarmiento to Philip III, London, 9 May and 8 Aug. 1614 n.s., Francisco de Jesus, *The Spanish Marriage Treaty*, trans. by S. R. Gardiner, Camden Society, O.S., 101 (1869), pp. 286-91; Buisseaux to Puisieux, London, 14 Mar., 14 Apr., 8 Jun., 24 Jul., 2 Aug. 1614 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-47-8.

[34] Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 12 Feb., 23 Feb., 16 Mar. 1616, P.R.O., S.P., 178-63, fos. 52-5, 72b, 105; Edmondes to James I, Paris, 16 Mar. 1615, B.M. Stowe MSS. clxxv, fo. 260; Foscarini to Doge and Senate, London, 30 Jan. 1615 n.s., *C.S.P. V. 1613-1615*, pp. 327-8.

[35] Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 17 Jun. 1615, P.R.O., S.P. 178-63, fos. 206-210b, text of remonstrance is found in fos. 224-4b.

[36] Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 12 Jul. 1615, Ibid., fos. 231-3; Contarini to Doge and Senate, Paris, 25 Jul. 1615 n.s., *C.S.P. V. 1613-1615*, p. 549.

[37] Giovanni Biondi's proposals to the assembly at Grenoble, Sep. 1615, P.R.O., S.P. 178-64, fos. 63-63b; Foscarini to Doge and Senate, London, 30 Jul, 1615 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1613-1615*, p. 541.

[38] Foscarini to Doge and Senate, London, 13 Aug. and 20 Aug. 1615 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1613-1615*, pp. 557, 563.

[39] Woodford to Edmondes, London, 3 Sep. 1615, B.M. Stowe MSS. clxxv. fos. 345-345b; Contarini to Doge and Senate, Bordeaux, 31 Oct. 1615 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1615-1617*, pp. 54-5; Edmondes to Winwood, Bordeaux, 16 Oct. 1615, P.R.O, S.P. 178-64, fos. 73-5.

[40] Edmondes to Winwood, Bordeaux, 24 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1615, P.R.O., S.P. 178-64, fos. 158b-9, 173-5.

[41] Contarini to Doge and Senate, Tours, 2 Feb., and Paris, 16 May 1616 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1615-1617*, pp. 118-9, 201; letters from Edmondes to Winwood, 10 Dec. 1615 to 23 Apr. 1616, P.R.O., S.P. 178-64-5, passim.

[42] Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 13 May 1616, Winwood to Sir Daniel Dunn, Greenwich, 3 Jun. 1616, P.R.O., S.P. 178-65, fos. 216b, 225; O. Bon and Contarini to Doge and Senate, Paris, 2 Aug. and 16 Aug., 1616 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1615-1617*, pp. 271, 279.

[43] Hay and Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 31 Jul. 1616, P.R.O., S.P., 178-66, fos. 31b-32.

[44] Hay and Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 31 Jul. and 27 Aug. 1616, Ibid., fos. 20-31, 47-47b.

[45] Hay and Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 21 Aug., 26 Aug., 27 Aug., 2 Sep., 9 Sep., 16 Sep. 1616, Ibid., fos. 47b-9, 54-8b, 64-5b, 77-77b, 81, 89b; G.B. Lionello to Doge and Senate, 14 Oct. 1616 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1615-1617*, p. 323.

[46] Bon and Gussoni to Doge and Senate, Paris, 20 Dec. 1616 n.s., Lionello to Doge and Senate, London, 5 Jan. and 19 Jan. 1617 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1615-1617*, pp. 384, 402, 411; Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 30 Nov. 1616, B.M. Stowe MSS. clxxvi, fo. 70.

[47] Lionello to Doge and Senate, London, 39 Mar. and 14 Apr. 1617 n.s., Bon and Gussoni to Doge and Senate, Paris, 11 Apr. 1617 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1615-1617*, pp. 476, 487-9; Desmarets to Villeroi, London, 3 May 1617 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-51.

[48] Woodford to Winwood, Paris, 14 Apr., 25 Apr., 9 May 1617, P.R.O., S.P. 178-67, fos. 81-81b, 95-6, 111.

[49] Lionello to Doge and Senate, London, 25 May 1617 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1615-1617*, p. 509; James I to Louis XIII, n.p., n.d. (received 5 Jun. 1617 n.s.), P.R.O. 31-3-51; Buckingham to Edmondes, Hexham, 27 Apr. 1617, B. M. Stowe MSS. clxxvi, fo 89.

[50] Edmondes to Winwood, Paris, 30 Sep. 1617, P.R.O., S.P. 178-67, fos. 195-195b; Contarini to Doge and Senate, Paris, 29 Dec. 1617 n.s. *C.S.P.V. 1617-1619*, p. 88.

[51] Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), p. 264; Contarini to Doge and Senate, London, 18 Jan. 1618 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1617-1619*, p. 107; Desmarets to Mangot, London, 9 Sep. and 14 Nov. 1616 n.s., to Richelieu, London, 19 Jan. 1617 n.s., to Puisieux, London, 29 Nov. 1616, 15 Jan., 16 Jan., 7 Feb., 20 Feb., 27 Feb., 5 Apr. 1618 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-51-2.

[52] Le Clerc to Puisieux, London, 16 May, 6 Jun., 7 Jul., 5 Aug., 1618 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-52; Becher to Secretary of State, Paris, 4 Aug. 11 Aug., 26 Aug., 5 Sep. 1618, P.R.O., S.P. 178-68, fos. 90, 96-96b, 99-101b, 104-104b, 114-5.

[53] Contarini to Doge and Senate, London, 28 Sep., 5 Oct. 1618 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1617-1619*, pp. 326, 331; Notes by Sir Thomas Wilson, (Tower of London), 14 Sep., 15 Sep., 21 Sep., 24 Sep., 28 Sep. 1618, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, of the Reign of James I, 1611-1618*, pp. 574-8.

[54] Le Clerc to Puisieux, London, 10 Oct. 1618 n.s., P.R.O. 31-3-52; Contarini to Doge and Senate, London, 12 Oct. 1618 n.s., *C.S.P.V. 1617-1619*, p. 334.

[55] Becher to Secretary of State, Paris, 9 Oct. 1618, P.R.O., S.P. 178-68, fos. 133-4.

[56] Becher to Secretary of State, Paris, 9 Oct. 1618, P.R.O., S. P. 178-68, fos. 133-4.

[57] John Chamberlain to Carelton, London, 31 Oct. and 21 Nov. 1618, *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, ed. by Norman Egbert McClure, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1939), ii, 178, 185.

THE PALMETTO REGIMENT GOES TO MEXICO

Ernest M. Lander, Jr.

When Congress declared war on Mexico, all South Carolina congressmen voted "aye" except John C. Calhoun. He abstained. Initially, public opinion in South Carolina supported the President, but as time passed, public opinion gradually changed, and open criticism of the administration began to appear, first, over Polk's having provoked the war, and second, over his method of conducting it. Calhoun, Joel R. Poinsett, Wadddy Thompson, and Governor David Johnson were outspoken critics. A majority of the state's newspapers were also adversely critical in varying degrees.[1]

Be that as it may, public opinion cannot be dealt with in this brief paper. My comments shall be confined primarily to the trials and tribulations of the Palmetto Regiment before the decisive battles at Churubusco and Chapultepec. And here it may be noted that no matter how South Carolinians regarded the President, they were fullsome in their praise of the sacrifice of the volunteers. Briefly here is the history of the Palmetto Regiment. It was organized in June 1846, called into active service in November, rendezvoused at Charleston, and moved by way of Mobile to Lobos Island. There it joined General Winfield Scott's expedition and eventually played a significant role in the crucial battles before Mexico City. It remained on garrison duty until the treaty of peace was ratified.[2]

On May 25, 1846, Governor William Aiken announced that President Polk had requisitioned an infantry regiment of ten companies from South Carolina. Throughout the state efforts were made immediately to enroll volunteer companies. The usual procedure was for the colonel of the local militia to muster his troops, hold a parade, give a patriotic address, and then call for volunteers. In reporting such a meeting at Lexington, a newsman said the militia officer "made a feeling and irresistible appeal to their patriotism, and urged it as a duty . . . to go forth to share the perils and glories of their countries battles." He evoked tears as he reminisced about the Seminole War. After hearing his and two other speeches, 77 volunteers stepped forward. The newsman added: "Tell me not that chivalry of the age has passed."[3]

Nevertheless, there was indifference in some quarters, and it required a great deal of fanfare, appeals to patriotism, and cajolery to raise a company in some districts. In others none was raised at all. Excuses for declining to volunteer were summed up by the *Anderson Gazette:* "Some object to the length of time their services are required, others to the season of the year . . . or to the great distance to the seat of war; one has to attend to his merchandise and another to his crop; and finally one has married a wife and therefore begs to be excused. Upon the while, we are inclined to think, that to secure volunteers from this quarter, the fighting must be postponed till the coming of frost, or be brought nearer to us." However, by June 19 the Governor had accepted the requisite number of companies with their respective officers and had been forced to turn down several others. Near the end of June field officers were

elected amid much politicking and some logrolling. The emerging victors were Pierce M. Butler, colonel, J. P. Dickinson, lieutenant colonel, and A. H. Gladden, major.[4]

The popular Pierce Butler, 48 years old, an experienced military man, and former governor, was probably a poor choice for commander due to ill health, a fact frequently noted in the press. He suffered from periodic attacks of acute rheumatism which sometimes forced him to bed. In addition, in the early autumn of 1846 he underwent surgery for hemorrhoids. Though admitting "war or love" was for young men, Butler was eager to lead the regiment and was confident he could measure up in the crisis. Upon reaching Mexico, he contracted a fever and probably diarrhea. As a matter of fact, on the day of his death he arose from his sickbed to fight.[5]

The patriotic fervor of the volunteers was dampened by an announcement of Secretary of War Marcy on July 14 that the Palmettoes would not be needed "at present." In fact, it soon appeared doubtful that the regiment would be called at all.[6] As a consequence, its organization almost fell into disarray. However, as the plans for a quick termination of the war did not progress in a hopeful manner, Secretary Marcy on November 16 notified Governor Aiken that the Palmetto Rigiment was required immediately. But Marcy carefully called attention to the change in the terms of service. The regiment was required not for twelve months, as originally stipulated, but for the duration of the war. The *Anderson Gazette* properly suspected that many volunteers would now withdraw. What seemed last spring, the editor said "as a mere frolic to march to the City of Mexico" now appeared to have "some tall fighting" in the offing.[7]

Nowhere was the receding patriotism better exhibited than among the Greenville volunteers. Originally, that district had recruited two companies, and that of Colonel Thomas P. Butler had been accepted for service. On December 1 Colonel Butler mustered his company to tell them the good news. To his chagrin only 23 signed under the new terms. The Greenville politicos were sorely disappointed. Hence, on December 7 a muster was held at the court house. On this occasion there was a parade down Main Street, music by two military bands, much flag waving by pretty girls, and the usual battery of patriotic speeches. With all this only 19 more were persuaded to join. The uncertain length of service and general dissatisfaction with the progress of American arms had obviously cooled back country spirits.[8]

Not a single company was recruited from the back country bloc of Anderson, Pickens, Greenville, Spartanburg, Laurens, Union, and York districts, although initially several companies had been organized in this area. By contrast, the low countrymen had been consistently unenthusiastic about volunteering from the start of the war, and the only company organized in the coastal districts came from the city of Charleston. In referring to a Beaufort planter friend who volunteered, James L. Petigru exclaimed; "I think he must be a little cracked." With the exception of the Charleston company, the remainder of the companies were organized in the central districts of the state.

And even there it sometimes required "strenuous efforts" to meet minimum quotas.[9]

Whenever a company was ready to march, the local citizens invariably held a farewell ceremony, which usually included a banquet, toasts, speeches, and the presentation of a banner fashioned by local belles. In his reply to the Edgefield ladies, Captain Preston Brooks said: "We solemnly pledge ourselves to follow wherever it waves and bear it aloft in triumph, or perish beneath it in glory." En route to their rendezvous in Charleston the volunteers were feted in each town through which they passed. The local militia greeted them at the outskirts and escorted them for some distance beyond the town limits. When the dusty and sore-footed Chester company marched through Columbia, Benjamin F. Perry remarked of the spectators, "I do not think there was a dry eye present."[10]

By December 19 all companies, totaling about 900 men, had reached Charleston, and marching orders had been issued by the War Department. Days were filled with drills, parades, and ceremonials. On the 22nd newly-elected Governor David Johnson addressed the regiment and reminded the volunteers that the state "looks to you to sustain her honor in the field." Two days later in a ceremony at City Hall the mayor presented a banner prepared by the city council.[11]

Army life did not go smoothly in Charleston. The regiment was short on equipment despite the legislature's gift of $20,000. And much confusion arose when their makeshift "Camp Magnolia" was wrecked and inundated by a heavy storm, thus forcing them into quarters at the race course. Moreover, the volunteers complained of the unfriendliness of Charlestonians. This was due in part, at least, to their own drunkenness and brawling. In one street fracas a volunteer fired into a mob and killed a seaman. Some illness set in and one death was reported in camp.[12]

Because some of the companies were not at full strength, Secretary Marcy authorized Colonel Butler to recruit additional volunteers. The Secretary also authorized the acceptance of two additional companies, one of which was added later.[13] After the Palmettoes had departed, periodic efforts were made to recruit replacements within the state for the regiment. Most observers agreed with Governor Johnson that "the recruiting service . . . proved to be a dull business." There were too many reports filtering back into South Carolina about the hardships the volunteers were encountering. Eventually, in the fall of 1847 about 275 additional volunteers boarded ship in Charleston bound for Vera Cruz, and a few volunteers were recruited in Mexico. The latter, according to Preston Brooks, "were all a set of vagabonds—generally teamsters who had been turned off for drunkenness and had not the means of getting home."[14]

On December 26 the first wing of the regiment departed from Charleston. The second wing followed the next day. The regiment spent five or six days encamped near Hamburg, awaiting arrangements for rail transport from Augusta to Griffin by way of Atlanta. While at Hamburg, the regiment continued its training and heard a farewell address by the Governor "in his

usual felicitous style." Although improved in discipline and toughened by the rigors of camp life, the volunteers began to suffer much from colds and to some extent from pneumonia. Several volunteers remained behind when the regiment moved out. One correspondent attributed the illness largely to dissipation. More likely it was due to exposure, for the regiment was still short of tents, blankets, and medical services, and the January weather was miserably unpleasant.[15]

After an uncomfortable rail trip to Griffin, the South Carolinians again took to the road, several more ill members being left behind. On the march of more than one hundred miles the regiment encountered rain and mud and was forced to lie over one day because of a severe sleet storm. Butler, though impatient to push on lest they arrive in Mobile too late for Scott's expedition, began to worry about the health of his men. He chided Dickinson, in command of the advance wing, for pushing the volunteers too hard. Dickinson replied that he had never pressed forward "at the expense of the health and comfort of the soldiers," and he reminded his commander of the difficulties en route of securing wagons and provisions. Fortunately for all concerned, the unpleasantness was soon dispelled.[16]

Throughout their journey from Augusta to Mobile the South Carolinians were treated with kindness and ceremony. The following is a news account of their entry into Augusta:

> They were received by a salute of cannon at the Bridge, and escorted by the Augusta Artillery Guards, through our densely thronged streets, to the enlivening strains of music, amidst the huzzas of our population, who thus essayed to cheer them on their way. Many a white 'kerchief was waved by fair hands from window and balcony, and many a sweet voice bade God speed to the gallant volunteers. Often above the din and the dust that shrouded the advancing column, rose bright and clear in the moonlighted air, rocket after rocket which, in bursting, shed halos of gleaming light upon the banners of the different companies—gifts from the hands of beauty to animate the brave in the hour of battle. That they will wave triumphant in every field, and return unsullied to the land of the Palmetto, is our confident hope. [17]

There was rarely a village through which they passed where the local citizens had not made some preparation to receive and entertain them. Nevertheless, the hardships of the trip brought four or five deaths and several desertions—in fact, 41 deserted before the regiment left Mobile. One down-hearted recruit

wrote a sad letter from Mobile, pleading with his relatives to "pray for the return of the poor volunteers." [18]

Arriving in Mobile with the second wing of the regiment on January 16, Colonel Butler was greeted with loud cheers when he infomed the volunteers that their destination would likely be Vera Cruz. Their joy soon turned to displeasure when their commander issued orders restricting all personnel, including officers, to the camp (a large cotton warehouse and grounds) and establishing a strict day-long routine of training. When a group of South Carolinians resident in Mobile offered a public banquet, Butler accepted on the condition that it be held in the confines of the camp. He then hastened off to New Orleans on military business. [19]

As events turned out, the Palmettoes were assigned to three transports. Before they had hardly cleared harbor the ships encountered a storm that was the worst in the region in 20 years, according to volunteer N. R. Eaves. He also wrote that the 16-day trip to Lobos was "the most perilous voige ever experienced we encountered three Nothern stoms, one lasted 48 hours it caused us to suffer beyond description." During the rough weather the volunteers were crowded below deck, where, in addition to seasickness, they were buffeted and bruised by shifting boxes. [20]

When General Scott's army moved from Lobos Island against Vera Cruz on March 9 and 10, the Palmetto Regiment participated in a minor role. Dickinson and several enlisted men were slightly wounded in one skirmish. While at Vera Cruz the volunteers encountered difficulties which were a foretaste of what was to come. A norther blew in and cut off the beseigers from their supply ships. The Palmetoes had no tents or blankets and were reduced to half rations. Their adjutant begged the commissary to "send *quick* for we are starving." Supply lines were soon re-established, and food and blankets came in, but the regiment received no tents for a month. In addition to supply problems, some 200 Palmettoes were stricken with mumps and a few with dysentary, diarrhea or measles. [21]

After the capture of Vera Cruz, General John A. Quitman's birgade, which included the South Carolina Regiment, marched to Alvarado, some 50 miles south, for the purpose of procuring mules and beef. The Alvarado "wild goose chase—at which there is much mortification," Butler later explained, lasted for eight days and prostrated the South Carolinians. It was an especially hot and fatiguing march, mostly along a sandy beach. In order to slake their thirsts the men were forced to drink from mudholes where the brackish water was as "thick as soup" or dig holes for themselves. Because of fatigue, thirst, sore feet, and diarrhea there was much straggling. It was later described by one participant, with perhaps exaggeration, in the following manner: "For miles at a stretch the pathway was strewn with prostrate bodies, covered with dust, overwhelmed with heat and fatigue, and perishing from thirst. On pitching camp at night sometimes not more than 4 or 5 men to a company were present. The rest lingered behind and came up during the hours of the night." [22]

For all its hardships Quitman's brigade did not gain the glory of capturing

Alvarado. The town surrendered to the navy before the army arrived. Butler described Alvarado as "a low, hot, filthy place—fleas, sand flies, and musquitoes—too numerous for comfort." He wrote that "in such a climate no one can live in any comfort or safety." He said that the regiment had about 150 ill men, including about 60 who were unable to march back to Vera Cruz. Butler himself was ill. One correspondent wrote that had the Mexicans made the effort they might have annihilated the brigade on its return march.[23]

When stories circulated later that the high rate of illness in the Palmetto Regiment was due to an excess of liquor and fruit, a news reporter for the *Montgomery Advertiser* challenged them. Why were such stories circulated? "Is it," the reporter asked, "because the Commander-in-chief had laid himself liable to be censured by the friends of the regiment in neglecting to have them transported in the shipping then under the pay of the government and lying idle in the harbor of Vera Cruz?" He pointedly blamed the commander-in-chief for causing many of the "best blood" of South Carolina to be cut off in the "bloom of their youth."[24]

Once again in camp at Vera Cruz the ill and weary Palmettoes continued to suffer. Lieutenant John B. Moragne wrote that "no day passes without the solemn sound of the death march in the camp." The men grumbled much about the lack of proper medical care, which was due in part to a shortage of regimental doctors. After a few days' rest Quitman's brigade began the march toward Jalapa as the rear guard to General Scott's advance. Some of the Palmetto ill rode in wagons, but the most serious cases were left in the hospital at Vera Cruz. Shortly a surgeon reported to Butler that he had never seen men so emaciated by disease as the ill Palmettoes remaining in Vera Cruz. Many of them later died of yellow fever.[25]

Because they brought up the rear the Palmettoes missed the Battle of Cerro Gordo. Upon reaching the battlefield four days later, Private W. S. Johnson reported: "A great many dead Mexicans lying in all directions on the Road for miles. Dead men, Horses and Cattle create a horrible stench . . . Several Shanties here filled with wounded of both armies." In forced marches and on short rations Quitman's brigade toiled through sands infested with poisonous insects, drank "hot and acrid" water, and slept amid fleas, sand flies, and ants. Quitman privately admitted that almost the entire brigade, including himself, suffered somewhat from diarrhea. The weary troops caught up with the main army at Jalapa.[26]

From Jalapa Scott's army pushed on in late April to reach Puebla in mid-May. Disease took its toll along the way. The South Carolinians' problems were compounded upon reaching the highlands, for the rainy season had arrived and the nights were cold. Many members of the regiment, against the advice of wiser heads, had thrown away their winter clothing in Vera Cruz and had bought summer outfits from the sutlers. Now colds, chills, and some cases of typhus fever were added to their other woes. About 150 were laid up in hospitals near Jalapa and Puebla. Casualties became so numerous that Butler

disbanded the Lancaster company and divided its remnants among the other companies.[27]

Although the illness in the regiment was occasionally laid to intemperance, the major reasons seem to have been the climate, impure drinking water, a general lack of sanitation, and bad food. Butler complained to Quitman about the "poor and slimy" meat coming from the commissary. The regimental surgeon reported much filthiness of the Palmettoes' quarters and clothing. He also noted that many of the ill who were on quarters would attend sick call, collect their prescriptions, and disappear into the streets, eating whatever they could purchase from the market. In time, the surgon cut down sharply on sick call deadbeats by requiring each patient to swallow his medicine before leaving the dispensary.[28]

In addition to disease and the usual hardships of army life several privates wrote home about alleged mistreatment by officers. Private W. M. Goodlett, a former sheriff of Greenville District, described their unpleasant trip aboard an Alabama riverboat. The men were marched, he said, "like so many hogs" on to the lower deck among the boilers and machinery. For 36 hours they were confined to the hole with little to eat and no sanitary facilities while the officers had the run of the boat. Goodlett's troubles increased in Mobile. While on patrol duty he noted that the officer in charge failed to enforce Butler's order that no one should leave camp. When the Colonel returned from New Orleans, Goodlett filed a complaint. Dickinson, who was in command during Butler's absence, quickly arrested Goodlett and indicted him on a list of serious counter charges. The startled private was immediately court martialed and convicted. Having taught the private a lesson, Dickinson then appeared to be magnanimous and requested Butler to remit the sentence. This was done before Goodlett could appeal his case.[29]

Also in Mobile Private I. P. Detter and several other enlisted men who went into town were court martialed for being AWOL. Although punished lightly, Detter retorted: "In leaving camp, I only followed the example of my superiors in rank." Private W. S. Johnson also wrote home of mistreatment; whereupon, a friend offered some consolation: "All your friends joyn me in saying god of the universe prop up and strengthen the poor soldiers who are tyranised over"—and some philosophy: "Men at home who the world looks on as men when clothed with authority abroad become tyrants."[30]

Upon leaving Mobile, the privates received no improvement in treatment. On the day they boarded ship Johnson recorded in his diary: "No diner to day except dry crackers—Every boddy in bad humour, except the officers who feast in the Cabbin." The men spent most of the stormy voyage crowded in unlighted, ill-smelling, dirty accomodations below deck that would make "second choice to a pig sty." After the surrender of the Vera Cruz privates were generally restricted from the city. Goodlett wrote that the privates were "hardly looked upon as human beings." The officers' servants enjoyed greater privileges. While the officers revelled in the city at night, "the poor d---d privates," Goodlett said,

were detailed to the beach to bring up rations. And upon reaching Alvarado, the privates went hungry all day. That evening it was only after much loud complaint that they aroused Commissary Blanding from his game of billiards in a local coffee house long enough to issue rations for the night. Goodlett later admitted a turn for the better. On the grueling march to Jalapa the officers paid "every possible attention" to their men.[31]

Meanwhile, back in South Carolina several reports appeared charging the officers in general with incompetence and accusing the field officers of squandering the $20,000 appropriated by the legislature for the regiment. Some of the strictures were severe in tone. The *Hamburg Republican* accused the "Epauletted Gentlemen . . . of the most total inefficiency in every department of their duty." Butler himself wrote two lengthy letters rebutting these "insidious attacks." He denied charges of neglect and mismanagement of funds, although he admitted the men suffered privations beyond his control. He appointed a special committee of company officers, who found the field officers' expenditures of the state fund to be "perfectly correct." In any case, the furore died down before the crucial battles in late August.[32]

In July General James Shields was appointed commander of the First Brigade, which included the South Carolina volunteers. On August 19 and 20 the weakened Palmetto Regiment, at long last, saw decisive action at Contreras and Churubusco. Of a field strength of 331 before the battles 137 were killed or wounded. Butler died on the battlefield and Dickinson succumbed unexpectedly a few days later to wounds. The regiment suffered an additional 103 casualties at Chapultepec and Mexico City on September 13 and 14. This reduced its effective strength to about 150 men. The entire state lauded the regiment, at the same time it mourned the dead heroes.[33]

After the American capture of Mexico City the Palmettoes settled down to routine garrison duty near the capital. The health of the survivors remained generally good, and although homesick the volunteers seemed to enjoy life in Mexico. In time they fraternized rather freely with the Mexicans. After the peace treaty was ratified the regiment returned to Mobile, where the men were discharged about July 1, 1848. Upon arriving back in South Carolina, the volunteers were lionized with great ceremony.[34]

The Palmetto Regiment had suffered greatly, more so than most. Following Churubusco, one volunteer wrote: "It was a sad sight, one I can never forget—our poor regiment seems doomed to misfortune; dwindled down by disease to a mere handful; a noble band, they are led into battle and half of them are left on the field wounded and dead. Of our large regiment and pride of the State, almost two thirds have found graves in this country." Was the regiment ill-fated? The *Charleston Evening News* recalled that when Colonel Butler received the flag at City Hall a wing of the eagle fell from the staff, thereby presaging death or disaster to the Palmettoes. "It may have been an omen of death," said the *News*, "but thank God, not of defeat or disgrace."[35]

[1] *Charleston Courier*, May 15-16, 1846. See Calhoun to H. W. Conner, May 15, 1846, H. W. Conner Papers (Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress); Thompson in *Greenville Mountaineer*, March 12, 1847; Johnson to Calhoun, October 27, 1847, Calhoun Papers. (Clemson University); and Poinsett in *Winyah Observer* (Georgetown), February 2, 1848.

[2] Two brief accounts of the Palmetto Regiment may be found in David Duncan Wallace, *The History of South Carolina* (4 vols. New York, 1934), III, 111-14; and E. T. Crowson, "Manifest Destiny, Mexico, and the Palmetto Boys," *Sandlapper*, V (January, 1972), 32-34, 66-69.

[3] *Charleston Courier*, May 25, June 15, 1846.

[4] *Ibid.*, June 26, July 8, 1846; *Anderson Gazette*, June 5, 1846.

[5] Butler also faced some personal problems, such as an impending duel with an army colonel and some unsettled claims in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Butler to B. T. Watts, September 21, 1846, Watts Papers (South Caroliniana Library); Butler to Behethland Butler, April 4, 1847, Butler to A. Burt, October 22, 28, 1846, Butler to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 4, 1847, Butler Papers (South Caroliniana Library); *Pendleton Messenger*, February 5, 1847; *Greenville Mountaineer*, October 15, 1847; *Charleston Courier*, October 12, 1846.

[6] *Ibid.*, July 21, August 1, 1846.

[7] *Greenville Mountaineer*, November 27, 1846; *Anderson Gazette*, November 27, 1846.

[8] *Pendleton Messenger*, December 11, 1846; *Greenville Mountaineer*, December 4, 11, 1846.

[9] The companies came from Edgefield, Abbeville, Fairfield, Richland, Kershaw, Chester, Barnwell, Sumter, Lancaster, and Charleston districts. *Charleston Courier*, November 23, 1846; *Anderson Gazette*, December 18, 1846; *Edgefield Advertiser*, November 26, December 2, 1846; *Sumter Banner*, December 2, 1846.

[10] *Ibid.*, December 2, 9, 23, 1846; *Edgefield Advertiser*, December 2, 9, 16, 23, 1846; *Greenville Mountaineer*, December 18, 1846.

[11] *Ibid.*, December 18, 25, 1846, January 1, 1847, *Pendleton Messenger*, January 8, 1847; R. Jones to Butler, December 18, 1846, "Documents of the Palmetto Regiment" (unpublished manuscripts, South Carolina Department of Archives and History), p. 9; *Charleston Courier*, December 21, 25, 1846.

[12] *Ibid.*, December 23, 1846; *Greenville Mountaineer*, January 8, April 16, 1847; *Pendleton Messenger*, December 25, 1846; E. G. Randolph to Mary McCreight, January 15, 1847 (manuscript in South Caroliniana Library).

[13] Marcy to Butler, December 28, 1846, "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 16, 21. A company from Newberry was added, while the "Butler Guards" from Edgfield failed to gain a sufficient number of volunteers. Julia Butler to Pierce Butler, January 1847, Butler Papers; *Edgefield Adveertiser*, January 13, 20, 1847.

[14] *Ibid.*, July 7, 1847; "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 77-78, 235; *Winyah Observer*, June 9, 1847; James Petigru Carson, *Life, Letters and Speeches of James Louis Petigru* . . . (Washington, 1920), p. 258; *Anderson Gazette*, August 26, 1847. On one occasion the *Gazette* protested that a recruiting team in Anderson had lured several teenage school boys into service without the consent of their parents. June 10, 1847.

[15] *Edgefield Advertiser*, January 6, 13, 1847; *Greenville Mountaineer*, January 8, 1847; E. G. Randolph to Mary McCreight, January 15, 1847 (manuscript in South Caroliniana Library); "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 22, 30. Two Greenville volunteers, H. J. Moore and W. Goodlett, serving in companies from other districts, wrote frequent and lengthy letters to the editor of the *Mountaineer*.

[16] "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 29-40; *Edgefield Advertiser*, January 27, 1847. Many of the ill recovered and later joined the regiment.

[17] *Charleston Courier*, January 4, 1847 (citing *Augusta Constitutionlist*, no date).

[18] The recruit, H. S. Dickson, never returned. he died in Vera Cruz. J. Dickson to John Dickson, May 1, 1847, Dickinson Family Papers (University of North Carolina); "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 34-35; *Edgefield Advertiser*, January 27, February 10, 1847; *Greenville Mountaineer*, January 22, February 5, 12, 1847. One volunteer was killed when he fell from the train. *Ibid.*, January 22, 1847.

[19] *Ibid.*, February 5, 1847; *Anderson Gazette*, February 5, 1847; *Edgefield Advertiser*, February 3, 1847.

[20] *Ibid.*, February 10, March 24, 1847; *Greenville Mountaineer*, March 5, 19, 1847; Eaves to C. D. Melton, January 29, February 14, 1847, Eaves Papers (South Caroliniana Library).

[21] John Hammond Moore, ed., "Private Johnson Fights the Mexicans, 1847-1848," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, LXVI (October 1966), 211; John A. Quitman to (Eliza Quitman), April 10, 1847, Quitman Family Papers (University of North Carolina); *Charleston Mercury*, March 9, 1847; *Greenville Mountaineer*, April 16, 1847. The mumps had first broken out in Mobile, but the cases did not seem to be especially severe.

[22] *Greenville Mountain*, May 7, 21, 1847; Butler to Behethland Butler, May 2, 1847, Butler Papers; *Edgefield Advertiser*, May 5, 1847, February 23, 1848.

[23] *Ibid.*, May 5, 1847. Butler added that the exposure and bad water at Vera Cruz had given him a cold and "the worse Rheumatism—I ever felt finally—neuralgia." As for the volunteers, "At best their duty is painful. . . . It is improper service for any other than Regular Soldiers." To Behethland Butler, April 4, 1847, Butler Papers. General Quitman admitted the march was "hot and fatiguing," but he played down the sickness. To Eliza Quitman, April 7, 1847, Quitman Family Papers. Calhoun wrote Governor Johnson: "I agree with you that the Materials of which our Regiment is composed are not of a description, which such a service requires, I never think of the men, and what is before them, but with deep feelings of regret." January 13, 1847, Calhoun Papers (South Caroliniana Library).

[24] Quoted in *Pendleton Messenger*, September 3, 1847.

[25] "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 61-62, 67, 75; *Greenville Mountaineers*, May 7, 21, 1847. Regarding the ill left in Vera Cruz, Moragne added: "I have regretted their deaths very much, and more as I was compelled to leave them behind in the hands of strangers." To Mary E. Davis, April 12, May 3, 1847, Mary Moragne Papers (South Caroliniana Library).

[26] Moore ed., "Private Johnson," *SCHM*, LXVI, 213; Quitman to Louise, April 23, to Eliza, May 21, 1847, Quitman Family Papers; *Greenville Mountaineer*, May 21, 1847.

[27] *Ibid.*, May 14, 21, July 2, 1847; *Winyah Observer*, November 24, 1847; *Edgefield Advertiser*, May 12, December 1, 1847, February 23, 1848; "Doc.

Palmetto Regt.," pp. 107-108, 199. The Palmettoes' regular uniforms were shipwrecked off the North Carolina coast, salvaged and sent on, but did not arrive before the volunteers marched inland. *Pendleton Messenger*, April 16, 1847.

[28] "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 87-89, 97-99, 109-110; *Anderson Gazette*, September 2, 1847. After the surgeon's new rule, in one day the number on sick call dropped from 157 to 124.

[29] *Greenville Mountaineer*, February 5, 1847.

[30] "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," p. 52; William Maybin to W. S. Johnson, January 24, 1847, William S. Johnson Papers (South Caroliniana Library).

[31] Moore, ed., "Private Johnson," *SCHM*, LXVI, 205; *Greenville Mountaineer*, May 7, 21, 1847; *Sumter Banner*, March 24, 1847. One officer, Captain Francis Sumter, proved to be such an alcoholic that Butler exacted a pledge from him not to touch another drop of whiskey under the penalty of immediate dismissal. "Doc. Palmetto Reg.," p. 66. After the Alvarado expedition Goodlett wrote: "I could say much more in relation to the dereliction of officers, but to do the subject justice, would occupy too much time and space." He admitted some exceptions though "not very numerous." *Greenville Mountaineer*, May 7, 1847.

[32] *Ibid.*, June 25, 1847; *Charleston Mercury*, May 29, 1847; Butler to Behethland Butler, May 2, 1847, Butler Papers; *Edgefield Advertiser*, March 24, 1847 (citing *Hamburg Republic*, no date), April 5, June 30, 1847.

[33] *Ibid.*, October 27, 1847; "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," p. 200; *Greenville Mountaineer*, September 24, October 29, 1847. The distinction followed the dead in burial. Privates were placed in common graves with no marks of distinction. Officers were interred in wooden coffins. *Edgefield Advertiser*, April 5, 1848.

[34] *Ibid.*, August 2, 1848; *Pendleton Messenger*, June 2, 1848; *Greenville Mountaineer*, December 24, 1847, April 7, May 26, July 14, 1848; "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 231-41.

[35] J. Cantwell to B. Lucas, October 27, 1847 (manuscript in South Carolina Historical Society); *Winyah Observer*, September 22, 1847 (citing *Charleston Evening News*, no date). Documents reveal that the Palmettoes lost 423 men to death. 145 to disability discharges, and 41 to desertion. The strength of the regiment upon reaching Vera Cruz was 974, but there had been several deaths and desertions before that time and some ill left behind. Moreover, the regiment picked up a few recruits en route to Mobile and a few more in Mexico. A field report of Palmetto casualties as of March 1, 1847 (Lobos Island) showed 14 deaths, 41 desertions, 40 left behind sick, 11 discharged, and 37 mustered in, or a net loss of 68 prior to the attack on Vera Cruz. The 275 volunteers that left for Mexico in October 1847, did not join the regiment. See "Doc. Palmetto Regt.," pp. 256-77; and Wallace, *History of S. C.*, III, 111; *South Carolinian* (Columbia), June 22, 1847.

CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES TOWARD CUBA (1895-1898)

G. Wayne King

Conservatism did not present a solid phalanx against the marital spirit which precipatated the Spanish-American War in 1898. Conservatism for the purposes of this paper is defined in the restricted but classical sense of favoring the status quo. In this case, conservatives were simply those who opposed United States military intervention into the Cuban insurrection, 1895-1898. In this chapter of American history, as in so many others, conservatism acted only as a deterrent, delaying what seemed to be inevitable. This role has been the task of conservatism so often that Clinton Rossiter, a historian who has carefully examined conservatism in America, called it the "thankless persuasion." [1]

Nearly every American eventually sympathized with the insurrection against Spain which erupted on the island of Cuba on February 24, 1895. Generally, conservative Americans, however, characterized themselves by attacking rash jingosistic propaganda that would have involved the United States in an unnecessary war, stressing that sympathy should not interfere with the duties of international law, and deploring the sensationalism of the budding yellow press.

Toward their government, conservatives distinguished themselves by resisting Congressional resolutions which recognized Cuban belligerency or independence, stressing the President's preeminence in foreign relations and supporting the Chief Executives' own conservative leadership. With respect to the Cuban insurrectionists, conservatives limited their aid by pleading for humane war conditions and contributing to the relief of the destitute.

If any segment of the nation was united in its conservative attitude towards Cuba, it was the business element. [2] Business journals were among the first to advocate a non-intervention policy. In March 1896, as the Congress debated a resolution recognizing Cuban belligerency, the New York *Journal of Commerce* commented: "This Country desires no needless complication with Spain." [3] The same journal was more harsh in its condemnation of filibustering expeditions originating in the United States, a practice which more than anything else jeopardized true neutrality. [4] But when economic interests were involved, it could be just as abrasive in tone with the Spanish. After the Spanish military commander in Cuba imposed an embargo on the export of tobacco, the journal complained just as vociferously. [5]

Attacking the jingo press was another practice conservative business journals used. *The Commercial Advertiser*, a leading business journal in New York, denounced Richard Harding Davis, correspondent for a "yellow journal," when he reported that Spanish authorities had completely undressed women to search them. The journal labeled Davis' story along with Frederic Remington's graphic drawing as the "most monstrous falsehood that has yet appeared even in the new journalism" [6]

Some American businessmen who lived in Cuba hoped that Spain would succeed in suppressing the rebellion. This element believed that the Cubans were not qualified to govern themselves and would be more avaricious than the Spaniards.[7] American investors in Cuba gave no indication that they desired United States intervention.[8] On the contrary, the actions of Edwin F. Atkins, one of the most influential American sugar owners, indicated that intervention would be most undesirable. Believing that Cuban autonomy would prevent United States intervention, Atkins used his important contacts in both the Spanish and American governments to achieve this goal. There is evidence that he met with considerable success. In the United Sates government no less a person than Secretary of State Richard Olney listened to Atkins' advice.[9] Significantly, the first major proposal made by the United States to Spain in an effort to end the fighting in Cuba urged Cuban autonomy.[10]

The core of American business maintained its conservative attitude until the United States intervened in April 1898. In the last week before President McKinley relinquished the Cuban affair to Congress, the *American Banker* editorialized that "there is not an intelligent, self-respecting and civilized citizen anywhere who would not prefer to have the existing crisis culminate in peaceful negotiations."[11] About the same time Edwin Atkins arrived in Washington to exert his personal influence for peace. He talked privately with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Navy. Atkins recorded: "I talked as I never talked before."[12] Perhaps James J. Hill best summarized the businessman's attitude. Hill criticized both the Cleveland and McKinley administrations for involving the United States in foreign areas while, in his opinion, it should have minded its own business. When the war came, however, he advocated that it should be pursued to a swift end.[13]

Paradoxically, there was little evidence of conservatism in the attitude of organized religion toward Cuba. Imbued with the belief espoused by Josiah Strong, a prominent evangelical leader, that the Anglo-Saxon race had the duty to spread its superior culture under divine guidance to the rest of the world, most religious denominations saw the Cuban problem as a moral one and favored United States intervention. Some Christian churches, however, dissented.

Among those religious groups that never surrendered their position against United States intervention were the Society of Friends, Unitarians and the Roman Catholic Church.[14] The last group, because the United States rejected the Pope's attempt to arbitrate a settlement in April, 1898, bitterly attacked pro-war preachers. The American Catholic publication *Ave Maria* derisively chastised: "The pulpits of the country resound with war-cries and calumnies against our foes. Many of the pious men who occupy them preferred war to peace, and war at any cost rather than peace as a result of the Holy Father's Arbitrations."[15]

Most religious denominations, however, under the strain of moral attrition, abandoned the conservative cause. *The Churchman*, a Protestant tract, stuck to a posture of peace until, under the stress of the swift-paced events in the fall of 1897, it abdicated its position with the comment: "God alone knows the issues

of life and death, of peace and war."[16] The *Advance*, the leading Congregational journal abandoned its conservative position when it heard the descriptions of horror in Cuba by the moderate Senator Redfield Proctor in the middle of March, 1898.[17] When war came, even *The Independent*, an ecclesiastically oriented weekly which had religiously hoped for peace, rationalized the fact in an article entitled "The Christianity of It." The theme was that the United States had to make war to end war. Thus the United States entered the war cloaked in the righteous garment of a universal moral cause.[18]

Possibly the organization with the greatest interest in keeping the peace, but least influential in avoiding United States intervention, was the American Peace Society. Its Vice-President, Edward Atkinson, later one of the founders of the Anti-Imperialist League, urged churches to petition Congress for peace and implored President McKinley "to avoid the hell of war."[19]

Although there was no geographical stronghold of conservatism, with the possible exception of Boston, curiously there was a cohesive ethnic conservative attitude towards Cuba in the German-American community. Before the Cuban uprising had attracted widespread attention in 1895, the St. Louis *Westliche Post* exposed the motives of the inchoate jingoist: "As France has her chauvinist, so we have our jingoes, people who rattle the sword . . . and endeavor to force the country into playing the part of a brutal bully."[20] It called upon all good citizens to oppose the jingoist intentions.[21] Such widely separated newspapers as the New York *Vols-Zeitung*, the Cleveland *Wachter un Anzeiger*, and the Milwaukee *Seebote* indicate that the conservative attitude prevailed in many German-American settlements. These newspapers used the usual conservative arguments. Among these were that the Cuban rebels were too disorganized to deserve recognition of belligerency or the sanction of international law to justify their legitimacy. In addition, they employed a few unusual arguments. For instance, the Cincinnati *Volksblatt* thought that war would bring national disgrace and that those who clamored for war saw it as a boon for business. The latter argument was a twist on the jingoist's taunt that conservatives were the lackeys of Wall Street.[22]

The conservatives never concerted or sublimated their energies. Instead their opposition to United States intervention into Cuba was scattered and sporadic. There were eminent conservatives, however, who could make their voices heard. One of the most improbable men to be found in this group was John Burgess, the political scientist whose racial theories gave approbation to the expanionist sentiment which helped mold an atmosphere conducive to war. With rare myopia, Burgess established the School of Political Science to promote world peace. The professor failed to see that his own racial ideas were inimical to this goal. Yet Burgess fulminated against intervention. As war clouds approached, he found scapegoats which he attacked through the *Political Science Quarterly*. Burgess quixotically regarded atrocity stories emanating from Cuba as British fabrications to induce a Spanish-American conflict. He condemned Mark Hanna as a tool of business, interested in war profiteering and denounced Theodore Roosevelt as a representative of a class of

young, ambitious men seeking political advancement through war fame. When war came, Burgess cursed the martial spirit of the American people and succumbed to melancholia.[23]

Another unlikely pedagogic opponent to the Cuban involvement was William G. Sumner of Yale University. In the summer of 1896 he wrote an article in *Forum* which criticized any contemplated United States involvement. Fearing a war that might arouse latent imperialism in the United States, Summer stated that the American system of government was unfit to rule "subject provinces." On the other hand, the vision of Cubans in the United States Senate horrified him. Contrary to his colleague Burgess, he would have been gratified if England absorbed Cuba, since he thought that the United States would then have access to the economic advantages of Cuba without any political responsiblity.[24]

Indeed, the Cuban issue made "strange bedfellows." Carl Schurz, a bona fide liberal on most issues, assumed a distinctly conservative stance towards Cuba, Schurz, long before Sumner, expounded similar beliefs. He maintained that history proved domocracy had never survived in tropical climates such as that of Cuba and, moreover, that any extension of our democratic institutions would have serious effects on its vitality.[25] Moorfield Storey, President of the Massachusetts Reform Club and an independant by profession, behaved and talked like a conservative. His novel opposition to war with Spain was that it was certain to be successful. In that success he saw the germination of forces noxious to the democratic institutions of the United States. In his clairvoyance, Storey foresaw large standing armies and navies, a nation militarily aggressive, and territorial acquisitions. In a speech to the Reform Club he concluded: "God grant that such calmities are not in store for us."[26]

In Georgia resting from the election of 1896, Tom Watson, the unsuccessful Vice-Presidential candidate on the Populist ticket, hurled parthian shots at his former running mate, William Jennings Bryan, as the latter vied with Repulbicans and Democrats in expressing martial sentiments. During his metamorphosis from a Populist leader to Democratic demogogue, Watson condemned the war spirit of the country in its hiatus from sanity.[27] Another political figure who had recently undergone a political transition was Eugene V. Debs. As war approached, Debs expressed the socialist position. Like Watson, he used the war fever to advance his own ends:

> There are thousands who are not swept from their feet by the war craze. They realize that war is national murder, that the poor furnish the victims and that whatever the outcome may be, the effect is always the same upon the toiling class.
>
> In 1894 the press denounced us for the alloyed reason that we were murderous and blood-thirsty, and now the same press opposes

> us because we are not. We are opposed to war, but if it ever becomes necessary for us to enlist in the murderous business, it will be to wipe out capitalism, the common enemy of the oppressed and downtrodden of all nations. [28]

Incongruous as this coterie was, they all had one common characteristic—they were on the periphery of power, therefore their influence was negligible. Fortunately, however, their views were not dissimilar to the views of many conservatives with power.

Although the conservatives by themselves were never numerous or noisy enough to withstand the agitation of the jingoes, in President Grover Cleveland they possessed a bulwark that successfully resisted the aggressive pressure throughout his administration. Cleveland succeeded by the strong use of his executive powers. [29]

The first official measure the President made toward the Cuban insurrection was to issue a proclamation of neutrality. Although he did not proclaim this policy until June 12, 1895, over four months after the initial uprising, the Chief Executive admonished his fellow citizens to obey the neutrality laws, because offenders would be "rigorously prosecuted." [30] True to his word, Cleveland vigorously upheld strict neutrality. Since filibustering posed a serious threat to Cleveland's position, on July 27, 1896, he issued a second proclamation which tightened the restrictions on filibustering. So vigilant was Cleveland that during his administration only fifteen of some forty expeditions succeeded. In fact, the American patrol against filibusters was more effective than the Spanish. [31]

Probably, the greatest threat to Cleveland's policy came from the Congress. The Chief Executive stubbornly opposed the pressure from the jingo element in Congress to recognize Cuban belligerency, or independence, or to have military intervention. Throughout his term he sought to stand by the position stated in his annual message to Congress in 1895: "no matter what our sympathies our plain duty is to observe in good faith the recognized obligations of international relationship." [32]

Cleveland saved his trucelence for Congress. When the Senate considered a joint resolution on Cuban belligerency, the President snapped: "If it comes, it will give me an opportunity to tell the American people some plain truths, and d---d if they don't get them." [33] He demolished a Congressional threat to declare war by asserting that he could not mobilize the army in such a contingency. Unlike President McKinley, Cleveland never abdicated any of his foreign policy powers to the legislative branch. [34] To prevent eventual intervention, however, Cleveland knew that he had to do more than uphold the neutrality laws.

Only peace in Cuba could remove the issue permanently from American politics. Knowing this, Cleveland, perhaps influenced by Atkins, worked for peace by pressing Spain to grant Cuba autonomy. Although he failed in this

effort, the President continued his search for peace almost until his last day in office.[35] Conscious of his ultimate failure, Cleveland apologized to the new President on inaugural day for passing on "a war with Spain." Although Cleveland felt that he had failed, he "had done everything in his power to avert what he believed would have been a useless and disgraceful war . . ."[36]

While most of the credit for this should be attributed to Cleveland, he did not stand alone. In addition to the able support the President received from both of his Secretaries of State, he did have defenders in the Congress. These conservatives, however small in number, used various arguments to support Cleveland's leadership. Among the rational arguments that the conservatives in Congress employed, the executive's prerogative in foreign relations sanctioned by the Constitution and by tradition probably was the most persuasive. When reason appeared to be futile against the emotional jingoes, however, the vastly outnumbered conservatives resorted to derision. While it is difficult to assess the value of these tactics, it can be said that Congress never successfully infringed upon Cleveland's powers in dealing with foreign affairs.[37]

During Cleveland's administration, the conservative press characterized itself chiefly by applauding the actions of the executive branch of government and censoring the jingoist actions in the legislative branch. Generally, during Cleveland's tenure, the Republican newspapers opposed his moves in relation to Cuba and the Democratic newspapers either approved or acquiesced in his measures.[38] Like its allies in Congress, the conservative press used satire and truth as its main weapons. For example, the New York *Herald* dubbed Senator Wilkerson Call "the eminent ambassador from Florida to the United States" because he had introduced a bill calling for annexation of Cuba in each Congress since shortly after the end of the Ten Years War.[39] Jingoes in Congress were not the only targets of the conservative press. It also mocked the sensational stories which appeared in the yellow press. For example, the ascerbic E.L. Godkin, editor of the *Nation*, sneered that "neither side (in Cuba) is waging war with anything like the fury of the newspaper correspondents."[40]

These fabian tactics, conservatives realized, were no substitute for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem. Torn between sympathy for the rebels and tolerance toward Spain, they hoped for a *deus ex machina* in Spanish reforms, Cuban autonomy or, as *The Independent* wished aloud: "If Spain would only allow Cuba to purchase her freedom (with United States money), how happily would the devastating warfare . . . be ended."[41] Whatever the method, a peaceable solution to a potentially inflammable situation was the primary concern of most conservatives. As long as the Cuban insurrections continued, they saw the United States drawn closer and closer to a vortex which would lead to an unwanted war and new responsibility. As the Cleveland Administration ended, although the Cuban situation had grown more dangerous with time, the conservatives could still point to the fact that the United States was at peace.

President William McKinley was a conservative. Although he was not the same stripe of man as his predecessor, for over a year McKinley continued

Cleveland's policy of working for a negotiated peace in Cuba while keeping a lid on the jingoes in Congress. In a conversation with the retiring President the night before the innaugural, McKinley remarked that he would "be the happiest man in the world" if he could leave the White House "with the success (towards Cuba) that has crowned your patience and persistence . . ." [42]

The new President had support for his goal. Along with regular conservatives, new men of power rallied behind the Chief Excutive. Among these were Thomas Reed, newly elected Speaker who could be trusted to keep the jingoes in the House of Representatives in order and Mark Hanna, who entered the Upper Chamber. [43] With their party chief in the White House, many Republicans proved to be chameleon. Following McKinley's leadership, some who had previously displayed their bellicosity toward Spain suddenly inserted siren tones of friendship in their speeches. [44]

The Republican press, like most party stalwarts, changed its position on Cuba overnight to support the new President's leadership. The Milwaukee *Journal* noting this phenomenon, commented that responsibility brought soberness as a corollary. The New York Evening Post witnessed the transformation of McKinley's Secretary of State John Sherman with pleasure and was convinced by his performance. These neophytes, however, should be regarded as only pantomine conservatives. [45]

Continuity was the essence of the regular conservative press. It continually earned the President's deliberate, concilliatory position toward Spain, while condemning the exaggerated and emotional threats and demands of the jingoes in the Congress. The humanitarian endeavors of the President and private organizations to help the Cuban victims also received praise. In addition, the conservative press eagerly searched for and commended any Spanish moves toward reform in Cuba. But signs of impatience and despair that Spain alone would end the war began to appear. Imperceptibly some conservatives began to prepare themselves to accept United States intervention on humanitarian grounds—the same basis that until then had been used as a weapon against intervention. [46]

Despite the attritional effect of the prolonged twilight struggle, the year of 1897 ended with a note of hope. Spain, under a new government, instituted new reforms in Cuba. As the year ended, United States intervention appeared to be unlikely. [47]

Unfortunately, a series of incidents shattered this quasi-serenity and plunged the United States into a "splendid little war" within four months of the new year. The events which led directly to United States intervention in Cuba in April 1898 left many conservatives disoriented and bewildered, while others escaped into a world of delusion.

When the President dispatched the battleship *Maine* to Havana, the Chicago *News* called its peaceful reception "the most convincing of all possible tokens that every danger of rupture has passed, and that our relations with Spain are now on a rock bottom peace basis." [48] *Harper's Weekly* reported that

there was every reason to think the visit was a wise and friendly act. Even when the *Maine* exploded some conservatives saw potents for peace. The Philadelphia *Inquirer* warned that the destruction of the *Maine* was an example of the annihilation both nations would inflict with terrible weapons of modern warfare. There would be no victory for either country, it cautioned. [49]

Inexorably the tide for intervention gained momentum as the asthenic conservative sentiment wavered in the wake of the events of February. On March 9, 1898, Congress passed a fifty million dollar appropriation for national defense. Ominously, for the first time, the conservatives and the jingoes were in accord as not one dissenting vote was cast. The conservatives deluded themselves, however, by thinking the measure would strengthen the President in his bargaining with Spain; therefore, they acted as if they had struck another blow for peace. The *Journal of Commerce*, showing an appalling lack of understanding of Spanish people, speculated that the measure might have a more calming effect there than in the United States. [50]

The more realistic conservatives still placed their hope for peace in the President. Since the beginning of the insurrection in 1895, the Executive Office had been the most puissant force for peace. In placing their trust in McKinley at this time, however, the conservatives failed to see the attritional effects that the viscissitudes since the turn of the year had upon him.

By the end of March the kaleidoscopic events in the international situation coupled with increased personal problems had placed McKinley in a deleterious psychological state. The President had lost so much sleep that he had begun to use soporific narcotics. The dark shadows under his eyes and the fatigue in his face were evident to those close to him. George B. Cortelyou, the private secretary to the President, recorded on March 20, "the far-away, deep set expression" in McKinley's eyes. Clearly, the strongest link in the conservative chain was rapidly becoming the weakest. Indeed, on April 11 the conservative cause was surrendered by McKinley to a Congress dominated by the jingoes. [51]

The final failure of the conservatives eclipses their successes. It cannot be denied that the Cuban insurrection continued for over three years with mounting liberal-jingo pressure for intervention before the United States entered the war. That the United States never entered the Ten Years War under similar pressures for intervention diminishes this success somewhat. It must be remembered, however, that America in the late 1890's was more amenable to such persuasions than in the two previous decades.

It is clear that the main credit for this three year delay belongs to the executive branch. It was not until McKinley abandoned his conservative position that intervention became possible. In Congress, the conservatives brought clarity to confusion, sanity to sensation and temperance to temperamentalism. Altogether these institutions allowed the American people a path which it chose not to take. The conservative press played a similar role. It used the devices of satire, ridicule and the simple truth to fight the excesses of

yellow journalism.

In the end, the failure of conservatism was the failure of reason and common sense in a nation intoxicated by prosperity and social Darwinism.

The final tragedy is that ample evidence demonstrates the presence of anti-interventionist sentiment in the United States, however diffuse, which a resourceful determined Chief Executive could have rallied to avoid confrontation with Spain in the spring of 1898. A John Adams of 1798 was needed in 1898.

On President Harry Truman's desk during his years in the White House was a sign: "The buck stops here." In April, 1898 President McKinley passed the "buck" to an aggressive Congress.

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[1] For a fuller explanation see Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).

[2] This is the traditionalist-historian view. Most prominent of the historians in this group is Julius W. Pratt, *Expanionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 266. Also see Wilfred Hardy Callcott, *The Carribean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1942), p. 102. Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion, 1890-1900 (New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1959) p. 223; and John L. Offner, "President McKinley and the Origins of the Spanish-American War" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Pennsylvania State University, 1957) p. 87. For a dissenting view see Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1963) pp. 390, 400-405.

[3] *Journal of Commerce* (New York), March 16, 1896, p.4.

[4] *Ibid.*, June 10, 1896, p. 1.

[5] *Ibid.*, May 23, 1896, p. 1.

[6] *Commercial Advertiser* (New York), February 15, 1897, p. 1.

[7] Thomas Gold Alvord, Jr. "Why Spain Has Failed in Cuba," *Forum*, (July, 1897), p. 573.

[8] Richard Weigle, "The Sugar Interests and American Diplomacy in Hawaii and Cuba, 1893-1903" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Yale University, 1939), p. 242.

[9] Edwin F. Atkins, *Sixty Years in Cuba.* (Boston: Privately published by the Riverside Press, 1926), pp. 157-162. A large sugar planter in Cuba and a native of Massachusetts, Atkins wrote confidential reports about conditions in Cuba to Olney, who had been an old friend of Atkins' father.

[10] Olney to deLome, April 4, 1896, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897.* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898) pp. 540-544.

[11] *American Banker*, March 30, 1898, LXIII, 528.

[12] Atkins, *Sixty Years*, p. 278.

[13] Joseph Gilpin Pyle, *The Life of James J. Hill* (New York: Peter Smith, 1936), II, 77-78.

[14] Pratt, *Expanionist of 1898*, pp. 284, 289.

[15] *Ave maria*, May 7, 1898 XLVI, 596.

[16] Quoted in Pratt, *Expansionist of 1898*, p. 288.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

[18] "The Christianity of It, "*The Independent*, April 28, 1898, L. 544.

[19] Quoted in Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 93.

[20] "The Cuban Uprising and Its Effects," *The Literary Digest*, April 13, 1895, X, No. 24, 713.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] "German-American Opposition to War" *Ibid.*, April 16, 1898, XVI, No. 9, 452-453.

[23] John W. Burgess, *Reminiscences of An American Scholar* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 314-321.

[24] "The Fallacy of Territorial Extension," *Forum*, June, 1896, pp. 414-419.

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[31] Ibid., 694; Elbert J. Benton, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1908, pp. 43-45.

[32] Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, IX, 636-637.

[33] Festus P. Sumners, ed., *The Cabinet Diary of William L. Wilson, 1896-1897* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1959), p. 82.

[34] Callcott, *Caribbean Policy*, p. 85.

[35] Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), p. 72; Atkins, pp. 157-162; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, IX, 720, Olney to deLome, April 4, 1896, For. Rels., 1897, 540-544.

[36] Millis, *Martial Spirit*, p. 71.

[37] U. S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., XXVIII, Part 1, 725-726; *Ibid.*, Part 2, 1976; *Ibid.*, Part 3, 2121, 2211, 2250, 2257, 2589-2592, 2350; *Ibid.*, Part 4, 3584, 3627-3628.

[38] George W. Auxier, "The Cuban Question As Reflected in the Editorial Columns of Middle Western Newspapers, 1895-1898" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Ohio State University, 1938), p. 158.

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[45] Auxier, "Cuban Question," p. 161; Wisan, *Cuban Crisis*, p. 280.

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[47] "The So-Called Cuban Reforms," *Public Opinion*, February 11, 1897, XXII, No. 670; Wisan, p. 363; Ernest R. May, *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America As a Great Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 111.

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[50] U. S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 55th Cong. 2nd Sess., 1898, XXX, Part 3, 2605; Wisan, *Cuban Crisis*, p. 410.

[51] Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 173, 181; Herman H. Kohlsaat, *From McKinley to Harding* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), p. 67", Lawrence Shaw Mayo (ed.), *America of Yesterday As Reflected in the Journals of John Davis Long* (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1923), p. 165; LaFeber, *New Empire*, p. 383. LaFeber speculates that McKinley, sometime between March 18-27, decided that war was inevitable unless Spain surrendered Cuba. For the message to Congress see Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, X, 150.